

The Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate as presented in Dharmapāla's Commentary to *Catuhśataka XVI.23*

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List of Abbreviations

CSV-Dh 「大乘廣百論釋論」 (Hsuan-Tsang's Chinese translation of the *Catuhśatakavṛtti* (CSV) by Dharmapāla), T. No. 1571, vol. 30, 187a-250b2. (Extant in Chinese only)

D. Tibetan Tripitaka, Derge Edition.

Eckel Malcolm David Eckel, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa*," in Chr. Lindtner ed., *Indiske Studier V, Miscellanea Buddhica*, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 25-75.

Hoornaert Paul Hoornaert, Edited Tibetan text and annotated translation of Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā/Tarkajvālā* Chapter 5 in *Studies and Essays, Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Kanazawa University* 1999 (pp. 127-159), 2000 (pp. 75-111), 2001 (pp. 149-190), 2002 (pp. 113-137), 2003 (pp. 139-170).

LAS Sanskrit text of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (B. Nanjio ed.).

Lindtner Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya's Controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter XXV," in Louis Ligeti ed., *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies. Commemorating the 200th anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Korös*, Volume 2, Akadémiai Kiadó Budapest, 1984, pp. 77-97.

MHK Bhāvaviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*.

P. Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition.

PP Tibetan translation of Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, D. Tohoku No. 3853, Tsha 45b4-259b3 (Dbu Ma 2); P. No. 5253, Tsha 53b3-326a6 (Vol. 95, pp. 153-262).

SNSt-Ch 「解深密經疏」 Extensive Commentary (*ṭīkā*) on [Hsuan-Tsang's Chinese translation of] the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* by Wonch'uk (圓測), 大日本正續藏經, vols. 1-34-4~35-1.

SNSt-Tib Tibetan translation of **SNSt-Ch** by Chos grub (法成), P. No. 5517, Ti 1-Di 198 (Vol. 106, pp. 1-349); D. Tohoku No. 4016, Ti 1-Di 174 (The Tibetan Tripitaka, Taipei Edition, Vol. 38, pp. 1-211).

T. Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (Chinese Tripitaka).

TJ *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāvaviveka's commentary to **MHK**.

1. Text and background of the debate

Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570), one of the founding thinkers of the Indian Madhyamaka school, criticizes the teachings of the rival Yogācāra school in each of his works.¹ Refuting all the major Yogācāra tenets, Bhāvaviveka argues in sum that the Yogācāra teachings about reality (*tattvam*) and about the corresponding knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*, *nirvikalpajñāna*) are thoroughly mistaken. Although only Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* is mentioned by name², Bhāvaviveka's critique actually draws upon all the major Yogācāra texts. Similarly, although only 'Asanga, Vasubandhu and others'³ are explicitly mentioned as representatives of the opponent Yogācāra school, it is clear that the 'others' certainly include Dignāga (c. 480-540) and perhaps also Dharmapāla (530-561?).⁴

The 'Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate', included in Dharmapāla's commentary to verse 23 of the final chapter (Chapter 16) of Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka*, is one of the few surviving texts that give us a direct account of an Indian Yogācāra response to Bhāvaviveka's critique.⁵ The text of the debate, about 3,5 pages long in the Taisho edition, covers almost half of Dharmapāla's entire commentary to Chapter 16. It is however doubtful whether the debate actually took place as an oral debate. Hsuan-Tsang (玄奘), a reliable source, reports indeed that Bhāvaviveka went up

¹ Bhāvaviveka criticizes all the major Yogācāra tenets in Chapter 5 of MHK/TJ (see Hoornaert). The main points of MHK/TJ Chapter 5 are repeated in abridged form, with some new accents added, in his two later works 「大乘掌珍論」 and *Prajñāpradīpa*. For bibliographical references and a useful summary of Bhāvaviveka's critique of the Yogācāra in these three works, see Chr. Lindtner, "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Chapter IV," in B. K. Matilal ed., *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Studies of Classical India Vol. 7, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, pp. 239-244. For reasons I cannot discuss here, *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* can not be considered authentic Bhāvaviveka works, despite Lindtner's arguments to the contrary.

