

# Democratization Under Occupation: The Case of Iraq Compared with Japan

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Democratization Under Occupation: The Case of Iraq Compared with Japan  
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1. The Framework of Comparison

The occupation of Iraq by the coalition forces led by the United States was originally said to be undertaken in order to prevent Iraq from developing WMD. But, as WMD and their production facilities were not found, the occupation is now justified as an attempt at changing Iraq from a rogue state into a democratic and peaceful country. President Bush had already referred in his pre-war address to Germany and Japan as models for producing democratic allies through occupation<sup>(1)</sup>. However, there are reports (e.g., Pei & Kasper) that suggest that Germany and Japan are exceptions, as most other U.S. attempts at democratization through occupation have failed. In fact, Iraq under occupation for more than three years is now in a state of near civil war and it is difficult to claim that is becoming a stable democracy. It is still premature to conclude the occupation of Iraq is a complete failure, but its difference from the German and Japanese cases is already clear. Space doesn't allow me to discuss the Japanese case in detail, not to mention the German one, but I would like to explore the differences between Iraq and Japan and to trace their causes. In particular, I wish to find out whether the causes are national character (political, social, and cultural), or the war itself, or occupation policies and their implementation, or all of the above.

As a framework of comparison, I would like to employ Samuel P. Huntington's theses on democratization presented in his "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1991). There are many more studies on democratization<sup>(2)</sup>, but I find Huntington's comparatively newer, more comprehensive, and its framework the most appropriate to the research purpose of this study. First of all, he defines democracy as follows:

Following in the Schumpeterian tradition, this study defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision

makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. So defined, democracy involves the two dimensions — contestation and participation — that Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns. (p.7)

It is without doubt that since the occupation ended in 1952 Japan has maintained a political system that fits to this definition of democracy, but Iraq is, after formally restoring sovereignty in mid-2004, still dependent on the coalition forces for security and finding it difficult to conduct free elections with civil and political freedoms, as candidates are afraid of campaigning for fear of losing their lives.

In order for democratization to succeed, it is necessary to promptly fill the vacuum of authority when an authoritarian system collapses. According to Huntington, “This can be done by: pushing to the fore a popular, charismatic, democratically inclined leader; promptly organizing elections to provide popular legitimacy to a new government; and building international legitimacy by getting support of foreign and transnational actors.”(p.151) As a new democracy becomes consolidated and achieves a certain stability, it would have to tackle “systemic problems” such as: “overly concentrated decision making, deficient feedback, dependence on performance legitimacy,” and “stalemate, the inability to reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery, domination by vested economic interests.”(p.210) Huntington also presents “guidelines for democratizers” in dealing with authoritarian crimes (e.g., don’t indict perpetrators except the leaders and high officials) and curbing military power and promoting military professionalism.(chap.5)

Whether a new democracy succeeds in solving these problems or not depends on the following, according to Huntington:

- (1) The ability of the principal political elites to work together ... and refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate

material or political advantage.

- (2) The ability of publics to distinguish between the regime and the government or rulers. ...Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessary to anything else.(pp.259-263)

Then, when can we expect such abilities of the principal political elites and also publics? Huntington's hypotheses are:

- (1) When there is a longer and more recent experience with democracy.
- (2) If the state has a more industrialized, modern economy, the more complex society and more educated populace.
- (3) When there is an external environment supportive of democracy -- foreign governments and other actors that are democratic themselves and can help or influence other states' democratic regimes.
- (4) The prevalence of indigenous causes is likely to be more conducive to democratic consolidation than are external influences.
- (5) A consensual, less violent transition provides a better basis for consolidating democracy than do conflict and violence.
- (6) The number and nature of severe contextual problems a new democracy confronts may be one variable.
- (7) Nations may differ in their political capacities and that a people who made a success of authoritarianism will do the same with democracy.(pp.270-279)

If I may sum up Huntington's above arguments on transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the following factors seem to be important for its success --

Internal factors: whether or not political elites strongly support democracy and can cooperate with each other to solve social problems; the ordinary people have a tradition of civil society activities; and the level of social and economic development is sufficiently high.

External factors: whether or not other democratic countries can help and influence; or neighboring states give "snowballing effects" with their democratization.

Transition policies: establishment of a legitimate government through elections; and dealings with authoritarian crimes, the military, and vested economic interests, etc..

Although the cases of Iraq and Japan are different from the cases Huntington discussed in that they were forced democratization by occupying powers, I am going to compare the two with above hypotheses in mind, with additional factors of war and occupation<sup>(3)</sup>. Therefore, I will start with pre-war political, social, and economic conditions (Both Iraq and Japan had been engaged with many wars, but here the wars that led to occupation are taken up).

## 2. Pre-War Conditions

### 2-1-1 Iraqi Historical and Social Background

Baghdad prospered as the capital of the Abbasid Dynasty between the 8<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, but was later under Mongolian and then Turkish domination and was the core city of Baghdad Province. The area was occupied by the British army in 1917 and constituted, together with Mosul and Basra Provinces, a territory named Iraq which was mandated to Britain by the League of Nations in 1920. In an uprising to protest the British rule, Iraqis and British as well as Indian soldiers estimated at six thousands and five hundreds each perished (Tripp, p.44), and Turkey intervened claiming its right to own Mosul. In the following year Faisal of Mecca's Hashimi family was enthroned as King, and Iraq obtained independence in 1932.

So, Iraq was an artificial state created by Britain and the League of Nations, and its history extends to only 86 years. Besides, the original three Ottoman provinces are rather different from each other – the predominant inhabitants are Sunni Kurds in Mosul, Sunni Arabs in Baghdad, and Shiite Arabs in Basra – and it has not been easy for them to have a sense of one nation. The constitution of 1924 formalized a constitutional monarchy with King's wide-ranging power over a bi-cameral Parliament. The Upper House members were appointed by the King, the Lower House members indirectly elected, and the King appointed the Cabinet, which was however made responsible for the Lower House. Sunni

Arabs were a minority, but because Ottomans as well as the King were Sunnis, they came to dominate the government and army. The Iraqi economy was shaken by the world economic crisis in the 1930s, but with concession fees paid by the Iraqi Oil Company and oil exports from Kirkuk, the financial base of the government became solid.

