

# The Turnover of Regime and LDP Keiretsu Realignments

メタデータ	言語: eng 出版者: 公開日: 2017-10-03 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	<a href="http://hdl.handle.net/2297/27680">http://hdl.handle.net/2297/27680</a>

# The Turnover of Regime and LDP *Keiretsu* Realignment

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## Introduction

In 1994 Japan reformed its national electoral institutions. The 1994 changes eliminated Single Non-Transferable Vote in multi member district (SNTV/MMD, *Chu-Senkyoku sei*) in the House of Representatives (HR), and replaced it with a mixed-member system combining 300 Single member districts (SMDs) and 200 Proportional Representation (PR) seats (*Sho-Senkyoku Hiei-Daihyo Heiritsu sei*). Many politicians have said that by introducing SMDs changes of governments can occur easily. Further, they say, this electoral reform has fostered the shift from candidate-centered elections to party-oriented elections. Until 2009, however, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) never relinquished power and the supposed change to party-centered politics never materialized (Kobayashi, 2008).

Yet, in the 2009 general election, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, and it increased its seat count in the HR from 112 to 308. The LDP, which had essentially maintained a government for fifty-four years, was ousted from the ruling position. Why did the DPJ win? Previous research indicates that there are roughly three key reasons responsible for the DPJ's unprecedented victory in 2009.

First, was the weakening of the LDP clientelist system over the long-term. Scheiner (2006) reasons that the LDP was in power precisely because they maintained a strong clientelist system. Since the 1990 s, however, the support rate of conservative organizations (e.g. *koenkai* (candidate personal support organization), *nokyo* (Japan's agricultural cooperative association), and *chonaikai* (neighborhood

association)) slowly diminished (Tanaka, 2009). Also the “iron triangles” formed in the LDP administration were not able to make gradual adjustments to the global economy. Some researchers point out that these system fatigues helped lay the groundwork of an eventual LDP defeat (Nonaka, 2008 ; Tanaka,2009 ; Kawamura, 2010).

Second, many Japanese voters were disenchanted with the three successive LDP cabinets (Abe, Fukuda and Aso) following the Koizumi cabinet. The Koizumi cabinet maintained a high approval rating among Japanese voters. In particular, urban independents were in favor of Koizumi’s far-reaching reforms as a positive shake-up to the entrenched LDP system. However, the next cabinet headed by Abe, reversed many of the Koizumi reforms and suddenly steered LDP policy back to the pre-Koizumi era. In fact, Abe allowed some politicians who left the LDP in response to the Koizumi reforms to rejoin the party. This policy reverse was viewed positively by some LDP supporters in rural districts, but it dissatisfied many urban independents (Sugawara, 2009). In addition, several notable political problems plagued the successive governments after Koizumi’s tenure. For example, Abe’s cabinet was forced to deal with the ‘*Kieta Nenkin Mondai*’ (the disappearance of pension records), Fukuda was under constant criticism for lack of leadership, while Aso repeatedly made high profile gaffes. As such, the LDP lost the trust of many Japanese voters. As a result, the probability of the change of government increased (Tanaka, 2009).

Thirdly, the DPJ realized that the voters must be confident that their party was ready to assume government leadership (Ushiro, 2009). As such, the DPJ dramatically changed their campaign strategy when Ichiro Ozawa took office as the party head. Some foreign political scientists point out that because Japan’s opposition parties continually embarked on negative, anti-clientelist elections campaigns against the LDP (Johnson, 2000 ; Scheiner, 2006 ; Weiner, 2008).

However, Ozawa, who was former chief secretary of the LDP, noticed that most of people did not vote for the opposition party that only criticized the LDP<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, Ozawa adopted new tactics to oppose the LDP. One was to campaign deeply into electoral districts more positively, under the mission name of '*Kawakami-Senryaku*'. Another was to engage special interest groups who were dissatisfied with recent LDP policies (e.g. farmer's groups, construction business groups, and anti-Koizumi reform groups). These two tactics had been, in fact, LDP techniques. Another strategy was prohibiting of the jumping on the bandwagon with the LDP in gubernatorial and mayoral elections (Kawamura, 2008). Ozawa's DPJ appealed to voters by arguing that DPJ had the ability to take charge of government through these campaign tactics. Meanwhile, the DPJ made substantial efforts to reinforce their substructure (Tsutumi and Mori, 2008). Ozawa's campaign management techniques were successful in the 2007 HC (House of Councilors) election and culminated in the DPJ finally forming a government following the 2009 general election with the DPJ's Hatoyama taking the reins as Prime Minister.

