An Annotated Translation of

Madhyamakāḥṛdayakārikā/Tarkajvāla V.27-54

Paul HOORNAERT

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.27-54

(Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 207a6-214b1; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 207a6-214b1; Peking (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 228b4-237b8)

yang pha rol po dag gi bsam pa gzhan bsal ba'i phyir bshad pa/

gal te smra 'dod bsgrub bya ba//
phyi don sms kyi dngos nyid de//
rnam par shes pa'i yul yin phyir//
dper na de ma thag bzhin no// (27)
(cittasvabhāvo bāhyārtha yadi sādhyo vivakṣitah/
vijñānaviśayatvena tad yathā samanantarah//(27))

zhes bya ba 'di la phyi rol gyi don ni chos can no// de sms kyi ngo bo nyid yin par sgrub pa ni de'i chos so// rnam par shes pa'i yul yin phyir/ zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs kyi don du phyir zhes smos so// dper na de ma thag pa'i rkyen bzhin no zhes bya ba ni dpe ste/ sms dang sms las byung ba mtshungs pa de ma thag tu 'gangs pa rnam s ni de las gzhan pa'i sms dang sms las byung ba rnam s snye ba'i rkyen gyi1 dngos por 'gyur bas de ma thag pa'i rkyen zhes bya'o// gal te de yang rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir sms kyi ngo bo nyid yin pa de bzhin du phyi rol gyi don yang rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir sms kyi ngo bo nyid yin no zhe na/

des na sms byung so so yis2//
gtan tshigs 'khrlu pa nyid du 'gyur// (28ab)
(pratyekacaitasair hetoh svañ evaṁ vyabhicārīta/ (28ab))

1 P: gyis
2 P: yi
zhes bya ba ni des ci1 re zhig rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir de ma thag pa'i rkyen bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang sems kyi ngo bo nyid yin par 'gyur ram/ 'on te rnam par shes pa'i yul yin pa'i phyir tshor ba la sogs pa nums las byung ba so so dag sems kyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa bzhin du phyi rol gyi yul yang sems kyi ngo bo nyid ma yin par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid do//

(C. 207b4, D. 207b4, P. 229a3) ci ste yang 'di snyam du de ni lung gis 'grub ste/ 'di lta ste/ khams gsum pa ni sems tsam mo zhes gsungs par sems na/ 'dir bshad pa/ de ni rigs pa ma yin te/ lung gi don yongs su ma shes pa'i phyir ro// gang gi phyir zhe na/

mdo las sems tsam gsungs pa ni//
byed po za po dgag phyir ro// (28cd)
(sütre ca cittamätrokti kartbrhoktrniśedhata h// (28cd))

zhes bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs can dag gis rnam par shes pa las gzhan gyi byed pa po dang za ba po yod par brtags2 pa sel bar mdzad pa'i phyir sangs rgyas dang/ byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyi sems tsam zhes bstan pa mdzad pa yin gyi/ phyi rol gyi yul bsal pa'i phyir ni ma yin no// gang gi phyir zhe na/ sa bcu pa'i mdo sde las/ byang chub sems dpa'i sa drug pa la byang chub sems dpa' rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba lugs su 'byung ba dang/ lugs su 'byung ba ma yin pa la rnam par lta ba 'di snyam du sems te/ ma rig pa la sogs pa yan lag bcu gnyis pa las3 sdu bsngal gyi phung po 'ba' zhig pa byed pa po dang/ tshor ba po dang bral ba 'di 'byung zhing sdu bsngal gyi shing ljon pa mgon par 'grub par 'gyur ro snyam du de lta nges pas/ kye4 rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste/ khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam ste/ sems kyi mgon par 'dus byas pa dang/ sems kyi bris pa yin gyi5/ sems las gzhan pa'i byed pa po dang/ za ba po ni 'ga' yang med do zhes gsungs pas phyi rol gyi yul med pa nyid du mi 'grub bo//

(C. 208a1, D. 208a1, P. 229b3) 'dir smras pa/ de ni shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las kyang gsungs te/ byams pa byang chub sems dpa' gzugs kyi bye brag gdags pa ni rnam pa gsum gyis6 khong du chud par bya ste/ 'di lta ste/ 'di ni kun brtags pa'i gzugs so// 'di ni rnam par brtags pa'i gzugs so// 'di ni chos nyid kyi gzugs so zhes bya bas so//

1 "ci" omitted in P.
2 P: brtags
3 P: pas
4 P: kya
5 P: gyis
6 P: gyi
de la kun brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe na/ gzugs zhes bya ba ni ming dang/ 'du shes dang/ gdags pa dang/ tha snyad la brten nas gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid du rtog pa gang yin pa de/ de ni rdzas su med do// de la rnam par brtags pa'i gzugs gang zhe na/ rnam par rtog pa la brten nas gang la ming dang/ 'du shes dang/ gdags pa dang/ tha snyad kyi gzugs zhes bya ba la sogs par mngon par brjod pa nyid de/ 'di ni rnam par rtog pa rdzas su yod pa nyid la brten nas rdzas su yod pa yin gyi/ rang dbang du 'jug pa las ni ma yin no// de la chos nyid kyi gzugs gang zhe na/ kun brtags pa'i gzugs des rnam par brtags pa'i gzugs de la rtag tu ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang/ chos bdag med pa nyid dang/ yang dag pa'i mtha' la sogs pa gang yin pa ste/ de la rdzas su yod pa yang ma yin la/ rdzas su med pa yang ma yin te/ rnam par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid dang/ rnam par shes pa yod pa'i phyir ro zhes gsungs so zhe na/ bshad pa/

gal te rnam brtags don stong pas//

rnam par shes pa sgrub byed na//
brtags pa ma yin don yod phyir//
yul med par ni mi 'gyur ro// (29)
(vikalpitärthašunyã ca vijnãnam yadi sãdhya(te/ akalpitärthasadbhãvãna syãd arthanirãkiyã// (29))

(C. 208a7, D. 208a7, P. 230a2) zhes bya ba ni rnam par shes pa la rnam par brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa nyid yin yang de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig par bya ba'i chos nyid kyi gzugs kyi don yod pa'i phyir sgra ji bzhin gyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa'i dngos po gang yin pa de yod pas brtags pa ma yin pa'i don yod pa'i phyir yul yod pa kho na yin par rnam par shes pa thams cad du yul gyis' stong pa yin par mi rigs so//
dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba/ bam po bco brgyad pa/ gzhan yang/

rmi lam la yang brtags min pa'i//'
ngo bo nyid blos ma nges 'gyur// (30ab)
(svapne buddhisvabhãvenãkalpitenaãpi saµñayã/ (30ab))

(C. 208b2, D. 208b2, P. 230a5) zhes bya ba ni khams gsum pa ni sens tsam ste/ gzugs

¹ P: gyi
la sogs pa'i don gyis stong pa'i phyir/ rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no
zhes bya ba de la 'di ltar/ rmi lam la yang brtags pa ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi blo'i
cha yod pa'i phyir des na ci re zhig rmi lam la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa bzhin no zhes
bya ba de rmi lam gyi rnam par shes pa brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi skyes bu la sogs
pa'i don gyis stong par 'gyur ram/ 'on te rang' gi cha la dmigs pa brtags pa ma yin pa'i
don gyis mi stong par 'gyur ba'i gtan tshigs ma nges pa nyid du 'gyur ro//

dmigs pa med par² mi 'dod de//
dpe ni rab tu ma grub phyir// (30cd)
[na nirālambanāpiṣṭā drṣṭāntasyāprasiddhitaḥ// (30cd)]

(C. 208b4, D. 208b4, P. 230a8) zhes bya ba ni brtags pa'i don gyis stong pa'i phyir ro
zhes bya ba'i dpe rmi lam blangs pa der yang brtags pa'i don sel bar byed kyi brtags
pa ma yin pa'i don gyi cha sel bar mi byed pa³ des kyang sems tsam nyid du mi 'grub
pa'i phyir/ dmigs pa med par mi 'dod de/ dpe bsgrub par bya ba'i phyogs gcig dang mi
ldan par rab tu ma grub pa'i phyir ro// rmi lam gyi shes pa'i chos nyid kyi gzugs kyi³
don la dmigs pa'i phyir dmigs pa med pa nyid ma yin no// 'di ltar rmi lam ni yang dag
pa ma yin pa'i phyir gtan la dbab par na de dpe nyid du mi rung ngo zhes bya bar bsams
so//
'tdir smras pa/

ci ste blo yul rnam pa gnyis//
gcig dang 'dus pa yin snyam na//
rigs pas yongs su brtags pa na//
de ni gnyi gar mi rigs so// (31)
[atha syād viṣayo hy ekaḥ samūho vā bhaved dhiyāḥ/
yuktyā parīkṣayamānas tu sa dvidhāpi na yuṣyate// (31)]

(C. 208b6, D. 208b7, P. 230b4) zhes bya ba ni pha rol po dag na re ci ste phyi rol gyi
don yod par smra ba dag blo'i yul rnam pa gnyis su 'dod de/ rdul phra rab gcig pu 'ba'

---
¹ P : gang
² C, D : pa
³ P : pas
⁴ "gzugs kyi" omitted in P.
zhig yul du 'dod dam/ 'on te rdul phra rab 'dus pa yul du 'dod do snyam na/ gnyi ga yang rigs pas yongs su brtags pa na 'gal ba'i phyir de ni gnyi gar mi rigs te/ bzang po ma yin no zhes zer ro// rigs1 pa de yang gang zhe na/ de'i phyir smras pa/

de la gzugs rdul gcig pu ni//
gzugs blo'i spyod yul ma yin te//
de snang nyid du mi 'gyur phyir//
dbang gzugs spyod yul ma yin bzhin// (32)
(tatrāṇurūpam ekaṃ tu rūpabuddher na gocaraḥ/
atadābhatayā yadvad aksarūpaṃ na gocaraḥ// (32))

(C. 209a1, D. 209a2, P. 230b7) zhes bya ba la gzugs kyi phra ba nyid kyi mthar thug pa ni rdul phra rab bo// gcig pu zhes bya ba ni 'ba' zhig ces bya ba'i tha tshig go// gzugs kyi rdul gcig pu ni zhes bya ba ni chos can yin la/ de gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul ma yin te zhes bya ba ni de'ichos te/ chos can dang chos bs dus pa ni phyogs yin no// de snang nyid du mi 'gyur phyir zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs te/ de snang nyid du zhes bya ba ni yul gyi dngos po nyid du snang ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// de snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur zhes bya ba ni de blo la snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur zhing/ yul gyi dngos po nyid du mi 'gyur ba ste/ gtan tshigs kyi don gyi phyir zhes bya ba smos so// dbang gzugs spyod yul ma yin bzhin2 zhes bya ba ni dpe ste/ dbang po zhes bya ba ni dbang po lnga rnams te/ de rnams kyi nga bo nyid yul kha dog gzugs dang ba nyid du yod pa yin yang de snang ba nyid du mi 'gyur ba'i phyir/ dper na de gzugs kyi blo'i yul ma yin pa de bzhin du rdul phra rab kyang gzugs kyi blo'i spyod yul ma yin no//

phra rab gzugs ni du ma ste//
sems kyi spyod yul yin mi 'dod//
r dzas su yod pa ma yin phyir//
dper na zla ba gnyis bzhin no// (33)
(anekam api citsaya naiva tad gocaram matam/
rūpaṃ hi paramāṇunām adravyatvād dvicandravat// (33))

(C. 209a5, D. 209a6, P. 231a5) zhes bya ba ni rdul phra rab kyi gzugs du ma de dag 'dus

1 P: rig
2 “bzhin” omitted in P.
pa de yang sms kyi spyod yul yin par mi 'dod de/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro// 'di lta rdul phra rab kyi gzugs 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su 'dod la/ de dag 'dus pa ni dmag¹ dang nags tshal la sogs pa bzhin du rdzas su yod pa ma yin pas de snang bar 'gyur du zin kyang sms kyi spyod yul yin par mi rigs te/ dper na rab rib can gyi mig skyon gyis nyams pas zla ba gnyis pa² la sogs pa yang dag pa ma yin par mthong ba bzhin no³/ 'dir bshad pa/

de la gal te pha rol po//
bsags pa min' pa'i gzugs sms kyi//
spyod yul min par sgrub byed na//
der ni grub pa nyid sgrub 'gyur// (34)
(tatrasamcitarūpasya cittāgocaratā yadi/
prasādhya te pareṇāpi siddha eva prasādhya// (34))

(C. 209b1, D. 209b1, P. 231b1) zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag bsags pa ma yin pa'i gzugs rdul phra rab gcig pu sms kyi spyod yul nyid ma yin par sgrub par byed na phyogs snga ma der grub pa nyid la sgrub par 'gyur te/ kho bo cag kyang de lta 'dod pa'i phyir ro//

ci ste bsags pa'i gzugs la ni//
gtan tshigs ma grub nyid 'gyur te//
gzugs gzhan dag gi bsags⁵ pa ni//
der snang blo ni skye phyir ro// (35)
(atha samcitarūpasya hetor evam asiddhatā/
rūpāntarīr upakṛtais tannirbhāsodayād dhiyāḥ// (35))