² See MHK/TJ V.39 (Hoornaert, 2001, p. 178).

³ See MHK/TJ V.1 (Hoornaert, 1999, p. 139).

⁴ On the life, date and works of Dharmapāla, see Tom J.F. Tillemans, *Materials for the study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, Volume 1, Wien 1990, pp. 8-13.

It is nearly impossible to know whether Bhāvaviveka actually criticized Dharmapāla in his works. The commentary Dharmapāla reportedly wrote to Vasubandhu's *Trīṃśikā* may have been one of the major targets of Bhāvaviveka's critique, but there is no way of telling since that commentary is lost. The *Chen wei shi lun* (成唯識論), although attributed to 'Dharmapāla and others', is essentially a compilation by Hsuan-Tsang (玄奘, 600-664) and is therefore not a reliable source of information about Dharmapāla's thought. As for Dharmapāla's commentary on *Catuhśataka*, the implicit references to *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) in Dharmapāla's account of his debate with Bhāvaviveka (see notes 18 and 40 below) show that this commentary was written at a later date than PP. PP was most probably Bhāvaviveka's last work, but even if we assume that TJ and 「大乘掌珍論」 were composed after PP, there are no clear indications in these two works that Bhāvaviveka has bothered to further reply to the content of the debate in CSV-Dh or to Dharmapāla's teachings in general.

⁵ The only other texts I know of are a few short passages that criticize Bhāvaviveka in Sthiramati's works (see Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla," WZKSOA Band XII-XIII, 1968/69, pp. 198-199) and Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XVI.20 (T. vol. 30, 245b20-c15; cf. Y. Kajiyama, *ibid.*, p. 203). Indirect sources, describing the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra controversy as a conflict between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla, abound however in the Chinese Yogācāra school, especially in the works of Hsuan-Tsang's two main disciples Kui-Ji (窺基, 632-682) and Wonch'uk (圓測, 613-696).

north to Nālandā to have a debate with Dharmapāla but was refused by the latter who had already retired to devote himself to meditation in Bodh Gaya.⁶ We may therefore assume that the debate was not carried out orally but was composed by Dharmapāla himself; presumably after his retirement to Bodh Gaya, as a reply to Bhāvaviveka's earlier critique of the Yogācāra teachings.

The written debate, extant only in the Chinese translation by Hsuan-Tsang, is a difficult piece of text. Not only is the name of Dharmapāla's opponent not mentioned even once, but the text does not indicate who says what, or who is the proponent and who the opponent in each of the exchanges. Bhāvaviveka's statements are often introduced by phrases such as "He says..." (彼作是說), "He replies..." (彼救言) or by the conditional phrase "If you say ..." (若言), but there are also many instances where the text just continues without indicating a new objection or reply by Dharmapāla or Bhāvaviveka. This makes it often difficult to exactly determine who says what.

Fortunately, a large portion of the second part of the debate has been preserved in Chos grub's Tibetan translation (SNSt-Tib) of *The Extensive Commentary to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (SNSt-Ch) by the Korean scholar-monk Wonch'uk (圓測, Ch. Yuan-che, 613-696).⁷ This partial account of the debate, which is missing in the extant edition of the original Chinese version, is incorporated in the long introductory section of Wonch'uk's *Extensive Commentary*.⁸ Wonch'uk's account of the debate is extremely useful for a faithful reconstruction of the second part of the debate, because Wonch'uk tells us which statements are made by Dharmapāla and which by Bhāvaviveka by adding clarifications such as "Dharmapāla says ..." (*slob dpon chos skyong gis bshad pa*) or "Bhavya says ..." (*slob dpon bha byas bshad pa*).

J. Hirabayashi and S. Iida were the first to present an English translation of parts of the Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate based on the version in Wonch'uk's *Extensive Commentary*.⁹ Although the translation is not always accurate and no reference is made to the original text of the debate in CSV-Dh, the great merit of this study is that it has drawn our attention to the importance of Wonch'uk's *Extensive Commentary* for the study of the debate.

