## A Study on Multi－Agent Systems for Stable Matching

| メタデータ | 言語：eng |
| :---: | :--- |
|  | 出版者： |
|  | 公開日：2017－10－05 |
|  | キーワード（Ja）： |
|  | キーワード（En）： |
|  | 作成者： |
|  | メールアドレス： |
|  | 所属： |
| URL | http：／／hdl．handle．net／2297／43854 |

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## Abstract For Dissertation

# A Study on Multi-Agent Systems for Stable Matching 



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## 1 Motivation and Objectives

The stable marriage problem (SMP) is a combinatorial optimization problem of finding a stable matching between two sets, namely men and women. Each man and woman has their own set of preference lists in which they rank orderly their preferred partners. With this information, the aim of solving the matching problem is to establish a stable partnership without the blocking pairs.

The terminology of SMP was first coined in year 1962 by David Gale and Lyod Shapley in their seminal work of [1]. They introduced a sequential algorithm (as from now on we refer it as G-S algorithm) to establish matching between two bipartite sets, in consideration of matching students with their appropriate colleges, or in the marriage situation per se. The algorithm works by one side of the divides to make the proposal, while the other evaluates either to accept or reject the said proposal. The proposing iteration continues as long as there exists proposer which has yet to be matched with his/her stable partners.

The G-S algorithm works flawlessly to attain stable matching between these two sets without the blocking pairs. However, it only uses partial information from the preference lists. Therefore, there are possibilities that other matching might yield to better matching results suppose full information is used. Moreover, the G$S$ algorithm favors proposer than the receiver. Hence, the final matching attained by the G-S algorithm will be optimal to the men (if they are the proposer) over the women. These phenomena is commonly known as the men-optimal, womenpessimal situation.

The way this algorithm works in sequential manner limits the usage of all the information available in the preference lists. Therefore, in this dissertation we aim to emulate the strategies given by the G-S algorithm, but to introduce dynamical approach in attaining stable matching between the bipartite sets. In the following, we state the main objectives which motivate us in our investigation of the stable marriage problem.

The objectives of this work are as follows:

- To investigate the potential of treating a discrete optimization problem through solving the sets of differential equations in the multi-agents formulation.
- To identify and formulate suitable cost function that best interpret the preference lists of both men and women.
- To attain dynamically stable matching between men and women.


## 2 Stability Theory

Consider the autonomous system of

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}=f(x(t)) \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f: D \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{n}$ is locally Lipschitz map from domain $D \subset \mathbb{R}^{n}$ into $\mathbb{R}^{n}$. The system (1) is said to be continuous and smooth, since the right hand side is continuous.

On the other hand, let the differential equation with discontinuous right hand side be represented by a differential inclusion

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x} \in^{a . e .} K\{f(x, t)\} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $K\{f(x, t)\}$ is the Filippov's differential inclusion and a.e. is the abbreviation for "almost everywhere".
Definition 1 (Filippov solution [2, 3]). A vector function $x(\cdot)$ is called a solution of (2) on $\left[t_{0}, t_{1}\right]$ if $x(\cdot)$ is absolutely continuous on $\left[t_{0}, t_{1}\right]$ and for almost all $t \in\left[t_{0}, t_{1}\right]$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x} \in K\{f(x, t)\} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
K\{f(x, t)\}=\bigcap_{\delta>0} \bigcap_{\mu(D)=0} \overline{\operatorname{co}} f(B(x, \delta)-D, t) \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\overline{\text { co }}$ means the closed convex hull; $B(x, \delta)$ is a closed $\delta$ neighborhood of $x$; $D$ is an arbitrary set in $R^{n} ; \mu$ is $n$ dimensional Lebesgue measure. Hence, $\cap_{\mu(N)=0}$ means the intersection over all sets $D$ of Lebesgue measure zero.

