An Annotated Translation of
Madhyamakāḥdayakārikā/Tarkajvalā V.69-84
Paul HOORNAERT

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.69-84

[Editions used: Cone (C.), Dbu-ma Dsa 218a4-221b7; Derge (D.), Dbu-ma Dsa 218a4-221b7; Peking (P.), Dbu-ma Dsa 242b4-247a6]

ʼdir smras pa/ kho bo cag gi tshul ni mi rigs pa ma yin te/ rigs pa dang mi ’gal baʼi phyir ro// ji lta zhe na/ kho bo cag ni dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med de/ ming du mngon par brjod paʼi bdag nyid kyis stong paʼi phyir ro zhes bya bar ʼdod de/ mngon par brjod paʼi bdag nyid de nyid ma skyes pa yin la/ skye ba med pa deʼ kho naʼi phyir ma ʼgags pa yang yin no// mngon par brjod pa dang ldan paʼi dngos po gang yin pa de yang rnam pa gang gis mngon par brjod paʼi rnam pa de ltar yod pa ma yin te/ brda tsam du zad paʼi phyir ro// ʼdi ltar gal te dngos po de mngon par brjod paʼi spyod yul du ʼgyur du zin na meʼ zhes brjod pa kha tshig paʼi skyon du ʼgyur ro// de bzhin du/ kun brtags dngos po yod ma yin// gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa yin// zhes bya bas gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du khas blangs paʼi phyir ro// ʼdir bshad pa/

dngos rnams ngo bo nyid med de//
mngon brjod bdag nyid stong phyir ro//
de nyid kyis de skye med phyir//
ma skyes pa dang ma ʼgags nyid// (69)
gang phyir mngon brjod ldan dngos ni//
ji lta brjod pa de ltar med//
de phyir chos rnams dngos med nyid//
ces bya la sogsmang smras dang// (70)
gzhan dbang yod pa nyid smras pa//
kun rdzob tu ni grub pa sgrub//
gal te don dam dpe med cing//
gtan tshigsʼ ʼgal ba nyid du ʼgyur// (71)

[abhilāpātmasūnyatvād bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatā//

1 'de' ommitted in P.
2 P: 'mes
3 C, D: ʼphyir ro zhe na/
4 P: tshig
tenaiva cápy anutpādād anutpannānruddhatā// (69)
yato ’bhlāpavadvastu na tathā kathyate yathā//
avastukatvāṃ dharmāṇām nyādi bahu coditaṃ// (70)
paratanānāstitoktau ca saṃvrtyā saddhāśādhanam/
tattvataś cen na drṣṭānto hetoś cápi vīruddhatā// (71)]

[C. 218b2, D. 218b2, P. 243a2] ces bya ba ni de dag thams cad kun rdzob tu sgrub na ni grub pa
la sgrub pa yin te/ kho bo cag kyang de dag thams cad kun rdzob kyi bden pa ’i tshul du ’dod
pa ’i phyir ro// gal te de don dam par sgrub na ni don dam par gzhan gyi dbang yod pa nyid du
sgrub pa la dpe med de/ de yang ngo bo nyid kyis¹ stong pa ’i phyir ro// de bzhin nyid² du
mgon par brjod pa ’i bdag nyid kyis stong pa ’i phyir zhes bya ba ’i gtan tshigs ’gal ba nyid du
yang ’gyur te/ mgon par brjod pa ’i bdag nyid kyis¹ stong pa nyid du dres su dpog pas brjod du
med pa ’i dngos po yod pa nyid kyis dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa nyid bsal ba ’i phyir
chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo log par bsgrubs pa ’i phyir ro//
ci ste yang ’di snyam du kho bo cag gi gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni skye ba ngo bo nyid
med pa yin te/ yod par gyur pa la ma skyes pa ’i phyir sgyu ma bzhin te/ de yang ngo bo nyid
kyis¹ stong pa ’i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ’gal ba nyid du mi ’gyur bar sens na/ ’dir bshad pa/
gal te gzhan dbang ngo bo nyid//
skye ba ngo bo nyid med de/
yod par gyur las ma skyes na//
skye ’gag la sogs ’gal sgrub yin// (72)
[utpattiniḥsvabhāvatvaṃ sadbhūtājātito yadi/
nanūtpādanrodhādpratṣedhasamarthanam// (72)]

[C. 218b5, D. 218b5, P. 243a7] zhes bya ba ni de lta na kho bo cag gi ’dod pa nyid bsgrubs pa
yin te/ kho bo cag kyang rgyu dang rkyen rigs° mthun pa ’i bdag nyid las skyes pa rnams ni rang
gi bdag nyid las ma skyes pas ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa dang/ skye ba dang ’gag pa la sogs pa
med par ’dod pa ’i phyir ro// tshul ’di ni lung dang yang mi ’gal te/ ji lta zhe na/

rkyen rnams las ni gang skyes pa//
de skye med par thub pas gsungs// (73ab)

¹ ’kyis’ omitted in P
² ’nyid’ omitted in P
³ P kyis
⁴ P kyis
⁵ C, D rig
[pratyayair jāyate yo hi tam ajātaṃ jagau muniḥ/ (73ab)]

zhes bya ba’i phyir ro// rigs pa gang gis zhe na/
don dam du na dngos nyid las//
de yi skye ba dgag phyir ro// (73cd)
[svabhāvatas tadutpādaniṣedhāt paramārthatāḥ// (73cd)]

zhes bya ba ste/ gang rkyen mams las skyes pa de ni don dam par na skye ba med pa nyid yin
par thub pas gsungs te/ rgyu dang rkyen gyi’ tshogs tha dad pa’i dngos po dag la de’i ngo bo
nyid dmigs su med pa’i phyir ro// de ltar yang ’di skad du/ gang zhig rkyen las skyes pa de ma
skyes// de la skye ba’i ngo bo nyid med de// gang zhig rkyen la ltos’ pa des stong gsungs// gang
gis stong nyid shes de bag yod yin// zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o// gzhan yang/

chos mams yang dag nyid min phyir//
de dag kun rdzob blo dang sgra’//
sna tshogs rang spyi’i spyod yul du//
’gyur ba la ni ’gal ba med// (74)
[abhūtatvāc ca dharmāṇāṃ te svasāmānyagocarāh/
samvätyā na virudhyante citradhiśabdavṛttayāḥ// (74)]

[C. 219a2, D. 219a2, P. 243b5] ces bya ba ni gang kho na’i phyir chos mams yang dag pa nyid
ma yin pa de kho na’i phyir/ de dag kun rdzob tu blo dang sgra sna tshogs kyi rang gi mtsshan
nyid kyi spyod yul dang/ spyi’i mtsshan nyid kyi spyod yul sngon po la sogs pa dang/ gzugs la
sogs pa dang/ bum pa dang/ snam bu zhes bya ba la sogs pa dag tu ’gyur ba la ’gal ba med do//
gal te dngos po mams yang dag pa nyid yin par gyur na ni des na nam mkha’ la sogs pa bzhin
du ngo bo nyid gcig pa kho nar4 gyur pas blo sna tshogs dang/ sgra sna tshogs kyi yul du mi
’gyur ba zhig na de lta ma yin no/
de la gzhung lugs gnyi ga la grags pa’i lung yang yod de/ gang zhe na/

ming ni gang dang gang dag gis//
chos mams gang dang gang brjod pa//
de la de ni yod min pa//
de ni chos rnam schos nyid do// (75)
[yena yena hi namna vai yo yo dharmo 'bholapya/
na sa sembyate tatra dharmāṇāḥ sā ca dharmatā// (75)]

[C. 219a5, D. 219a5, P. 244a1] zhes bya ba yin te/ ming ni gang dang gang dag gis// zhes bya
ba ni rang dang spyi'i brjod pa'i ming dang/ yi ge sna tshogs kyi ngo bo nyid dag gis so// chos
rnam schos gang dang gang brjod pa// zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa mgon par brjod par bya ba
dag gi tshug gi brjod pa'o// de la de ni yod min pa// zhes bya ba ni chos de la mngu du mgon
par brjod pa de yod pa ma yin pa ste/ chos rnam schos ni yi ge med pa'i ngo bo nyid yin pa'i phyir
ro/ 'di litar yul gyi skad dang/ nges pa'i tshig sna tshogs dag gis dngos po gcig kho na la rnam
pa du mar mgon par brjod pa dper na chu la paniya dang/ apa dang/ sanila dang/ mra zhes bya
ba la sogs pa dag tu brjod pa de la gal te de sgra gcig gis mgon par brjod pa'i ngo bo nyid yin
par gyur na ni de la sgra ghzan dag 'jug par mi 'gyur zhih/ sgra de dag gis mgon par brjod
par yang mi dus pa zhig na de lta ma yin no/ de ni chos rnam schos nyid do// zhes bya ba ni
mgon par brjod du med pa de ni chos rnam schos kyin don dam pa ni yin pa'o// kun rdzob tu ni
ngo shes par bya ba'i phyir mngu du 'dogs pa dang/ brda dag byed de/ de dag gis kyang dngos
po de'i khyad par las 'di ni ba lang yin gyi 'rta dang mi ma yin no zhes bya ba la sogs par
yongs su shes par byed do// ngo bo nyid de ni blo'i yul yin te/ gang gi phyir zhe na/ lkgug1 pa
dang/ 'on pa la sogs pa yi ge dang brda mi shes pa de dag gis kyang bum pa la sogs pa'i dngos
po ngo shes pa dang ba lang la sogs pas kyang dri dang mig gis rang dang ghzan gyi be'u la
sogs pa ngo shes pa'i phyir ro/ de lta bas na don ni rnam pa thams cad du mngi gis stong pa
nyid yin pas des dngos po'i ngo bo nyid mgon par rjod' par mi byed pa ni yu bu cag gnyi ga la
yang 'dra'o//

ci ste rkyen byung ngo bo yis"//
gzhon gyi dbang las skye 'dod na//
gsyu bzhun yang dag nyid min pas//
'dod pa sgurb par byed pa yin// (76)
[atha pratyaasambhūtasvabhāveneṣṭādhanam/
utpattih pāratantryāc cen māyā yadvad abhūtāt// (76)]