(C. 209b2, D. 209b2, P. 231b3) zhes bya ba ni ci ste rdul phra rab kyi rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i gzugs phyogs su byas nas de la rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa nyid gtan tshigs su brjod na ni/ de lta na gtan tshigs gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa nyid du 'gyur

¹ P : dmags
² "pa" omitted in C, D.
³ "zhe na" added in P.
⁴ C, D : med
⁵ P : bsams
te/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ 'di ltar rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i gzugs gzhan dag gis de la bsags shing kun nas sbyar ba na' de yul gyi dngos por khas blangs shing der snang ba'i blo rdul phra rab 'dus pa'i rnam par skye ba'i phyir ro// kho bo cag ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa'i bsags pa bum pa la sogs pa nyid dang phra rab kyang kun rdzob pa'i rdzas su 'dod de/ 'di ltar rdul phra rab ni rdzas brgyad 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas/ de yang rdzas nyid yin par 'dod la/ de bzhin du bum pa la sogs pa 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyang 'rdzas nyid yin te/ 'ba' zhig pa ni rdzas su ma grub pa'i phyir ro//

de ni dmigs nyid yin 'dod de//' der snang blo yi rgyur 'gyur phyir//
'dod chags bzhin te de yi phyir//
khyod dam bcas la rjes dpag gnod// (36)
(tasyālambanatā cesṭā tadābhamatiḥetutath/
rāgavad bādhyate tasmāt pratiṃṭa te 'numānatah// (36))

[Ca. 209b5, D. 209b6, P. 231b8] ces bya ba ni rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa bsags pa'i gzugs de ni dmigs pa nyid yin par 'dod de/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ 'di ltar rdul phra rab bsags pa de ni bsags pa'i gzugs der snang ba'i blo'i rgyu'i dngos po nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir te/ gang dang gang der snang ba'i blo'i rgyur 'gyur ba de dang de ni bsags pa la dmigs pa yin te/ dper na 'dod chags yul la chags pa'i mtshon nyid de² ni bud med kyi gzugs la sogs pa bsags pa nyid la dmigs par 'dod pa bzhin te/ de'i phyir khyod kyi bsags pa'i gzugs ni dmigs pa ma yin no zhes dam bcas pa de la rjes su dpag pa 'dis gnod par 'gyur ro// rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga'i gnas dang/ dmigs pa ni bsags pa yin no zhes gsungs pa'i lung³ dang yang 'gal lo//

[Ca. 210a1, D. 210a1, P. 232a4] 'dir smras pa/ blo ni dmigs pa med pa kho nar skye ste/ rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i sa bon las skyes pa'i phyir yid kyi blo bzhin no zhe na/ 'dir bshad pa/

gal te rang blo dmigs med de//
rang gi sa bon las skye'i phyir//
yid blo bzhin 'dod btags min phyir//

¹ C: ni
² "de" omitted in P.
³ P: lus

—155—
khyod kyi\(^1\) dmigs bcas nyid du 'gyur// (37)
[yady anālambatā svasyāḥ svabijād udayād dihiyah/
manodhīvad akalpatvāt syāt te sālambatā nanu// (37)]

zhes bya ba ni yid kyi rnam par shes pa la 'ang btags pa ma yin pa'i rang gi don du
snang ba'i cha yod pa'i phyir khyod kyi blo dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ro
gzhān yang/

dmigs pa med pa rjes dpog pas//
de ni blo nyid ma yin 'gyur//
'dus pa dam ni ma bcas pas//
de 'gog pa ni gnod pa med// (38)
[anālambānumānād vā taddhitvasya nirākriyā/
samūhasyāpratijñānāt tanniseñho na bādhakāh// (38)]

(C. 210a4, D. 210a4, P. 232a8) ces bya ba ni dmigs pa rtogs par byed pas blo zhes bya
ba yin na dmigs pa med pa nyid rjes su dpog pas blor 'dod pa de blo ma yin pa nyid
du gyur pas blo de ni blo nyid ma yin par bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi rang gi ngo bo
log par bsgrubs pas dam bcas pa nyams par 'gyur ro// khyod kyiṣ 'dus pa ni dmigs pa
ma yin no zhes smras pa gang yin pa de la yang kho bos kyang 'dus pa dmigs pa yin
par dam ma\(^2\) bcas te/ 'o na ji ltar dam bcas she na/ rdul phra rab bsags pa ni dmigs
pa yin par dam bcas pas khyod kyiṣ 'dus pa dmigs pa ma yin par de 'gog pa ni kho bo
la gnod pa med do// bsags pa dang 'dus pa zhes bya ba gnyis la khyad par ci yod ce
na/ rdul phra rab rigs mthun pa dag gzhi gcig la brten pa ni tshogs pa zhes bya'o//
glang po che dang/ rta la sogs pa dang/ skyer pa dang/ seng ldeng la sogs pa'i rdzas
rigs mi mthun pa gzhi thā dad pa 'dus pa la dmag dang nags tshal la sogs par gdags
pa ni 'dus pa zhes bya'o//
'dir smras pa / 'o na kho bo cag gi dmigs pa brtag pa'i skabs su/

phyi rol don ni med par yang//
nus pa\(^3\) dang ni yul gyi dngos//

---156---

\(^1\) P.: kyis
\(^2\) "ma" omitted in P.
\(^3\) "pa" omitted in P.
gnyis po phan tshun rgyur 'gyur bas/
thog ma med pa'i dus nas 'jug// (39)
(asaty api ca bâhyärthe dwayam anyonyahetukam/
šaktir višayarúpam ca tannvirttih kuto matâ// (39))

ces bya bas phyogs 'di brtan' por bzhag zin to zhe na/ bshad pa/ tshig le'ur byas pa
de'i rtsa ba bzhì pa/ ji ltar de ni ldog par 'dod/ ces bya ba 'dis rjes nas brgal zhing brtag
par bya ste/ phyi rol gyi don yod pa la ni yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba
de'i dag pa tshol ba'i rnal 'byor pas yul ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rto gs par gzung
ba dang/ 'dzin pa ldog pa'i phyir 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par mi rto gs par skye
ba rigs pa kho nar 'gyur gyi/ khyed yul med pa la ni dang po nas kyang phyi rol gyi
don med la/ phyis kyang med pa bzhin du gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i ngo bo nyid du 'jug
par 'gyur ba de phyis rgyu gang gis ldog cing 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes rnam par
mi rto gs par skye bar 'gyur ba'i thabs ci yang med do// yul med par smra ba la ni 'jig
rten las 'das pa'i lam skye ba'i thabs med pas nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid kyi rnam
par shes pa thog ma med pa'i dus nas 'jug pa de ji ltar ldog pa'i rigs pa brjod par bya
dgos so//
(C. 210b4, D. 210b4, P. 233a3) gal te khyod 'di snyam du/

mi rto gs blo ni spang min te//
'phags phyir rnam par mi rto gs phyir// (40ab)
[aâryatvâd avikalpatvâd aheyya nirvikalpadûh// (40ab)]

zhes bya bar sms na zhes bya ba ni gal te 'khor bar 'jug pa'i rgyu gzung ba dang 'dzin
pa'i rnam par rto gs gnyis spangs su zin kyang rnam par mi rto gs pa'i blo ni spang ba
ma yin te/ 'phags pa'i phyir dang/ rnam par mi rto gs pa'i phyir skye bar 'gyur ba nyid
yin te/ ldog par mi 'gyur bar sms na'o// de lta na/
de skye thar pa ga la yod//
de yi sa bon ma bcom phyir// (40cd)

1 P: bstan
2 P: rig
3 P: de'i
4 P: na
(tadūtpādāt kuto mokṣas tadbījānupaghātataḥ// (40cd))

zhēs bya ba ni 'di ltar nram par shes pa'i sa bon 'jug pas ni 'khor bar 'dod la/ de bcom
pas ni thar par 'dod pa yin na ji srid du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa 'am/ rnam par
mi rtog pa'i shes pa' skye ba yod pa de srid du thar pa ga la yod/ de'i phyir sens tsam
du smra ba khyod la thar pa yang mi 'thad par 'gyur ro//
(C. 210b7, D. 210b7, P. 233a7) ci ste 'di snyam du rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes
pa skye ba ni 'ching ba yin la/ rnam par mi rtog pa'i shes pa skye ba ni thar pa yin
par sens te/ ci'i phyir zhe na/ 'di ltar/

gnyis kyi 'du shes 'jug pa na//
sna tshogs snang ba rab tu skye//
de yi sna tshogs snang gang dang//
de rang sa bon las skye'i phyir// (41)
(dvayapravṛttau saṃjñāyā viśvābhāsah prajāyate/
viśvaṃ tādābhataḥ yāsyāḥ tadūtpādāt svabhājataḥ// (41))

zhēs bya ba ste/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis kyi rnam par shes pa 'jug pa na/ gzugs
la sogs pa yul sna tshogs kyi rnam par snang ba rab tu skye ste/ de'i rnam pa sna
tshogs snang ba de yang gang zhe na/ rnam par shes pa yul gyi rnam par yongs su 'gyur
ba gang yin pa'o// de dang rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa de yang rang gi sa bon
yul du snang ba'i rnam pa de las skyes pa'i phyir ro//

zhā ba de la nus phul dang//
rang bdag nyid dang gzhan las so// (42ab)
(layaḥ śākyarpaṇāt tasya svātmānyo evānyato 'pi vā/ (42ab))

(C. 211a3, D. 211a3, P. 233b3) zhēs bya ba ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa de dag 'gag cing
bag la zha ba na yang rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa de la 'jug par 'gyur te/ gang gi nus
pa phul ba'i ngo bo nyid du gnas pa yin no// rang gi cha la dmigs pa rang gi bdag nyid
dang/ yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan 'gag pa las kyang de la zha bar 'gyur
ro zhēs bya bar sbyar bar sens na/ 'dir bshad pa/ de ni 'jig rten yid ches par bya ba

1 P: adds “de” after “pa”.

—158—
tsam la bden mod kyi/ skyon 'di yod de/

rnam par shes pa'i ming gis ni/
de la bdag tu btags par 'gyur// (42cd)
(nanu vijñānaparāyād ātmāvāyam nirūpitaḥ// (42cd))

zhes bya ba ni bdag tu smra ba dag kyang yul sna tshogs 'byin pa'i bdag gcig pu la thams cad kyi¹ nus pa rab tu bsags par sems pas² khyod kyis kyang rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba'i ming tsam gyi rgyu thabs kyis de nyid la bdag tu btags par 'gyur te/ des na bdag med pa nyid du smra ba yang nyams so//
(C. 211a6, D. 211a6, P. 233b8) khyed kyis³ rnam par grol bar btags pa yang 'khor ba las khyad par med pa nyid du 'gyur te/ ji lta zhe na/ 'di la sems tsam du smra ba'i rnal 'byor pa 'khor ba dang thar pa'i sems tshul la sems pa na/

gnyis yod sgyu ma lta bu dang//
zad can ma zhi bdag med dang//
gnyis med mi zad yang dag⁴ dang//
'chi med go 'phang mchog rtogs nas// (43)
de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyir//
rnam par rtog pa rnam ldog pas//
mì rtog bloś ni dmigs byas⁵ pa'i//
grol ba khyad par med par 'gyur// (44)
dvaitaṃ māyopamaṃ matvā kṣaya aśāntam anātma ca/
advaitaṃ cākṣayam bhūtam amṛtaṃ paramaṃ padam// (43)
sāmānyābhāvatas tatra kalpanāvinirvṛttitaḥ/
nirvikalpadhiyālambyo mokṣābhedo 'pi vidyate// (44))

zhes bya ba ste/ gnyis yod ces bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa rnam pa gnyis kyi dngos por gnas pa ste/ de ni sgyu ma lta bu dang/ zad pa can dang/ ma zhi ba dang/ bdag med par rtogs so zhes bya bar sbyar ro// sgyu ma lta bu zhes bya ba ni yang dag