After independence, the government promoted centralization through suppression of revolts by Shiite tribes, and the army came to interfere in politics. Pan-Arabism gained influence among political elites, but during World War II they split into a pro-British camp and a pro-Axis camp. In 1941 the pro-Axis camp seized power with a coup-d'Etat, but British troops occupied Iraq and supported a pro-British regime led by Regent Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Said. After the war, political parties generally enjoyed freedom and in 1954 elections opposition parties gained considerable seats of the Lower House. Then King Faisal II and Regent Abd al-Ilah ordered Nuri al-Said to lead a cabinet and dissolve the Lower House, repressing the opposition parties. Moreover, the government concluded an alliance treaty with Britain and Turkey (the Baghdad Pact of 1955) angering young Pan-Arabist officers. In 1956, Egypt obtained a major political victory over Britain and France in the Suez War, and further stirred up Pan-Arabism by announcing establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria in February 1958, triggering a military coup-d'Etat in Iraq in July, which ended the dynasty and democratic experiments (Tripp, chaps.2-4; Marr, chaps.3-4; Dawisha).

The revolutionary government led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim however didn't unify Iraq with the UAR, and tried to unify Shiites and Kurds with Sunni Arabs. Pan-Arabists were therefore angry, and so Ba'thists and allied officers staged another coup and killed Qasim in 1963. In the ensuing struggle for power among Ba'thists, Nasserists, Communists, and tribes, Abd al-Salam Arif, a former ally of Qasim, became victorious and produced a new constitution in 1964, which stressed the aim of Arab unification. His government agreed with Egypt over future Iraqi unification and introduced political as well as economic reforms after the Egyptian model including land reforms, nationalization of big companies, and the merger of political parties.

Eventually, however, Arif also inclined toward an Iraq-first policy rather than Arab unification, and repressed the Ba'thists. In 1968, Ba'thists and allied officers again resorted to a coup, by which Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became President and Saddam Husain (Hussein), Deputy-Secretary of Regional (that is, Iraqi) Command of the Ba'th Party. But this regime pursued unification of Iraq by Sunni Arabs (rather than Arab unification), and imposed violent control on Shiites and Kurds. On the other hand, Bakr and Husain rewarded Sunni loyalists with land and concessions, and strengthened their rule with now abundant oil money in the 1970s.

In 1974, Kurds began an independence movement aided by Iran, and Baghdad tried to suppress it, but in the next year made an Algier Agreement with Iran in which Iran promised to stop aiding Kurds in exchange for an Iraqi concession of territory. When Egypt began to negotiate peace with Israel, Iraq convened an Arab summit in Baghdad in 1978 and tried to grab Arab leadership from the hands of the Egyptians. The following year saw an Islamic revolution in Iran, and in Iraq Husain took over from Bakr, became President, and began to purge rivals. As Husain's power base was consolidated with loyalists from his home town (Tikrit), he began war with Iran in 1980 to restore territory and eliminate the threat of a Shiite revolution spreading to Iraq. In 1982, Iran succeeded in its counter-attack, and the Husain regime was only saved by Soviet and French weapons made available with massive financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In fact, since 1984 Husain used chemical weapons both against Iranian soldiers and rebellious Kurds. Iran gave up its aim of achieving victory and agreed to truce in 1988. The eight -year war with Iran cost Iraq 200-250 thousand lives, including those of the repressed Kurds (Tripp, p.248; Marr, pp.207-208).

#### 2-1-2. Iraq's Pre-War Political Conditions

Husain had to placate the people angry over the failed war by restoring economy, but his government was handicapped by a huge amount of war-related debts and a decrease of oil-export income owing to low prices. So, Baghdad tried to persuade other OPEC members to control oil production

in order to raise the price, and also requested Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to exempt 40 billion dollars in debts and to aid in Iraqi reconstruction. Having failed in both, Iraq invaded Kuwait and declared its annexation in 1990, taking hold of its territory and wealth. As is well-known, Iraq was condemned by both the United Nations and the Arab League, was imposed economic sanctions, and in the next year it was attacked and forced to withdraw from Kuwait by the multi-national forces led by the United States and Britain, which included troops from many Arab countries as well. Iraq was defeated in only 44 days after the onset of land war, and consented to accept UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament) inspection teams, as well as other demands in UN Security Council resolutions. As the humiliating defeat weakened the Husain regime, Shiites and Kurds rose in mass revolts, but the remaining elite “Republican Guard” units loyal to Husain easily suppressed them, killing tens of thousands and driving millions into refuge within and beyond borders (Marr, pp.251-252).

Multi-national forces refrained from intervention fearing the breakup of Iraq and possible regional conflicts, but the Security Council had to forbid Iraqi planes to fly over a northern (Kurdish) zone to stop the massacre (later, a southern, Shiite zone was added). Soon UNSCOM and the IAEA teams entered Iraq and tried to find and destroy WMD and their production facilities, against Iraqi attempts at obstruction. The Iraqi government first resisted but accepted in 1996 a Security Council resolution which set up an “oil for food” scheme. Iraq was allowed to export oil up to 2 billion dollars a year to pay for Kuwaiti reparations and import of foods and medicine, the amount to be raised later to 5.5 and then 8.3 billion dollars. Iraq objected to continuation of UN inspections, obstructed them, was bombed by U.S. and British air forces, and expelled inspectors in 1998.