[C. 219b4, D. 219b4, P. 244b2] zhes bya ba ni ci ste ghzan gyi dbang gi rkyen 'dus pa las byung
ba'i ngo bos ngo bo nyid yod pa kho na yin te/ de ni gzhan gyi dbang las skye ba yin pas don
dam pa ni ma yin par 'dod na/ 'dir bshad pa/ 'o na de ltar de gzhan gyi dbang las skye bar 'dod
na sgyu ma bzhin yang dag pa nyid ma yin pas de la ngo bo nyid ga la yod de/ de ltar na khyed
kho bo cag gi 'dod pa sgrub par byed pa yin no// de ltar sgrub pa ji skad bstan pa des na/

gzhan gyi dbang yang gzung med pa/
ngo bo nyid kyis ma skyes 'dod// (77ab)
[paratantrāgraṇaś cāpi svabhāvāṇātita mataḥ/ (77ab)]

ji lta zhe na/ 'di ltar/

don dam du ni skyes pa la/
log par snang ba mi rigs phyir// (77cd)
[jātasya paramārthena mithyākhyānaṁ na yuṣyate/ (77cd)]

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyis gzhan gyi dbang ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid dang bral
ba nyid kyi phyir/ gzung du med par smras pa de yang gal te ngo bo nyid kyis skyes par gyur na
ni log par snang bar 'gyur ba mi rigs pa'i phyir te/ gang gi phyir de'i ngo bo nyid kyis' ma
skyes pa de kho na'i phyir te/ de log par snang bar 'gyur ro// gzhang yang/

gal te ji ltar snang ba ltar//
der snang bdag nyid yod gyur na/
ji ltar snang ba de yod phyir//
chos mams ji ltar sgyu ma bzhin// (78)
[yathā khyānti tathā santi tadābhāsāmanā yataḥ/
yathā khyānti tathā sattvād dharmā māyopamāḥ katham// (78)]

[C. 220a1, D. 220a1, P. 244b8] zhes bya ba ni gal te dngos po 'di dag rgyu dang rkyen gzhan
gyi dbang gi bdag nyid las ji ltar dbang po'i yul nyid du snang ba ltar der snang ba'i bdag nyid
yod par gyur na ji ltar snang ba der yod pa'i phyir chos mams ji ltar sgyu ma lta bu nyid yin par
'gyur te/ 'di ltar sgyu ma ni skyes bu la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du snang yang de'i ngo bo nyid
dmigs su med de/ sgyu ma ni skyes bu la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis3 stong pa'i phyir ro// de ltar
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par rtags4 pa yang rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no//
de nyid kyi skye med phyir// ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags nyid// ces gang smras pa de yang 'di ltar ches rigs par snang st//

ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags dang//
ṅgos med ngo bo nyid med' pa 'ang//
yod pa nyid las ma skyes dang//
r dzas su yod pa ma yin phyir// (79)
[sadbhūtenāmanā-ājāter anutpannāniruddhā/ avastutvāsvabhāvatve drṣṭasyādravyasattvataḥ// (79)]

[C. 220a4, D. 220a4, P. 245a4] zhes bya ba ni dngos po 'di dag ni rgyu dang rkyen rgs mthun pa'i bdag nyid las skye ba yin gi/ yod pa nyid las skye ba ni ma yin te/ rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad pa'i dngos po gnas pa'i dus na' ngo bo nyid du' rdlul phran tsam yang dmigs su med pa'i phyir rol/ de'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa nyid dang/ dngos po med pa nyid dang/ ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yod pa nyid las ma skyes pa'i phyir ro/ dngos po 'di dag gi ngo bo nyid dang rgyu dang rkyen rgs mthun pa'i bdag nyid las snang bar dmigs par snang ba gang yin pa de yang sa dang/ chu dang/ me dang/ rlung dang/ gzugs dang/ dri dang/ ro dang/ reg pa zhes bya ba'i r dzas brgyad 'dus pa yin te/ de yang dma dang/ nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du r dzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa nyid dang/ dngos po med pa nyid dang/ ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyang yin par khong du chud par bya'o zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don to//

'dir gal te 'di snyang du khyed la dngos po med pa'i phyir chos gdags pa dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro zhes bya bar sems na 'dir bshad pa/

gdags la skyon chags nyid med de//
rnam rig tsam du mthungs phyir rol// (80ab)
[vijñāptimātratulyatvāt prajiñāpter nästi duṣṭatā// (80ab)]

[C. 220b1, D. 220b1, P. 245b2] zhes bya ba ni bdag dang bdag gi rto g pa dang bral ba'i rnam par rig pa tsam du yang kho bo cag dang khyed du mthungs pa nyid' yin la/ phyi rol gyi don rnam par shes pas bskyed pa'i las kyi/ mngen par 'dus byas pa r dzas su med pa la yang phyi nang gi chos 'dogs pa'i phyir kho bo cag gi phyogs la nyes pa med do// khyod kyi phyogs la ni

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spang ba dang spong byed yod pa'i phyir/
yongs shes sogs yod gang gir 'dod// (80cd)
[heyaprahāṭsaddbāvāt kasyeṣṭaṃ nirvidādi sat// (80cd)]

ces bya ba ni gal te sdu gsgal la sogs pa spang ba dang/ spong bar byed pa lam skyses pa
bsgom pa goms par byed pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs dag rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid gzhan gyi
dbang gi cha nyid du yod pa nyid yin na/ ngo bo nyid la ni gzhan du 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir
dang/ gnas 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir sdu gsgal yongs su shes pa la sogs pa 'jig rten las 'das
pa'i rkyen gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yod par 'dod pa de gang gi yin par 'dod de/ 'jig rten
pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'i gnas skabs la 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir gang la ji ltar 'byung bar
'gyur zhes bya bar tshig khong nas drang ngo/
gal te 'di skad ces 'o na khyed la yang rdzas su med pa'i phyir thar pa med par mi 'gyur ram
zhe na/ de'i phyir bshad pa/

de ni gang phyir rdzas med kyang//
rmam rtog bral bas thar par 'gyur//
rdzas yod nyid na 'ang skye med phyir//
'di las gzhan du brtag'i mi 'dod// (81)
[vikalpoparamāṃ muktil adrayatve 'pi sā yataḥ/
dravyasattve 'py ajātatvān nātō 'nyā kalpaneṣyate// (81)]

[C. 220b6, D. 220b6, P. 245b8] ces bya ba ni dngos po rnamz rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa kho na
yin pas 'jig rten pa'i shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i muj thogs su 'jig rten las 'das
pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rtog pa 'phags pa skye bas thar par rigs kyi/ rdzas su yod pa nga bo
nyid mi 'gyur ba rnamz la mi rigs pas thar pa de ni gang gi phyir dngos po rnamz rdzas su med
kyang/ rnam par rtog pa dang bral bas thar par 'gyur ba nyid do/
gal te rnam pa 'ga' zhig gis de dag rdzas su yod pa nyid du 'gyur yang/ de lta na 'ang nga bo
nyid kyi 'sky ba med pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba kho nas thar par rigs so// de'i
phyir tshul 'di las gzhan du yongs su grub pa'i nga bo nyid la dmigs pa'i ye shes yod par brtags
pas ci bya ste/ sngar yang/ nga bo nyid la dmigs yin na/ ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dang//
dmigs pa can du 'gyur ba dang// rnam par mi rtog blor mi 'gyur// zhes bstan zin pas de ni mi
'dod do//
'dir pha rol pos rang gi tshul nyes par smras pa'i gnad du bsun pas shun tu 'khams' nas gtum'
tshig rtsub mo smras pa/

dngos rnams ngo bo nyid med na/
gdags pa 'ang yod par mu 'gyur bas//' de ni med par lta ba dang//
mi gleng bsten' par bya min dang// (82)
rang yang ngan song gzhol ba dang//
gzhan yang phung bar byed pa yin// (83ab)
[prajñapātra apy asadbhāvo svabhāve vastuno 'satu/
taddṛṣṭirāśāsiko 'kathyāh sa hy asaṃpāvyasa eva ca//' (82)
svayamāpāyikatve 'sau paresāṃśca vipādakāh' (83ab)]