This paper focuses on the LDP *keiretsu* realignments which previous studies have not examined thoroughly (Park, 2000 ; Taniguchi, 2004). The *keiretsu* is an electoral-alliance formed by LDP Diet members and some conservative local councilors in each electoral-district. The 1994 electoral reform forced this interdependence relationship to dramatically change. The LDP *keiretsu* realignments are one of the most important dynamics that fostered the recent change of government. It is my contention that this cooperative system in each district temporarily failed during the last general election. Why did the reshuffle happen? In the SNTV/MMD era, the inter-party, multiple-candidate rivalry competition worried most LDP Diet members and conservative local councilors. By electoral reform (i.e. SMDs introduction), the LDP Diet member did not have to compete with the same

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1 See, for example, *The Daily Yomiuri* of April 1, 2010.

LDP candidate<sup>2</sup>. However, many conservative local councilors must be still reelected by themselves because the local electoral system did not change. As such, this gap influenced this election results indirectly.

**Ishikawa Districts 1**

Name	Sex	Age	Party	Incumbent/ Newface	Number of Votes	
Ken Okuda	Male	50	DPJ	Incumbent (PR)	125,667	SMD winner
Hiroshi Hase	Male	48	LDP	Incumbent	117,168	'zombie' winner by PR
Masayuki Sato	Male	41	JCP	New face	10,982	
Jun'ichi Matsubayashi	Male	45	HRP	New face	1,738	

**Ishikawa Districts 2**

Name	Sex	Age	Party	Incumbent/ Newface	Number of Votes	
<u>Yoshino Mori</u>	Male	72	LDP	Incumbent	123,490	SMD winner
Mieko Tanaka	Female	33	DPJ	New face	119,021	'zombie' winner by PR
Satoshi Miyamoto	Male	49	HRP	New face	3,467	

**Ishikawa Districts 3**

Name	Sex	Age	Party	Incumbent/ Newface	Number of Votes	
Kazuya Kondo	Male	35	DPJ	New face	100,832	SMD winner
Shigeo Kitamura	Male	63	LDP	Incumbent	98,599	'zombie' winner by PR
Yoshikazu Higashi	Male	54	HRP	New face	2,654	

\* : JCP (Japan Communist Party)

\*\* : HRP(Happiness Realization Party, Kofuku -Jitsugen To)

Source: *Hokuriku Chunichi Shimbun*

Table 1 2009 General Election Results (Ishikawa Districts only)

One representative case is the electoral districts in Ishikawa (Ishikawa Prefecture). In 2009, Ishikawa District 2 elected former Prime Minister Mori, but

2 After the electoral reform, the candidate selection became more important (Christensen, 1998 ; Park, 2000 ; Taniguchi, 2008).

only by a narrow margin (Table 1). Generally speaking, in Japan, the political machine of a former Prime Minister is very strong because it has substantial political resources (e.g. 3-*bans*: *jiban* (support base), *kanban* (name recognition), and *kaban* (financial support)) which increases the chances of winning or keeping a seat. In addition, in Ishikawa districts most non-LDP parties' candidates cannot be elected as it is called '*Jimin Ohkoku* (a kingdom of the LDP)'. Why was a supposed easy campaign an uphill battle? By analyzing this case, I will focus on the importance of the influence that the LDP *keiretsu* realignments had in ushering in a change of government.

I think that the LDP *keiretsu* realignment is a long-term factor in the turnover of governments. Probably my viewpoint is near to Scheiner's, however I put more emphasis on the short-term factor, called the 'Ozawa electoral campaign'. It is my standpoint that the declining LDP would have won in many rural districts had it not been for Ozawa's electoral campaign instructions.