¹ C, D : kyis
² P : dpas
³ P : kyi
⁴ C, D, P : yang yang
⁵ C, D, P : byed. Corrected into “byas” according to the commentary in TJ.
pa ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pas skyed pa'i phyir ro// zad can zhes bya ba ni de la zad pa yod pas zad can no// ma zhi zhes bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa'i bya bas 'phangs pa'i phyir ro// bdag med ces bya ba ni gzhan mu stegs byed pa dag gis yongs su btags pa'i bdag med pa'i phyir dang/ rang yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro// gnyis med ces bya ba ni gang gi tshe gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa rnam sams las phyi rol las mi snang ba de'i tshe na/ rang gi sans kyi chos nyid la nges par gnas pa'i sans ni gnyis med ces bya ste/ de ni mi zad pa dang/ yang dag pa dang/ 'chi ba med pa dang/ go 'phang mchog yin par rtogs nas zhes bya bar sbyar ro// mi zad ces bya ba ni de la zad pa yod pa ma yin pa'o// yang dag ces bya ba ni mi slu ba'o// 'chi med ces bya ba ni skye ba dang 'chi ba la sogs pa dang bral ba'o// go 'phang mchog ces bya ba ni mthar thug pa'i gnas so// rtogs nas zhes bya ba ni gnyis yod pa dang/ gnyis med pa dag tshul de ltar rtogs nas so// de la 'dra bar med pa'i phyir// zhes bya ba ni gnyis med pa de la gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dag ji ltar 'khor ba'i gnas skabs na med pa bzhih du thar pa'i gnas skabs na yang de dang 'dra bar ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro// rnam par rtog pa rnam ldog pas// zhes bya ba ni de la gnyis po 'dra bar med par rtogs pa'i phyir rnam par rtog pa rnam par ldog pas so// mi rtog' blos ni dmigs byas pa'i// zhes bya ba mgon sum gyi shes pas sgra ji bzhih gyi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa dang/ rnam par mi rtog pa'i blos kyang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid dmigs par byas pa'i rnal 'byor pa la'o// de la/ grol ba khyad par med par 'gyur// zhes bya ba'i skyon 'dir 'gyurā te/ de la skye ba dang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid sngon dang 'dra bar yod pa'i phyir sngon gyi shes pa rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa las thar pa khyad par med pas bcings pa dang/ thar pa gnyis khyad par med par 'gyur ro//
(C. 212a1, D. 212a1, P. 234b6) gzhan yang/

yang na sans tsam bsgrub pa'i phyir//
sems las byung rnam sams las ni//
tha dad med par khas blang bya//
yang na rnam rig tsam mi 'grub// (45)
[cittamātraprasiddhyartham na cittād vyatirekināh/
caittā vābhypagantavyā na vā viññaptimātratā// (45)]

1 C, D, P : ldog
2 P : bcas pa
3 C : 'byung

--- 160 ---
ces bya ba ni yang na khyed sems tsam nyid du 'dod pas sems tsam nyid sgrub pa'i phyir sems las byung ba dmigs pa rnam pa sna tshogs tha dad rnam kyang sems las tha dad pa med par khas blang bar bya'o// yang na sems las byung ba rnam sems las tha dad par rtog na ni sems las byung ba rnam mang ba'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du mi 'grub po//

yang na tshor sogs 'dus pa la//
sems su gdags par 'dod par gyis//
des na gzhan gyi rjes smra dang//
rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur// (46)
(vedanādisamūhe vā cippa раjñaptir īṣyatām/
tathā parānuvādaḥ syāt svanītīyāditāpi ca// (46))

(C. 212a4, D. 212a4, P. 235a1) zhes bya ba ni yang na khyed kyis tshor ba dang/ sems pa dang/ reg pa dang/ yid la byed pa la sogs pa 'dus pa mdung khyim lta bu dang/ sa dang chu dang me dang rlung dang 'dus pa la sogs pa lta bu dang/ gzugs dang dri dang ro dang reg pa dang ldan pa'i bum pa la sogs pa lta bu la sems su gdags par khas blang bar bya'o// gal te de lta bu nyid1 yin no zhe na/ des na khyed gzhang dbu ma smra ba'i rjes su smra ba dang/ rang gi gzhung yang btang bar 'gyur te/ kun gzhir rnam par shes pa gcig pu kho na las rkyen ji lta ba las rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga 'byung ba dang/ sems las byung ba rnam kyis yongs su 'gyur ba yang khas blangs pa'i phyir ro// gal te 'di snyam du 'di la tshor ba la sogs pa 'dus pa nyid la sems su brtags na sems rdzas su yod pa nyid ma yin par 'gyur zhing des na kun nas nyon mongs pa dang/ rnam par byang ba dag gi gzhi ci yang med par 'gyur bas tshor ba la sogs pa thag da pa dag la ni re re las de rdzas su yod pa nyid yin pas kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba dag gi gnas nyid du rigs te/ ji skad du/ thog ma med pa'i dus ldan khams// sa bon kun gyi gnas gyur pa// de yod pas na 'gro kun dang// mya ngan 'das pa thob par 'gyur// zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o zhe na/ 'dir bshad pa/

kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang las//
gal te sems ni rdzas 'dod na//
tshor sogs de bzhih skye ba'i phyir//
de grub pas na gnod pa med// (47)

1 “nyid” omitted in P.
(samkleśavyavadānāc ced dravyasac cittam iṣyate/
vedanādeḥ tathotpādāt tat prasiddher na bādhakam// (47))

(C. 212b1, D. 212b2, P. 235a8) ces bya ba ni 'di ltar nyon mongs pa dang/ nye ba'i nyon mongs pa'i yid la byed pa dang bcas pa dag sems dang lhan cig 'byung ba nyid na bcings pa yin par 'dod la/ nyon mongs pa dang bral ba na1 shes rab mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas pa sems dang lhan cig nyid du grol bar 'dod pas sms nyid kyi gnas skabs gzhan dang/ gzhan dag la sms las byung ba dag tu gdags pa yin gyi/ gang gis2 sms 'ba' zhig pa yin na rdzas su yod pa nyid du 'gyur pa'i sms dang sems las byung ba phan tshun tha dad par gnas pa ni med do// de'i phyir tshor ba la soggs pa dag nyid bcings pa'i rnam pa dang/ thar pa'i rnam par de bzhin skye ba'i phyir tshogs pa las 'byung bas sms dang sems las byung ba dag 'dus pa'i ngo bo nyid du yod pa de rab tu grub pas na khyed sems rdzas su yod pa nyid du rtogs pa des kho bo cag la gnod pa me do//
(C. 212b5, D. 212b5, P. 235b5) gal te de ltar sms 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su yod pa nyid ma yin na/ ji ltar de las srid pa'i rgyun dang thar pa 'thob par 'gyur zhe na/ de'i phyir bshad pa/

utpala rtsa ba nus mang las//
lo ma la soggs rgyun 'byung ltar//
de bzhin sms rdzas med pa las//
rgyun rnams sna tshogs 'byung bar 'gyur// (48)
(yathā parṇādīsaṃtānaṃ śāluke bahuṣaktikāt/
tathādravyasatāḥ cittāc citrasaṃtativṛttayah// (48))

zhes bya ba la/ utpala rtsa ba zhes bya ba ni utpala'i rtsa ba la ste/ de la rtsa ba'i 'brel pa gzhan med par yang nus pa mang po dang ldan pa las mtsho ci tsam du rgya che ba dag lo ma dang me tog la soggs pa'i rgyun gyis kun du khyab pa 'byung bar 'gyur ba ltar de bzhin du sems rdzas su med pa las kyang sems can rnams kyi 'khor ba'i rgyun gyi bye brag 'kham dang/ 'gro ba sna tshogs kyi rnam pa tha dad pa dag3 'byung bar 'gyur ro//
(C. 212b7, D, 212b7, P. 235b8) rgyun gyi bye brag de dag kyang/

1 C. D : bral na
2 P : gi
3 P : rnam pa tha dad pas tha dad pa dag...
gnyen pos skye bar mi 'gyur zhing//
byed rgyu yod na skye bar 'gyur// (49ab)
(pratipakṣād anutpattir utpattiḥ kārāṇe sati/ (49ab))

zhes bya ba la gnyen po zhes bya ba ni 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad pa ste/ de skyes pa na rgyun rnam skye bar mi 'gyur zhing/ byed rgyu zag pa zhes bya ba dag yod na skye bar 'gyur ro// yang na/ lnga po'i rtsa ba'i rnam shes las/ rkyen¹ bzhin du ni 'byung bar 'gyur// zhes khyod kyis gang smras pa de la rtsa ba'i rnam par shes pa med par yang sems 'dus pa'i bdag nyid kyi rkyen gyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi gnyen po yod pas ni skye bar mi 'gyur la/ byed rgyu gzugs dang/ snang ba dang/ nam mkha' dang/ yid la byed pa la sogs pa'i rkyen yod na ni skye bar 'gyur ro//

'di las² sna tshogs skyes la sogs/
btags pa mi 'dod rdzas med phyir// (49cd)
(adravyatvān na cātreṣṭā viśvotpādādikalpanā// (49cd))

zhes bya ba ni khyed kyi rnam par shes pa yongs su gyur pa 'di las rnam par smin pa dang/ ngar sems pa dang/ rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba gsum po dag gi sna tshogs skye ba la sogs par btags pa ltar ni kho bo cag mi 'dod do// gang gi phyir zhe na/ sems rdzas su med pa'i phyir ro// 'di ltar sems kyi gnas skabs kyi bye brag las de dag tu gdags par³ ni mi 'dod do//
(C. 213a4, D. 213a4, P. 236a6) gzhan yang/

de la dmigs pas mi 'grol te//
blo 'gag⁴ med pa 'ang ma yin pas//
de phyir kun rdzob don dam du 'ang//
bdag tu smra dang 'dra mi 'gyur// (50)
[na tad ālambya nirmokṣo nāpi noparatir dhiyah/
saṃvṛtyā tattvato vāpi nātmavittulyatāsty atah// (50)]

¹ C, D, P: rgyun. Correction in accordance with TrK 15a.
² P: la
³ P: pa
⁴ P: 'ga'
zhes pa la de la dmigs pa zhes bya ba ni rang gi sems snang ba tsam nyid du rtogs pas so// mi 'grol te zhes bya ba ni srid pa'i rgyun las so// blo 'gag med pa 'ang ma yin pas// zhes bya ba la/ 'o na ci zhe na/ blo 'gag par 'gyur ba 'ang yod pa kho na yin te/ dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo yongs su ma grub pa nyid du rtogs pa'i phyir dang/ kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la mi rtog pa'i phyir ro// de'i phyir kho bo cag sems rdzas su yod pa ma yin zhing 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin par smra ba ni kun rdzob dang/ don dam par yang bdag tu smra ba dang 'dra ba nyid du mi 'gyur gyi/ de las bzlog pas khyed sems tsam du smra ba dag la ni skyon de dag 'byung ba nyid du 'gyur ro//
(C. 213a7, D. 213a7, P. 236b3) khyed kyis¹/ dmigs pa la ni brten byas nas// mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye// mi dmigs pa la brten byas nas// mi dmigs pa ni rab tu skye// zhes gang smras pa de la yang kho bo cag mi dmigs pa goms par byas² pa nyid gzhan du mi 'dod de/ ji lta zhe na/

gzugs la sog pa stong pa ste//
ngo bo nyid kyis³ ma skyes phyir//
rdzas su med phyir 'jig pa'i phyir//
sgyu ma bzhin goms chags med 'gyur// (51)
   (svabhāvato 'py ajātatvād aḍravyatvād vināśatah/
rūpādi śūnyam māyāvad ity abhyāsād araktatā// (51)

zhes bya ba te/ gzugs la sog pa phyi rol gyi yul rgyu dang rkyen du snang ba las byung ba yod pa kho na yin pa rnam ts stong pa ste/ rgyu dang rkyen gyi tshogs tha dad pa dag la yod pa ma yin pas ngo bo nyid kyis ma skyes pa'i phyir 'dus pa'i bdag nyid yin pas rdzas su med pa'i phyir dang/ yun ring du mi gnas pas 'jig pa'i phyir/ dper na sgyu ma bzhin du dmigs su med par goms par byas pas chags pa med pa nyid du 'gyur ba' yin gyi/ phyi rol gyi yul rnam pa thams cad du med pa ni ma yin no//
(C. 213b4, D. 213b4, P. 236b7) gzhan yang/
gzugs la sog pa yod kyang ni//
yang dag ji bzhin rtogs gyur pa//
de yod ma yin de yi tsbe//

¹ P: kyi
² P: bya
³ P: kyi
⁴ C, D, P: mi 'gyur ba

—164—
log 'dzin ci phyir mi ldog 'gyur// (52)
(sadbhāve 'pi ca rūpāder yathābhūtāvabodhatah/
yāvartate hy asadgrahas tadabhāve na kim tadā// (52))

zhes bya ba ni dper na sngar sgyu ma byung ba las¹ skyes bu'i ngo bo nyid yod par btags pa la phyis 'di ni sgyu ma byas pa yin te/ 'di la ngo bo nyid ci yang med do zhes bya bar rtogs pa'i tshe na/ skyes bu'i blo ldog par rigs kyi ri bon gi rva sngon dang phyis kyang gtan med pa la ni de lta bur 'gyur ba ni mi rigs so// de bzhin du gzugs la sogs pa yod kyang kun rdzob kyi shes pas gzugs la sogs pa 'di dag ni ngo bo nyid yod pa yin no snyam du btags pa la/ phyis yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid med par yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin rtogs par gyur pas ngo bo nyid de² yod pa ma yin par shes pa de'i tshe log par 'dzin pa ci'i phyir ldog par mi 'gyur te/ ldog pa kho nar 'gyur ba yin pas khyed kyi³ so so⁴ skye bo de nyid shes pa ma skyes pa dag la dang po kho nar gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul med par btags pas don ci zhig 'grub par 'gyur/ de bzhin du/

gnyis su rnam par rtog pa dag//
sems dang sms byung spyod yul na³//
gzugs la sogs pa dgag byas kyang//
'jug par mi 'gyur mi rigs so// (53)
(naiva dvayavikalpaś ca cittacaitasagocaraḥ/
pratiśedhe 'pi rūpādau na pravartitum arhati// (53))