The plight of the masses caused by economic sanctions, and the blow to the government’s prestige by military sanctions didn’t after all bring about the fall of Husain regime. It survived because about 500 thousand loyalists, mostly Sunni Arabs especially from Tikrit, who were treated with privileges kept watch over the other twenty million people, suppressing any – actual or

presumed – opposition movements very harshly (Tripp, pp.264-271; Anderson & Stansfield, pp.101-109). Shiites were thus systematically repressed, but Kurds in the northern no-fly zone enjoyed relative autonomy and set up their regional assembly and government in 1992 (Anderson & Stansfield, pp.172-178). Iraq's émigré oppositionists and Kurdish representatives formed the Iraq National Congress (INC) and occasionally met in the Kurdish region, but they couldn't overcome their disagreements. Another émigré opposition group, made of mostly Sunni Arabs, named itself Iraq National Accord (INA) and organized coup-d'Etat attempts from Jordan, but never succeeded. The U.S. Congress adopted an "Iraq Liberation Act" in 1998, which pledged to aid such recognized Iraqi opposition groups with 100 million dollars in total.

### 2-1-3. Iraq's Pre-War Economic Conditions

There is scanty data available on the Iraqi economy after the Gulf War, and in pre-war 1987, the agricultural population amounted to 13%, mining and manufacturing 18%, services 53%, etc. (Marr, p.311). Iraq's GNP was 38 billion dollars and 2,160 dollars per capita in 1989, which dropped to 17 billion dollars and 907 dollars per capita in 1992 because of the war and economic sanctions (The Middle East, p.274). The literacy rate was estimated at 57% in 2001 (Marr, p.295). As the oil-for-food deal was expanded, in 2001-2002 Iraq produced 2.8 million barrels of oil per day, exported 1.7 million, and obtained 12 billion dollars. After deduction of Kuwaiti reparations, UN operation expenses, and 13% sharing to the Kurdish region, the Iraq Government received about 50%. Then, Iraq's GNP per capita was estimated at above 1,000 dollars (Tripp, p.278; Marr, p.294). Without previous wars with Iran and Kuwait (as well as multi-national forces), and with an enormous amount of possible revenues from oil export, Iraq would have been a prosperous nation by then, but as it was in pre-war days, most people were in dire economic and social conditions, while the Husain family and its clients appropriated the wealth of the nation<sup>(4)</sup>.

## 2-2. Comparison with Japan

In historical and social background, Japan is entirely different from Iraq as it formed a state as early as the 5<sup>th</sup> century, and except for the colonies it held briefly between the late 19<sup>th</sup> and mid-20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it has been a very homogeneous nation (even today, most Japanese speak only Japanese and are Buddhist-Shintoist). In democratic experiences, too, it differs from Iraq considerably, as it adopted a constitution in 1889 and had governments composed mostly by elected members of Parliament between 1890 and around 1932, which was longer and in the more recent past than that of Iraq between 1924 and 1958. The militarist and semi-totalitarian regime between 1932 and 1945 apparently resembles that of Iraq between 1980 and 2003, but in mainland Japan (that is, excluding the colonies), a social order based on nationalistic unity was maintained, which differed qualitatively from the fragile social order in Iraq distinguished by terror with occasional revolts. Economically, Japan started its industrial revolution in the 1890s, and with a quarter of the working population employed in manufacturing in 1940, it was capable of producing some of the best fighter airplanes and warships during World War II, whereas the Iraqi economy has remained dependent on oil export. So, Japan, with well educated populace, had developed by the war relatively modern and efficient administrative as well as economic systems which enabled it to keep fighting with the U.S. more than three and a half years. By contrast, the Iraqi government and economy before the war were on the verge of collapse, which resulted in military defeat in only 40 days. In sum, in terms of its political and economic development, Japan was much more ready for transition to democracy than Iraq was.

## 3. War

### 3-1. Iraq

In 2001 the new Bush administration demanded Iraq to accept the UN inspection teams again, and as tightening the UN sanction was opposed by Russia and other Arab states, it may have started thinking about invading Iraq. After the September 11 attacks, Husain's public comment to the effect

that the U.S. asked for them angered Americans and made them think Iraq was united with al-Qaida. Therefore, when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was defeated in about 40 days with minimum American casualties, Washington wanted to use the mobilized troops to topple Husain regime, too (Woodward, chaps. 5 & 9; Zunes, pp.21-30). With this military pressure Iraq was forced to readmit UN inspection teams in November 2002. The UN teams were unable to find WMD or production facilities, but the U.S. and Britain were resolute to finish the job before the hot season came, so they insisted on termination of inspection and use of force at the Security Council in February 2003. As is well known, France and Germany in addition to Russia and others opposed, but the coalition forces went on anyway on March 20 without a clear-cut UN resolution.

On April 11, after only three weeks since the start, President Bush announced the collapse of Husain regime and his plan to let an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) of the Defense Department, headed by a retired army general Jay M. Garner, govern Iraq. On May 1 the President announced the end of major combats, but not only Husain and other leaders but also most officers and soldiers didn't surrender but simply went into hiding. The administrative and security organs collapsed, but the occupation forces were too few (about 173,000 for an estimated Iraqi population of 24 millions) and incapable to fill the void, thus allowing the masses to loot public facilities. Garner was considered incompetent and replaced on May 6 by a retired diplomat and Ambassador at Large for Counter Terrorism, L. Paul Bremer, III, who started to head the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on May 12.

### 3-2. Comparison with Japan

Japan was in rivalry with the U.S. over hegemony in East Asia since the end of World War I, and when war broke out with China in 1937 the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Japan. When war broke out in Europe in 1939 and Germany was at first successful, Japan allied with the Axis Powers and occupied French Indo-China in July 1941. The U.S. reacted strongly and banned oil exports to Japan, which deprived the latter of its oil supply.