### 2.1 Lyapunov Stability

To investigate the stability of a given dynamical system, we may analyze the stability of the solutions of its differential equations near to a point of equilibrium. Hence, by ensuring that the stability conditions are satisfied, then we can conclude about the behavior of those system at this point. The following lemmas provide us with essential tools in analyzing the stability of the dynamical system near its equilibrium points.
Lemma 1 (Lyapunov's second method for stability). Assume that the system (1) has an equilibrium point at $x=x_{0}$. Then, the system is asymptotically stable in the sense of Lyapunov if and only if, there exist a Lyapunov function $V(x): \mathbb{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that

- $V(x)>0$ for all $x \neq x_{0}$ and $V\left(x_{0}\right)=0$,
- $\dot{V}(x)<0$ for all $x \neq x_{0}$ and $\dot{V}\left(x_{0}\right)=0$.

Suppose the right-hand-side of (1) is non-smooth (i.e., equation (2)), then the following lemma provides the generalized form of Lemma 1 to discuss the stability of the non-smooth dynamic.

Lemma 2 (Generalized Lyapunov Theorem). Given that (2) is discontinuous on the right-hand-side, and has an equilibrium point $x=x_{0}$. Then, if there exists

- a $V: \mathbb{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, V\left(x_{0}\right)=0, V(x)>0, \forall x \neq 0$, such that $V(x(t))$ is absolutely continuous on $[t, \infty)$,
- with $\frac{d}{d t}[V(x(t))]<-\epsilon<0$ a.e. on $\left\{t \mid x(t) \neq x_{0}\right\}$,
then $x$ converge to $x_{0}$ in finite time. Thus, the system (2) is generally asymptotically stable in the sense of Lyapunov.
Proof. See Theorem 2 in [3] for the complete proof.


## 3 Problem Formulation

### 3.1 Gale and Shapley Algorithm

We assume that there exists sets of men $\mathcal{M}:=\left\{m_{1}, m_{2}, \ldots, m_{P}\right\}$, and women $\mathcal{W}:=$ $\left\{w_{1}, w_{2}, \ldots, w_{P}\right\}$ with $P$ is the number of pairs. Each of the individuals in these two sets rank orderly their preferred partners in the preference lists. Let us denote the man $m$ is the current man proposing to the woman $w$ in his preference list. Also, if the proposed woman $w$ is already engaged, we denote her current partner as $\bar{m}$. We denote $\bar{w}$ as the next-woman to be proposed from of the man $m$ 's preference list. The procedure of the G-S algorithm [1] is presented in Algorithm 1.

```
Algorithm 1 Gale \& Shapley Algorithm (Men-proposer)
    procedure \(\operatorname{StableMatching}(m, w)\)
        Initialize all men and women to be free
        while \(\exists\) free \(m\) do
            \(w=m\) 's highest ranked woman to whom he has not yet proposed
            if \(w\) is free then
                    \(m=p_{M}(w) \& w=p_{M}(m)\)
                    \((m, w) \rightarrow M \quad \triangleright m, w\) become partner
            else if \(w\) is already engaged with \(\bar{m}\) then
                if \(m\) precedes \(\bar{m}\) in \(w\) 's preference list then
                    \(w=p_{M}(m)\)
                    \((m, w) \rightarrow M \quad \triangleright w\) choose new partner
                    \(\bar{m}\) becomes free
                    else
                    \(w=p_{M}(\bar{m})\) remain engaged
                    \((\bar{m}, w) \rightarrow M \quad \triangleright(\bar{m}, w)\) remain partner
                    \(m\) proposes to \(\bar{w}\) in his preference list
            end if
            end if
        end while
        Final matching is established.
    end procedure
```

This algorithm is guaranteed to terminate at $O(P \log P)$ iterations[4], and upon termination, stable pairs $M$ will be established. The stable pairs established in $M$ is said to be Men-Optimal, Women-Pessimal since the men are the first proposing to the women. The results will be the opposite if women is the first party to propose [1, 5].

Notice that G-S algorithm utilizes the sequential steps of optimizing in seeking for the stable pairs between the bipartite sets. In the following chapters, we attempt to address the same optimization problem as before, but utilize the multi-agent system to achieve the objective.