(C. 214a1, D. 214a1, P. 237a5) zhes bya ba ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa gnyis su rnam par rtog pa gang dag yin pa de dag khyed sms dang sms las byung ba'i spyod yul yin par 'dod cing gzugs la sogs pa'i phyi rol gyi yul rnams dang 'brel ba yin par mi 'dod na/ de la khyed kyi⁶ gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams rnam pa thams cad du dgag pa byas kyang gnyis su rnam par rtog pa de dag 'jug par mi 'gyur bar mi rigs so// 'o na ji lta zhe na/ 'jug par 'gyur ba kho nar rigs te/ sngon dang phyis kyang gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi yul rnams la mi ltos par khyad par med pa'i phyir ro//

¹ P: la
² “de” omitted in C, D.
³ P: kyi
⁴ P: so
⁵ P: ni
⁶ P: kyi
gal te 'di skad ces gzugs la sogsa pa phyi rol gyi yul rnam dang ma 'brel ba'i rnam par rtog pa gnyis po dag spang ba kho na'i phyir kho bo cag gis rnam¹ grangs gzhan gyis² phyi rol gyi yul rnam rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag ste/ de'i 'og tu rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes skyes pa na rang dang gzhan du snang ba'i cha bsal bas yul de dang de la 'dzin pa dag 'gag par 'gyur ro zhe na/ 'dir bshed pa/

gal te de ni dgag pa'i phyir//
sgrub gzhan yongs su 'dzin 'dod na//
'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa bas//
ma reg par ni bsring na bzang// (54)
(tannišedhāya saced isto vidhyantaraparigrahāḥ/
prakṣālanaḥ dhi paṅkasya dūrād asparśanaṃ varam// (54))

(C. 214a5, D. 214a5, P. 237b3) zhes bya ba ni gal te khyped snying nas phyi rol gyi yul med par 'dod na ni/ de rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par btags pas kyang ci bya ste/ gal te de³ rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par rnam par bzhag nas phyis de dgag pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa'i cha nyid yin par sgrub pa gzhan yongs su 'dzin par 'dod na ni/ des na/ 'dam rdzab 'khru bar byed pa bas/ ma reg par ni bsring pa bzang/ zhes bya ba'i dpe 'di don mthun pa nyid du 'gyur te/ mi smyon pa blun po 'ga' zhig gis lam gtsang ma bor te/ mi gtsang ba'i 'dam rdzab kyi klong du zhugs pa na gzhan dag gis de la dris pa/ ci'i phyir khyod lam bor te 'dam rdzab tu zhugs⁴/ des smras pa/ yang bkru bar bya'o// gzhan gyis smras pa/ glen pa gal te gdon mi za bar bkru bar bya dgos na snga nas 'dam rdzab kyi ma reg pa thag bsringa na ches bzang ngo zhes bya ba lta bur 'gyur ro//

¹ P.: rnam
² P.: gyi
³ “de” omitted in P.
⁴ P.: zhugs pa
2. Translation

Next, to refute another reasoning of our opponents, we say:

If you want to prove that a [so-called] external object has the nature of mind, because it is an object of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding (condition),” (27)

In this inference, 'external object' is the subject of the proposition (dharmin). Its property to be proven (dharma) is that it has the nature of mind (cittasvabhāva). 'Because it is an object of consciousness' is stated as the reason (hetu). 'Just like the immediately preceding condition' is the example (drṣṭānta). An instance of mind (cittam) together with its accompanying mental factors (caitī) which perishes in the immediately preceding moment (tadanantara) becomes a real condition for the (present) arisal of another but similar (sama) instance of mind with its mental factors. The former is therefore called 'the immediately preceding condition' (samanantarapratyaya). If you Yogācārans argue that, just as this (immediately preceding condition) is of the nature of mind because it is an object of consciousness, just so external objects are of the nature of mind because they also are objects of consciousness,2

---

1 Another reasoning (bsam pa) by which the Yogācāra attempts to prove that all the objects of consciousness, including the so-called 'external objects' or objects of the sense consciousnesses, are themselves mental phenomena.

2 This inference says that the immediately preceding condition of a consciousness is of the nature of mind because it is an object of consciousness. Neither the commentary in TJ nor the parallel passages in PP (Eckel, pp. 64-65) and in Avalokitavrata’s commentary elaborate on this point; they apparently treat it as an established tenet, accepted by both the proponent and the opponent. Yamaguchi (p. 365) refers to the Abhidharma tenet that any instance of consciousness which functions as the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) of the next instance of consciousness is also the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya) of that new instance of consciousness (see Mahāvibhāṣāsāstra, T. vol. 27, 109a10-11). This is the same as saying that all the instances of consciousness are accompanied by an awareness of the immediately preceding past.

Note that this general tenet takes on a different meaning in the Yogācāra doctrine. According to the Yogācāra, the store-consciousness functions at each instant as the immediately preceding condition and as the object-condition of all the other kinds of consciousness which originate in the next instant (see TrBh 34.5-11 ad TrK 15). The store-consciousness is the uninterrupted, indistinct awareness of the 'objective' world of which it constantly creates the images within itself. These images are the primordial objects of our sense perceptions and of the conceptual apprehensions proper to the mental consciousness (manovijnāna). The defiled seventh consciousness (kliṣṭamana), on the other hand, has the uninterrupted world-awareness of the store-consciousness as its object and misconceives this awareness as an enduring subject or self. The store-consciousness thus functions as both the immediately preceding condition and the object-condition of all the other kinds of consciousness. This specific Yogācāra understanding of samanantarapratyaya/ālambanapratyaya is however not applicable to the present inference because it is not approved by the Madhyamaka.
Then the reason (in your inference) is erroneous, because mental factors exist separately (from the mind). (28ab)

Your inference either proves that external objects have the nature of mind, because they are objects of consciousness, just like the immediately preceding condition; or it proves that external objects do not have the nature of mind, because they are objects of consciousness, just as separately existing mental factors (caittā) such as feeling (vedanā) and the like do not have the nature of mind. Hence, the reason (in your inference) is inconclusive (anaikāntika).1

You may think that (your thesis that external objects have the nature of mind) is established by scripture, since it is in fact taught that “The threefold world is mind only.” We reply that this is not correct, because you do not understand very well the meaning of this scriptural statement. If you ask us why, we say:

“Mind-only” is taught in the Sutra in order to negate the existence of an agent or enjoyer (other than the mind). (28cd)

The Buddhas and bodhisattvas have taught “mind-only” in order to refute the theory of other non-Buddhists (tīrthika) who maintain that there exists an agent and enjoyer other than the mind. They have not taught it in order to negate the existence of

---

1 Bhāvaviveka’s rejoinder is based on the Yogācāra tenet that an instance of mind (cittam) and its accompanying mental factors (caittā) are separate entities, each having its own nature. See also the parallel passage in PP (Eckel, pp. 64–65). As Yamaguchi (pp. 367–369) remarks, the Yogācāra was divided on this issue. In his introductory commentary on MSAL XI. 34–35 (D. No. 4034, M184a1-3) Sthiramati says that, according to some Yogācārins, “vijnaptimātra” means that only the mind and its mental factors exist as separate entities whereas external objects do not exist as separate from the mind; according to others, “vijnaptimātra” means that only the mind exists and that neither mental factors nor external objects exist as separate entities apart from the mind. The first position is explained as follows in MVK I.8: the mind apprehends the substance of the object, while the mental factors apprehend special qualities of the object (lātrāthādṛṣṭir vijnānam tadviśe tu caitasāh). The Vijnaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, representing the view of Dharmapāla, also defends the first position that mental factors have their own nature (svabhāva) different from that of the mind itself, but specifies that this is true from the point of view of the conventional truth only. From the point of view of the highest truth, the mind and the mental factors are neither different nor identical. (T. vol. 31, 36c22-37a11; Siddhi, pp. 395–397).

Bhāvaviveka’s position on the ontological status of the mind and the mental factors is explained in MHK/TJ V.45–46. Bhāvaviveka follows the Sautrāntika thesis that cittam and caittā are not separate real entities, but are only names or designations (upādhyya prajñapti) of the different mental functions that occur within the unitary stream of consciousness of a person.

2 cittamātram idam yad idam traidhātukam (Daśabhrānikasūtra, J. Rahder ed., p. 49, E). This statement is quoted for the first time as a scriptural argument for the mind-only tenet in the Mahāyānasamgraha (MS, T. vol. 31, 138b3–4). Vasubandhu quotes it in a slightly different form in his Viniśatikā (as restored into Sanskrit by S. Lēvi in VIIV 3.2–3: cittamātram bhū jñānapratā yad uta traidhātukam). The Vijnaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra also quotes it as one of the scriptural arguments for the mind-only tenet (T. vol. 31, 39a6–7).
objects outside the mind. This can be known from the following passage in the Daśabhūmikasūtra: “A bodhisattva in the sixth bodhisattva-stage reflects on dependent arising in forward (anuloma) and reverse (pratiloma) order and thinks as follows: ‘Only the aggregates of suffering, devoid of an agent (kāraka) and an experiencer (vedaka), arise from the twelve limbs (of dependent arising), starting from ignorance and so forth, and thus the immense tree of suffering (duḥkhavṛksa) is brought into existence.’ O Sons of the Conqueror, because it is definitely that way, it is thus: these three (samsaric) realms are mind only; they are produced and constructed by the mind and nowhere does there exist an agent or enjoyer other than the mind.”1 Thus, (this Sutra) does not establish the non-existence of external objects.

At this point (the Yogācārin) object: “But (the non-existence of external objects) is also taught in the Prajñāpāramitā (sūtra), as follows: “Maitreya! A bodhisattva should realize that perceptible form (rūpa) is (correctly) conceived (prajñapti) by distinguishing the following three aspects: “This is imagined form (parikalpitarūpa),” “This is form as it appears in consciousness (vikalpitārūpa)” and “This is the true nature of form (dharma-tārūpa).” What is imagined form? It is that which is (mistakenly) imagined to be the nature of form in dependence on the name, the concept, the designation and the conventional term “rūpa.” That imagined form is not a real entity (adravyam). What is form as it appears in con-

---


Bhāvaviveka quotes the context of the “mind-only” statement in the Daśabhūmikasūtra to show that the Sutra teaches “mind-only” in order to negate the existence of an enduring self as the agent of actions and the experiencing subject of karmic retribution. Accordingly, “mind-only” in the Sutra means that only the mind as a non-enduring entity is the agent and enjoyer of a person’s actions. The Sutra does not intend to say that external objects do not exist and that only the mind exists. Bhāvaviveka is no doubt right here, because the context shows indeed that the Sutra teaches “mind-only” in order to negate the existence of ātman (see also section “N” on page 52 in Rahder’s edition).

2 E. Conze translates vikalpitārūpa as “discerned form” (The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, p. 648) and R. Thurman as “constructed form” (The Speech of Gold, p. 356). The terms ‘discerned’ and ‘constructed’ do however not clearly indicate how vikalpa differs from parikalpa which both Conze and Thurman translate as ‘imagined’. vikalpa is a dual consciousness, bifurcated into a perceiving subject and a perceived object (in this case, the image of an external form or rūpa). vikalpitārūpa is therefore the image (ābhasa, pratibhasa) of a seemingly external form as it appears in a consciousness which is habituated to the dualistic apprehension of such images. According to the Yogācāra, people in general misapprehend these internal object-images as replicas of real external objects outside the mind (= parikalpitarūpa) due to their familiarity with names, concepts and everyday language.
sciousness? It is that to which verbal expressions such as the name, the concept, the designation and the conventional term “rūpam” are applied in dependence on the (dual) consciousness (vikalpa) (in which images of perceptible form appear). Since this (aspect of form) is supported by the reality of the consciousness (in which it appears), it itself is a real entity, but not in the sense that it originates through its own power. What is the true nature of form? It is the permanent absence of the reality of imagined form in form as it appears in consciousness. It is the absence of self-existence (dharmanairātmyam), the limit of reality (bhittakoti), and so forth. It is neither a real entity nor mere non-existence, because (consciousness) is empty of imagined objects and because consciousness itself (as empty of such objects) exists.”