The Franklin D. Roosevelt administration intended to enter the war to help the democratic camp, and uncompromisingly demanded that Japan withdraw from China, which it knew Japan would not accept<sup>(5)</sup>. The militarist and reckless Japanese government was thus provoked to fight with the U.S. by grabbing oil and other resources in South-East Asia, hoping German victory would force the U.S. to make a compromise. As is well known, Germany was defeated in May 1945, and Japan surrendered in August with the Showa Emperor's radio announcement, after having suffered two atomic bombs blasts and having the Soviets attack in spite of the Neutrality Pact they had concluded with Japan in 1941. Japan had lost more than 2.7 million lives and one quarter of national wealth, having had nearly all major cities bombarded and destroyed (Dower, 1999, p.45).

Iraq likewise challenged the U.S. hegemony in the Middle East by trying to annex Kuwait, resulting in economic and military sanctions imposed by the United Nations led by the U.S. Husain provoked the anger of the U.S. by lauding the September 11 attacks, but Iraq also tried to avoid a major war with the U.S. by readmitting UN inspection teams. So, the Iraqis didn't understand why they were attacked, and as the war ended in only 40 days, they didn't suffer so many casualties and loss of wealth as did the Japanese. The Japanese had been exhausted by the long war with tremendous blood-letting and felt relieved when it ended, but the Iraqis, especially Sunni Arabs led by Husain, didn't accept defeat and wanted to continue resistance. The Kurds and Shiite Arabs were pleased with the demise of Husain regime, but felt humiliated by such a poor performance of the Iraqi army, just like that of Afghanistan's army.

#### 4. The Aims and Preparations of Occupation

##### 4-1. Iraq

In April 2002 the U.S. State Department initiated a "Future of Iraq Project" in which not only Iraq specialists inside and outside the department but also more than 240 Iraqis (in exile or in the Kurdish region) participated in meetings (held in London). The project produced 13 volume reports on how to end Husain regime and how to reform its political, administrative,

financial, judicial, economic, health, and educational sectors in Iraq afterwards (6). So, the U.S. should have been prepared for occupation, but actually these reports were not used, because of rivalry between the State and Defense Departments. As is well known, while Secretary of State Powell was rather reluctant to attack Iraq, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice-President Cheney were pushing for it in August 2002. Britain's and Powell's persuasion led the U.S. to seek for a new UN Security Council resolution which would sanction the use of force, and the State Department organized a "Democratic Principles Working Group" (DPWG) of Iraqis and made it plan a transition government.

In the Defense Department, however, Ahmad Chalabi was considered an important information source on Iraq. He emigrated from Iraq in 1958 and obtained his Ph.D. from Chicago University. In 1992 he organized the afore-mentioned INC in Vienna, and succeeded in recruiting supporters among American ruling circles, promising Iraq would be pro-U.S. and friendly to Israel after revolution. Thus, the INC came to receive a huge American aid based on the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act. The CIA and State Department didn't trust him, but the Defense Department continued to listen to his advice and help him (Phillips, chap.7).

The DPWG incorporated diverse Iraqis, but Kanan Makiya of the INC (author of a book depicting horror of Husain's rule, "Republic of Fear") played an important role there. But he was unable to forge consensus among the members over Islam as the state religion, de-Ba'thification, federalism, a transitional government, etc. (Phillips, chap.8). Washington therefore gave up temporarily forming a transitional government and convened an opposition group conference in London in December. Zalmay Khalilzad, of Afghan stock and former envoy of Washington in post-Taliban Afghanistan, was sent to the conference to represent the U.S. Many groups involved in the DPWG joined the conference and it managed to agree on forming a coordination committee consisting of 65, half of whom to be Shiite, especially from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution on Iraq (SCIRI). Immediately after collapse of Husain regime the conference issued a communique calling for the establishment of a Provisional National

Assembly, an Executive Council, and a Transitional Government composed of specialists (Phillips, chap.9).

In January 2003, President Bush ordered to set up the afore-mentioned ORHA, which was to be composed of about 450 officials from various departments, headed by Garner, but it indicated victory of the Defense Department in a turf war. Garner himself intended to profit from the results of the Future of Iraq Project, but Rumsfeld was opposed and vetoed his plan of employing 32 Iraq specialists from the State Department. The man in charge of the ORHA in the Defense Department, Douglas Feith, showed a list of some INC members to Garner and asked him to employ them (Diamond, pp.29-31). Thus, the Defense Department meant to disregard the results of the State Department's efforts to mobilize Iraqis and Iraq specialists in making transition plans, and tried to make officials without knowledge on Arab affairs carry out the INC's plans.

#### 4-2. Comparison with Japan

After Japan's Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. Government set up, with the State Department's initiative, an Advisory Committee on Post-War Planning, and also a Far Eastern Unit in a Special Research Division within the State Department, involving Japan specialists from universities, too. In 1944, as German surrender became imminent, a Committee on Post-War Programs was organized in the State Department, which planned to govern Japan directly by using authority of the Emperor and Japanese lower administrative organs in order to disarm, democratize, and industrially weaken Japan. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee then adopted in June 1945 "SWNCC150," which laid principles to govern an occupied Japan in line with the above committee's program (Iokibe, 1985, Vol.2, chaps.7-8). However, Harry Truman's administration which succeeded the deceased Roosevelt in April 1945 was reconsidering the principles as it was facing difficulties in directly governing Germany.

So, in both the Iraq and Japan cases the U.S. made plans for occupation beforehand by mobilizing State Department officials and knowledgeable outsiders, and aimed at disarming and democratizing the occupied country,

although the U.S. didn't intend to disarm Iraq completely and industrially weaken Iraq, as it did with Japan. In preparation, the State and Defense departments cooperated in planning for Japan, while in the Iraq case they were engaged in a turf war, and the victorious Defense Department disregarded the results of the State Department's investigations.