### 3.2 Agents Dynamics

We consider $N$ agents moving in an $n$ dimensional Euclidean space. Each of the agents is described by a single integrator as

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{i}=u_{i}, \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $x_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$ is the position vector of agent $i$ and $u_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$ is the (velocity) control input to be designed. To represent $N$ agents, the total state and control vectors are defined as

$$
x=\left[\begin{array}{c}
x_{1}  \tag{6}\\
\vdots \\
x_{N}
\end{array}\right] \in \mathbb{R}^{n N} \text { and } u=\left[\begin{array}{c}
u_{1} \\
\vdots \\
u_{N}
\end{array}\right] \in \mathbb{R}^{n N},
$$

respectively. We further rewrite the total system dynamic in the form

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}=u . \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

The group center that is the virtual center state can be obtained by considering the average of all positions as

$$
\begin{equation*}
x_{c}=\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{i} . \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

It is also assumed that the desired state trajectory $x_{d} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$ for the group center $x_{c}$ can be achieved by $u_{d} \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$, that is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\dot{x}_{d}=u_{d} . \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

### 3.3 Dynamical Stable Marriage Problem

In this section, we introduce the the terminology of the dynamical stable marriage problem. For the case of the dynamical stable marriage problem, we aim to find the optimum stable matching between the bipartite sets by using the dynamic of the multi-agent systems.

We consider a group of agents $I=\{1,2, \ldots, N\}$ and the corresponding positions $\mathcal{X}=\left\{x_{1}, x_{2} \ldots, x_{N}\right\}$, where $x_{i}$ is defined in (5). We assume that $\mathcal{I}=\mathcal{M} \cup \mathcal{W}$ and $\mathcal{M} \cap \mathcal{W}=\emptyset$. Furthermore, we assume that $P$ satisfies $N=2 P$. In addition, let the odd numbering agents belong to the men set and the even numbering agents belong to the women set, respectively. That is,

$$
\begin{align*}
& i \in \mathcal{M} \leftrightarrow i \in I_{M}:=\{1,3, \ldots, N-1\} \\
& i \in \mathcal{W} \leftrightarrow i \in I_{W}:=\{2,4, \ldots, N\} . \tag{10}
\end{align*}
$$

The following definition provides the physical interpretation of the dynamical stable matching.

Definition 2 (Dynamical Stable Matching). For the agent $x_{i}$, we define an index set denoting opposite gender and same gender as follows.

$$
\mathcal{J}_{i}=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}
I_{W} & \text { if } i \in \mathcal{M}  \tag{11}\\
I_{M} & \text { if } i \in \mathcal{W},
\end{array} \quad \mathcal{K}_{i}= \begin{cases}I_{M} & \text { if } i \in \mathcal{M} \\
I_{W} & \text { if } i \in \mathcal{W}\end{cases}\right.
$$

The agents $i \in \mathcal{I}$ are said to dynamically achieve stable matching if
(a) for the stable partner $j^{*} \in \mathcal{J}_{i}$ of $i$, (i.e., $j^{*}:=p_{M}(i) \mapsto\left(i, j^{*}\right) \in M$ ), then $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty}\left\|x_{j^{*}}(t)-x_{i}(t)\right\|=0$.
(b) for $k \in \mathcal{K}_{i}$ there exists $t_{0}>0$ such that $\left\|x_{k}(t)-x_{i}(t)\right\| \geq d$ for all $t>t_{0}$.
(c) the center trajectory $x_{c}$ satisfies $\lim _{t \rightarrow \infty}\left\|x_{c}(t)-x_{d}(t)\right\|=0$, for the desired trajectory $x_{d}$.
To achieve the dynamical stable matching, we use the weighted degree $w_{i j}$ defined as follows:

Definition 3 (Weighted Degree). The weighted degree $w_{i j}$ is defined by using the preference rank $p_{i j}$ as

$$
w_{i j}=\left\{\begin{array}{cc}
\frac{2}{\left|\mathcal{J}_{i}\right|\left(\left|\mathcal{J}_{i}\right|+1\right)}\left(\left|\mathcal{J}_{i}\right|-p_{i j}+1\right) & \text { if } j \in \mathcal{J}_{i}  \tag{12}\\
0 & \text { otherwise }
\end{array}\right.
$$

where $\left|\mathcal{J}_{i}\right|$ is the cardinality of $\mathcal{J}_{i}$.