⁶ For bibliographical references and a description of Hsuan-Tsang's report, see M.D. Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1992, pp. 11-12.

⁷ For more information on Wonch'uk, the translator Chos-grub, the differences between SNSt-Ch and SNSt-Tib, and further bibliographical references, see: Shōju Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation of the *Chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu*," in L.S. Kawamura, K. Scott ed., *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization. Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday*, Dharma Publishing, California, 1977, pp. 105-113; John Powers, "Lost in China, Found in Tibet: How Wonch'uk Became the Author of the *Great Chinese Commentary*," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1992), pp. 95-103.

⁸ The exact references are: SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 31b5-35a1; D. Ti 28a4-31a1. Note that Wonch'uk repeats some sections of this partial account of the debate at a much later point in his Commentary and that these sections are preserved in the extant Chinese text (SNSt-Ch, vol. 34-5, 458c-459b; SNSt-Tib, D. Thi 194b1-196b1).

⁹ J. Hirabayashi and S. Iida, "Another Look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence," in Lewis Lancaster ed., *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in honor of Edward Conze*, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series 1, 1977, pp. 341-360.

The final chapter of CSV-Dh, including the entire Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate, has been translated into English by John Keenan.¹⁰ Although the commentarial part of Keenan's study (pp. 1-64) offers some useful reading, his translation of this important chapter is full of flaws. A new translation of this chapter is highly desirable. As for the translation of the debate itself, the author apparently has not consulted Wonch'uk's *Extensive Commentary*, confuses objections and replies throughout the debate, and on top of that mistranslates many passages.

2. Structure and content of the debate

Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XVI.23 starts with an objection, introduced in the first half of verse 23, by an opponent (presumably a non-Buddhist) who questions the value of making an endeavor to realize the emptiness of all things. The second half of verse 23 answers this objection, saying that the realization of emptiness is of great benefit because it liberates us from the fetters of false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpa*). Dharmapāla then enters into a discussion with the opponent. The discussion ends with the opponent's objection that false imaginations cannot fetter, and that any endeavor to seek liberation from them will consequently be meaningless, unless false imaginations do themselves really exist (that is, are not empty of inherent existence). This section (CSV-Dh, 246a15-b14) forms the 'Prologue' to the actual debate between Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka. The problem it raises is clear: what is the ontological status of defiling states of mind (*saṃkleśa*) and of liberating or purifying states of mind (*vyavadāna*)?

The debate itself consists of two parts. The beginning of each part is clearly indicated in the text by the words "Some respond as follows to this objection [by the non-Buddhist opponent in the Prologue] ..." at CSV-Dh 246b14, and "Other teachers reply as follows to the objection [by the non-Buddhist opponent in the Prologue]" at CSV-Dh 247b15.

The first part (CSV-Dh, 246b14-247b15) opens with Bhāvaviveka's reply to the opponent's objection. Bhāvaviveka offers a reply that is based on his theory of two truths: All things, including false imaginations, exist with their own inherent nature according to the conventional truth, but they completely lack inherent existence according to the ultimate truth. This response by Bhāvaviveka is the starting point of a long exchange with Dharmapāla, which is focussed on the interpretation of the two truths. Although an exact and full picture of Dharmapāla's understanding of the two truths cannot be obtained until we dispose of a reliable translation of the entire

¹⁰ J. P. Keenan, *Dharmapāla's Yogācāra Critique of Bhāvaviveka's Mādhyamika Explanation of Emptiness. The Tenth Chapter of Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih Commenting on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka Chapter Sixteen*, Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, 1997.

CSV-Dh (especially of the final chapter), the exchanges on the two truths in the present debate offer us some clues.