## **LDP *Keiretsu* Realignment after 1994 Electoral Reform**

### ***Relationship between Koenkai and Keiretsu***

It is well-known that most Japanese politicians have the *koenkai* as a candidate's personal support organization. This private association is a mass-membership political machine, not an organization of the party, and its function is to promote the 'personal vote' (Kabashima and Yamada 1995 ; Kohno 1997 ; Hrebener, 2000 ; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2004). Many Japanese politicians maintain it and enlarge it for re-election. The *koenkai*, especially, is one of the organizations symbolizing mobilization in the LDP's electoral campaign. In the SNTV/MMD era, there was hardly a LDP Diet member who could depend on the party to expand his private club aggressively (Tani, 1986 ; Inoue, 1992 ; Curtis, 1999 ; Yamada, 2007).

In addition, there are at least two limits as to what one can do solely to

expand their organization. One is geographical, because the main work place of the Diet member is in Tokyo, the capital of Japan, and the second limit is financial - politicians must prepare a lot of political funds if they attempt to expand their own organization. Therefore, Diet members must put a lot of money into traveling expenses to shuttle between Tokyo and their electoral district, not to mention the personnel expenses of the staff stationed in their electoral district. Because of this there is an incentive for LDP Diet members to ask local politicians for their cooperation. By building these collaborative relationships, Diet members can cut their power base expansion costs and secure the solid votes of local politicians who are active on a daily basis in their local electoral districts<sup>3</sup>.

What is the reason that local politicians are strengthened by personal cooperation with LDP HR members? The incentive is that if the local politician participates in the *keiretsu* there are certain rewards for his cooperation. One, of course, is that he can increase his chances of realizing his own campaign pledges. Also, because the *keiretsu* holds sway amongst other politicians it can urge governors, mayors and central bureaucrats to promote a politician's opinions and policies. With this type of structural support not only do a politician's reelection chances increase but his influence is also strengthened (Scheiner 2006 ; Krauss and Pekkanen 2008).

Incidentally, in most of Japanese local councilor elections, candidates do not maintain affiliation to any one party<sup>4</sup>. Even some LDP members do not inform the

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3 In a period of old electoral system, the LDP HR Member tended give cooperation to local politicians whose election district is close by in or in the central city of his district. By doing so, not only could he build a stronger electoral campaign system, but he was able to easily prevent the expansion of his rival's organization.

4 Also LDP-backed candidates tend to keep silent about their partisanship in the most of Japanese gubernatorial and mayoral elections. Weiner (2008) points out that it is a tactic for them and the LDP to continue being the ruling party at the local level.

voters of their partisanship transparently. They have several reasons not to clarify this. One of the most important reasons is because they cannot depend on the LDP in Japan's local election system. By the local election, it is more important what *keiretsu* he belongs to than which political party he belongs to. Especially, the rural voter tends to appreciate *keiretsu* relationships more. Therefore, *keiretsu* is one of the most important political tools a local politician can wield. As such, *keiretsu* participation is very attractive to a local politician.

In this way the *keiretsu* system, in conjunction with the *koenkai* coalitions, acts like a cloud computing system (shared resources) and provides for a 'win-win' networking system between LDP Diet members and conservative local politicians.

### ***Cause of Keiretsu Realignments***

As mentioned above, one should not recognize the relationship between LDP Diet members and local politicians in each electoral district as a hierarchy of superior-inferior relationships. The strength of their ties is relative<sup>5</sup>, and they can leave this patchwork of connections at anytime<sup>6</sup> (Tani, 1986 ; Yamada, 2007).

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5 So the LDP is often called '*Jibun-to* (the party which consists of self-centered organizations)' (Tani, 1986).

6 I will give hereditary increase as an example. When a LDP representative expressed retirement (or died), what kind of action can local politicians under his *Keiretsu* take? They have multiple choices, but most of them generally tend to take 'keeping this relation' which is the lowest-risk.






Figure 1 *Keiretsu* Structure

Figure 1 simply illustrates the *keiretsu* relationship. An oval represents a Diet member's *koenkai*, while a triangle represents a local politician's *koenkai*. The overall figure expresses a *keiretsu* with multiple triangles shouldering an oval.