### 3.4 Lyapunov Function Minimization

In designing the suitable control law for the dynamical stable matching, we utilize all information available in the preference list. We design a Lyapunov function to be minimized as

$$
\begin{equation*}
V(x)=V_{T}(x)+V_{c}(x), \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $V_{T}(x)>0: \mathbb{R}^{n N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $V_{c}(x)>0: \mathbb{R}^{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ are defined to use a multiplier constant $v_{i k}>0 \in \mathbb{R}$ and the weighted degree $w_{i j}$ as

$$
\begin{align*}
V_{T}(x) & =\sum_{i=1}^{N} V_{i}(x),  \tag{14}\\
V_{i}(x) & =\exp \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_{i}} w_{i j}\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\|+\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{i}} v_{i k}\left(d-\left\|x_{k}-x_{i}\right\|\right)^{2}-1,  \tag{15}\\
V_{c}(x) & =\frac{1}{2}\left\|x_{c}-x_{d}\right\|^{2} . \tag{16}
\end{align*}
$$

The Lyapunov candidate $V_{T}$ is designed to take (a) and (b) in Def. 2 into consideration. Minimizing $V_{T}$ implies to solve an optimization problem:

$$
\begin{array}{lc}
\text { minimize } & \exp \sum_{j \in \mathcal{F}_{i}} w_{i j}\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\| \\
\text { subject to } & \left\|x_{k}-x_{i}\right\| \geq d, \forall k \in \mathcal{K}_{i}, i=1,2, \ldots, N . \tag{17}
\end{array}
$$

Meanwhile, the Lyapunov candidate $V_{c}$ is designed as the energy dissipation function corresponding to the $x_{c}$ and $x_{d}$ to take (c) into consideration in Def. 2. The weight $w_{i j}$ in (17) is defined in Def. 3.

Problem 1. For the dynamic of agent $i$ in (5) and to use the weighted degree (12) obtained from the preferences list of men and women, design the appropriate control action $u_{i}$ such that the Lyapunov function (13) is minimized.

## 4 Main Results

### 4.1 Centralized Control

The following theorem provide the suitable control law to attain dynamical stable matching.

Theorem 1. (Fixed network stable matching theorem) For fixed network agents, starting from $\Omega=\{x: V(x) \leq \gamma\}$, the dynamical stable matching is achieved under the state feedback control

$$
\begin{align*}
& u_{i}=u_{i}^{S M}+u_{i}^{c}  \tag{18}\\
& u_{i}^{S M}=u_{i}^{a}+u_{i}^{r},  \tag{19}\\
& u_{i}^{c}=-k^{c}\left(x_{i}-x_{d}\right)+u_{d}, \tag{20}
\end{align*}
$$

where $u_{i}^{a}$ is the attraction of agent $i$ with $j \in \mathcal{J}_{i}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}^{a}=\sum_{j \in \mathcal{F}_{i}}\left(a_{i} b_{i j}+a_{j} b_{j i}\right)\left(x_{j}-x_{i}\right) \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

and $u_{i}^{r}$ is the repulsion between agent $i$ with $k \in \mathcal{K}_{i}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}^{r}=\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{i}}\left(c_{i k}+c_{k i}\right)\left(x_{k}-x_{i}\right), \tag{22}
\end{equation*}
$$

and $k^{c}>0$ is an appropriate control gain and

$$
\begin{align*}
a_{i} & =\exp \sum_{j^{\prime} \in \mathcal{I}_{i}} w_{i j^{\prime}}\left\|x_{j^{\prime}}-x_{i}\right\|  \tag{23}\\
b_{i j} & =\frac{w_{i j}}{\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\|}  \tag{24}\\
c_{i k} & =2 v_{i k}\left(1-\frac{d}{\left\|x_{k}-x_{i}\right\|}\right) . \tag{25}
\end{align*}
$$

### 4.2 Decentralized Control

The proposed control law (19) for each agent $i$ presented in Section 4.1 utilizes the information from all agents. Due to the excess information, the calculated control action tends to be very large. Hence, to overcome this problem we allow each agent $i$ to communicate only with its neighboring agents. As all agents tend to follow the desired trajectory to achieve condition (c) in Def. 2, there will be more agents within $i$ 's sensing range, thus permitting for wider selection of agents to be matched with.