[C. 221a3, D. 221a3, P. 246a7] zhes bya ba ni/ de dag na re/ kho bo cag rnal 'byor spyod pa pa
la ni phyi rol gyi yul med du zin kyang rnam par shes pa tsam nyid' re zhig yod pas rnam par
shes pa yongs su gyur pa'i rnam par phyi rol gyi yul yang dmigs su yod la/ yongs su grub pa'i
ngo bo nyid de de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba yang yod kyi/ dbu ma smra ba la
ni re zhig kun rdzob tu yang sgyu ma lta bu nyid du 'dogs pas 'jig rten pa'i chos rnam la skur
pa 'debs pa dang/ don dam par yang rnam par shes pa yang med la/ rnam par shes par' bya ba
yang med pas ci yang med de/ dngos po rnam ngo bo nyid med par skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir
chos gdags pa yang yod par mi 'gyur bas de med pa'i phyir de med par lta ba nyid dang mthun
pa dang/ sus kyang mi gleng mi brjod pa dang/ lhan cig 'grogs pa'i dngos pos brten par mi bya
ba yin te/ de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis kyang dge slong dag khyed kyis deng phyin chad 'jig
rt'en rgyaṅ pan pa sgsang tshig sna tshogs kyi spobs pa can dang bsten par mi bya bsnyen par mi
bya/ bsnyen bkur mi bya'o zhes gsungs pas khyed ni dam pa ma yin pas' yongs su spang bar
bya ba' de'i gnas su shin tu gyur pa dang/ dam pa'i chos spong' ba' phyir rang yang ngan song
la gzhol ba dang/ lta ba 'dzin pa'i chu sрин 'dzin khrī la mgon par zhen pa la mos par byed pa'i
phyir gzhan yang phung bar byed pa yin no zhes zer rol/ de la slob dpon gyis bshad pa/

¹ P: khamš
² C, D: gtun
³ C, D: brtan, P: brtan Correction based on the occurrence of "bsten" in the TJ-commentary to this verse
The closest equivalent of the Sanskrit "saṃpras" seems to be "bsnyen pa" (approach, associate with) which also
occurs in the TJ-commentary
⁴ P: ni
⁵ P: pa
⁶ P: pa
⁷ 'ba' omitted in P
⁸ C, D: slong
zhe sdang sha rul sgregs pa de/
nga rgyal ma zhu ston pa yin// (83cd)
[iti dveṣāmiṣodgāro 'bhīmānājīṁsūcakāḥ// (83cd)]

[C. 221b2, D. 221b2, P. 246b6] zhes bya ba ni khyod kyi khro tshig de ni dper na sha rul gyi sgregs pas ma zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa de bzhin du zhe sdang gi tshig gis mgon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid du ston par byed pa yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// de la zhe sdang nyid sha rul yin te/ de'i sgregs pa lta bu ni khyod kyi tshig de yin no/ mgon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid ma zhu ba lta bu yin te/ sha rul gyi' sgregs pas ma zhu ba nyid ston par byed pa de bzhin du/ zhe sdang gi tshig kyang khyod nyid mgon pa'i nga rgyal can nyid du ston pa yin gyi kho bo'i lta ba ni skyon ci yang med pa kha na yin no/ zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa des bdag nyid mgon pa'i nga rgyal ma zhu ba nyid du ston par zad kyi/ dbu ma pa la de lta bu'i skyon yang dag pa med pa' jī lta nges par bya zhe na/ de'i phyir/

chos rnam sgyu ma bzhin 'dod de/
ngo bo nyid ni med phyir dang/
byis pa rmongs pa'i rgyu phyir dang/
ma byung ba las 'byung phyir ro// (84)
[asadbhūtasvabhāvatvād bālasaṃmohahetutāḥ/ abhūtvā bhāvatvād vāpi dharmā māyopamā matāḥ// (84)]

[C. 221b5, D. 221b5, P. 247a2] zhes bya ba ni kho bos dngos po rnam rnam pa thams cad du med pa nyid yin no zhes ma smras te/ 'di lta kho bo cag ni kun rdzob tu chos rams rgyu dang rkyen rigs mthun pa las 'byung ba sgyu ma bzhin du yod pa nyid du 'dod de ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir dang/ skye bo byis pa lta bu rmongs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir dang/ sngon ma byung ba las byung ba'i phyir ro zhes smras pa de'i tshe ji lta gdags pa yod par mi 'gyur te/ gdags pa yod pa kho na'i phyir kho bo la khyed kyis smras pa'i skyon gysis gnas mi thod do// chos rnam ngo bo nyid med pa gang yin pa de ni' don dam pa yin par yod⁴ pa dang/ med pa'i mtha' gnyis spongs⁶ pa'i phyir kho bo cag med par lta ba nyid dang mthun par ga la 'gyur te/ de'i phyir khyod kyi' tshig de ni zhe sdang gi sha rul gyi sgregs pa nyid yin no/
2. Translation

The Yogācāra objects: "Our doctrine is not incorrect, because it does not contradict reason (yukti). Why is that so? We assert that things lack inherent existence (niḥsvabhāva) because they are empty of the identities (ātman) [expressed by] the words that are used to name them. Those very identities [expressed by] words do not originate. And just because they do not originate, they do not perish either. Any thing with which a word is associated, does not exist the way it is expressed by that word, because [words] are only [arbitrary] conventions (sāṅkṛetamātra). In fact, if things were the actual referents (gocara) of words,\(^1\) one would get hurt by burning one’s mouth when uttering the word 'fire'.\(^2\) Moreover, [our doctrine also agrees with scripture (āgama)] because the existence of the dependent nature is endorsed by the following statement [from scripture]: "Imagined things do not exist, but things that depend on others do exist.'"

We reply:

"Things lack inherent existence because they are empty of the identities [expressed by] the words [that designate them]. And just because things do not originate as having that identity, things neither originate nor perish. (69)

Any thing with which a word is associated, does not exist the way it is expressed [by that word]. Things are therefore not real [in that sense]."

Thus and in many other ways they argue. (70)

And they also say that the dependent [nature] exists.

If [this is argued] with reference to the conventional [truth], [the error of] proving what is already proven will occur. If [it is argued] with reference to the ultimate [truth], then there is no example and the reason is contradictory. (71)

If you intend to prove all that as conventionally [true], you will prove what is already proven, because we also assert all that as the conventional truth. But if you intend to prove it as the ultimate [truth], then there is no example to prove that the dependent [nature] exists ultimately, because that [nature] also is empty of inherent existence [ultimately].\(^3\) Moreover, the logical reason

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\(^1\) Or "If the real identity of things were expressed by the words that are used to designate them"

\(^2\) For this example, see Mahāvihārasūtra, T. vol 27, 73a1ff. (Reference in C. Cox, Disputed Dharmas Early Buddhist Theories on Existence. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo 1995, p 401, note 23 )

\(^3\) Quotation of Laṅkāvatāraśūtra II. 191ab nāvī vair kalpito bhāvaḥ paratāṅtraṁ ca vidvāre Also quoted in PP (Eckel, p 56)

\(^4\) Parallel texts in 'Karakalpataranaśūtra' "If, having in mind the inherent existences that are known to the uneducated minds of cowherds and the like, you argue with reference to the conventional [truth] that conditioned things such as the visual sense organ and so forth have their own inherent existence, then you prove what is already proven. But if you argue with reference to the ultimate [truth], then there is no accordant example (sādharmastuṣṭaṁ)" (T vol 30, 269c1-3); "If you argue that the dependent nature exists with reference to the conventional [truth], you prove what is already proven. If you argue that it exists with reference to the ultimate truth, then there is no accordant example" (T vol 30, 272b12-13)
"because [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words" is contradictory (vīruddhā).
In fact, by inferring that [things] are empty of the identities [expressed by] words, [you implicitly affirm] the existence of their inexpressible nature and thus negate [your thesis] that things lack inherent existence. The nature (svārūpa) of the subject of your proposition (dharmin) is therefore not correctly established.¹

You might argue as follows: "The dependent nature, as we understand it, lacks inherent existence with respect to its origination (upattinīṁśvabhāva) because it does not originate from [itself as] already existent, just like a magical apparition (māyā).² Thus, because that [dependent nature] also is empty of inherent existence, the meaning of the reason [in our inference] is not contradictory."

We reply:

If [you say that] the dependent nature lacks inherent existence with respect to its origination because it does not originate from [itself as] already existent, isn’t it then clearly established that its [ultimate] origination, perishing and so forth are thereby negated? (72)

If so, then exactly our view will be established. In fact, we also assert that things which [conventionally speaking] originate from the nature (ātman) of appropriate causes and conditions, are [ultimately] empty of inherent existence and [ultimately] lack origination, perishing and so forth, because they do not originate from their own nature (svātman). And this view agrees also with

¹ The nature attributed to the subject of the Yogācāra proposition ("things") is "lacking inherent existence [ultimately]." This predicate is however contradicted by the logical reason which says that things lack the identities that are imputed to them by words, without thereby excluding that each thing ultimately possesses its own existence and its own inexpressible nature which are the products of its own causes and conditions. This own-nature is not imputed and cannot be imputed by words simply because it is not expressible by words. As the Yogācāra understands it, "dependent nature" means that each real thing is produced by causes and conditions that are other than itself (paratāntar) and nevertheless possesses an existence and an essence that are strictly its own (svabhāva) precisely because each thing is the product of causes and conditions that are exclusively its own. This strictly individual nature cannot be included within a class, category or universal and is therefore never the object of conceptual knowledge or speech. "To have a dependent nature" thus means "to own an inexpressible, other-produced inherent existence and essence" or "to be the exclusive owner of an existence and an essence that were produced by others."