Figure 2 *Keiretsu* Realignments

Most of the old electoral districts were divided by 1994 reform, but local electoral systems did not change. The local councilor electoral system maintained the SNTV/MMD system. The *keiretsu* realignments were therefore inevitable. Under the SMDs voting system, there is only one LDP candidate for each electoral district. Some local politicians who cut their *keiretsu* ties had to build relations with one and only one candidate (Figure 2).

In addition, the party realignment in the 1990 s was an opportunity for the LDP *keiretsu* to realign as well (Tatebayashi, 2002 ; Saito, 2010). The reason is because some local politicians were pressed for a choice as to whether they wanted to maintain or cut relations with the LDP. In some districts where influential HR members left the LDP (e.g. Iwate, Fukushima, and Nagano), many local conservative politicians drifted to the DPJ. Today internal LDP rivalries turned into LDP - DPJ inter-party competitions<sup>7</sup>. But the majority of the conservative local politicians chose to keep relations with the LDP and transfer to other *keiretsu*. The reason is because they felt more comfortable maintaining connections with the LDP as it was the government ruling party.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the following point ; the influence of the local members in *keiretsu* is different depending on the entry time to a particular system and the size of an organization (Inoue, 1992). Local politicians who are forced into *keiretsu* changes are treated coldly by other *keiretsu* members if they are so coerced. In fact, one local politician states that in the electoral district where the competition between LDP candidates had been intense in the past, the newbie was not treated well. It seems that many old-timers in the *keiretsu* are not able to readily forget the memory of the competitive era. Also, the rate and speed at which the various electoral districts realigned was different. In the electoral districts where a

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<sup>7</sup> This shows that the DPJ Diet member has a *keiretsu* of his own. Most of them have ever belonged to the LDP.

veteran LDP member still ran, it realigned relatively late. LDP headquarters did adopt various ways to minimize dissatisfaction for *keiretsu* realignments (e.g. convincing one incumbent to shift to a safe position, the introduction of ‘Costa Rica’ Houshi<sup>8</sup>), even still, not all candidates selected could get along well<sup>9</sup>.

Because of this “cold treatment”, their allegiance to the LDP deteriorated, and latent defectors from the LDP increased. Antagonism between old *keiretsu* resulted in cracks throughout the new district branches of the LDP.

### **Case Study : Ishikawa Districts**

In the 2009 general election, former Prime Minister Mori won by a narrow margin in Ishikawa District 2. However, in Ishikawa District 1, Hiroshi Hase, who Mori supported, was defeated by Ken Okuda - son of Mori’s ex-rival, Keiwa Okuda. Similarly, Shigeo Kitamura whom he also supported lost in Ishikawa District 3. Hase and Kitamura were elected in PR as the so-called ‘zombie’ winners. Despite the two victories, DPJ local organization in Ishikawa was poor and there were few DPJ-backed local councilors. Nevertheless, Mori was forced into a hard fight. Why?

#### ***NFP Ishikawa, Former Okuda Koenkai***

More than ten years have passed since the New Frontier Party (NFP) was dissolved nationally, however, within the Ishikawa Prefectural Council, one political group maintained the initials ‘NFP’. One of the important factors which caused Mori an uphill campaign struggle was the existence of the local NFP in Ishikawa. The NFP of Ishikawa is based on the former *keiretsu* of Keiwa Okuda, one of politicians

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8 ‘Costa Rica’ Houshiki is a special rule of the candidacy of SMDs and the candidacy of the PR in rotation till either is rejected in SMDs.

9 In 1990s, some rural LDP supporters who objected to candidate selection of party executives in Tokyo were lazy about national election campaigns (Christensen, 1998).

who left the LDP, in order to establish the DPJ. As stated above, the late Okuda was a Mori's rival in the old Ishikawa District 1. Their internal LDP rivalry was called 'the Mori-Oku (or Oku-Mori) War' (Hase, 2006). After the national NFP dissolution, the late Okuda became a supervisor of the DPJ, but his *keiretsu* postponed their joining the DPJ. Local councilors who belonged to the Okuda *keiretsu* continued to make their loyalty to Okuda clear, but at the same time chose to keep the DPJ at a distance. The Ishikawa NFP was established in 1998, and Keiwa Okuda died in the same year. However, his death did spell disorder for the Ishikawa NFP because the group simply threw their support behind his son, Ken Okuda. As such, Ken Okuda became his father's successor in the new Ishikawa District 1 and it was the support of the Ishikawa NFP which was instrumental in his election victory. Now, the Ishikawa NFP functions as an Okuda *keiretsu*<sup>10</sup>.