Definition 4 (Neighboring Agents). Let $R_{g}$ be the distance sensing range of agent $i$. Agent $j$ is called a neighbor of agent $i$ if it belongs to the set

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathcal{N}_{i}=\left\{j \in \mathcal{I} \mid r_{i j}=\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\| \leq R_{g}\right\} . \tag{26}
\end{equation*}
$$

Due to limited communication between agents, we propose the decentralized control of the same form as (18) given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{i}=u_{i_{N}}^{S M}+u_{i}^{c} \tag{27}
\end{equation*}
$$

and in the vector form as

$$
\begin{equation*}
u=u_{\mathcal{N}}^{S M}+u^{c} \tag{28}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $u_{\mathcal{N}}^{S M}$ is denoted in (29) and $u^{c}=-\left(I_{N} \otimes \mathbf{k}^{c}\right)\left(x-\mathbf{1}_{N} \otimes x_{d}\right)+\mathbf{1}_{N} \otimes u_{d}$. The control law $u_{i_{N}}^{S M}$ in (27) is due to SMP and has the same form as (19), but with different control gains depending on the communication topology. In the vector form, it is recurrently defined as

$$
\begin{equation*}
u_{\mathcal{N}}^{S M}=-\left(L^{\mathcal{N}} \otimes I_{n}\right) x \tag{29}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $L^{\mathcal{N}}=L_{\mathcal{N}}^{a}+L_{\mathcal{N}}^{r}$ with

$$
\begin{aligned}
& L_{\mathcal{N}}^{a}:=\left(l_{i j}^{a, \mathcal{N}}\right)_{N \times N}=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
\sum_{j^{\prime} \in \mathcal{J}}\left(\mathcal{N}_{i}\left(a_{i}^{\mathcal{N}} b_{i j^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{N}}+a_{j^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{N}} b_{j^{\prime}{ }^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{N}}\right)\right. & \text { if } j=i \\
-\left(a_{i}^{\mathcal{N}} b_{i j}^{\mathcal{N}}+a_{j}^{\mathcal{N}} b_{j i}^{\mathcal{N}}\right) & \text { if } j \neq i, j \in \mathcal{J}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i} \\
0 & \text { otherwise, },
\end{array}\right. \\
& L_{\mathcal{N}}^{r}:=\left(l_{i j}^{, \mathcal{N}}\right)_{N \times N}=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
\sum_{k^{\prime} \in \mathcal{K}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}}\left(c_{i k^{\prime}}^{\mathcal{N}}+c_{k^{\prime} i}^{\mathcal{N}}\right) & \text { if } k=i, \\
-\left(c_{i k}^{\mathcal{N}}+c_{k i}^{\mathcal{N}}\right) & \text { if } k \neq i, k \in \mathcal{K}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i} \\
0 & \text { otherwise. }
\end{array}\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

The variables $a_{i}^{\mathcal{N}}, b_{i j}^{\mathcal{N}}$ and $c_{i k}^{\mathcal{N}}$ of each agent $i$ take the form of equation (23) but only their neighboring agents are taken into accounts. Here, we redefine (23) as

$$
\begin{align*}
& a_{i}^{\mathcal{N}}=\exp \left(\sum_{j^{\prime} \in \mathcal{\mathcal { T } _ { i } \cap N _ { i }}} w_{i j^{\prime}}\left\|x_{j^{\prime}}-x_{i}\right\|\right) \\
& b_{i j}^{\mathcal{N}}=\frac{w_{i j}}{\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\|}  \tag{30}\\
& c_{i k}^{\mathcal{N}}=2 v_{i k}\left(1-\frac{d}{\left\|x_{k}-x_{i}\right\|}\right) .
\end{align*}
$$

### 4.3 Discontinuous Dynamic

Due to the selection of control law (29), the total control dynamic (7) has discontinuous right-hand-side, hence it takes the differential form of (3). Based on Def. 1 and using (28) where $f(x, t)=u=u_{\mathcal{N}}^{S M}+u^{c}$, the differential inclusion defined in (4) for


Figure 1: Agents trajectories in matching with their stable partners when we use the centralized control (18).
the discontinuous differential equation of (3) can be calculated using the calculus in [3]. Hence, the total dynamic is obtained as

$$
\begin{align*}
\dot{x} \in K\{f(x, t)\} & =K\{u\} \\
& =K\left\{u^{S M}\right\}+K\left\{u^{c}\right\} \\
& =\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
u_{\mathcal{N}}^{S M}+u^{c} & \text { if } \bar{\exists} \\
u^{c} & \text { otherwise },
\end{array}\right. \tag{31}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\bar{\exists} \triangleq\left\{\forall i, \exists j \in \mathcal{J}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}, \exists k \in \mathcal{K}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}\right\}$.