First, according to Dharmapāla, Bhāvaviveka separates and contrasts the two truths as ‘things exist conventionally’ versus ‘things do not exist ultimately’ to the extent that conventional realities are completely nullified into ‘nothing at all’ at the level of the highest knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*), the absurd result being that the ultimate liberating knowledge will have ‘nothing’ as its object. Bhāvaviveka’s view thus clearly deviates from the Prajñāpāramitā teaching: “Form is not apart from emptiness, nor is emptiness apart from form. Form itself is emptiness. Emptiness itself is form.” Dharmapāla insists that form (conventional truth) and emptiness (ultimate truth) are not two separate things. As the opening verse of *Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā* says, false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpa*) and emptiness are inseparably connected because emptiness is always an emptiness **in** false imaginations. Similarly, as *Triṃśikā* 21cd-22ab says, the fully established nature of things is an unconditioned emptiness **of** or **in** their dependent nature (*niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā*) and is therefore neither identical with nor different from their dependent nature (*naiva anyo nānanyaḥ*). Dharmapāla’s critique of Bhāvaviveka can provisionally be summarized as follows: instead of affirming ‘*rūpam eva śūnyatā, śūnyatā eva rūpam*’, Bhāvaviveka onesidedly affirms only ‘*rūpam eva śūnyatā*’.

Second, according to Dharmapāla, the object of the highest knowledge is not the complete absence of an inherent nature in conventional realities, but is rather their truly unconditioned nature which consists in the absence of their imagined nature only. The ultimate nature of things is neither *sat* (非有) unlike their dependent nature, nor *asat* (非無) unlike their imagined nature, but is an unconditioned reality beyond and yet within each individual thing, and always ‘there’ as the real object of the highest liberating knowledge.

The second part of the debate (CSV-Dh, 247b15-249b13) opens with Dharmapāla’s reply to the earlier objection by the opponent in the Prologue. Dharmapāla’s reply is based on the Yogācāra theory of the three natures. The subsequent debate with Bhāvaviveka accordingly centers around this theory, in particular the ultimate existence of the dependent nature of things, the interpretation (*nītārtha or neyārtha?*) of some Mahāyāna sutras that apparently negate the existence of dependent natures, the status of ‘*pr̥sthalabdhajñāna*’, and the ‘mind-only’ tenet. Most of these themes are familiar from Bhāvaviveka’s critique of the Yogācāra. Further study of CSV-Dh as a whole is needed before we can attempt a comprehensive discussion of Dharmapāla’s stand on each of these issues.

Dharmapāla concludes the debate with an Epilogue in which he briefly explains the essence of the two truths and summons the students of the True Dharma to abandon all disputes by for-

saking attachment to the extreme views of existence and nonexistence.

3. Translation of the Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate

[Notes: (1) In the translation below, I have changed or omitted some of the indirect phrasings in the original text (“He says ...”, “He replies...”) in order to present the text as a live face-to-face debate. (2) Some of the Sanskrit restorations in the translation are conjectural.]

[PROLOGUE: Objection by a non-Buddhist and Dharmapāla’s reply] (T. vol. 30, 246a15-b14)

[Objection:] If all things are entirely empty of inherent existence (本性, *svabhāva*), what special benefit is gained from realizing (證見) that emptiness?

[Dharmapāla:] To introduce this objection, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

If things are empty of inherent existence, what benefit is gained from seeing that emptiness?¹¹ (CSV-Dh VIII. 23ab = CS XVI. 23ab)

Commentary [by **Dharmapāla**]: [According to the opponent] not the slightest benefit can be gained from realizing the absence of a self (我空) in the [mental and physical] conditioned factors (行法, *saṃskāra*) that are void of a self (離我, *ātmavirahita*, *ātmavigata*). The same applies to all things (諸法). If [all things] are empty of inherent existence, what benefit can be gained from realizing that emptiness? If no benefit is gained from it, what purpose is there in making an effort to cultivate the numerous preparatory practices (加行, *prayoga*) that lead to the realization of emptiness?¹² (246a20)

To answer this objection, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

The realization of emptiness [is of great benefit because it] sets us free from the bondage