## 5. Occupation Policies and Executive Organs

### 5-1. Iraq

Rumsfeld and Garner of the ORHA seem to have planned to promptly appoint an interim Iraqi government, make it adopt a new constitution, and let coalition forces withdraw by August (Diamond, pp.135-139; Dodge, pp.710-713), which soon turned out to be impractical, as the rampant looting destroyed most public facilities. The ORHA scarcely had any staff who spoke Arabic or who were knowledgeable of Arab affairs, and Garner tried to hire Iraqi higher officers, but the INC and its followers opposed it. As was mentioned above, Garner was relieved in only three weeks and Bremer appointed as head of the CPA. It was given more power than the ORHA, but was still responsible for the Defense Department and shared Iraqi rule with the Combined Joint Task Force. Bremer cancelled the plan of appointing an interim Iraqi government, and intended to himself exercise administrative, legislative, and judicial powers and oversee adoption of a new constitution. First, he ordered the banning of the Ba'th Party and exclusion of its elite members (estimated to be about 20,000) from public jobs, and then called for the dissolution of all the defense and security related ministries, offices and military formations<sup>(7)</sup>. He had his staff make a Strategic Plan in July and define the ultimate goal of the CPA as "a unified and stable, democratic Iraq" with a vibrant economy and a representative government (Bremer, p.115).

Garner had appointed an Iraqi Leadership Council composed of Kurds (Barzani and Talabani), Shiites (al-Hakim and al-Ja'fari), émigrés (Chalabi and Allawi), and a Sunni (al-Chaderchi), which Bremer enlarged into an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July. The 25 member council failed to elect a chairperson, and so chose a group of nine who would chair one month

each in rotation. The IGC was allowed to appoint a committee to prepare a new constitution and an interim cabinet of 25 specialists in August. The coalition forces had been preparing local elections, but Bremer stopped them and made local notables elect local assemblies. Iraqis were angry at it and the American Government as well as public opinion demanded early transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, and so Bremer had to announce in September his intention of letting Iraqis draft a constitution, approve it with referendum, elect a parliament, form a government, to which the CPA would cede power and then dissolve itself (Diamond, pp.45-47; Wilcke).

The CPA was not promptly staffed because of difficulty in securing budget and finding the right persons, but came to be composed of about 3,000 in July, about one thousand of whom were Americans and the rest from coalition countries and Iraq (many of Iraqis were interpreters). Many Americans were young, with only a three month contract and scanty knowledge of Iraq, but were positioned to give orders to Iraqis. Although they were good-willed and hard-working (and risk-taking), they were not well received by Iraqis and were not very effective(s). The UN staff withdrew from Iraq after its office was bombed in August. The Iraqi army and police were newly organized after vetting former soldiers and policemen, but their skill, equipment, and morale were not enough to suppress insurgency by themselves. The administrative offices had their Ba'hist elites replaced by returning émigrés and began tackling formidable jobs under CPA directives, but these bosses were neither liked by ordinary employees nor necessarily competent.

## 5-2. Comparison with Japan

Just before General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), arrived in Japan at the end of August 1945, the Truman administration changed the occupation policy from direct rule to one of indirect rule. So, SCAP's (and his General Headquarters, GHQ's) occupation policy principles sanctioned by Washington in early September were: ruling through the Japanese Government; freedom of religion and speech; basic human rights; dissolution of monopolies; and democratic

transformation of the feudalistic and authoritarian system. Allied forces (mostly American) occupied Japan throughout, amounting to about 430,000 by the end of the year, which were not many for the Japanese population of about 75 million, but in fact more than enough as the social order was maintained by the police and there was no resistance against occupation forces. GHQ was composed of about 6,000 in 1948, of whom 3,850 were civilian (Takemae, p.95). The Army, Navy, and military forces were dissolved, and more than 2,000, including about 100 military as well as political leaders (excepting the Showa Emperor), were arrested as war criminals. Later, in 1948, the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East” sentenced death to 17, and prison terms to 18. Moreover, in other parts of Asia, about 5,700 Japanese (some were ethnic Koreans or Taiwanese) were tried by military tribunals and 920 were executed. Many of those tried in the Soviet Union are still unaccounted for (Dower, 1999, chap.15). While not considered criminals, but about 210,000 elites in politics, public offices, business, press, and education were purged from January 1946 on as having been responsible for militarism and multiple war efforts, although some of them were later rehabilitated.

So, in both Iraq and Japan the armed forces were dissolved, politico-military leaders arrested and tried (though Iraqi leaders are being tried not for war crimes but for brutal repression of their own people), many social elites purged for the sake of democratization, and political as well as economic reforms were pursued by the U.S. and its allies. However, a critical difference is that in Japan the occupational rule was indirect, employing the Emperor, government, and police, while in Iraq it was direct, as legitimate leaders were lacking, administrative organs in disarray, and the police dissolved. Therefore the social order was maintained and governance effective in Japan, while in Iraq the social order collapsed and governance is largely ineffective. The direct rule in Iraq ended only after 13 months, but a certain indirect rule may be said to continue.

## 6. Policy Implementation and Results

### 6-1. Iraq

The first objective of the war and occupation against Iraq for the U.S. was removal of WMD and their production facilities, but the UN inspection before the war and American searches afterwards have only found traces of them. A recent investigation report tells that Husain regime had destroyed them before readmitting the UN inspection teams in 2002, but production of WMD was a top secret project and those in charge were used to lying to Husain for fear of severe punishments, making nobody including Husain himself informed of the true situation (Woods).

As for rebuilding the armed forces, the Iraqi Government announced in June 2006 that the number in Iraqi security forces reached 265,600: 113,400 military forces under the Ministry of Defense and 148,200 police and police commando forces under the Ministry of Interior (Katzman, tables 4-5). However, they are mostly underequipped and poorly trained, and so security matters are still administered by the coalition forces, based on the mandate given by the U.N. Security Council resolutions (1511 of 2003, 1546 of 2004, and 1637 of 2005). In the Kurdish region, "Peshmerga" militias are working as the security organ of the Kurdish regional government, but Shiite ones such as "Badr Brigade" and "Mahdi Army" are not smoothly dissolved and absorbed by state security organs. In Sunni areas and Baghdad, insurgent groups including foreigners like Al-Qaeda affiliates keep fighting against coalition and Iraqi troops, threatening the country with an "ethnic cleansing" civil war<sup>(9)</sup>. Therefore the coalition forces can't withdraw any time soon, and the U.S. troops remain at about 130,000 in mid-2006, while the Spanish and Ukrainians withdrew and the British, Polish, Italians, and Koreans have all reduced their troops.