### 4.3.1 Nonsmooth Stability Analysis

In similar form to (13), we use a suitable Lyapunov function candidate for the nonsmooth system as

$$
\begin{equation*}
V(x)=V_{T}(x)+V_{c}(x) \tag{32}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
V_{T}(x)=\sum_{i=1}^{N} V_{i}(x) \tag{33}
\end{equation*}
$$

and $V_{c}(x)$ is defined in (16), respectively. However, slight modification in $V_{i}$ is needed so that $\mathcal{J}_{i}$ is divided into two groups: neighbor $\mathcal{J}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}$ and not neighbor $\mathcal{J}_{i} \backslash \mathcal{N}_{i}$, and $\mathcal{K}_{i}$ into $\mathcal{K}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}$ and $\mathcal{K}_{i} \backslash \mathcal{N}_{i}$, as well. That is,

$$
\begin{aligned}
V_{i}(x)= & \exp \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}} w_{i j}\left\|x_{j}-x_{i}\right\|\right)+\exp \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_{i} \backslash \mathcal{N}_{i}} w_{i j} R\right) \\
& +\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{i} \cap \mathcal{N}_{i}} v_{i k}\left(d-\left\|x_{k}-x_{i}\right\|\right)^{2}+\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{i} \backslash \mathcal{N}_{i}} v_{i k}(d-R)^{2}-1
\end{aligned}
$$

where $V_{i}(\cdot) \in C^{0}$ corresponds to the local Lyapunov function of agent $i$.
To achieve dynamical stable matching between agents with time-varying communication topology, we propose the following theorem:


Figure 2: Agents trajectories in matching with their stable partners when we use the decentralized control (27).

Theorem 2. (Time-varying network stable matching theorem) For time-varying network agents, starting from $\Omega=\{x: V(x) \leq \gamma\}$, the dynamic stable matching between agents as defined in Def. 2 is generally asymptotically stable under the state feedback control $u_{i}$ (27) with appropriate control gain $k^{c}$.

## 5 Numerical Example

We consider a MAS consists of 12 agents (which constitute 6 stable pairs) in such they can be segregated into men and women's sets. We denote the odd-numbering agents as belonging to the men set and the even-numbering agents are assigned to the opposite gender. Each of these agents ranks orderly their preferred partners as listed in Table 1. We assume that the individual agent has access to the information on the preference list of the other agents. We consider the movement of agents in the Euclidean space such that $n=2$.

The positions of all agents at $t=0$ were randomly initialized within [ $-20 \mathrm{~m}, 20 \mathrm{~m}$ ] in both x -y coordinates. The desired trajectory dynamic was chosen as straight line given by $x_{d}(t)=[5 t, 0]^{T}$. Meanwhile, the desired distance separation between stable pairs was set as $d=5 \mathrm{~m}$. The state feedback control gain and the multiplier constant were chosen as $k_{c}=2$ and $v_{i}=10$, respectively.

We first investigate the overall system's behavior due to the centralized control law (18). Figure 1 shows the agents' trajectories and their final positions, respectively. It can be seen that formation center converged to the desired trajectory which yield to the final matching of $M=\left\{m_{1} w_{5}, m_{2} w_{2}, m_{3} w_{3}, m_{4} w_{6}, m_{5} w_{1}, m_{6} w_{4}\right\}$ satisfying all conditions in Def. 2.

Next, we tested the decentralized control law (27) to achieve the stable matching in the multi-agent systems. In contrast to the centralized control structure, each of the agents calculate its control action based on the information obtained from the other agents which are within its sensing range. In this case, we choose the sensing range of the agent $i$ as $R=10 \mathrm{~m}$. Figure 2 shows the agent trajectories and their final positions when we use the decentralized control law (27). The final matching obtained by this control action is $M=\left\{m_{1} w_{6}, m_{2} w_{1}, m_{3} w_{5}, m_{4} w_{4}, m_{5} w_{3}\right.$,
$\left.m_{6} w_{2}\right\}$.