There are three major reasons why the Ishikawa NFP can keep constant power without joining the DPJ or rejoining the LDP. One is that some veteran members who possess the wherewithal to expand the *keiretsu* are in good health. Hiroshi Kanahara and Kunio Uno, who are Ishikawa prefectural councilors, fulfill their duties in this regard. Another is that the Ishikawa NFP has the experience in recruiting candidates for local chief elections (e.g. Ishikawa gubernatorial election, Kanazawa mayoral election) and has the sway to get them elected. The Ishikawa NFP keeps power by being the ruling group in this regard (Kanahara, 2004). Lastly, there are many LDP supporters who dislike Mori. Originally most of them were Okuda supporters and were not able to come to support Mori because of past grudges<sup>11</sup>. They sometimes voted for a Non-LDP candidate whom the Ishikawa NFP backed in SMDs and voted for the LDP in PR in same national election (Kawamura,

10 After the 2009 general election, the Ishikawa NFP joined the DPJ. However, they are stronger in *keiretsu* identification than in party identification.

11 In my survey, a certain LDP supporter answered "I support the LDP, but I never vote for former Prime Minister Mori. I may vote for a LDP candidate in SMDs if he retired."

2002). The Ishikawa NFP therefore, profits from this type of split-ticketing<sup>12</sup>.

### ***Keiretsu Realignment and Accumulation of Grudge in Ishikawa Districts***

Former Prime Minister Mori became a key person of *keiretsu* realignments in Ishikawa districts by Keiwa Okuda having left the LDP. In the 2000 general election, Hiroshi Hase, who Mori supported in Ishikawa District 1 was elected, and Naoki Okada, who is Mori's nephew-in-law, was elected to an Ishikawa District in the 2004 HC election.

In the 2005 general election, Mori mandated that Riki Kawara, former Director General of the Defense Agency, transfer as a PR candidate, and then supported Shigeo Kitamura, former chairman of Ishikawa prefectural council and his former secretary as a successor to Kawara. Kawara initially felt unwilling to transfer to the PR but he ultimately acquiesced because LDP headquarters promised to support his registration bill. However, Kawara supporters remained dissatisfied.

LDP incumbent Tetsuo Kutsukake was forced to retire by reason of advanced in age in the 2007 HC election, and Tomiro Yata who was former chairman of Ishikawa prefectural council became the succeeding LDP candidate. Yata had belonged to the Okuda *keiretsu*, and ran from the NFP's platform on the late Okuda's request in 1996 general election. He returned to the LDP after having lost in that general election. His candidacy in the 2007 HC election was by Mori's request. It seemed that Mori planned on the insufficiency of the NFP Ishikawa's mobilization plan by supporting Yata who had been a former Okuda *keiretsu* member. Kutsukake who hoped for the candidacy was dissatisfied with the advice to retire, but he was unable to go against the intentions of Mori, who had finally

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<sup>12</sup> In addition, Some JCP supporter sometimes voted for a candidate affiliated with NFP in SMDs (and voted for the JCP in PR). Their voting behavior is the split-ticketing and strategic voting. About the split-ticketing of the Japanese voter, see Reed and Scheiner (2003).

become an LDP executive<sup>13</sup>.

Just before the 2009 general election, two major dilemmas unfolded in the Ishikawa Districts. One was that internal LDP rivalries emerged within Mori's support base. For example, the incumbent mayor, Toru Nishimura, former chief executive of the Mori *koenkai*, lost the Komatsu mayoral election in spring 2009. The bitter atmosphere of such oppositions remained until that summer. Another is that LDP headquarters forced Riki Kawara into retirement. Because the LDP anticipated a difficult election campaign in the 2009 general election, LDP headquarters decided not to allow an elder incumbent to run in the PR as part of a rejuvenation plan. It was pressed on whether Kawara retired or ran without party support in the SMDs. Kawara finally chose retirement, and commented at the time of retirement interview, "I will not be able to support the incumbent Kitamura because I do not recognize him as my successor." Some LDP supporters of the Kawara *keiretsu* were badly shaken by his remark upsetting Kitamura's reelection strategy.