As for the aim of democratizing Iraq, the CPA faced strong resentment of the Iraqis against the direct rule, and so in October came under direction of an Iraqi Stabilization Group of the White House, run by Rice, and after consulting with the IGC announced the following month a new plan to accelerate the transfer of sovereignty. That is, a Transition Law would be adopted first, and a 15-men Organizing Committee would elect a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) by May, and then that Assembly would appoint an Interim Government (IG) by the end of June, which would

take over sovereignty (Diamond, pp.48-52; Phillips, pp.177-183; Bremer, chap.8). However, the most respected Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani opposed election of the TNA by the Organizing Committee as undemocratic, so the U.S. had to invite a UN investigation team for consulting with Iraqis. The team, headed by an Algerian Lakhdar Brahimi, advised appointment of a care-taker government consisting of specialists, which would take over sovereignty in June and conduct general elections of the TNA, and then it would adopt a new constitution by August the next year, and if it was approved by national referendum, election of the National Assembly (NA) should be done by December. The CPA basically agreed, and the IGC adopted a Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) to that effect in March. The IG was appointed in June, again with Brahimi's mediation, and was comprised of a 3-men Presidium and a Cabinet headed by Ayad Allawi, which turned out to be more than a specialists' care-taker government, reflecting ethnic balance and employing many of the IGC members (Diamond, chap.9; Bremer, chap.13; EIU, September 2004, pp.14-22). The IG did formally take over sovereignty before the end of June, and a National Conference was convened in August gathering more than 1,400 from across the country, which elected a 100-member National Council. But the TNA was elected directly with a single national constituency system in January 2005, although Sunni Arabs largely boycotted the elections. The results were a victory for Shiites with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) obtaining 48% of the vote and 140 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance came next with 26% and 75 seats, followed by the secular Iraqi List with 14% and 40 seats, etc. (Sakai, 2005, pp.26-32). The TNA elected or appointed the Transitional Government (TG) with President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja'fari in April, and set up a committee to draft the new constitution the following month. The draft constitution was agreed upon in August and approved by national referendum in October despite intensified resistance to coalition forces and ethnic conflicts, with 78% of the votes supporting it (the majority of Sunni Arabs opposed, though).

The constitution adopts republic and federalism. The three-men Presidium is elected by a two-thirds majority of the NA, which appoints

Prime Minister from the largest group in the NA, who chooses other ministers. The 275 members of the NA are elected by proportionate representation, but more than 25% of them have to be female. Freedom, democracy, and human rights have to be respected, but Islam is designated as an important source of law. Moreover, Article 2-(a) ordains that “No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam,” so there is possibility that freedom and human rights, especially of women, might be restricted, and actually recent rise of Islamism does seem to be curtailing women’s rights (Efrati). As for federalism, Iraq consists of a Kurdish region and an Arab region, with official languages of Kurdish and Arabic, the Kurdish region having an autonomous government, assembly, and army, with rights to negotiate with foreign governments. The Kurds are attempting to incorporate the oil-rich Kirkuk area into their region, though it was Arabized during the Husain era, and the constitution can be read as giving rights to regions to exploit and benefit from new oil wells, although it says the profit from existing oil wells has to be shared equally among the nation. Therefore, Sunni Arabs are opposed to federalism and demanding revision of the constitution.

The general elections of the NA were duly conducted in December as ordained by the TAL, but insurgent and terrorist activities had intensified and candidates couldn’t freely campaign except through media. However, most Sunni Arabs chose to participate in elections this time, as they had suffered from insufficient representation in the TNA and constitution committee. The results were again victory for the UIA which obtained 128 seats, followed by the Kurdistan List (53), the Iraqi Accordance Front (44) and the National Dialogue Front (11, both are of Sunni Arabs), the Iraqi National List (25, of secular Arabs), etc.. The Presidium was elected soon with Talabani again at the top, and the UIA chose to keep Ja’fari as Prime Minister, but he was considered too close to Islamists by the other parties (and the U.S.), and competition for key posts like Ministers of Defense, Petroleum, etc. was so severe, it took as many as five months for the government to be appointed. Ja’fari had stepped down, but the new Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, is his close ally and 16 other ministers are Shiites,

followed by 7 Kurds, 8 Sunni Arabs, and 6 secular Arabs (Ridolfo)<sup>(10)</sup>.

So, democratization has been almost accomplished in form, but economic reconstruction is lagging behind. The U.S. had presumed that Iraq would recover promptly with oil wealth and not demand massive American aid. However, Iraqi production facilities were damaged not only by war but also by looting, and insurgency and sabotage have obstructed reconstruction. The facilities had been worn out under the pre-war sanction regime, and their replacement demands an enormous investment, but foreign investment is slow in coming due to poor security conditions. The U.S. managed to make the UN not only abolish the sanction regime but also convene an international conference to help Iraq, leading the participants including Japan to pledge 13.6 billion dollars in total, and then made the Iraqi debtor consortium (France, Russia, Kuwait, among others) forgive more than 80% of the debt. The U.S. itself is devoting massive assistance to Iraq, but under the CPA big enterprises from the coalition countries, especially the U.S., received orders for reconstruction projects. The worsening of security conditions have either stopped many projects or forced them to allocate a big portion of funds for security measures. Moreover, huge sums of ministerial budgets are reportedly embezzled by Iraqi officials, and one can't be optimistic that such harmful traditions would be eradicated any time soon (Le Billon; EIU, June 2005, pp.25-26).