## 6 Conclusion

Motivated by the Gale \& Shapley seminal work, we investigated the potential of acquainting the SMP theory into MAS. Two control algorithms have been presented: the centralized and decentralized control structures. Our results indicated that the total system is asymptotically stable in the sense of Lyapunov, but the final matching exhibited a number of blocking pairs. Hence, the final matching is unstable in terms of SMP stability theory.

## A Example of Preference Lists

Table 1: Example of Men and Women Preference Lists for 6 pairs SMP

Men's List

|  | $1^{\text {st }}$ | $2^{\text {nd }}$ | $3^{\text {rd }}$ | $4^{\text {th }}$ | $5^{\text {th }}$ | $6^{\text {th }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}$ | $w_{3}$ | $w_{6}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{1}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{4}$ |
| $m_{2}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{1}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{6}$ | $w_{3}$ | $w_{4}$ |
| $m_{3}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{3}$ | $w_{1}$ | $w_{6}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{4}$ |
| $m_{4}$ | $w_{1}$ | $w_{3}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{4}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{6}$ |
| $m_{5}$ | $w_{4}$ | $w_{6}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{3}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{1}$ |
| $m_{6}$ | $w_{1}$ | $w_{6}$ | $w_{4}$ | $w_{2}$ | $w_{5}$ | $w_{3}$ |

Women's List

|  | $1^{\text {st }}$ | $2^{\text {nd }}$ | $3^{r d}$ | $4^{\text {th }}$ | $5^{\text {th }}$ | $6^{\text {th }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $w_{1}$ | $m_{2}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{1}$ | $m_{4}$ | $m_{6}$ |
| $w_{2}$ | $m_{6}$ | $m_{4}$ | $m_{2}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{1}$ |
| $w_{3}$ | $m_{2}$ | $m_{4}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{6}$ | $m_{1}$ |
| $w_{4}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{4}$ | $m_{1}$ | $m_{6}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{2}$ |
| $w_{5}$ | $m_{6}$ | $m_{1}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{2}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{4}$ |
| $w_{6}$ | $m_{3}$ | $m_{4}$ | $m_{2}$ | $m_{6}$ | $m_{5}$ | $m_{1}$ |

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## 学位論文審査報告書（甲）

1．学位論文題目（外国語の場合は和訳を付けること。）
A Study on Multi－Agent Systems for Stable Matching
（安定マッチングのためのマルチェージェントシステムに関する研究）
2．論文提出者（1）所 属 電子情報科学 専攻
（2）氏 年 名 名 Mohd Syakirin bin Ramli
3．審査結果の要旨（ $600 \sim 650$ 字）
当該学位論文に関し，平成 27 年 8 月 3 日に第 1 回学位論文審查委員会を開催した．．．．同日に口頭発表を害施し，その後に第2回審查委員会を開催した。慎重審議の結果，以下の通り判定した。 なお口頭発表における質疑を最終試験に代えるものとした。
…本論文は，マルチェージェントシステムの安定マッチング形成に関する研究成果をま とめたものである。二部グラフの安定な一対一マッチングを求める問題は，，安定結婚問題として知られ，その解を得るGale－Shapleyアルゴリズムは庭く知られている。．．．．本論文では，二次元空間内を移勲できる複数の移動体の間で安定マッチングを形成するため の制御則を提案している。従来のアルゴリズムではペアを形成するためには離散的なス テップを繰り返すが，提案法では連続的に二次元空間内を移動して最適なパートナーを探すことができる方法となっている。この提案手法に従うマルチェージェントシステム は安定結婚問題の動的モデルとも解釈できる。
…以上の研究成果は，マルチェージェントシステムの制御問題での新しい知見を与える． と共に，ゲーム理論や社会制度設計などへの展開に寄与するとも考えられる。従って，．．．．本論文は博士（工学）に値すると判定した。
4．審査結果（1）判 定（いずれかに○印）合 格 •不合格
（2）授与学位 博 士（工 学）