¹¹ The Tibetan version of the verse-text of *Catuhśataka* XVI.23 differs considerably from the Chinese version of verse 23 in CS and in Dharmapāla’s CSV. The former reads as follows: “gal te rang bzhin gyis dngos yod// stong mthong yon tan ci zhiḡ yod// rtog pas mthong ba ‘ching ba ste// de ni ‘di ru dgag par byall” (D. No. 3846, Tsha 18b3-4). The Tibetan version introduces the opponent’s view that ‘things have inherent existence’ as a hypothetical thesis entailing the undesirable consequence that the seeing of emptiness will then be valueless. The second half of the Tibetan version says that people’s perception of things (*mthong ba*) is ‘fettered’ by mistaken thoughts (the view that things do have inherent existence), adding that those fetters are destroyed ‘here’ (that is, in Āryadeva’s *Catuhśataka*). Candrakīrti’s commentary to CS follows this Tibetan version (D. No. 3865, Ya 237a7 ff.). Both versions must have been based on different Sanskrit manuscripts. In any case, the Chinese version of verse 23 in CS/CSV-Dh is clearer and perhaps more reliable than the Tibetan version of the same verse of CS.

¹² This objection is most probably made by a non-Buddhist who understands the Buddhist notion of ‘emptiness’ as meaning ‘absolutely nothing’ and questions the meaningfulness of making an effort to realize ‘nothing’. I assume the objector to be the same as the one who earlier in Chapter 16 has already objected as follows: “If the true nature of things is just nothing, what joy could there be in cultivating the knowledge [of that nothing]?” (CSV-Dh, commentary to CS XVI.20, T. vol. 30, 245b20).

of false imaginations (虛妄分別, *abhūtaparikalpa*)¹³. (CSV-Dh VIII. 23cd = CS XVI. 23 cd)

Commentary [by **Dharmapāla**]: Although all things and all the [mental and physical] conditioned factors are empty [of inherent existence] and void of a self (空無我, *sūnyānātma*), deluded people (愚夫, *bālapṛthagjana*) mistakenly imagine and cling to identities and differences (一異), and so forth. By force of these false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpavāśena*), they nurture the propensities (隨眠, *anuśaya*) for greed (貪, *lobha*) and other defilements, and depending on the conditions they give rise to all kinds of good and bad actions (善惡業, *kuśalākuśalakarman*). As a result, they sink in the ocean of triple existence (三有, *tribhava*), where they continue to transmigrate and are tormented by the three forms of suffering (三苦), and from where they are unable to escape by themselves. But if they apply themselves to the [path of] preparation (*prayoga*), they will come to realize the absence of self and the emptiness [in all things]. They will gradually eliminate their false imaginations and will certainly attain full enlightenment (三菩提, *sambodhi*) as well as the inexhaustible qualities of self-accomplishment (自利, *svārtha*) and of realizing the welfare of others (利他, *parārtha*). (246a28)

[**Question:**] What is the nature (體) of these false imaginations?

[**Dharmapāla:**] All the minds and mental factors that exist in the triple world.

[**Objection:**] But aren't these also empty of inherent existence, just like the material forms (色, *rūpa*), and so forth, to which deluded people are attached? How then can they produce the sufferings that torment living beings? If they are empty [of inherent existence] but can nevertheless produce suffering, then material forms and so forth should also have that capacity. Why do you say that only false imaginations [produce suffering]? (246b3)

[**Dharmapāla:**] Although material forms, minds, and all other things are empty [of inherent existence], [people] inevitably rely on false imagination when they conceive things as [inherently] existent or nonexistent. Depending on [the presence or absence of] this [false imagination], people produce states of defilement or purification (雜染清淨, *saṃkleśavyavadāna*). As a result, the defilement and purification of sentient beings are not the same. That is why we say that only false

¹³ As explained below (246a29), *abhūtaparikalpa* refers to 'all the minds and mental factors of the triple world'. All of these are 'impure' (*sāsrava*), because they are affected by the grasping of nonexistent (*abhūta*) things, in particular the grasping of 'I' and 'mine'. 'False imaginations' include not only the mistaken conceptions or judgments whereby people identify and differentiate, or unify and separate things, thus imagining inherent existence where there is none (*samāropa*) or negating existence where there is genuine existence (*apavāda*). 'False imaginations' also include the misperceptions by the five sense consciousnesses that are accustomed to perceiving things as if they had a self-identity, different from the self-identities of other things, or—in the perspective of 'mind-only'—that are accustomed to perceiving images of nonexistent external objects. To include both the meanings 'misconception' and 'misperception', I have translated *abhūtaparikalpa* as 'false imagination(s)' throughout the text. Note that the debate makes no mention of the Yogācāra theory of eight types of consciousness. On *abhūtaparikalpa*, see also Hoornaert, 1999, p. 151 note 3.