Institutionally, the CPA liberalized government control of trade, financial, and economic activities, and gave independence to the central bank which started to issue new notes. It also announced principles of privatization of state enterprises, which invited criticism as violating international law or incurring an even higher unemployment rate, and so it wasn't carried out (Looney). However, restoration of the government finance which had been started by the CPA has been pursued after its departure, as it is demanded by creditors like the U.S., the debtor consortium, the IMF and World Bank. For example, the price of gasoline, which had been very cheap and so stimulated smuggling, has been raised in spite of popular resentment. Thus, the governmental deficit which amounted to 41% of the GNP in 2004 is estimated to have dropped to 24% in

2005 (EIU, September 2005, p.20). The inflation rate is high: 36% in 2003, 32% in 2004, and estimated 20% in 2005. But the real growth rate of the GNP rebounded from -- 30% in 2003 to 47% in 2004 and estimated 3% in 2005<sup>(11)</sup>. In spite of high oil prices, economic growth has been hampered by the worsening security condition since the regaining of sovereignty.

## 6-2. Comparison with Japan

SCAP ordered the Japanese Government to carry out five major reforms: emancipation of women; promotion of labor unions; liberalization and democratization of education; abolishment of secret repressive organs; and democratization of economic structure. A considerable number of “New Deal Liberals” who joined GHQ aided Japanese who, having learned hard lessons from the disastrous failure of militarist authoritarianism, were eager to undertake them. SCAP then demanded that they adopt a new constitution, so the Japanese Government appointed a committee to draft it. But the committee was not willing to radically change the existing constitution. So, in February 1946 MacArthur ordered his staff to draft a new one, with three principles: (1) The Emperor is at the head of the State; (2) War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished; and (3) The feudal system of Japan will cease. The draft was made in only a week (based on a SWNCC document which had been sent to SCAP in January), approved by him, and secretly handed over to the Government. The Cabinet members were told that accepting it was the only way to save the Emperor, and it was accepted with minor changes (Dower, 1999, chaps.12-13; Sakamoto & Ward, chaps.2 & 4). In April 1946, Lower House elections were conducted with a new election law which gave franchise to not only men but also women of 20 years old or above, and eligibility for election to those of 25 years old or above. 2,770 ran for 464 seats, and the Liberal Party won 140, followed by the Progressive Party (94), the Socialist Party (92), the Cooperative Party (14), the Communist Party (5), other parties (38), and independents (81), with 39 women. A coalition government of Liberals and Progressives headed by Yoshida Shigeru was formed. The new constitution was adopted by both Houses and came into force the following year, which made the Emperor a

“symbol of the state” with no political power, forbade the State to engage in war, and established a system of checks and balances between the three branches of government. In the same year, a Local Autonomy Law and a new Police Law were adopted and the Ministry of Interior was abolished and replaced by Ministries of Local Autonomy and of Construction and the National Police Agency. The new Parliament was elected, and in the more important Lower House, Socialists won 143 seats, followed by Liberals (131), Democrats (124), Cooperativists (31), Communists (4), and others (33). A coalition government headed by Katayama Tetsu, a Socialist, was formed, reflecting discontent of the masses over economic hardships (such a leftist government was to be a passing phenomenon).

In the economic sphere, the Japanese faced famine in immediate post-war months and estimated two thousands died of hunger in Tokyo and five other major cities (Dower, 1999, p.93). Massive food assistance by GHQ saved others, but finding jobs for 9 million former soldiers and 3 million civilians returning from former colonies (Ibid., pp.48-49) was not helped, as the Japanese Government had to provide the massive occupation troops with housing and utilities. So, the first half of 1946 was the worst period which saw a lot of protest actions by underpaid workers and the unemployed. The government tried to promote reconstruction through concentration of funds to coal-production, while GHQ imposed economic democratization, namely, disbanding conglomerates and the landed class. As for conglomerates, 9 major holding companies were disbanded by a November 1945 law, and more big companies were to be split up by an Anti-Monopoly Law and a law for “forbidding over-concentration of economic power” in 1947 (Nakamura, 1979, pp.203-221). But in January 1948 the U.S. occupation policy for Japan was radically changed, as it decided to make Japan an ally in East Asia, while China was turning into communist and an ally of the Soviet Union, the American foe in the rising Cold War rivalry. So, GHQ stopped pursuing the policy to weaken Japanese industries, and the U.S. and Britain renounced their rights to demand reparation payments (though South-East Asian countries didn’t). As for the land reform, the first and second Land Adjustment Laws of 1946 practically confiscated farm lands above three

hectares (excepting Hokkaido area) and distributed them to poor peasants. Hyper-inflation was calming down in 1948 as production increased, when GHQ imposed a “nine principles for economic stabilization” which gave priority to budgetary equilibrium. In the following year, an American economic envoy pushed for de-regulation and deflationary policies, putting a brake on economic growth and increasing unemployment. The resulting economic crisis was only overcome by unexpected “special procurements” from American troops engaged in the Korean War which broke out in 1950. In 1952, Japan at last regained its sovereignty (though with a Security Pact with the U.S., which made American military presence in Japan permanent), and also regained the level of pre-war economic production.

So, the U.S. imposed on both Iraq and Japan similar occupation policies of disarmament, democratization, and economic reform (though the Iraqi army is being rebuilt), and the Japanese peacefully accepted them, while many Iraqis, especially Sunni Arabs, do not accept occupation and have been trying to obstruct democratization and economic reform. It was easier for the Japanese to accept the occupation as the Emperor ordered it himself and the Japanese Government carried out occupation policies, but punishment of those responsible for the war as well as post-war economic hardships were more severe in Japan than Iraq. It was unfortunate for Iraq not to have found a legitimate national leader who could replace Husain immediately, and so direct rule had to be adopted, but it had to be abandoned only after 13 months. For the succeeding Iraqi governments to pursue such radical reforms has been most difficult, as ethnic conflicts over greater portion of power and oil wealth have intensified. Oil wealth seems to be a blessing for Iraqis and a curse at the same time.