Figure 3 *Keiretsu* Realignments in Ishikawa Districts

The 2000s were a period when the new Mori *keiretsu* accumulated the grudges held by *keiretsu* unification (Figure 3).

13 Incidentally, Yata was not elected.

### *Grudge of Keiretsu Realignment and DPJ Campaign Strategy*

In the 2009 general election, DPJ, the under Ozawa's instruction, adopted a strategy to exploit the cracks within the LDP. In the Ishikawa Districts, for example, the DPJ and the Ishikawa NFP supported Kutsukake as the DPJ PR candidate in Hokushinetsu District<sup>14</sup>. The LDP was shocked with the news that Kawara shook hands with the DPJ candidate Kazuya Kondo in Ishikawa District 3. Did Kutsukake's candidacy and Kawara's handshake bring the equilateral effect in DPJ electoral campaign?

Kutsukake's candidacy was the result of his wishes and was in accord with the expectations of the DPJ (and the NFP Ishikawa). Actually, part of the building trade members union threw their support behind the DPJ because of his candidacy as an expression of 'anti-Mori' sentiments. Therefore, LDP supporters who had been Okuda *koenkai* members now supported Kutsukake and the Ishikawa NFP (as well as the DPJ). This realignment was particularly remarkable in Ishikawa District 2. In turn, the LDP allowed Nobuaki Sato, who is Kutsukake's nephew-in-law, to support campaigns in the Ishikawa Districts, in order to deny any unrest concerning his own candidacy. However, this unrest was not easily settled.

Kutsukake made his anti-Mori sentiments clear, while Kawara said nothing, when they shook hands. Was this Kawara's personal revenge? *Hokuriku Chunichi Shimbun* reported on the influence of his action<sup>15</sup>. According to this news, there were more Kondo votes in Kawara's support base than Kitamura votes. Some Kawara supporters recognized his action as his intention not to support Kitamura, and it was ultimately advantageous to the DPJ campaign.

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14 The NFP Ishikawa understanding Kutsukake hoped political comeback, advised Ozawa to let him run and to get his organized votes. Ozawa expected to give the LDP supporter confusion if things went well.

15 See *Hokuriku Chunichi Shimbun* (in Japanese) of August 31, 2009.

When I interviewed voters in Ishikawa District 2 after election, one said to me, "Because I wish to end the internal LDP rivalries from the SNTV/MMD era, I voted for DPJ candidate Tanaka in the SMDs." I expect that there were many voters like him, and his comment suggests that grudges of the *keiretsu* realignments have indeed affected voting behavior.

## Conclusion

In the 2009 general election, many LDP executives had a hard fight and some of them failed in their reelection bids in the SMDs (Table 2). For example, former Prime Minister Kaifu lost in Aichi District 9. It had been forty-six years since the last defeat of former Prime Minister. Incidentally, some of the LDP executives who lost in the SMDs were elected in the PR. Though they had many campaign resources, why did they lose? The viewpoint of this report is useful examining this puzzle.

It is generally said that 1994 political reforms promoted centralization of the LDP (Reed, 2002). The reason is because LDP headquarters held the nominations for candidates for Diet member and the campaign cash needed for each HR electoral district branch. Most of the LDP Diet members were freed from the usual intra-party competition provided they release part of their allegiance to the *keiretsu*, and took office as the chairman of each HR electoral district branch. As a result, they came to be affiliated more by the image of the LDP President than their local organization alliances<sup>16</sup> (Mori, 2005). Only Some LDP Executives, like Mori, have become key figures of the *keiretsu* realignment, and gone on to build their own kingdoms<sup>17</sup>

16 The appearance of 'Koizumi's children' may be one symbol. To support a new face by central leadership is effective to minimize the dissatisfaction by the *keiretsu* realignments if the popularity of the LDP President is high

17 It is a factor to reduce the urban LDP supporter to build such a small kingdom (Kabashima, 2004).



(including adjacent electoral districts). Such kingdoms were a huge barrier if the opposition party did not stimulate past grudges<sup>18</sup>. However, to do so was one of the most important tactics for DPJ in this election. LDP supporters were divided by these tactics, and left a large part of the LDP political machine disoriented.