² Although Bhāvaviveka agrees to this as far as the conventional truth is concerned, he does not accept that such an other-produced existence is an inherent existence (svabhāva) in the ultimate sense (paramārtha), because only something that is "unmade (akṛtaka, akṛtrima) and not dependent on others (paratāntarapekṣa)" (MMK XV.2) can be an inherent existence in the ultimate sense for the Madhyamaka. Madhyamaka reasonings in search for ultimate existences should therefore exclude the dependent nature as non-ultimate. This exclusion of individually owned existence, although at first theoretical, is foremost a matter of meditational practice (bhāvanā). Its final outcome is an enlightened mind characterized by the non-perception (anupalambhā) of individual entities, that is to say, of entities that would own a part of being in their own right.

The crucial problem in this connection is the following. What exactly does Bhāvaviveka mean when he says that the Yogācāra attributes ultimate existence to the dependent nature of things? And is he right in attributing this view to the Yogācāra? I intend to discuss this problem on another occasion. For Tsong Khapa’s approach to this problem, see R. Thurman, The Speech of Gold, Motilal Banarsidass 1989, pp. 218-223.

² This is the standard definition of upatīṁsvabhāva in the Yogācāra texts (SNS, T. vol. 16, 694a18-20; YBh, T. vol. 30, 702b21-23; Xiang-yang-sheng-jiao-lung, T vol. 31, 557b19-20, 559a8-9; TrBh 41.16-17 ad TrK 24 [na svayambhāva etasya (= paratāntarāsvabhāvasya) māyāṇaḥ parapratyayena upatīṁ]). Parallel texts in PP (Eckel, pp 59-60) ; Karatalaramaśāstra, T. vol. 30, 271c22-25.
Scripture, because

“The Lord of the world has taught that whatever originates from conditions does not originate [ultimately].” (73ab)

Why is that so?

Because its origination as an inherent existence in the ultimate sense is negated. (73cd)

The Lord has taught that something which originates from conditions does not originate ultimately (paramārthaḥ), because the nature of that thing is not seen [to exist] in that thing [itself] apart from the collection of its causes and conditions (hetupratyasamagri). Similarly, [the Lord] has taught: “Whatever originates from conditions does not originate. Origination in its own right is not found there. Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty. Whoever knows emptiness is free of delusion.” Furthermore,

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There is a fundamental difference between the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka understandings of “upattonmaysvabhāva.” The Yogācāra says that the dependently originated nature of each instance of mind is not an inherent or ultimate nature in the sense that it is not a self-produced nature. Nevertheless, an other-dependent nature inheres exclusively in each particular instance of mind, and is in that sense an exclusively-owned inherent nature or an ultimate existence that must not be negated, but should be retained as a genuine remainder (avatāra) of reality, by and in the minds of those who desire to know and see reality as it is. In short, for the Yogācāra “upattonmaysvabhāva” means both svātva-upattonmaysvabhāva (ultimate absence of a self-produced inherent nature) and parama-upattonmaysvabhāva (ultimate presence of an other-produced inherent nature).

For Bhāvaviveka, however, a nature that originates in dependence on others needs to be negated and excluded as non-originated and as absolutely non-existent in the ultimate sense. Bhāvaviveka therefore rejects “upattonmaysvabhāva” in the Yogācāra sense of “things ultimately lack inherent existence only to the extent that they do not originate from themselves.” Instead, he asserts the much more radical Madhyamaka position of “anupattonmaysvabhāva” (things ultimately lack inherent existence because ultimately they do not originate at all). Bhāvaviveka’s view is most clearly stated in his reply to the following Yogācāra objection in the “Karatalaravatsāsna”

“You [Madhyamikas] argue that conditioned entities are ultimately (tattvaḥ) empty [of inherent existence] because they arise from conditions. If you intend to say that conditioned entities are empty in the sense that they lack inherent existence with respect to their origination (upattonmaysvabhāva) because they arise from conditions and do not exist by themselves, then your argument establishes the Yogācāra position and is perfectly in conformity with reason.” (T. vol. 30, 271c22-25)

Bhāvaviveka replies as follows

“What do you mean when you say that conditioned entities are empty in the sense that they lack inherent existence with respect to their origination because they arise from conditions and do not exist by themselves?

If you mean that conditioned, dependently originated things such as the visual sense organ and so forth are empty in the sense that the unconditioned, permanent and imperishable nature (viśvabhāva) of the visual sense organ and so forth is absolutely absent in them, then you attempt to prove something that needs no proof (viśvabhāva). This is indeed accepted by the Buddhist schools, the Sāṃkhya, the Vaibhāṣika, and so forth.

Since it is taught that the visual sense organ and so forth are not made empty but are empty by nature (prakṛtvā sūnya),49 you should say that things are empty in the sense of “absence of inherent existence because of non-origination” (abhimūla-pratīptavabhāva), and not in the sense of “absence of inherent existence because of [other-dependent] origination (sūnya-tattva-pratīptavabhāva). If things, at the time of their origination, originate as having an inherent existence in the ultimate sense (paramārthaḥ), how can you say that they lack inherent existence with respect to their origination (upattonmaysvabhāva)? You should be consistent and say that they originate in the ultimate sense (upattonmaysvabhāva). On the other hand, if they do not really originate and have no substance at all, you should not say that their true nature is ‘mind only’. But if you accept this al-
The fact that things are not ultimately real explains perfectly well why, conventionally speaking, their individual and general [properties] function as the objects of different cognitions and words. (74)

Just because things are not ultimately real, we can explain the fact that, conventionally speaking, they function as the objects of different cognitions and words [which apprehend or designate] their individual and general properties such as blue and so forth, form and so forth, or pot and cloth and so forth. If things were ultimately real, then like space they would have just one undifferentiated nature and could therefore not be the object of different cognitions and different words. But that is not the case.¹

In this connection, there is also the following scriptural statement which is approved by both [the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka] systems:

Such and such a name is used to express such and such a thing, but these [names] do not exist therein. That is the ultimate nature of things.² (75)

¹ According to Bhāvaviveka, the Yogācāra argument that the dependent nature of things exists as the substratum of conventional knowledge and speech (cf. MHK V.6) implies that the dependent nature is not ultimately real. In his view, the dependent nature of things comprises strictly individual properties (sva-lakṣaṇa) which are the objects of non-conceptual and non-verbalized direct perception (pratyakṣa), and general properties (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) which are the objects of conceptual knowledge and speech and are an integral, real part of the dependently produced identity of each thing (see MHK V.62). If the dependent nature were an inherent existence in the ultimate sense, as the Yogācāra asserts according to Bhāvaviveka, it should be one, unchangeable and undifferentiated, and could not function as the object of many different cognitions and words. See also Bhāvaviveka’s account of “prañāpti” in verses 80ab and 82-84 below.

² From the Arñadhavaśesāṃkāntasūtra (cf. Yamaguchi, p 511-512). Also quoted in PP (Eckel, p. 56). The pre-Bhāvaviveka Yogācāra texts where this verse is quoted are BBh (48.12-13) and Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti (D. Sems 14, Si 110b3 ff.).

The author of BBh quotes this verse to substantiate his view that the true nature of all things is imexpressible (svabhāvapraśna-vahāvā) and explains its meaning as follows (BBh 48.15-22). The identity (atman) that is expressed by for instance the name “rūpa” does not exist in the real things to which the name “rūpa” is applied (rūpa-sva-vat-tat tuḥkha dharmāḥ = prajñapti-vadāśraya = vastumātra). And the fact that things exist (viṇṇamānata) as imexpressible (that is, as lacking the identity which words attribute to them) is their ultimate, true nature (paramārtha-ha-svabhāvadhammatā).

Vasubandhu’s interpretation of this verse in Vyākhyāyukti focuses more on the necessary existence of “the real things that have an inexpressible nature” (bṛjod du med pa’i mtshan ngyi kyi dngos po, anabhātāya laksanavastu). These real things are the substrata of immanent things (= the identities imputed by words) and of an ultimate inexpressible nature (dharmatā = parniśparnasvabhāva). As Vasubandhu says, if those real things did not exist, the verse would not say “na sa sāṃvidyate tatra” nor would it say “dharmānāṃ sā ca dharmatā”
'Such and such a name' means 'names that express the individual and general [properties of things] and consist of a number of syllables (akṣara)'. 'To express such and such a thing' refers to the verbal expression of the things that are objects of speech (abhidheya), such as colors and shapes (rūpa) and so forth. 'These [names] do not exist therein' means that the expression in the form of a name does not exist in the thing [to which it is applied] because the nature of things does not consist of syllables. In fact, one and the same thing is expressed in many different ways depending on the variety of local languages (deśabhāṣā) and word-derivations (nirukti). Water, for instance, is called "pāṇīya", "āp", "salīla", "nīra", and so forth. Now, if water had the nature of the verbal expression (abhidhāna) effected by one of these words, then the other words would not be applicable to it and could not express it. But that is obviously not the case.