## 7. Conclusion

Now, let me conclude by considering how those differences between Iraq and Japan can be explained with Huntington’s above hypotheses.

When an authoritarian regime collapses, it is essential for a peaceful transfer to democracy to have a “popular, charismatic, democratically inclined leader.” Japan may arguably have found such a leader in the

Showa Emperor himself<sup>(12)</sup>, while Iraq has found none – Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani may be said to be like one among Shiites, but he avoids direct involvement in politics. As for “systemic problems,” both countries faced severe problems, but unlike the cases Huntington discusses, these are under foreign occupation and so drastic measures could be imposed on vested interests. Transition policies such as the establishment of a legitimate government through elections, dealings with authoritarian crimes, the military, and vested economic interests, etc. ... may be said to be similar: former political, military, economic, and social leaders were purged in both countries, although some of them were later rehabilitated. But in Japan, many people were punished for war crimes, while in Iraq Husain and a few other leaders are being tried by Iraqis themselves (however, many other Ba’thists are being assassinated).

Huntington says that for a new democratic regime to stabilize, mutual cooperation and the devotion of political elites as well as the ability of publics to distinguish between the regime and the government or rulers are necessary.

Japan may be said to have had both, but Iraq seems to lack both – political elites are split along ethnic or religious lines, and publics blame democracy for insecurity, economic hardships, and ethnic conflicts. Such differences can be attributed to many factors according to Huntington. In earlier experiences in democracy, levels of industrialization and education, and political capabilities of a nation, the Japanese appear to have had higher levels than the Iraqis do. The latter suffers from ethnic complexity and dependency on the “rentier-state <sup>(13)</sup>.” As for external environments and influences, both countries were occupied by a democratic super-power, the U.S., and imposed democratization. In Japan, some influence of communism from neighboring Russia and China was felt, while in Iraq considerable influence of Islamism from neighboring Iran is evident, and Syrian as well as Turkish interference is suspected. A consensual, less violent transition based on indigenous causes is preferable, but both countries had a forceful, violent transition imposed by foreign powers. However, the Japanese had attacked first and fought long and hard enough

to accept defeat and its consequences with resignation, while the Iraqis do not understand why they were attacked and did not fight much, so they can't accept defeat and still try to resist the occupation. As for the number and nature of severe contextual problems, both countries may be said to be roughly at the same level, but Japan's economic hardships were more severe, while Iraq suffers from ethnic conflicts.

Finally, I wish to address a factor that Huntington does not discuss ---- namely, occupation. The U.S. had prepared well for Japan, and executed plans during a long period using the Emperor, Japanese police and administrative organs skillfully, while with Iraq, it didn't prepare well (when it did, the results were not used), and tried to reform many areas in a short time without being much able to use the Iraqi police and administrative organs, thus leaving the democratization project only half done. Half the responsibility for the present confusion lies with the Bush administration, especially Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but the other half of course belongs to Iraqi political elites who are vying with each other for ethnic-sectarian supremacy and oil wealth. The eventual success in stabilizing the democratic regime hinges on their collective will and efforts. After all, the Japanese success was due to the collective will of their political elites to support democracy, which is clearly shown by the fact that they have kept the post-war Constitution intact even after regaining independence.

## Notes

- (1) See, George W. Bush, "Iraq is Fully Capable of Living in Freedom," in Sifry and Cerf, pp.558-559.
- (2) See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986); John D. Nagle and Alison Mahr, *Democracy and Democratization* (Sage Publications, 1999)
- (3) Senryo Kaikakuno Kokusai Hikaku (*International Comparison of Reforms under Occupation*) (Tokyo, 1994) edited by Yui Daizaburo et al. studies social reforms under occupation in Japan and other cases in Asia and Europe in the wake of World War II, but treats them separately and does not present any theoretical framework.
- (4) According to Bremer, more than 90% of the state budget was directly controlled by

Husain's presidency, and the inflation rate was running at 100,000% and unemployment 50% at the end of 2002. Bremer, pp.66-67.

- (5) The United States had wanted to postpone the confrontation with Japan as long as possible, but German invasion of the Soviet Union changed its policy. See Waldo H. Heinrichs, "Daidomei'-no Keiseito Taiheiyo-Sensono Kaimaku (The Formation of the 'Grand Alliance' and the Outbreak of the Pacific War)" in Hosoya. However, I do not accept the conspiracy theory that President Roosevelt had known of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.
- (6) Phillips, chap.3. However, it didn't anticipate American occupation, but presumed establishment of a transitional government by basically émigrés and Kurds. See also, Diamond, pp.27-28.
- (7) Diamond, p.39. Actually, however, 120,000 including teachers and doctors were at least temporarily purged. See also, Phillips, p.145.
- (8) Bremer, p.108; Diamond, pp.289-300. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal which came out in January 2004 increased Iraqi resentment against Americans.
- (9) Local politics are dominated by particular groups and their militias, and the central government cannot control them. See Rangwala, pp.170-177.
- (10) Later, a Sunni Defense, a Shiite Interior, and a Shiite National Security Ministers were added.
- (11) EIU, September 2005, p.12 & ibid., March 2006, pp.28-29. The GNP per capita for 2004 is estimated at 693 dollars. Ibid., December 2004, p.30.
- (12) On the first day of 1946 the Showa Emperor declared that he is not a living god, and later he was formally deprived of political power and private lands, but the fact that he made such a declaration testifies to his enormous authority and influence he still maintained. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why the Japanese military men meekly obeyed his order to surrender to the enemy.
- (13) See, e.g., Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State* (Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1987). The Iraqi Government expects to depend on oil for at least 90% of revenue over the coming years. EIU, March 2006, p.25.

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