Name	Position	District
Machimura, Nobutaka	Machimura Faction Leader	Hokkaido 5
Nakagawa, Shoichi	former Minister of Finance	Hokkaido 11
Takebe, Tsutomu	former LDP Chief Secretary	Hokkaido 12
Nukaga, Fukushima	Nukaga Faction Leader	Ibaraki 2
Niwa, Yuya	former Niwa Faction Leader	Ibaraki 6
Omi, Koji	former Minister of Finance	Gumma 1
Sasagawa, Takashi	Chairman of LDP Executive Council	Gumma 2
Yatsu, Yoshio	former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	Gumma 3
Yosano, Kaoru	Minister of Finance	Tokyo 1
Fukaya, Takashi	former Chairman of LDP Executive Council	Tokyo 2
Amari, Akira	Minister of State	Kanagawa 13
Ibuki, Bunmei	Ibuki Faction Leader	Kyoto 1
Yasuoka, Okiharu	former Minister of Justice	Kagoshima 1
Shimamura, Yoshinobu	former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	Tokyo 16
Horiuchi, Mitsuo	former Horiuchi Faction Leader	Yamanashi 2
Kaifu, Toshiaki	former Prime Minister	Aichi 9
Yamasaki, Taku	former LDP Vice-President	Fukuoka 2
Nakayama, Taro	former Foreign Minister	Osaka 18
Kyuma, Fumio	former Chairman of LDP Executive Council	Nagasaki 2

Source: *Asahi Shimubun*

Table 2 List of LDP Executives Who Lost in SMDs

From my viewpoint, the DPJ's victory should be understood as a 'deviating election.' This is for two reasons. One, because some LDP supporters voted for the DPJ in order to satisfy personal revenge and, second, the LDP campaign system was not completely broken. For these reasons the defeat of the DPJ in 2010 HC election

18 In other words, they were not able to change campaign style to depend on the *koenkai* (and the *Keiretsu*) (Nonaka, 2008). Results of the 2009 general election show that party-centered politics is not realized without reforming the local electoral system (Horiuchi and Natori, 2007 ; Tsuji, 2008).

can easily be understood. Prime Minister Kan apologized for the DPJ defeat by blaming it on the slip of his tongue. However, this reasoning is insufficient and superficial. A more important cause of the defeat is that their campaign downplayed the rural organizations. In other words, the DPJ lost because they abandoned Ozawa's campaign strategy, and chose a campaign strategy that attached great importance to the media and focused on independents a strategy called 'Kuchu-Sen (the aerial dogfight)' in Japanese<sup>19</sup>. The LDP local campaign network would have broken up further if Kan had continued Ozawa's campaign strategy for several more years. On the other hand, the LDP carried out thorough electoral campaigns by tightening local organizations as an emergency measure. As such, the LDP is trying to ensure that losing to the DPJ will not be inevitable due to the unrest of their campaign network<sup>20</sup>. If the DPJ returns to its former campaign style, while, in turn, the LDP local organization is not completely dismantled, it is natural that the DPJ will fail<sup>21</sup>.

By the failure of the anti-Ozawa group in 2010, maintenance of the local DPJ organizations came too late for success. However, the prospects of the LDP due to the *keiretsu* realignments became uncertain as well<sup>22</sup>.

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19 By the way, the campaign strategy of old LDP style is called 'Chijo-Sen (the ground war)' in Japanese.

20 See, for example, *Hokuriku Chunichi Shimbun* (in Japanese) of August 31, 2009.

21 See, for example, *Asahi Shimbun* (in Japanese) of July 13, 2010.

22 It is hard to forecast the *keiretsu* realignments that there are many LDP veterans in each local council.

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