The Sanskrit text of this passage can be reconstructed as follows (based on the Sanskrit text edition by E. Conze and S. Iida, pp. 237-238):

“tribhir Maitreya abhānir bodhisattvena rāpaprabhedaprajñāptir anugantavā, yad uta idam parikalpitaṁ rūpam, idam vikalpitaṁ rūpam, idam dharmatārūpaṁ iti. tatra katamat parikalpitam rūpam. yā rūpam iti nāmasamjñāprajñāptiavahāram niśritāḥ rāpasabhāvāya parikalpaṇā. idam parikalpitaṁ rūpam, idam vikalpitaṁ rūpam, idam adravyam. tatra katamat vikalpaṁ rūpam, iśvarīn vikalpaṁ pratiśritāḥ abhālapaṇā hi nāmasamjñāprajñāpīvahāraṁ rūpam itvā. idam vikalpaṁ sadāvāsthitam paśūyati, sadāvāsthitam na tu svatvārttattvaḥ, tatra katamat dharmatārūpaṁ, yat tena parikalpitarūpENA tasva vikalpaṁ vinirvajitaṁ niśritāṣsavāt prajñāparāpayāt bhūtāsthitāḥ, tān naiva adravyam na sadāvāsthitam vikalpaṁ pratiśrayaṁyate voc ca (nam par brtags pa’i don gyis stong pa nyid dang rnam par shes pa yod pa’i phir ro)”

There are three Yogacāra texts in which the three aspects of rūpam are discussed in a very similar way as in the Maitreyaparipṛcchā. They are the following: (1) MVK III. 16cd, MV Bh. 44.15-19 (Teaches that one should develop the skill (kṣaṇāyā) to distinguish these three aspects for each of the five aggregates (skandha) as an antidote (pratīpāka) against the mistaken belief in the existence of an enduring self (ātman). (2) Abhidharmaśāstra, T. vol. 31, 672b20-27 (Says the same as MVK III.16cd and is most probably based on it). (3) Asvabhāva’s commentary on Mahāyānasamgraha, T. vol. 31, 399b29-c13 (Commenting on the definition of the three natures, Asvabhāva quotes a text, identical with the Maitreyaparipṛcchā passage quoted in TJ, and identifies it as a quotation from the Mahāyānaprajñāpāramitāsūtra.) It is clear that these three texts deal with the three natures, and not with mind-only (cittamātra, viññāpatīmātra). The same should be said about the Maitreyaparipṛcchā passage quoted in TJ, except for the last line (underlined in the Sanskrit version above). That last line is however not found in the original text which reads “parāprakāsaṇaparbāvitaṁ” instead. My assumption is therefore that the author of TJ (Bhāvaviveka?) has added the last line to the original text in order to relate this passage to the
We reply:

If you argue that (only) consciousness (exists) because it is empty of imaginary objects, then the existence of objects is thereby not refuted, because a non-imaginary object (of consciousness) really exists (according to you). (29)

Although consciousness is empty of imaginary objects, the true nature of perceptible forms (dhammatārūpa) which is the object (artha) to be realized by the strictly individual awareness (pratyātmasamvedanīya) of the Tathāgatas, does exist (according to you). Since this inexpressible (ayathārta) reality exists (according to you), a non-imaginary object (akalpitārtha) exists. Hence, an object (of consciousness) actually exists and it is not correct that consciousness is in every respect empty of objects.¹

¹ Verse 29 can be interpreted in the following two different ways.

(1) In verse 29, Bhāvaviveka rejects the opponent's thesis of "mind-only" by arguing that a non-imaginary object of consciousness, also called 'the true nature of form', really exists and is the object apprehended by the Tathāgata's unmistakable awareness of Reality. S. Yamaguchi (pp. 397–398) follows this interpretation, but rightly observes the problem it involves. It is indeed hard to accept that Bhāvaviveka, who throughout Chapter Five of MHK/TJ insistently rejects the idea that the true nature of things is itself an entity capable of functioning as the object-condition of the Tathāgata's knowledge, would be saying here that the 'true nature of form really exists' and is the object apprehended by the awareness of the Tathāgatas. Jang-gya focuses on the same problem in his interpretation of verse 29, but he uses an obscure reasoning (see D.S. Lopez, A Study of Sva-tantrika, p. 313) in an attempt to rescue Bhāvaviveka from literally saying that 'the ultimate nature of form really exists'.

(2) The problem can be avoided by assuming that the reason of the inference in verse 29 ("because a non-imaginary object really exists") is not asserted by Bhāvaviveka himself, but by the Yogācāra. I have added "(according to you)" in my translation to indicate that I favor this interpretation of verse 29. On this interpretation, Bhāvaviveka uses the Yogācāra premise about the real existence of the true nature of things against the Yogācāra argument for the non-existence of objects outside consciousness. His reasoning in verse 29 is that the Yogācāra's contradict their own doctrine if they argue that objects outside consciousness do not exist while maintaining at the same time that the inexpressible, ultimate nature of things is an objective reality and functions as the object apprehended by the non-conceptual awareness of the Tathāgatas.

This interpretation of verse 29 is substantiated by the important observation that the textual basis of MHK V.29 is not the Maitreyaparipṛcchā, as the quotation in TJ leads us to believe, but is rather Vasubandhu's Vinśatikākārikā/-vṛtti (VIκ/VIv). This can be argued as follows.

(i) The idea that imaginary objects (kalpitārtha) do not exist, but a non-imaginary object
(Eighteenth section of the *Madhyamakahrdayavṛtti-tarkajñāla*)

Moreover,

(The reason in your inference) is uncertain, because even in dreams consciousness (has an object of which) the nature is non-imaginary. (30ab)

As for (your inference,) “The threefold world is mind only, because (consciousness) is empty of (external) objects such as perceptible form, as is the case with the consciousness in a dream and the like,” the truth is that, even in dreams, there exists an (objective) aspect of consciousness which has a non-imaginary nature. Thus, when you say “as is the case with the consciousness in a dream,” you argue either that the consciousness in a dream is empty of (external) objects which are merely imaginary, such as a (real) man and the like, or that consciousness—as the perceiver of its own (objective) aspect—is not empty of objects which are non-imaginary. Your reason is therefore inconclusive.¹

(Your proposition that consciousness) has no object is not acceptable, because the example (of your inference) is not established. (30cd)

Even if (the consciousness in) a dream is approved as an example of (the reason) “because (consciousness) is empty of imaginary objects,” (that example) negates (the existence of) imaginary objects (only), but it does not negate that part (of consciousness) which is its non-imaginary object. Thus, that (example) also does not prove that only the mind exists. (Your proposition) that (consciousness) has no object is

---

¹ (akalpitārthaka) exists, is explicitly stated in the following passage of ViV: “na khalu sarvathā dharmo nāsti ity evam dharmajñātavānpravṛśvya bhavati, api tu kalpitātmano yo kailair dharmajñāno svabhavo prācchayogadhatāḥ pārikalpitaḥ tena kalpitena atmanā teṣām nairātmyam. na tv anubhātyena atmanā yo buddhānām visaya iti.” (ViV, 6.14-18 ad ViK 10d) (“One does not understand the absence of self-existence in things by claiming that things do not exist in all respects, but (one understands it correctly by seeing that they do not exist) with respect to their imagined nature. Things lack self-existence in the sense that they lack the imagined nature which ignorant people identify as 'apprehended object', 'apprehender' and so forth. But things are not empty of the inexpressible nature which is the object (of the awareness) of the Buddhas.”)

(ii) The reasonings in the verses preceding and following MHK V.29 are all refutations of tenets which are found in ViK/ViV.

MHK V.28: Refutes the Yogācāra interpretation of the ‘cittamātra’ teaching in the Daśabhūmi-kāsāstra. This āgama is quoted in ViV 3.2-3.


MHK V.30: Refutes the ‘dream simile’ argument found in ViK 3a/4a.

MHK V.31-38: Refutes the arguments for the non-existence of atoms found in ViK 11-15.

¹ According to Bhāvaviveka, the consciousness in a dream perceives real mental phenomena which are its internal ‘objective aspect’ (see MHK/TJ V.19). One such real phenomenon is for example the image of a man seen by the consciousness in a dream. This image is the non-imaginary object of that dream consciousness. Its imaginary, nonexistent object is a real man of flesh and blood.
therefore not acceptable. This is because (your) example is not correctly established, since it lacks a part of what you want to prove.\textsuperscript{1} The consciousness in a dream is not without object, because it has the true nature of form (\textit{dharmanārūpam}) as its object.\textsuperscript{2} In short, the meaning here is that (the consciousness in) a dream is not a correct example and should therefore not be used as an example when it comes to correct reasoning.

(The Yogaçāra) objects again as follows:

The object of a (sense) perception is thought to be either a single (atom) or an aggregation (of many atoms). But when one examines this by means of correct reasonings, (the existence of) such an object is in both cases not possible. (31)

Some (Yogaçāra) opponents object as follows: “Those who claim that external objects exist, conceive the object of a (sense) perception in two ways. They say that the object (of a sense perception) is either a single atom or an aggregation of (many) atoms. But when one examines this by means of correct reasonings, both propositions appear to be against reason, and are therefore not correct, because both contradict (what is actually the case).” To show what these correct reasonings are, they say:

(First,) a single atom is not the actual object of a sense perception, because it does not appear as that, just as a physical sense organ is not the actual object (of a sense perception). (32)

An 'atom' is the smallest particle of matter. 'Single' means 'alone' (or 'all by itself'). (In this inference), 'a single atom' is the subject of the proposition (\textit{dharmin}). Its property to be proven (\textit{dharma}) is that it is not the actual object of a sense perception (\textit{riññabuddhi}). The combination of this subject and its property is the proposition (\textit{pa-kṣa}). 'Because it does not appear as that' is the reason (\textit{hetu}). 'Appear as that' means 'appear as the actual object (in a sense consciousness)'. 'It does not appear as that' means 'It does not appear in a (sense) consciousness and is (therefore) not the actual object (of a sense consciousness)'.'Because' indicates that this is stated as the reason. 'Just as a physical sense organ is not the actual object (of a sense perception)’ is the example (\textit{āśūnta}). 'Physical sense organ' (\textit{indriya}) stands for the five sense

\textsuperscript{1} That is, you intend to prove that consciousness has no object at all, but your example proves only that it has no imaginary object.

\textsuperscript{2} Bhāvaviveka uses the same strategy as in verse 29 (see note 1, p.23). As in verse 29, it is again the Yogaçārins, and not Bhāvaviveka, who assert that the non-imaginary, true nature of the objects of dream consciousness exists as a reality in its own right, independent of consciousness itself.
organs. Although the sense organs are objects of knowledge and are colored, transparent matter (rāṭapatrasāda), they do not appear (in a sense consciousness) as the actual object (of that consciousness) and are therefore not the actual object of a sense perception. In the same way, a (single) atom is not the actual object of a sense perception.

It is also not right that (an aggregation of) many atoms is the actual object of a (perceiving) mind, because (such an aggregation) is not a real entity, just like a double moon. (33)

It is also not right that an aggregation (samāha) of many atoms is the actual object of a (perceiving) mind. This is because (an aggregation) is not a real entity. In fact, although it is held that individual atoms are real entities (dvāvyā), aggregations of atoms are not (considered to be) real entities, just as an army, a forest and the like (are not real entities). Therefore, although the form of an aggregation (of atoms) certainly appears (in a sense consciousness), an aggregation cannot be the actual object of a (sense) consciousness. This is similar to the mistaken perception of a double moon and so forth by somebody who suffers from cataract (tāmirika).2

---

1 According to the general Abhidharma theory, the sense organs are objects of knowledge (yukti = visaya), but they are not objects of sense perception because they are invisible, inaudible, intangible, etc. Their existence is known by inferential knowledge.

2 The two main Yogācāra texts in which it is argued that atoms, either one by one or in aggregated form, cannot be the actual object of a sense perception are Vasubandhu's Viś 11-15 (Viś 6:25-8:22) and Dignāga's Alambanapratyaya (AP). Other Yogācāra texts which discuss the same issue, but depend on Viś and AP, are: PS/PSV I; TrBh 16:18-17:7; MVT 25:1-17; Siddhi, T. vol. 31, 4:10-2:25. Bhāvaviveka's exposition of the Yogācāra arguments in MK V.32-33 is based on AP.

In AP, Dignāga examines whether external objects function as the object-condition (alambanapratyaya) of the sense perceptions. His discussion is based on the following definition of 'object-condition': "(Only) the entity which produces the perception in which the form of that entity appears can be said to be the actual object of that perception" (AP, 176:17-18: don gang zhi ng snang ba'i rnam par rig pa bskyed pa de ni dngiṣ pa yin par rigs te...). This definition stipulates that an entity should meet the following two conditions in order to qualify as the actual object of a sense perception. First, that entity must be one of the producing causes of that particular sense perception. This implies that the entity must really exist, because unreal things cannot function as causes. Second, the form (dārṣṭa) of that entity must appear in the consciousness it produces. If this second condition was not stipulated, other producing causes of the sense perceptions, such as the immediately preceding instant of consciousness or the sense organs, would also be objects of the sense perceptions.

The theory considered in verse 32 says that single atoms are real entities and that each single atom of a gross object functions as the object-condition of the perception of that object. Kuei-chi attributes this theory to the old Vaibhāṣīka school (see his commentary on Siddhi, T. vol. 43, 270c4). Dignāga refutes this theory as follows (verse 1 of AP). Single atoms, in as far as they are thought to be real entities, can produce a sense perception. But they cannot be the object-condition of a sense perception because they do not meet the second condition mentioned above. That is to say, the form or image which appears in a sense consciousness is never an image of individual atoms one by one, but is always an image of a gross object.
We reply:

If the opponent intends to prove that non-aggregated matter is not the actual object of a (perceiving) mind, he ends up proving what is already proven. (34) If the opponents intend to prove that a single atom of non-aggregated (bsags pa ma yin pa, asamcitat) matter is not the actual object of a (perceiving) mind, then their thesis (pārvaṇapāka) will (have the error of) proving what is already proven (siddhasādhana), because we also assert this.