'That is the ultimate nature of things' means that 'being inexpressible' (nirabhilāpya) is the ultimate nature (paramārthatā) of things. People in the world (sāṃvṛti) invent names and establish connections between names and things (sāṃketa) for the sake of identifying and recognizing (pratyabhijñā) [things]. Based on the characteristics (viśeṣa) of a particular thing, these names make it known that this thing is for instance a cow, and not a horse or a human being. The identity [of the thing designated as 'cow'] is an object of knowledge (buddhiśaya). Why? Because even people who do not know syllables and do not understand spoken language, such as mute and deaf people, recognize things such as pots and the like, and even cows recognize their own and others' calves by means of smell and eyesight. Because things are thus in all respects empty of [the nature of] names, both of us agree that names do not express the nature of things.\footnote{As Yamaguchi (p. 518, note 6) observes, 'the identity (agō bo nyu) [of the thing designated as `cow']' refers to the general property (sāmānyya) `cow'. For Bhāvaviveka, the general property `cow' is an objective reality inherent in each particular cow (cf. MHK/TJ V 62 ff.) But the word `cow', consisting of syllables, does not exist in any particular cow. It is therefore not necessary to know words in order to be able to identify and recognize a particular animal as a `cow'. Because the general property `cow' inheres in each particular cow, even deaf and mute people can identify cows by eyesight or touch (cf. TJ ad MHK V 63 on the perceptibility of general properties) and can entertain the notion or idea `cow' even though they are not able to connect that idea with the word `cow'. Similarly, animals have a recognizing and notional knowledge of `my call', `food', etc (see also TJ ad MHK V 58).}

\footnote{In all respects' means 'both conventionally and ultimately.' Although the text says that both the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka agree that things are in all respects empty of the nature of names, the way this is understood by each is fundamentally different. For the Yogācāra, the dependent nature of things is a real (aśravasaś), instantaneous (kaśyapa), strictly individual (svalakṣaṇa) and inexpressible nature. Words refer to general properties or identities (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) that are imaged to be real (parakalpa) but are actually only nominal existences (prajñāpti). The identities that are designated by words are therefore not only ultimately but also conventionally unreal (aśravasaś). In contrast, for Bhāvaviveka, independently originated things are, conventionally speaking, empty of the nature of the words that designate them for the quite simplistic reason that things, unlike words, are not made up of syllables. But this does not mean that the general properties or identities (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) to which words refer are only nominal existences or imaged identities. As we have observed again and again, Bhāvaviveka holds that general properties are independently originated properties, and are in that sense real properties, inherent in and constituting an integral part of the individual nature (svabhāvī) of each independently originated thing. But since these individual natures depend on causes and conditions, they do not exist ultimately. That is to say, they are excluded from the true reality as seen by an enlightened mind. An en-}
If you argue that [the dependent nature] originates by the power of others because it is an inherent nature (svabhāva) that arises from conditions, then like a magical apparition it is not [ultimately] real (abhūta) and you end up proving our position. (76)

You might argue as follows: "The [dependent] nature exists only as a nature that arises from a collection of conditions in the power of others. Since it thus originates by the power of others, it is not the ultimate reality (paramārtha)."

We reply: "If you argue that it originates by the power of others, then it is not [ultimately] real, just like a magical apparition. How can it then be an [ultimate] inherent existence? Thus, you end up proving our position."

If [our position] is thus proven, then

[Your statement that] the dependent [nature] does not exist the way it is apprehended also implies that it does not originate as an inherent existence [ultimately]. (77ab)

Why is that so? Because

Something that originates in the ultimate sense cannot be a deceptive appearance. (77cd)

You say that the dependent [nature of the mind] does not exist the way it is [normally] apprehended because it lacks the nature of an objective aspect and a subjective aspect (grāhyagrāhakasvabhāvavirahitatvāt). Again, if [the dependent nature of the mind] really originated as an

lightened mind remains necessarily silent, for it has eliminated all notions and perceptions of individual existences that could have general properties (sāmānyavadvastu) and could be expressed by words. It sees reality as it is through a knowledge that is non-conceptual, non-differentiating and non-dual (nirvikalpañāna)

1 If I understand the text correctly, the Yogacāra position, as it is rendered here, says that notwithstanding its dependency on others the dependent nature exists ultimately (paramārthaḥ) in the sense that, for the Yogacāra, an enlightened mind still has a differentiating perception of the individual, dependently originated nature of all things. But since the dependent nature is a conditioned and impermanent nature, it is not the unconditioned, unchangeable, ultimate reality (paramārtha) itself. "Ultimate reality" in this context is a synonym of emptiness (śūnyatā), absence of self-existence (nairātmyam, niḥsvabhāvatvam), perfectly established nature (puristipavnasvabhāva) and other terms mentioned in MHK V.3.

"abhūta" in verse 76 does not mean "nonexistent" or "unreal". It means "deceptive;" "not existing the way it appears to exist;" "apparently non-empty but ultimately empty;" "inherently existent for a common nonsense, but absolutely non-existent for an enlightened mind." For Bhāvaśekha, the dependent nature of things is deceptive in that it so speaks hides its dependency on others and takes on the appearance of a self-established, truly ultimate existence. The Yogacāra asserts the same, but whereas Bhāvaśekha excludes the individual, dependent nature of things from the realm of true reality, the Yogacāra retains it as a genuine reality to be known as it is by an enlightened mind.

2 "paratantrāgraḥā” in verse 77ab is a reference to "paratantrasya vāgraḥāḥ" in verse 5ab.
inherent existence, it could not be a deceptive appearance. Hence, it is just because it does not originate as an inherent existence that it is a deceptive appearance! 

Furthermore,

If [things] really had the nature they appear to have, they would exist exactly as they appear. How could they then be similar to a magical apparition? If the things whose nature depends on other causes and conditions and which appear [in our mind] as objects of the senses, really had the nature they appear to have, they would exist exactly as they appear. How could things then be similar to a magical apparition? Although a magical apparition appears to have the nature of a [real] man and so forth, that nature is not observable because the nature of a [real] man and so forth is absent in a magical apparition. In the same way, there are no valid reasons to believe that the dependent nature exists [ultimately].

Also, your statement "And just because things do not originate as having that identity, things neither originate nor perish" sounds much more reasonable [if it is explained] as follows:

Because [these things] do not originate from [their own nature as already] existent, and also because they are not real entities (adravya), they do not originate, do not perish, are not real (avastu) and have no inherent nature (asvabhāva).

These things originate from the nature of appropriate causes and conditions and not from [their own nature as already] existent, because not any inherent nature—not even that of a single atom—is seen to exist at the time when things are apart from the collection of their causes and conditions. Things do therefore not originate and do not perish. And because they do not originate [from their own nature as already] existent, things are also not real and have no inherent existence [ultimately].

In addition, the nature of these things and also their form (ābhāsa) which appears as an object

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1 The comparison of the dependent nature of things with the deceptive nature of magical phenomena is also discussed in PP (Eckel, p 60) and in KR (T vol 30, 269a2-7; 271a9-b19). The argument of verse 77 is repeated as follows in KR. "If magical phenomena [such as the appearances of a horse or an elephant created by a magician] really existed in one way or another with that nature [of a real elephant or a real horse, they could not deceive and] mistaken perceptions (upavṛṣṭi) of them would be impossible." (T vol 30, 269a6-7)

2 To an ordinary perceiving mind, all dependently originated things appear as if they were self-established individual existences, having their own borders and contours that isolate them from other things. In that sense, dependently originated things exist as things which do not have the nature they appear to have. According to Bhāvaviveka, to exist that way disqualifies them from being ultimately real. Common minds, perceiving isolated, individual existences, perceive correctly as far as common sense (saṃvit) is concerned. But when it comes to the ultimate truth, one should say that common minds are being deceived in that they are still seeing unrealities.

3 To be compared with Catuḥṣataka XIII 23cd (= 323cd). See J F Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmaśāla and Candrakīrti, Wien 1990, Volume 1, pp 170-171

4 Reference to verse 69cd

"These things" refers to the "bhāvā" in the Yogācāra argument in verse 69ab
[of perception] and originates from\(^1\) the nature of appropriate causes and conditions, are aggregations (\textit{samāhya}) of the eight real entities (\textit{dravya}) earth, water, fire, wind, color and shape, odor, taste and the tactile. Because [such aggregations] also are not real entities [ultimately], just as an army, a forest, and so forth [are not real entities even conventionally], one should realize that they do not originate, do not perish, are not real and have no inherent nature [ultimately].\(^2\) Such is the meaning of the verse.

Here you might object as follows: "Because in your view things do not exist [at all], you cannot account for the conventional designation of things (\textit{dharma}prajñāpīti)."