imaginations [produce suffering]. (246b6)

[**Objection:**] It would be as you say, if things really existed. But if things do not really exist, how can [people] mistakenly conceive them as [inherently] existent, nonexistent, and so forth, so that the states of defilement and purification [of sentient beings] are accordingly not the same? (246b7)

[**Dharmapāla:**] It is similar to dreams and the like. Although [real] material forms and so forth are not present [in dreams], various images [of material forms] nevertheless appear [in the mind] and are distinctly perceived (分明). (246b8)

[**Objection:**] That example does not apply. In mental states such as dreams and the like, dual consciousness (分別, *vikalpa*) exists and is therefore really active and not nonexistent. This dual consciousness acts as the support of the appearance of mental images of external objects (境像) and thus gives rise to defiled and pure [states of mind]. That is perfectly possible. But if everything is empty [of inherent existence], then dual consciousness does not really exist. What then could produce these different mental activities? It has never been observed that something unreal (無體) has the capacity [to act]. If something unreal has the capacity [to act], then the horns of a rabbit or the hairs of a turtle should all have the capacity to act. And if sentient beings get defiled or purified although the defilements or the roots of virtue (善根, *kuśalamūla*) do not exist, then those who have already eliminated all the defilements should still be transmigrating in samsara and those who have not yet planted the roots of virtue should already have attained the eternal bliss [of nirvana]. (246b14)

[PART 1: BHĀVAVIVEKA'S REPLY and DHARMAPĀLA'S REJOINDERS] (246b14-247b15)

Some (一類, *eke*) [= Bhāvaviveka] respond to this objection as follows.

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] That fault does not occur, because [in our view] conventional realities are not nonexistent (世俗非無).¹⁴

[**Dharmapāla:**] Let me ask you: Are conventional realities then not truths (世俗非諦實耶)?¹⁵

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] No, [they are truths]. According to the conventional means of knowledge (世俗

¹⁴ Depending on the context, I translate 世俗 (*saṃvṛti*) and 世俗諦 (*saṃvṛtisatya*) as 'conventional realities' (all the things that are accepted as real by people in general) or as 'common opinion, conventional thought, conventional truth(s)' (the consensus that determines what is real or unreal for people in general). In the present context, the translation 'conventional realities' is preferable to 'common opinion', although both meanings are always possible in Bhāvaviveka's system of two truths.

¹⁵ As Chr. Lindtner has pointed out, Śāntarakṣita quotes this objection and attributes it to Dharmapāla: "*slob dpon chos skyong gis ci ste kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ci zhig yin/ mi bden pa'i rnam grangs yin nam zhes bya ba la sogs pa smras pa*" (*Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā*, P. No. 5283, Vol. 100, Sa 27b3-4). See Chr. Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981), p. 199, note 7.

量) they really exist (實有) and are therefore said to be truths.¹⁶

[**Dharmapāla:**] How can you say that one and the same thing at the same time exists [conventionally] and does not exist [ultimately] (一法一時有無) and that these contradictory facts are both truths?¹⁷ The same applies to the arising [of things], and so forth. [If you say that] one and the same thing at the same time arises and does not arise (*anutpāda*), ceases to exist and does not cease to exist (*anirodha*), is annihilated and is not annihilated (*anuccheda*), continues to exist and does not continue to exist (*asāśvata*), comes [into existence] and does not come [into existence] (*anāgama*), goes [to the past] and does not go [to the past] (*anirgama*), and so forth, [you] again [state] contradictions (互相違, *parasparavirodha*). How can you say that all these are simultaneously true?¹⁸ (246b20)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] One and the same thing does not exist in the ultimate sense (無義為眞) and at the same time exists in the conventional sense (有義為俗). Since there is a difference in sense (義), there is no contradiction. It is similar to virtues (善法, *kuśaladharmā*) such as giving (施, *dāna*) as practiced in the world. These are said to be not good (不善, *akuśala*) because they are intrinsically impure (有漏, *sāsrava*), and they are also said to be good (善, *kuśala*) because they are associated with the roots of virtue (善根相廡故, *kuśalamūlasamprayogena*). Both designations are true and yet there is no contradiction. (246b24)