But if (the opponents intend to prove this) with respect to aggregated matter, the reason (in their inference) will not be correctly established, because an aggregation of different atoms (of the same kind) produces (a consciousness in which) the form of that (aggregate) appears. (35) If the subject of the proposition (in verse 33) is matter as an aggregation of atoms of the same kind (sajjīti) and you state as the reason that it is not a real entity, then that reason will not be established for both parties. In fact, when different atoms of matter of the same kind are accumulated and conjoined, that (aggregate) is acknowledged as an actual object (of perception) because the consciousness in which it appears originates as having the form (ākāra) of aggregated atoms. We assert that

The second theory (verse 33) says that aggregations of atoms, and not single atoms, are the object of the sense perceptions. Kuei-chi attributes this theory to the Sautrāntika (T. vol. 43, 267a8-13, 270a13-b11). This theory is refuted (AP, verse 2ab) on the ground that aggregations of atoms do not have the power to produce a sense perception because they are merely nominal things (prarthaṇātisat) and not real entities (dravyasat), just as a non-existent second moon cannot be the producing cause of the mistaken perception of two moons.

Dignāga introduces a third theory (AP, verse 3ab) which says that each single atom of a gross object possesses the form of the gross object of which it is a constituent part. This gross form, inherent in each atom, is a real entity (dravyasat). Hence, individual atoms as parts of a gross object meet the two conditions for being the object-condition of the consciousness which perceives that gross object. Kuei-chi attributes this theory to Saṃghabhadra and the new Vaibhāṣika school (T. vol. 43, 271a9-10). (See also Siddhi, T. vol. 31, 4b16-18; T. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 24.1, Wien 1990, note (227), pp. 247-249.) The main point of Dignāga's refutation of this third theory (AP, verses 3cd-5) is the following. If the form of a gross object, as perceived by a sense consciousness, inheres in each of the atoms of that object, the absurd consequence will be that all the objects which consist of atoms of the same kind (for instance, a pot and a cup) will be perceived as identical (AP, verse 4ab) because the gross form inherent in each of their atoms is identical.

Bhāvaviveka does not mention this third theory in his presentation of the Yogācāra arguments in MHK V.31-33. According to S. Yamaguchi (pp. 404-405), this indicates that Bhāvaviveka's target in MHK V.31-38 is not Dignāga's epistemological theory as set forth inĀlambanaparikṣā (although the phrasing of MHK V.31-33 follows AP), but is rather Vasubandhu's argumentation of the ontological issue of 'mind-only' in ViK/ViV where only the first two theories are explained and refuted. However that may be, another and perhaps a better explanation of Bhāvaviveka's silence about the third theory might be that his own position on this issue, as explained in verses 35-36, is very close to this third theory.
both an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, such as a pot and so forth, and the (individual) atoms (of such an aggregate) are real entities (dravya) for conventional thought (samvrti). In fact, just as we assert that an atom is a real entity because it is an aggregation of eight real entities, just so (we assert that) aggregations (of atoms), such as a pot and so forth, are real entities (for conventional thought) because isolated atoms are not approved as real entities (by conventional thought). 1

Just that (aggregation of atoms of the same kind) is the actual object (of a sense perception), because it functions as the cause of a consciousness in which its form appears, as is the case with desire.

Your thesis is therefore refuted by (this) inference. (36)

We assert that matter, as an aggregation of atoms of the same kind, is the actual object (of the sense perceptions). Why? Because such an aggregation of atoms functions as the actual cause of the consciousness in which the image of that aggregated matter appears. Whatever functions as the cause of a consciousness in which its image appears, is observed to be an aggregate, just as it is agreed, for example, that desire which has the character of attachment to an object perceives indeed an aggregate, such as for instance the body of a woman. Your thesis, “Aggregated matter is not the actual object (of a sense perception),” is thus refuted by this inference. 2

---

1 Bhāvaviveka follows here the Abhidharma theory that each atom is an aggregation of at least eight particles: four elementary particles (mahābhitāni; earth, water, fire, wind) and four composite particles (bhaṇṭika; color/shape, odor, taste, tangible) (see AK II. 22, p. 145). These eight particles are real entities but they never exist in isolation. Atoms, as aggregations of real entities, are themselves real entities. Atoms also never exist in isolation (AK, I.13, p. 25) but only in aggregated form. Bhāvaviveka’s ‘conventional’ reasoning here is that, just as atoms themselves are real entities because they are aggregations of particles which are real entities, just so aggregations of atoms of the same kind are real entities because their constituent atoms are real entities. An aggregation of atoms of the same kind thus meets the first condition for being the actual object of a sense perception; that is to say, such an aggregation is a real entity and is therefore capable of functioning as one of the producing causes of a sense perception. And it also meets the second condition, because its form appears in the consciousness it produces.

2 Verse 36 is an inference based on conventional thought or common sense, premised on the general belief that both atoms and aggregations of atoms are real entities. The Yogācāra’s denial of the existence of external objects is thus refuted on the ground of contradicting common sense.

Bhāvaviveka’s position, as explained in verses 35-36, is close to the third theory rejected by Dignāga in AP (see note 2, p. 27). It is however not stated clearly in verses 35-36 that the form of a gross object which appears in a sense consciousness belongs to each of the constituent atoms of that object. The parallel text in PP is much clearer in this respect (see Eckel, p. 66). Bhāvaviveka explicitly states there that all the atoms of an aggregate cooperate to produce a consciousness in which the form of that aggregate appears, so that one may also say that each single atom of an aggregate produces a consciousness in which the form of that atom itself appears (gcig pa yang rang gi bdag nyid snang ba'i blo bskyed pa yin pa'i phyir).

---

— 176 —
Moreover, (your thesis) also contradicts the scripture which says that the supporting faculties\(^1\) and the objects of the five (sense) consciousnesses are aggregations (of atoms).\(^2\)

(The Yogācāra) replies: "A (perceiving) consciousness certainly originates without (apprehending an external) object, because it originates from the seeds (produced by) a (past) consciousness which had an object-image similar to its own, just like a mental perception." We reply:

If you argue that a (sense) consciousness apprehends no (external) object, because it originates from its own seeds just like a mental perception, then (your reasoning implies that) a (sense) consciousness will surely apprehend an (external) object because (a mental perception also apprehends its own) non-constructed (object). (37)

Because a mental perception also has an (objective) aspect which is the appearing of its own non-constructed object, the (sense) consciousness you are arguing about will (consequently also) apprehend its own external object.\(^3\)

Also, by inferring that (a sense consciousness) has no (external) object, you deny that it is a (sense) consciousness.

Since we do not assert that an aggregation (is the object of a sense perception), your refutation of that does not damage us. (38)

Something is called 'consciousness' because it makes an object known. But since you infer that (a sense consciousness) has no (external) object, that which you assert to be a (sense) consciousness will not be a (sense) consciousness. '(Sense) consciousness' (in the thesis of your inference in verse 37) is thus negated in that it does not have

---

\(^1\) āstrāya (=the five physical sense organs)

\(^2\) See AK I. 35d (scriptural source not mentioned).

\(^3\) For the Yogācāra, mental perceptions are produced from the seeds that were deposited in the store-consciousness by previous mental perceptions. They are not produced by mental objects that would exist independently of the mind and would function as their object-condition. The mental perceptions of non-Buddhas are conceptual cognitions which identify/differentiate the internal object-images of the five sense perceptions and misconceive them as images of real objects outside consciousness. Similarly, the five sense perceptions are not produced from real external objects but from seeds that were produced by previous sense perceptions of the same type. The sense perceptions are non-conceptual cognitions. Hence, unlike mental perceptions, they are not misconceptions. Nevertheless, the sense perceptions of non-Buddhas are misrepresentations of reality because they perceive images of unreal external objects.

According to Bhāvaviveka, however, mental perceptions apprehend mental phenomena which are real entities in their own right, and not just constructs or fabrications of the mind itself (see the commentary on MHK/TJ V.19). And just as mental perceptions apprehend real mental objects, just so the sense perceptions apprehend real external objects.
the nature of a (sense) consciousness. Hence, your thesis (pratijñā) is invalid because the reality of the subject of the thesis (dharmin) is not correctly established.¹

Regarding your thesis (in verse 33) "An aggregation is not the object of a sense perception," we also do not assert that an aggregation (samāhā, 'dus pa) is the object (of a sense perception). What we assert is that a conglomeration (samcitā, bsags pa) of atoms is the object (of the sense perceptions). Hence, when you argue that an aggregation is not an object of perception, you do not inflict any damage on us. What then is the difference between a conglomeration and an aggregation? When many atoms of the same kind have the same supporting base, we call it 'a conglomeration'. When dissimilar things with different supporting bases, such as elephants and horses or harita trees and khadira trees, are gathered together and are called 'an army' or 'a forest', then that is what we call 'an aggregation'.

(The Yogācāra) objects: "The thesis (that a sense consciousness does not apprehend any external object) is firmly established by what is said in our Ālambanaparikṣā:"

Even though external objects do not exist,

(the sense perceptions) have been originating from time immemorial,

because the capacities (of perception) and the forms of objects (appearing in actual sense perceptions) mutually cause each other.

(We reply:) (If so,) how will the cessation of these (sense perceptions) ever be possible?² (39)

¹ The inference in verse 37 sets out to prove that a sense consciousness does not apprehend any external object. Bhāvaviveka points out that the thesis of this inference is self-contradictory because the property to be proven ("does not apprehend any external object") annuls the reality of the subject ("sense consciousness"). Self-contradiction or self-anulment (for example: "All statements are false") is mentioned as one of the five fallacies of the thesis (paksābhāṣā) in the Nyāyamukha (T. 1628, vol. 32, 1a19-20).

² This verse is not found in the Tibetan translations of MHK (verses-only text) which are presumably based on a Sanskrit manuscript in which this verse was lacking. (On the Sanskrit manuscripts of MHK, see Y. Ejima, Chūgan Shisō no Tenkai – Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū, Tokyo 1980, pp. 261-264.) Since this verse occurs in the Sanskrit manuscript of MHK discovered by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, as well as in the Tibetan version of TJ, it should be counted as verse 39 of the fifth chapter of MHK (see Y. Ejima, "Daijō-shō-chinron no Yugagyō-gakusetsu-hihan," in Tokasaki Jikōdō Hakushi Kanrekikinen-ronsū, Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū, Tokyo 1988, p. 211 note 1.)

Verse 39 is an adapted version of verse 8 of AP. Bhāvaviveka has substituted the first line of verse 39 ("Even though external objects do not exist") for the first line of AP 8 ("It is not a contradiction to say that the capacity (of future sense perceptions) resides in consciousness (itself)") in order to relate verse 39 to the topic discussed in the previous verses. As the commentary in TJ says, the last line in the Sanskrit version of verse 39 ("How will the cessation of these ever be possible?") was substituted for the original in AP 8 ("have been originating from time immemorial") as an immediate rejoinder to the opponent's argument. For the meaning of AP 8, see the commentary and notes to MHK V.22cd.
We reply. The fourth line of this verse "How will the cessation of these (sense perceptions) ever be possible?" is an immediate rejoinder (to the opponent's argument) and should be understood as follows.

When external objects are present, (sense) consciousnesses originate in which images of these objects appear. The yogin who aims at the purification of consciousness, comes to realize that these objects lack inherent existence. Because he thus (gradually) removes (all) apprehended objects (grāhya) and (all) apprehending (grāhya-ka) (from his mind), it is but right that the transmundane non-dual awareness (of reality as it is) (lokottaranirvikalpajñāna) will originate (in him).

But for you, who assert that objects (outside consciousness) do not exist (at all), external objects do not exist at first and also not later. In that case, there exists no cause by which one could later eliminate the (habitual) functioning (of consciousness) as an apprehended-apprehending (duality), and there exists thus no means (upōya) by which the transmundane non-dual awareness could ever originate. Since a means for the origination of the transmundane non-dual awareness does not exist if one asserts that (external) objects do not exist, you should explain how that beginningless functioning of consciousness (based on the mutual causation) of capacities and object-forms will ever cease!

---

1 According to Bhāvaviveka's view, which is based on the Madhyamaka tenet of 'two truths', external objects exist 'at first' but do not exist anymore 'later'. That is to say, external objects exist for the conventional thinking (samérti) which does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status of things. But they no longer exist for those who have become Madhyamaka yogins and are using Madhyamaka reasonings to examine whether things are ultimately real in the sense of having an inherent existence (swabhāva). Bhāvaviveka's position on this issue is explained in detail in MHK/TJ V.51-52.

2 The Yogācāra distinguishes the following stages in the path that leads to the attainment of the transmundane non-dual awareness: (1) Through correct reasoning one can acquire the certain knowledge that external objects do not exist and that all the sense data are products of the mind itself. (2) In accordance with this knowledge, the concentrated mind of the yogin gradually empties itself of all the images of external objects. (3) Finally, the mind of the yogin ceases to exist as an apprehender of objects. (For the details of this process, see the commentary and notes to MHK/TJ V.4.)