We reply:

We are not at fault as to the [real basis of] conventional designations, because we assert the same as [you who advocate] consciousness-only. (80ab)

Regarding consciousness-only as free from the [mistakenly imputed] notions of "I" and "mine", there is no difference between you and us. [In fact, we say that] the conventional designations of external and internal things occur with respect to things that are not [ultimately] real (\textit{dravya}) and are created (\textit{abhisamśkṛta}) by actions originating from a consciousness that perceives external objects. Hence, there is no fault in our view.\(^3\) But your view [involves the following problem]:

Since [consciousness] exists as the thing to be eliminated and as the eliminating agent as well, where will the perfect knowledge [of suffering] and so forth (\textit{parijñānādi})\(^4\) exist?

(80cd)

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\(^1\) Literally: "...and appears from ..." (\ldots las snang bar).

\(^2\) The present passage is difficult to understand, unless one reads it in combination with the commentary on the verses V.35-36 and 38. These verses deal exclusively with the conventional truth. They say that the following are conventional truths: (1) Atoms, as aggregations of the eight real entities, are themselves real entities (\textit{dravya}-\textit{asat}), (2) An aggregation, or rather a conglomerate (\textit{sanceta}) of atoms of the same kind in a single object, such as for instance a pot, is a real entity, (3) Aggregations of dissimilar objects at the same place, such as an army or a forest, are only nominal entities (\textit{prajñāpītīt}).

It is therefore clear that in verse 79 Bhāvaviveka is reasoning from the point of view of the ultimate truth and in that sense negates what was said in verses 35-36, 38. The point of verse 79 is that a real entity in the ultimate sense cannot be composite, but should be strictly one. The same reasoning could of course be used to negate the ultimate existence of the "eight real entities" too.

\(^3\) S. Yamaguchi (pp. 527-529) apparently has not understood the meaning of verse 80ab. His commentary misses the point. Bhāvaviveka intends to say the following: The Yogācāra teaches that the dependent nature of consciousness, although empty of a substantial self (\textit{ātman}) and of self-established mental factors (\textit{caitīś) or external objects (\textit{nirṛtya}) that are habitually grasped as "mine", necessarily exists as the substratum to which the false notions of "I" and "mine" are applied. But, says Bhāvaviveka, we Mādhyamikas also posit consciousness as the only original substratum of conventional designations, except that consciousness for us is also conscious of real external objects. Consciousness, being the only agent (cf. MHK V. 28cd), is the origin of all the actions by which all things are created. The thus created things are not ultimately real (\textit{dravya} = \textit{abhiśita} in verse 74) and can therefore function as the objects of conventional designations.

\(^4\) Based on the Tibetan text. The Sanskrit text reads \textit{nirvālādi} ("disregard of the world and so forth")
[In your view], both the things to be eliminated, such as suffering and so forth, and all the actions (saṃskārā) of cultivation (bhāvanā) from which the path of elimination (prahāṇamārga) originates, exist as parts of consciousness and as parts of the dependent [nature of consciousness]. Now, since [that] inherent nature (svabhāva) does not change and is not subject to fundamental transformation (āśrayaparāvyṛti), where do you think will the conditions of transmundane [mental states] such as the perfect knowledge of suffering and so forth, which in your opinion exist as the dependent nature [of consciousness], exist? The following is meant here. Since [the dependent nature of consciousness] does not change in both its mundane (laukika) and transmundane states (lokottarāvasthā), where and how will [the transmundane mental states] ever arise?

In case you object and ask: "Isn’t it so that final liberation (mukti) is nonexistent for you also, because [in your view, things] are not real entities (adravya)?", we reply:

It is also [just] because [things] are not real entities that [true] final liberation is attained through the cessation of dual consciousness (vikalpa). Even if [things] are real entities, they [still] do not originate [by their own nature]. Any view [of final liberation] other than ours is therefore unacceptable. (81)

Just because things are not real entities, the birth of the superior transmundane non-dual knowledge (āryalokottaramvikalpa-paṭīna) following upon [the elimination of all the forms of] mundane dual knowledge (laukikasavikalpa-paṭīna) is fit to be the [true state of] liberation. But that would not be the case if there existed real entities with an unchangeable nature. Hence, it is also just because things are not real entities that liberation is [true] liberation when dual consciousness has been abandoned.

Even if things are in some way real entities, they [still] do not originate by their own nature. Thus, in that case also, the absence of dual consciousness is fit to be the [true] liberation. So, what good is there in adhering to a different view [than ours] by asserting the existence of a knowledge that perceives the perfectly established nature (parinīṣpannasvabhāva) [of things]? Such [a view] is unacceptable also because of what we have said before, namely: "If the enlight-

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1 This commentary seems to be informed by Mūlamadhyamakakāśikā XXIV.26-27 where Nāgārjuna points out that the perfect knowledge of suffering, the elimination of its causes (saṃdāva-praṇāga), the cultivation of the path (mārga-bhāvanā) and the realization of final liberation (nirvāṇa-pāktavāya) will be impossible if things exist inherently (svabhāvataḥ). In Nāgārjuna’s own words: “If [consciousness] has [at first] by its own nature no perfect knowledge [of suffering, etc.], how can it then ever [attain] that perfect knowledge? Isn’t it so that an inherent nature is unchangeable?” (MMK XXIV.26)

2 Verse 81 and its commentary are one of the most difficult passages in Chapter 5. Other translations than the one I offer here are certainly possible. In my interpretation, Bhāvaviveka criticizes here the Yogācāra understanding of liberating knowledge or "lokottaranvikalpa-paṭīna" in connection with the Yogācāra view that the dependent nature and the perfectly established nature of things exist ultimately. If these two natures really exist ultimately, the liberating knowledge will have to know them as they are in order to be the truly liberating knowledge of reality as it is. In that case, however, the liberating knowledge will not be non-dual (nirvākalpa) but will still be a dual or object-dyfing (svikalpa) knowledge of things that exist inherently. In contrast, the lib-
enewed mind of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will [still] be a dual consciousness (savikalpa). It will then also have an object and will consequently not be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of reality as it is]."

Our opponent, extremely agitated because of [our] very cutting criticism of his views, now utters these furious words:

If things have no inherent nature, conventional designations also will not exist. He [who propounds this] is a nihilist to whom one should not talk and with whom one should not dwell together. (82)

Not only is such a [nihilist] himself destined for an unhappy existence, but he also leads others to misery. (83ab)²

They say: "For us Yogācāras, objects outside consciousness do not exist. Nevertheless, because consciousness alone really exists, the perception of external objects in the form of images (ākāra) that are [internal] transformations (parināma) of consciousness [itself] also exists. And the perfectly established nature [of consciousness], which is realized individually (pratyātmavadya) by the Tathāgata, also exists. You Mādhyamikas, however, first of all negate the existence of the things in the world because you say that, even according to the conventional [truth], [things are] similar to magical apparitions. And when it comes to the ultimate [truth], nothing exists [for you] because neither consciousness (vijñāna) nor its object (vijñeya) exists. Since you thus negate the inherent nature of things [in all respects], the conventional designation of things (dharmanaprajñapti) also will not exist. And since [even] that does not exist [for you], your view is the same as that of the nihilists, and nobody should talk or discuss with you, nor should any true fellow [Buddhist] (sahacārin) rely [on you]. That is the reason why also the Blessed One has said: "Monks, from this day forward, you should not rely on, not approach, and not respect the Lokāyatanas who are experts in all kinds of secretive language (mantra)." Accordingly, you, who are evil (asat), ought to be shunned by all means.³ Because you reject the true teaching

1. Reference to MHK V.16
2. The content of verses 82-83ab is repeated, almost word by word, in KR, T. vol. 30, 272a5-7. Verses 82-83ab are based on the following passage against the 'nihilists' in the Bodhisattvabhūmi: "tēṣām prajñaptvadhishthānasya vastumātrasya abhāvāt sava prajñaptiḥ sarveṣa sarvaḥ na bhavati. kataḥ pūṣṇaḥ prajñaptvamatraṁ tattvaṁ bhavyātā tadv atena parāryaṇa tais tattvaṁ api prajñaptiḥ api tadabhavam api aparavādaṁ bhavati prajñaptvadāvatādācā prahānaṁ nāṣṭakāḥ vedavyātāḥ sa evaṁ nāṣṭakāḥ sann acaḥ yāyo bhavati asaṁvāyyo vijñāṇaṁ sabrahmacāriṇīm. sa atmānaṁ api viṣayālayati loko 'pi yo 'syāḥ dṛṣṭyamunataḥ ṛṣya yaśa." (BBh 46.14-21; T. vol. 30, 488c3-10)
3. Literally: "You are an extreme case (sthāna) of what needs to be avoided [according to the just quoted words of the Blessed One]."
(saddharma) [of the Buddha], you yourself are destined for an unhappy existence. And since you incite [others] to become attached to the evil demon (graha) of [extreme] views, you make others fall into misery as well.”

The teacher replies:

Those words are the vomiting of the putrid meat of hatred. They betray your undigested pride. (83cd)

Just as the vomiting of putrid meat indicates an indigestion, just so your hateful words indicate that you are full of pride. Such is the meaning of the words [of the teacher]. Your hatred is [like] vomited meat. Your words are like the vomiting of that [meat]. Your being full of pride is like having an indigestion. Just as the vomiting of putrid meat indicates an indigestion, just so your hateful words indicate that just you are full of pride, while there is no fault at all in our view.

The vomiting of the putrid meat of [your] hatred merely betrays [your] indigested pride of self.