[**Dharmapāla:**] Your reasoning is not correct. In the case of virtues such as giving, there is no contradiction because there is a difference of perspective (觀待異故, *apekṣābheda*?). But there is no such difference of perspective in the case of 'exist' (有) and 'not exist' (無) as two truths that simultaneously apply to one and the same thing. So, how could there be no contradiction [in that case]? (246b25)

Let us explain why that is so. Peace of mind (安和) is called 'good' (善). There are two

¹⁶ Bhāvaviveka accepts three conventional means of knowledge (or rather, three means of true conventional knowledge): (1) Direct perceptions by people with unimpaired sense organs, (2) Conventional inferences (All the inferences that are not restricted by the '*paramārthataḥ*' qualification. For instance, to infer the presence of an unseen fire from the presence of observed smoke, without thereby inquiring into the ultimate-reality status of fire and smoke.), and (3) Scriptures of provisional meaning (*neyārtha*). For instance, scriptures that affirm the existence of a self.

¹⁷ Quoted and attributed to Dharmapāla by Śāntarakṣita: "*slob dpon chos skyong gis dngos po gcig la cig car bden par yang 'gyur/ mi bden par yang 'gyur zhes 'gal ba smras pa*" (*Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā*, P. Sa 27b7). See Chr. Lindtner, reference in note 15, p. 199, note 8.

¹⁸ As Y. Kajiyama has shown, the present paragraph and Bhāvaviveka's next two rejoinders, adducing the examples of 'mundane virtues being both good and not good' and 'consciousness being both self and not self', are directly based on a passage in Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) commentary to the opening stanza of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. In his commentary to this passage in PP, Avalokitavratā mentions that Dharmapāla criticized Bhāvaviveka's view in his commentary to *Catuḥśataka*. We thus know for sure that Dharmapāla knew PP at the time when he wrote the present debate. For further details, see Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka, Śthiramati and Dharmapāla," *Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festschrift für E. Frauwallner*, WZKSOA XII-XIII (1968/69), pp. 200-202.

kinds of goodness: mundane (世間, *laukika*) and transmundane (出世間, *lokottara*). Transmundane virtues can completely destroy all the fetters (纏, *pariyavasthāna*) of the defilements (*kleśa*). [As they bring about] complete peace of mind, they are said to be good in the ultimate sense (勝義善). Mundane virtues, on the other hand, are able to [destroy the fetters of the defilements] temporarily but not definitively. As they can subdue (伏) the fetters of the defilements temporarily, they are said to be good in the conventional sense (世俗善). But since they cannot sever (斷) the fetters of the defilements permanently, they are also said to be not good in the ultimate sense (勝義不善). (246c1)

‘Good’ and ‘not good’ [as attributed to mundane virtues] do not contradict each other, because the time at which [mundane virtues] have or do not have the capacity (有能無能) [to sever the fetters of defilements] is different. Thus, a virtue such as giving is said to have that capacity inasmuch as it lasts for a single instant. After that instant has passed, [giving] definitely does not continue to exist and is said to be without that capacity. Although ‘having capacity’ and ‘not having capacity’ exist in one and the same thing, there is no contradiction because the time [to which both refer] is different. [You may wonder] if anybody would attribute ‘lack of capacity’ to the second and later instants of giving, [since giving] then no longer exists and is without substance. [We answer:] Since its substance does not exist, its capacity definitely does not exist, and since its capacity does not exist we say that it has no capacity. (246c6)