The point of Bhāvaviveka's objection here, and also in verse 53 below, is that the non-apprehending of external objects will never come about if, as the Yogācāra says, the content of all our sense perceptions is determined by the mind alone and not also by real external objects. Because the Yogācārins teach that the appearance of object-images in consciousness is the result of a beginningless intramental process and is not conditioned at all by the presence of real objects outside the mind, they cannot reasonably argue that the knowledge of the non-existence of external objects will lead to the non-perception of external objects or to the non-appearance of object-images in consciousness. The knowledge of the non-existence of external objects is therefore not a true means (upōya) by which the yogin could ever eliminate the perception of external objects. In short, the yogin who follows the Yogācāra path will never succeed in emptying his mind of the images of external objects and will therefore never attain the true non-dual awareness of reality as it is.
You might argue as follows:

Non-dual consciousness [itself] is not abandoned, because it is [the awareness] of the superiors and because it is [consciousness as] free of dual apprehension. (40ab)

You may think as follows. [Only] the dual apprehension of a perceived object and a perceiving subject, which is the cause of one’s existence in samsara, is abandoned. But consciousness as free of that dual apprehension is not abandoned. [On the contrary], it truly originates and does not cease to exist because it is [the awareness of reality] proper to the superiors (ārya) and because it is [consciousness as] free of dual apprehension.

(We reply:) If so,

As long as [that consciousness] originates, how can there be liberation?

[Liberation will be impossible] because the seeds [of consciousness] are not subdued. (40cd)

It is agreed that samsara is caused by the activity of the seeds of consciousness, and that liberation [from samsara] is attained when these seeds are subdued. If so, how can there be liberation as long as consciousness, either with or without dual apprehension, originates? Therefore, you who assert ‘mind-only’ cannot account for [the possibility of] liberation either.

You may object as follows: “In our view, the origination of a consciousness which is accompanied by dual apprehension is bondage (bandha) and the origination of consciousness as free of dual apprehension is liberation. Let us explain why that is so.

When the dual apprehension is active, diverse object-appearances originate [in consciousness]. This is because these diverse object-appearances and [consciousness] itself originate from the own seeds [of consciousness]. (41)

When consciousness functions as having both an apprehended aspect and an apprehending aspect (grāhya-grāhākāvijñāna), appearances (ābhāsa) representing the forms (ākāra) of various objects, such as colors and shapes (rāpa), originate [in consciousness]. Now, what is this appearance of diverse forms in consciousness? It is an [internal] causal process (parināma) whereby consciousness assumes the form (ākāra) of (diverse) objects. This is because both this [appearance of object-images] and

---

1 This reasoning is based on the Yogācāra theory that an actual consciousness, upon perishing, leaves its own impression or trace (vāsana) behind in the store-consciousness; these impressions mature into seeds (bīja) from which new instances of the same kind of consciousness will originate later.
consciousness as the appearance of itself (svabhāsa) originate from [consciousness'] own seeds [which were produced by previous instances of consciousness as] an appearance of object-images.¹

In fact, when [a consciousness] perishes, it deposits a potency in that [store-consciousness]. [This happens through the perishing] of [both consciousness] itself and [consciousness as the appearance of] another [than itself]. (42ab)

When these active consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) perish and disappear, they enter into that root-consciousness which is the place where their potency remains deposited. The meaning here is that [their potency] gets hidden² in that [store-consciousness] through the perishing of [consciousness'] own-nature (svātman) as a perceiver of its own object³ and also through the perishing of 'an other [than itself]' (anya), that is to say, also through the perishing of consciousness as an appearance of object-images (viṣayabhāsa).”

We reply. That may be true only as a theory which pleases the ears of common people (loka), but it succumbs to the following error:

What you designate by the name 'consciousness' is really conceived as a 'self'. (42cd)

Those who say that the 'self' exists also think that the potencies of everything are accumulated (pracita) in a single self which generates a variety of objects. You also, under the guise of⁵ what is merely the name 'consciousness', end up conceiving that (consciousness) as a 'self'. Thus, you also negate the (Buddhist) doctrine of no-'self.'⁶

¹ For the meaning of this paragraph, see the commentary and notes to MHK/TJ V.20 ff.
² chā ba (Sanskrit: cf).
³ rgya’i cha la ’bums pa (equivalent with consciousness as svabhāsa). See also MHK/TJ V.22cd.
⁴ Bhāvaviveka insinuates here that the Yogācāra is trying to attract common people to Buddhism by softening the radical 'no self' stance of Buddhism. Commoners will be pleased to hear that the Buddhists affirm the existence of a 'store-consciousness' as the enduring basis of a personal existence both in samsara and in nirvana!
⁵ rgyu thabs kyi (Sanskrit: vyājena).
⁶ The Yogācāra teaches that the store-consciousness contains all the seeds of defilement (sukleśa, sāsava) and of purification (vyavattana, anāsava). When the seeds of defilement are subdued and the seeds of purification have fully matured, the store-consciousness is transformed (parārttī) into a pure mental substratum from which the non-dual awareness of reality uninterruptedly originates. According to Bhāvaviveka, this theory of consciousness is not different from the atmanātva of the non-Buddhists. Just as the non-Buddhists teach that the eternal, unchangeable self (atman) is the subject of bondage and liberation, just so the Yogācāra affirms the existence of the store-consciousness as the selfsame subject of defilement and purification. Bhāvaviveka explains his own theory of consciousness in MHK/TJ V.45-50.

In fairness to the Yogācāra, it should be added that the store-consciousness differs from the 'self' of the non-Buddhists because the former is conceived as an uninterrupted but continuously changing stream of consciousness. The Yogācārins were in fact aware that, especially because of
Moreover, what you conceive as 'liberation' (*vimukti*) will not be different from samsara. Why? Because, when the yogin who follows the 'mind-only' teaching reflects on what the mind is like in samsara and on what it is like in the state of liberation, then:

(That yogin) understands that the duality (of consciousness) is similar to a deception (*māyā*), perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence.

And he understands that the absence of duality is imperishable, true to reality (*bhūta*), immortal and the highest abode. (43)

Because the absence (of duality) is the same (in both cases), liberation will not be different (from bondage in the yogin who) perceives (that absence of duality) by means of non-dual awareness after (all) the apprehensions of duality have been removed. (44)

'Duality' means that (consciousness) functions as having two forms (*ākāra*), that is to say, the form of an apprehended object and the form of an apprehender (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*). The verse says that this [duality] is understood to be similar to a deception, perishable, not appeased, and without self-existence. This duality is similar to a deception because it is produced by a deceptive consciousness (*abhiṭavikalpa*). It is perishable because it is subject to perishing. It is not appeased because it involves birth, death and so forth which are the retribution of [past] actions. It lacks self-existence because it does not exist as the 'self' conceived by the non-Buddhists, and also because it itself has no inherent existence (*nihsvabhāva*).2

'Absence of duality' means that, when sense objects such as colors and shapes are not perceived anymore as [objects] outside the mind, then the mind stands firm in its own true nature (*svacittadharmatā*). Such a mind is called 'non-dual'. The verse says that this [absence of duality] is understood to be imperishable, true to reality, immortal and the highest abode. 'Imperishable' means that it never perishes. 'True to its characteristic of uninterruptedness, the store-consciousness was likely to be misunderstood as a kind of permanent self. This concern is for example expressed in the following verse from the *Samdhinirmocanāsūtra*: "The consciousness which appropriates all existence (*adānavijñāna*) is profound and subtle. Carrying all the seeds (of existence), it flows like a stream. I have refrained from teaching it to ignorant people for fear that they misconceive it as a 'self'." (SNS, T. vol. 16, 692c21-23; Skt. text in TrBh 34.3-4). In addition, the Yogācāra distinguishes a special kind of consciousness, called the 'defiled thinker' (*klīṣṭamanas*), which has the store-consciousness as its object and misconceives it as a permanent, unchangeable self.

1 On *abhiṭavikalpa* or *abhiṭaparikalpa*, see note 3 to my translation of MHK/TJ V.5.

2 The apprehended object and consciousness as its apprehender are merely imaginary (*parikalpita*) things and therefore lack inherent existence with regard to individual characteristics (*lakṣānantāsvabhāva*).
reality' means that it is not deceptive (amṛṣa). 'Immortal' means that it is free of birth, death, and so forth. 'Highest abode' means that it is the state of consummation (niṃsthāvasthā).

'(That yogin) understands' means that duality and absence of duality are understood that way. 'Because the absence (of duality) is the same (in both cases)' means that, just as the apprehended and the apprehender do not exist in the state (avasthā) of samsara, just so they do not exist in the state of liberation. 'After (all) the apprehensions of duality have been removed' means that (the yogin) has removed the apprehensions of duality by realizing that both (the apprehended and the apprehender) do equally not exist. '(In the yogin) who perceives (that absence of duality) by means of non-dual awareness' refers to the yogin who through direct perception (pratyakṣajñāna) perceives the inexpressible (ayathārūta) nature (of the objects of perception) and who also perceives the perfectly established nature (parinispannasvabhāva) (of the mind) through non-dual awareness. In that case, the error will be that 'in that (yogin) liberation will not be different (from bondage). This is because that non-dual awareness originates and apprehends an object, just like the earlier (forms of consciousness in samsara). (Consciousness in) the state of liberation will thus not be different from the earlier forms of consciousness which were accompanied by the apprehension of duality. Hence, there will be no difference between bondage and liberation.¹

¹ A direct sense perception (pratyakṣajñāna) is an instance of a samsaric consciousness which is free of the conceptual apprehension of its object. A direct sense perception does not conceptualize or identify and differentiate its object by means of names. It perceives the 'inexpressible' nature of its object as it is; that is to say, it produces an exact mental copy of its object. It originates from conditions (in particular, from the presence of a perceivable object in the vicinity of the sense organs) and it apprehends an object without subsuming it under a concept or name. Hence, it is still characterized by the apprehender apprehended duality. It is still vikalpa. If the true nature of the mind, as the Yogācāra conceives it, is an inherent existence (parinispannasvabhāva) or is the permanent presence of the absence of duality (see MHK V.2), then the transmundane non-dual awareness which apprehends that presence, will not be different from a samsaric direct sense perception. That is to say, the transmundane non-dual awareness will be a consciousness which originates from the presence of an object and apprehends that object. In short, the transmundane non-dual awareness of the Yogācāra may be non-dual (nirvikalpa) in the sense of 'without conceptual apprehension and without conceptually apprehended object', but it is still a dual consciousness (vikalpa) bifurcated into an apprehender and an apprehended object. It is therefore not truly non-dual in the sense of 'free of any apprehension whatsoever' (sarvopalambhopāsama). See also MHK/TJ V.14.
Moreover,

In order to establish 'mind-only', you should admit that mental factors are not separate from the mind. Or else, 'mind-only' will not be established. (45)

Since you assert that only the mind exists, in order to establish mind-only, you should admit that the mental factors, even though their respective objects (dmiṅgs pa) and cognitive forms (rnam pa, ākāra) are different from those of the mind itself, do not exist separately from the mind. Or else, if you think that the mental factors are separate from the mind, 'mind-only' will not be established because the mental factors are many.¹

Or, if you assert that 'mind' (cittam) is only a name for a collection of (mental factors) such as feeling and so forth, you will corroborate what others are saying and you will forsake your own doctrine. (46)

Or else², you will have to admit that the name 'mind' is used to designate a collection of (mental factors) such as feeling, volition (cetanā), sensation (sparśa), mental attention (manaskāra) and so forth, similar to a frame for leaning spears against (mchung khyim), or similar to an aggregation of (the four elementary particles) earth, water, fire and wind, or similar to a pot and the like consisting of (the four composite particles) color/shape, odor, taste and the tangible. If you admit that, you will corroborate what others—in casu the Mādhyamikas—are saying. And you will also forsake your own doctrine, because your doctrine says that the five (sense) consciousnesses originate from a single store-consciousness in accordance with the conditions³, and that the mental factors are also transformations (parināma) (of the store-consciousness).

You may think as follows: "If 'mind' is only a name for a collection of (mental factors) such as feeling and so forth, the mind will not be a real entity (dṛavyasat), and a real basis of defilement (samkleśa) and purification (vyavādāna) will consequently not exist anywhere. But if feeling and so forth are separate (entities), each of them will be a real entity and will consequently be suited as the support of defilement and purification. And that (position) agrees with the following words from Scripture: "The beginningless element is the support of all the seeds. Because this (beginningless element) exists, all the states of samsaric existence exist and there is also

---

¹ See p. 20, note 1 to verse V.28ab.
² That is, if you do not accept the two alternatives mentioned in verse 45.
³ Reference to TrK 13ab (pañcīnāṁ mālavijñāne (?) yathāpratyayam udbhavah).
attainment of nirvana.”¹

We reply:

If because of (the need to explain) defilement and purification, you assert that the mind is a real entity, then (your thesis) does not refute our position. (Our position)² is in fact established because feeling and so forth originate that way. (47)

(We) hold that bondage (bandha) is the state where mental activities (manaskāra) (which produce) primary and secondary defilements arise simultaneously with the mind. And (we) hold that there is liberation when these defilements are removed and the associated wisdom (samprayuktaprajñā) arises simultaneously with the mind. Thus, different states (avasthā) of the same mind are designated as (different) mental factors. It is therefore not the case that the mind is a single (substratum) and that the mind and the mental factors are real entities (dravyasat) which exist separately from each other. Because mental factors such as feeling and so forth do themselves originate that way, as associated with bondage or associated with liberation, they originate from the collection (kūya) (of mental and material aggregates). (Our position) that the mind and the mental factors exist as aggregates (samtuha) is therefore well-established. Hence, your theory of the mind as a real entity does not damage us.³

¹ This verse from the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra is quoted in MS (T. vol. 31, 133b15-16), TrBh 37.12-13, and Śiddhi T. vol. 31, 8a24-25 and 14a13-14. It is also quoted in PP (see Eckel, p. 55). TJ has substituted ‘all seeds’ for the original ‘all dharmas’. The Sanskrit version in TrBh reads as follows: anādikālīko dhātuḥ sarvādharmasamāśrayah/ tasmin sati gatih sarvā nirvānādhigamam ‘pi vā?/.