If you ask why we are sure that the error [of nihilism] does not occur in the Madhyamaka, we say:

In our view, things are similar to a magical apparition, because they have no [independent] own-nature, and because they are the cause of the bewilderment of ignorant people, and because they come into existence after having been non-existent. (84)

We [Mādhyamikas] do not say that things do not exist in every respect. In fact, in our view, things that arise from appropriate causes and conditions do exist for conventional thought in the same way as a magical apparition, because they lack an [independent] own-nature, and because they are the cause of the bewilderment that is observed in ignorant people, and because they originate after having been non-existent. So, how could it be that the existence of conventional designations is not accounted for [in our doctrine]? Since conventional designations do indeed exist [for us], the error you point out does not apply to us. On the other hand, the fact that things lack an [independent] own-nature is the ultimate [truth for us]. Since the two extremes of existence and non-existence are thus excluded [in our doctrine], on what grounds could our view be similar to the nihilistic view? Those words of yours are therefore merely the vomiting of the putrid meat of [your] hatred.

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1 A more extensive defense against the accusation of nihilism is found in "Karotaravarnasāstra, T vol 30, 271c 22-272c10 (L, de la Vallée Poussin, Le Bouddhisme Dans La Man, MCB II, 1932-33, pp 93-99)

This long "digression", as Bhāvaviveka himself calls it, contains some crucial passages that inform us about how the Yogācāra and Bhāvaviveka disagreed on the meaning of "that of which something is empty" (vāna sāṃvay) and "that which is empty" (vāna sāṃvay).

The Yogācāra interprets "vāna sāṃvay, vāna sāṃvay" in terms of its three-natures tenet in which the affirmation of the ultimate existence of the dependent nature plays a pivotal role. Bhāvaviveka renders the Yogācāra position as follows

"The Yogācāras say ( ) Moreover, the following is taught in scripture. When this [=A] is empty of that [=B], then that [=B] does not exist. When this [=A] is empty, then thus [=A] really exists. It is exactly thus that
the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness.” Now, the meaning of this statement is as follows. The imagined nature does not exist at all in the dependent [nature of things], because the dependent [nature] does not have that [imagined] nature. Because things that are designated by words (abhidheyas) do not have the nature that is expressed by words (abhidhānas), and because words do not designate the nature of the things they refer to, the imagined nature does not exist at all in the dependent nature. “Empty of that” (yena sānyam) refers to [these] mistakenly imagined things that do not exist at all. “This is empty” (yat sānyam) refers to the dependently originated entities that are real natures. If this does not exist, not anything will exist. What could then be empty of what? This real thing that arises from conditions is what we call the “dependent nature.” (T. vol. 30, 271c22-272a4)

Bhāvaviveka’s source for the above passage is obviously the following text in the Bodhisattvabhāmiya: “How is emptiness (sānyatā) incorrectly understood (durgtihāta)? Emptiness is incorrectly understood when a Srāṇa or Bhṛmaṇa does not accept that of which something is empty (tac ca necchat yena sānyam) nor that which is empty (tad api necchat yad sānyam). The reason is the following. Emptiness is [properly] established because of the non-existence of that of which something is empty and because of the real existence of that which is empty. But if everything does not exist, what will be empty of what? (sarvābhāvāca ca katra kim kena sānyam bhavasyait) It is against reason that something would be empty of itself (na ca tena tasyaiva sānyatā yuyyate). Therefore, emptiness is incorrectly understood if it is understood that way.

How then is emptiness correctly understood? When one correctly sees that this [≡A] is empty of that [≡B] because that [≡B] does not exist in this [≡A] (yataścā yaḥ yatra na bhavati tat tena sānyam iti samanupasyati) and when one correctly knows that what remains in this [≡A] really exists here (yat punar ativaśīṣṭam bhavati tat sad hātānā yathāhāthane praṇāsati), then that is called the correct and unmistakable understanding of emptiness.” (BBh 47 8-20).

The author of BBh defines the ‘real remainder’ as the [dependently originated] real entities (vastumātra) which function as the support of conventional designations (prajñaptivādavabhāva) and of the ultimate reality (tathātā = te bhāvāpannavabhāvātā = sānyatā). It is easy to see that vastumātra, prajñaptivādavabhāva and tathātā are the precursors of the three natures peratantra, parikalpita and parannespam respectively. The most explicit definition of the ‘real remainder’ is found in the later Madhyāntavibhāga texts. Vasubandhu quotes the BBh-passage on the ‘real remainder’ in his commentary to MVK I.1-2 and clarifies its meaning as follows.

“Everything is not empty because emptiness and false consciousness (abhātaparikalpa) exist. [Everything] is not non-empty because the duality of object and subject does not exist.” (MV Bh 18.10-11) Sthiramati’s sub-commentary puts it most clearly: “What then is the [real] remainder here? [Answer:] False consciousness and emptiness.” (MVT 14.12-13).

Bhāvaviveka gives us also his own interpretation of “yena sānyam, yat sānyam”, as follows: "Next, as for the teaching ‘When this is empty of that, then that does not exist. When this is empty, then this really exists, etc.,’ [the meaning is as follows.]: When the things that arise from conditions and are taken for real by all the people in the world, such as the eyes and so forth, function as the object (gocara) of the minds of unintelligent people, then [to those people who perceive and think] according to the conventional truth (samtryūtā), these things appear as if they had an inherent nature (svabhāva). But when the [superior] mind examines [these things] as to their ultimate reality (paramārthasatya), it is found that they have no real inherent nature at all, just as a man created by magic (māvāpunēṣa) [does not have the nature of a real man]. It is therefore said ‘When this is empty of that, then that does not exist.’ This is taught to ward off the error of falling into the extreme of eternalism (sāsvatānta)."

And just as that is said to be nonexistent in order to ward off the error of eternalism, just so is it said that this exists in order to avoid the extreme of nihilism (ucchedānta). That is to say, things that arise from conditions, such as the eyes and so forth, are included among the conventional realities (samtrytāsatya) and do have an inherent nature (svabhāva). Unlike flowers in the sky, they are not completely nonexistent. It is only from the point of view of ultimate reality (tattvataḥ) that they are said to be empty. It is therefore said “When this is empty [of an inherent nature in the ultimate sense], then this really exists [for conventional thought]. It is exactly thus that the Teacher of gods and men has taught emptiness.” If you say that the dependent nature exists in that sense, then I agree. Indeed, I also accept that such a [dependently originated] inherent nature exists.” (T. vol. 30, 272a26-88).

For Bhāvaviveka, “yat sānyam” thus stands for all the dependently originated things that are real for common sense. Note that this also includes the general properties of things (sāṃskṛta, see MHK V.60 ff.) which the Yogācāra disdains as ‘imagined’ (parikalpita). Only imaginary things, such as flowers in the sky or any other thing that common sense unanimously rejects as unreal, are excluded from “yat sānyam.” A conventional mind, not concerned with questioning things as to their ultimate-reality status, simply thinks that dependently originated things have their own existence and their own nature, and perceives them that way. A superior mind, on the other hand, negates all “own existence” and “own nature” of conditioned things because it searches for an ultimate reality that would not be dependent on anything else. For Bhāvaviveka, “yena sānyam” refers to this ultimate-reality status of which conditioned things are empty in virtue of their being dependent on others. And the ‘real remainder’ for Bhāvaviveka are those same conditioned things, stripped of any “own(ed) nature”, as they are seen by an enlightened mind.
APPENDIX: Notes on the Sanskrit text of MHK Chapter 5, verses 1-84

Although my translation of Chapter 5 of MHK/TJ is based on the Tibetan text, I have of course also made use of the Sanskrit text of MHK Chapter 5. In the previous installments, as well as in the present one, I have inserted the Sanskrit text for each of the verses in my edition of the Tibetan text. For the Sanskrit text of the verses 1-68, I have used the following two sources:

(1) Shrikant S. Bahulkar, "The Madhyamaka-Hṛdaya-Kārikā of Bhāvaviveka: A Photographic Reproduction of Prof. V.V. Gokhale’s Copy," Nagoya Studies In Indian Culture And Buddhism, Sāмbhāṣā, Vol. 15, 1994. (Chapter5 is on the pages 28-34.)

This is a photographic reproduction of V.V. Gokhale’s own handcopy of R. Sānkṛityāyana’s handcopy of the Sha-lu manuscript. Gokhale’s handcopy contains his own corrections and additions (in case of lacunae), for which he also made use of the Tucci photographs of the same manuscript.

(2) An unpublished critical edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of MHK Chapter 5 by Y. Ejima, which he used in his classes and distributed among his students. It bears the title "Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā V: Yogācāratattvaviniścayapariccheda of Bhāviveka. Sanskrit text collated with its Tibetan version." There are abundant textcritical notes, but there is no introduction (at least not in the copy I have) Since the notes refer to "Ms" and "SG", we can assume that Ejima’s main sources were the Tucci photographs (Ms) and the Sānkṛityāyana-Gokhale (SG) handcopy. In case of lacunae in Ms or doubtful readings, Ejima has followed SG, the Tibetan text and often also Gokhale’s emendations.