² I follow the commentary in TJ where “tat” is explained as referring to Bhāvaviveka’s position on the nominal existence of the mind and the mental factors. Alternatively, “tat” may also refer to ‘defilement and purification’.

³ According to Bhāvaviveka, only the individual, momentary instances of consciousness in the life-stream (samtuha) of what we call ‘a person’ or ‘a self’ are, conventionally speaking, real entities (dravyasat). ‘Mind’ is only a nominal existence (prajñaptisat), a name used to designate a homogeneous series or aggregate (samtuha) of instances of consciousness. Depending on the object and the sense organ from which it originates, a particular instance of consciousness is designated as ‘visual consciousness’, ‘aural consciousness’ and so forth. Mental factors such as ‘feeling’, ‘volition’ and so forth are also mere names referring to particular mental functions that are abstracted from the individual instances of consciousness. ‘Mind’, ‘sense consciousness’, ‘mental consciousness’, ‘mental factors’, etc. are thus nominal existences, conceived in mutual dependence and in dependence on the real, inconceivable and inexpressible instances of consciousness.

Similarly, ‘defiled’ is merely a name for an instance of consciousness occurring in a stream of consciousness which is accompanied by defilements, and ‘pure’ designates an instance of consciousness in a stream of consciousness which is free of defilements. Defilement and purification can thus be explained without postulating a real, individual mental substratum (=store-consciousness) and mental factors as real entities proceeding from that substratum.
You may ask: “If the mind is thus an aggregate and not a real entity, how can the stream of samsaric existence (bhava) and the attainment of liberation come forth from such a mind?” We answer:

Just as the series of leaves and other series arise (from a lotus-root) because many potencies are present in a lotus-root, just so a variety of series come forth from the mind which is not a real entity. (48)

'sāluka' is the root of the lotus. Although the connection with the root is not different (for all the effects that proceed from it), the entire surface of the lake gets covered with series of lotus-leaves, lotus-flowers and so forth, because that root has many potencies. In the same way, the diverse streams of samsaric existence of living beings, which are of different kinds in accordance with the different realms (dhatu) and states of migration (gati), arise from a mind which is not a real entity.

And these different kinds of life-streams

Do not originate when their counteragent is present, and do originate when their producing cause is present. (49ab)

'Counteragent' refers to the eight-membered Holy Path. When that is born, the samsaric life-streams do not originate anymore. But they do originate as long as defilements (āsavā), which are their producing causes, exist.

Or, regarding your theory that "the five (consciousnesses) originate from the root-consciousness in accordance with (the presence or absence of their) conditions"¹, (we say that) even if the root-consciousness does not exist, (the five consciousnesses) do not originate when their counteragent, which conflicts with the conditions for the arisal of the mind as an aggregate, exists. And (the five consciousnesses) do originate when perceptible form (rūpa), which is their producing cause, and conditions such as light, space, mental attention and so forth are present.

The idea that a variety (of consciousnesses) originates from that (store-consciousness) is not acceptable, because (the mind) is not a real entity. (49cd)

We do not accept your theory that three different types (of consciousness), which you call 'the (consciousness which is the result of) maturation', 'the 'ego' thinking (consciousness)' and 'the (six) object-manifesting (consciousnesses)'², originate from the

---
¹ Quotation of TrK 15ab (see the commentary to MHK V.46).
² See the commentary to MHK V.4.
transformation of (the store-)consciousness. Why? Because the mind is not a real entity. And (the existence of) these (three) cannot be ascertained on the basis of the different states of the mind (cittāvastha).\(^1\)

Further,

(For us, unlike for you,) there is no non-liberation by perceiving that, and there is also no non-cessation of consciousness. (Our doctrine is) therefore not similar, both conventionally and ultimately, to (the non-Buddhist doctrines) which teach the existence of the self. (50)

'By perceiving that' means 'by understanding (that everything) is only an appearance in one's own mind'. 'Non-liberation' means 'non-liberation from the stream of samsaric existence'.\(^2\) 'There is also no non-cessation of consciousness'\(^3\) means that consciousness really ceases to exist (for one who follows our system) because one understands that the inherent existence of things is not truly established (aparinispanna) and because one does not affirm (the real existence of) a store-consciousness. Therefore, our doctrine which says that the mind is an aggregate and not a real entity, is both conventionally (samurtyā) and ultimately (paramārthataḥ) not similar to the doctrine of those who affirm the existence of the self.\(^4\) But because you, advocates of 'mind-only', assert the contrary, these faults really occur in your doctrine.

Next, regarding your statement "The non-apprehending (of external objects) arises as a result of apprehending (everything as mind-only). And the non-apprehending (of the mind as an apprehender) arises as a result of the non-apprehending (of

---

\(^1\) As Yamaguchi (p. 383 ff.) observes, Bhāvaviveka follows the Sautrāntika view of consciousness. On this view, consciousness is a homogeneous series of causally connected instances or states of mind (cittāvastha), in which each instance is different from the previous instance. A result of this continuous transformation (parināma), the causal potencies (śakti) of the instances of consciousness within a particular mental series keep on changing. The residues of defilements and actions are also accumulated as potencies until the last instant of a particular mental series acquires the special capacity (viśesa) to produce the first instant of a new mental series in another samsaric existence. Bhāvaviveka does therefore not accept the Yogācāra view that the liberation from samsara consists in a fundamental transformation (parārthita) of the selfsame store-consciousness into a pure mental substratum. For Bhāvaviveka, liberation means that the transformation (parināma) of the stream of consciousness has come to an end, because the instances of consciousness have gradually lost their capacity to produce a new existence due to the presence of counteracting forces (pratipaśa, āryamārga).

\(^2\) Reference to MHK/TJ V.39.

\(^3\) Reference to MHK/TJ V.40cd.

\(^4\) Reference to MHK/TJ V.42cd.
external objects)"¹, we also do not assert anything else but the necessity to cultivate non-apprehending (anupalambha). How (do we understand this cultivation)?

One becomes free of attachment (to external objects) by the repeated practice of this (type of reasoning): "(External objects) such as colors and shapes and so forth are empty (of inherent existence), because they do not originate as inherent existences, and because they are not real entities, and because they perish, just like a magical apparition." (51)

External objects such as colors and shapes and so forth, which do exist as things that originate when their causes and conditions are present, are empty (of inherent existence) because they do not originate by their own nature since they do not exist apart from the collection of their causes and conditions (hetuprayatnasamagrī), and because they are aggregates and not real entities, and because they do not continue to exist for a long time but perish (immediately), just like a magical apparition. By repeatedly learning not to apprehend them, one becomes non-attached. But it is not the case that external objects do not exist in every respect!

Furthermore,

Although colors and shapes and so forth do exist, they do not exist (ultimately) for someone who has come to understand things as they really are. Why would the mistaken apprehension (of these things) at that time not be removed? (52)

When someone, upon seeing a magical apparition (of a man), at first thinks that it is a real man, but later realizes that this is (only) an illusory appearance (māyākṛta) without any reality to it, then it stands to reason that the perception of a man will disappear (from that person's mind). But such is impossible with respect to (the perception of) the horns of a rabbit which do not exist at all, both at first and later. The same is the case (with the perception of external objects). Although colors and shapes and so forth exist (as dependently originated things), conventional knowledge (samvrtijñāna) conceives them as inherently existing things. Later, when one comes to understand correctly that there are no inherent existences, one knows that (external objects) are not inherent existences. Why would the mistaken apprehension (of external objects) at that time not cease to exist? The truth is that it really ceases to exist. In contrast, what use is there in proclaiming from the very beginning, to ordinary people (prthagjana) in whom the knowledge of reality (tattvajñāna) is not yet

¹ See MHK V.4
born, that external objects such as colors and shapes and so forth do not exist? Similarly, If the consciousness which functions as an apprehended-apprehending duality is (entirely) confined to the range of the mind and the mental factors, then it is impossible that that consciousness will cease to function even after one has negated (the existence of) external objects. (53)

You argue that the consciousness which functions as an apprehended-apprehending (grāhyagrāhaka) duality is (entirely) confined to the range (gocara) of the mind and the mental factors and is not conditioned by external objects such as colors and shapes. In that case, there is no reason why that dual consciousness will not continue to function even after you have entirely negated (the existence of) external objects such as colors and shapes. On the contrary, that dual consciousness will certainly continue to function because there is no difference as to (how consciousness functions) independently of external objects such as colors and shapes both before and after (one has negated the existence of external objects).³

You might object as follows. It is precisely in order to get rid of the dual consciousness, which is not conditioned by external objects such as colors and shapes, that we (first) proceed in another way (antarena pāryayena) by teaching that the (so-called) external objects are a part of consciousness itself. And later, when the non-dual awareness (nirvikalpaññāna) originates, the (two) parts of consciousness as a self-appearance (svabhāsa) and as an object-appearance (anyābhāsa) are removed so that both that object⁴ and the apprehending of that object cease to exist.

---

¹ For the Yogacāra, external objects are similar to the horns of a rabbit in that they do not exist at all. Bhāvaviveka questions here that position as follows. If external objects do not exist at all, it cannot be explained how the perception of external objects originates in the first place. And if external objects are not perceived, the issue of how their perception can be removed becomes irrelevant. Alternatively, if a non-entity can produce a perception, it will continue to produce that perception irrespective of whether the perceiver does or does not realize its non-existence. In other words, if one perceives non-existent external objects at first, one will never be able to get rid of that perception later. See also p. 31, notes 1 and 2 to MHK/TJ V.39.

² For Bhāvaviveka, external objects are not similar to the horns of a rabbit. They are similar to a magical apparition. Like a magical apparition, they exist as the products of causes and conditions. Hence, they can act as the object-condition of a perception and can deceive a 'conventional' mind, which does not inquire into the ultimate-reality status of things, into perceiving them as inherent existences. But when one follows the Madhyamaka path of reasoning (vicāra) and examines whether the perceived external objects exist ultimately (tattvatah, paramārthaśya) or as inherent existences (svabhāvatāh), one understands such not to be the case. As a result, one gradually eliminates not only the attachment to such objects but also the perception of such objects.

³ Literally: "is not connected with" (sambandh).

⁴ Bhāvaviveka repeats here the same point as in MHK/TJ V.39.

⁵ 'That object' refers to 'the object as a part of consciousness itself' (visyābhāsa, anyābhāsa).
We reply:

If you think you should take a different course in order to negate that (later),
(we say that) you would be much cleaner by staying far away from the mud
than by washing it off (later). (54)

If you really want to argue that external objects do not exist, then what's the use of
(first) arguing that (external objects) are a part of consciousness itself? If you think
you should take this different course of (first arguing that external objects) are a part
of consciousness in order to negate (that later), then the following comparison applies
here: "One is much cleaner by staying far away from the mud than by washing it off
(later)!! Imagine an insane and stupid man who walks off the clean road and enters
a dirty, muddy swamp. Somebody else asks him: "Why did you get off the clean road
to enter into the mud?" He answers: "I'll wash it off later." To which the other
replies: "You fool! If you really need to be clean, you'll be much cleaner if you don't
touch the mud and stay far away from it from the very beginning."!

---

1 Parallel passage in PP (see Eckel, p. 70). The point of Bhāvaviveka's criticism here is that the
Yogācāra path is a 'detour' from the straight and clean Madhyamaka path. The Yogācāra path
starts with the negation of external objects and the affirmation of 'mind-only'. The 'mind-only'
tenet locates the object of the sense consciousnesses in the mind itself (vīṣṇīūbhātā) and thus claims
to explain how the sense consciousnesses function as an apprehended-apprehending duality even in
the absence of real external objects. This, according to Bhāvaviveka, is the 'muddy swamp' to
which the Yogācāra path leads people, under the pretext that the mud can be washed off at a later
stage of the path (the time when the apprehended-apprehending duality disappears and the non-
dual awareness of reality originates). The Yogācāra path misleads people because the negation
of external objects conflicts with the conventional truth, while the 'mind-only' dogma violates the
ultimate truth by attributing ultimate-reality status to the mind as a single privileged entity. The
Madhyamaka path, in contrast, is straight and clean. It starts out by affirming the conventional
truth: both external objects and consciousness exist as dependently originated things. The
Madhyamaka follower then engages in a sustained reflection (stācāra) in pursuit of ultimate
existences (stābhāta). Not finding any ultimate existences, the Madhyamaka follower negates
both all the apprehending consciousnesses and all the apprehended objects as not ultimately real
and consequently abandons all attachment to and all apprehending of these 'empty' things.