For the verses 1-68, I have mostly followed Ejima’s edition. I am however not competent to form a judgment on its accuracy, since I am not an expert in the reading of manuscripts nor in verse metre. For the present installment (verses 69-84), I have also consulted Chr. Lindtner’s edition of the Sanskrit text of MHK Chapter 5 in his article "Bhavya’s Madhyamakahṛdaya (Pariccheda Five) Yogācāratattvaviniścayavatāra," The Adyar Library Bulletin 59 (1995), pp. 37-65. (I am very grateful to Annette Heitmann of the University of Vienna who informed me about this edition and kindly sent me a copy of it). Lindtner’s edition is based on the Chinese photographs of the Sha-lu manuscript which were published by Prof. Jiang Zhongxin in his “Sanskrit Tarkajvala-Sutra Manuscript Copy” (in Chinese) in Papers in Honour of Dr. Ji Xianlin on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday, Jiang Xi, China, 1991.

I have compared Lindtner’s edition (L) of verses 1-84 with the Sānkṛityāyana-Gokhale handcopy (SG) and with Ejima’s unpublished edition (E), and have compiled the below list of
variant readings. Without intending to make definitive judgments, I have in many cases indicated the apparently correct or preferable reading in bold letters and have added an (x) after readings that are in my judgment definitely incorrect. When none of the variants is indicated in bold, it means that either reading is possible without significantly altering the meaning of the verse or half-verse. Although the variants are many, they are on the whole not important enough to make substantial changes necessary in the translation of the verses I have published thusfar.

Verse

1c E: 'pi (based on Tib. "yang"); SG, L: hi
5ab SG, E: kalpitānupalabdhīśca paratantrasya cāgrahāḥ
   L: kalpitānupalabdhīśca paratantrasya cāgrahāḥ (based on Tib.)
7d SG, E: ... paro nayah; L: parāyaṇā (based on Tib. "Ilhr len")
11d SG, E: tattulyatvād; L: tattulyavad (x)
12ab SG, E: yasya sā; L: yāsyas a
12c E: na ca (based on Tib.); SG, L: tacc
13b SG: tatvadarśanam (x); E: tatvadarśiṇaḥ (x); L: tatvadarśiṇām (based on Tib.)
14c SG: na tveva; E: tata eva (based on Tib.); L: na nevam
14d S(?), E: satī bhavet; G, L: satī bhavet (based on Tib.)
15a SG: naiṣā; E: cestā (based on Tib.); L: caiśā
18c (S?)G: tathābhāsodayād yacca; E: tadābhāsodayād yathā; L: tathābhāsodayād yadvat
19d E: ca viśayāpavādīta (based on Tib.); L: vastuno 'py apavādītā
21c SG, E: upadhanāt tathā; L: upādāṇāt tatre
22c SG: cānaya (x); E: ca dvībhaḥ; L: dvībhata
23c SG: sahaćāryānukāritvāt; E: sahaćāryanukāritvāt; L: sahaćārānukāritvāt
26ab SG: tannirvṛttau ... tannirvṛttiḥ; E: tannirvṛttau ... tannirvṛttiḥ; L: tannirvṛttau...tannirvṛttiḥ
26c E: anidarsanarūpasya; L: anirdeśyasvarūpasya
27a E: bāhyārtho; SG, L: bāhyo 'rtho
28c SG: sāstreva(?)(x); E: sātre ca; L: sūtreṣu
28d G, E: niśedhataḥ; (S?), L: niśedhitaḥ
30ab G, E: svapne buddhisvabhāvena-akalpitenaṃ saṃsayaḥ; S(?), L: svapnabuddhisvabhāvena-akalpitabhāvasaṃsayaḥ
34b SG, E: cittāgocaratā; L: cittagocaratā (x)
34d SG: siddhim eva; E: siddha eva; L: siddhir eva
37a E: yady anālambatā svasyāḥ; SG, L: yady anālambanā sādhyā
37d E: sālambatā; SG, L: sālambanā
38b E: vā taddhītvasya nirākriyā (based on Tib.); SG, L: vā na dhītvādinirākriyā (x)
39a E: bāhyārthe; SG, L: bāhye 'rthe
41b E: visvābhasaḥ; SG, L: visvābhasaṃ
d E: yāsyāḥ tadutpādāt (based on Tib.); SG, L: yāsya tadutpādaḥ
43b SG: kṛtsnasyādvātsāntataḥ (x); E: kṣayyi asāntanum anātma ca; L: kṣunṇam asānty anātma ca
44cd E: dhiyālambyo mokṣābheda 'pi; L: dhiyālambya muktyabheda 'pi
c E: parānuvādāḥ syāt; L: parānuvādaḥ syād
47a SG: saṃkṣleśavayavādānā ced (x); E: saṃkṣleśavyavādānāc ced; L: saṃkṣleśavyava-
dhānāc ced (x)
d G: vedanā vitathotpādā (x); E: vedanādeḥ tathotpādāt; L: vedanāditathotpādāt
48ab SG: yatha parṇādisantaḥ sāluḥ (ka) sāktkā (x); E: yathā parṇādisantaḥ sāluke bahuśāktikāt; L: yathā parṇādisantaḥāḥ sālukabahuśaktitaḥ
c E: tathā-adravyasaṭāḥ citācī cītraśarpatativṛttayāḥ (x); L: tathā dravyasaṭāḥ (x) cītācī cītraḥ sāntatvavruttayāḥ
d SG, L: visvotpādādikalpanā; citotpādādikalpanā
c E: saṃvṛtyā; L: saṃvṛtya (x)
51d SG: araṇ; E: araktatā; L: asaṅgtā
c E: pratśuddhe 'pi; L: pratśedhe 'pi
54a E: tannuśedhāya saced iṣṭo vidhyantaraparigrahaḥ; SG(?, L: tannirāśya ced iṣṭo vidyāantaraparigrahaḥ
55ab SG: neṣṭā bhujagavac cāsaṃkalpitaḥvataḥ (x); E: neṣṭaṃ bhujagavac cāsa kalpitaṃ kalpitavataḥ (based on Tib.); SG, L: neṣṭo bhujagavac cāsaṃ saṅkalpalo kalpitavatoḥ (x)
d SG, L: pratiṣṭir vāpi; L: pratiṣṭir api
c SG, L: abhilāpaparakṣānān; L: abhilāpapparokṣānān (x)
58a G: rūpadhaṁjanmato; E: rūpadher janmato; L: rūpadhījanmato
c SG, L: kṣanam; L: kṣanam (x)
59d SG, L: gocaram (x); L: gocaraḥ
d E: nābhilāpātmāsūnyatvam (based on Tib.); SG, L: nābhiltāpyātmāsūnyatvam (x)
d Close: "nāśrayasyāgrahe" in my text into "nāśrayasyāgrahe".
a SG, L: cēṣṭaṃ prthag bhave (x); E: cēṣṭaṃ prthag na ca (based on Tib.); L: neṣṭaṃ prthag bhavet (x)
64ab SG: abhedāśatadvāryābhyaṁ ekato ’nekavṛtyapi (x)
E: abheda-adravya-sattvābhyaṁ ekam anekeṇvṛty api
L: abhedasattvādṛavyābhhyām ekato ’nekavrtyapi

65a SG, E: anilānutpalabhinnarūpena ; L: anilānutpalābhinnarūpena (x)

67b E: kalpyatvavācyate ; SG, L: kalpyatvavācyate

68d E: vàcyatādi ; SG, L: vàcyatvādi

68a E: tasyāto bhinnam... ; SG, L: tadanayabhina...

68cd E: na yuktā-evam ato ’yuktā yogācāranayoditiḥ
SG, L: na yukt(y)aiva manoyuktā yogācāranayāditi (x)

74b E: te svasāmāṇya... (based on Tib.) ; SG, L: tatsvasāmāṇya ...

76b SG: svabhāve ceṣṭasādhanam (x) ; E: svabhāveneṣṭasādhanam ; L: svabhāve neṣṭasādhanam (x)

76d SG: māyāvan any[v?]abhūtataḥ ; E: māyā yadvad abhūtatā (based on Tib.) ; L: mā¬yāvan nanv abhūtata

78b E: yadi (based on Tib.) ; SG, L: yataḥ

79d SG: dr... vyasattvataḥ ; E: drṣṭasya-adravyasattvataḥ (based on Tib. ”snang ba”) ;
L: tathāpy adravyasattvataḥ

80c E: heya-prahāṭradhāvāt (based on Tib.) ; SG, L: heyaprahaṭryasadbhāvāt

82b SG: vastvabhāve bhave sati ; E: svabhāve vastuno ’sati (based on Tib.) ; L: vastvabhāve bhave sati

82c SG: na drṣṭir nāstiko ; E: nāstitādrṣṭiko (based on Tib.) ; L: taddṛṣṭirnāstiko

83ab SG: svayamapāyikatvāsau pare ... pādakaḥ ; E: svayamapāyikaś cāsau pareṣāṇi ca vipa¬dakaḥ ; L: svayamāpāyikatvē ’sau pareṣāṇi ca vipādakaḥ

83d SG, E: ajīrṇa ; L: acīrṇa (x)

84c SG, E: bhāvatvād ; L: bhāvanād (x)

84d SG, E: matāḥ) ; L: mataḥ (x)