One could also say that there is no contradiction [when ‘good’ and ‘not good’ are attributed to a mundane virtue] because, although the time at which it has and does not have capacity is not different, the envisaged object [of its capacity and non-capacity] is different (所望境別故). Let us explain why that is so. [Mundane virtues] are said to have capacity in as far as they can temporarily subdue (伏) the fetters of greed (貪) and of other defilements, and they are [also] said to lack capacity because they are unable to destroy (斷滅) the seeds (種, *bīja*) of greed and so forth. It is similar to taking a dose of ghee fat (酥膏, *ghṛta*?) which can cure a cold but cannot cure phlegm (痰癰, *śleṣman*?). Although the time at which [ghee fat] has the capacity [to cure one disease] and does not have the capacity [to cure another disease] is identical, there is no contradiction because the envisaged objects are different. But in the case of ‘exist’ and ‘not exist’ as two truths that simultaneously apply to one and the same thing, the object [thought to be existent and nonexistent] is not different. How then could there be no contradiction [in that case]? (246c12)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] It is just as when a single instant of consciousness is conventionally called ‘self’ (世俗名我) because it acts as the support of attachment to the self, and is also called ‘not self’ in the ultimate sense (由勝義故亦名無我). Although ‘self’ and ‘not-self’ are different [designations

of the same thing], there is no contradiction. The same is true when we say that one and the same thing at the same time exists [conventionally] and does not exist [ultimately]. Although the object (境) [said to be existent and nonexistent] is not different, there is no contradiction. (246c 15)

[**Dharmapāla:**] That is again not correct, because the meanings (義) of 'self' and 'not self' are not contradictory. Why is that so? A single instant of mind is called 'not self' because it is not sovereign (不自在, *asvatantra*, *avāsin?*), and it is also called 'self' because it acts as the support of the attachment to the self. As the sutra says: "If consciousness were a self, it should have mastery over itself and should not change. Yet, deluded people call it 'the self' because it is in dependence [on consciousness] that they produce attachment to the self."¹⁹ Although the meaning 'not sovereign' and the meaning 'support of attachment to the self' [are attributed to] one and the same consciousness, these [two meanings] are not contradictory.²⁰ But how could there be no contradiction when you say that the mutually opposite (相反) [meanings] 'exist' and 'not exist', attributed to the same thing at the same time, are both truths? You may adduce a multitude of everyday examples (世間譬喻) and use all kinds of expedients (方便, *upāya*) in order to prove that there is no contradiction in saying that 'exist' and 'not exist' are two truths about one and the same thing, in the end you will never be able to prove it. (246c22)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] One and the same color blue exists with reference to itself (據自故有, *svādhikṛtya sat?*), and does not exist when seen from the viewpoint of other [colors] (望他故無). The same applies to all things. The inherent nature (性, *svabhāva*) of each thing exists with reference to the conventional [truth] and does not exist from the viewpoint of the ultimate [truth] (望真故, *tattva-taḥ*).²¹ (246c24)

[**Dharmapāla:**] That is again not correct. Since blue and yellow have different natures (體異), it can be said that each is an existence when seen in itself, and is a nonexistence when seen from the viewpoint of the other.²² The nature of conventional realities is however not different from the ultimate reality (俗之興真其體不別). Accordingly, when seen in itself that nature no doubt ex-

¹⁹ Source not identified.

²⁰ If 'self' and 'not self', respectively meaning 'sovereign' and 'not sovereign', or respectively meaning 'support of attachment to the self' and 'not support of attachment to the self', were attributed to the same consciousness, there would be contradiction. That, however, is not the case. But you attribute the contradictory meanings 'exist' and 'not exist' to the same thing!

²¹ In his commentary to *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* XV.2ab, Bhāvaviveka argues that, conventionally speaking, each thing has a nature of its own (*svabhāva*) because it has a nature that does not exist in other things (*gzhan la med pa*). For instance, heat is the own-nature of fire because it does not exist in other things, such as water, etc. (PP, D. Tsha 158a6-7).

²² Blue things have the nature 'blue' and yellow things have the nature 'yellow'. Blue things do not have the nature 'yellow', and vice versa. Dharmapāla's reasoning is based on the '*anyonyābhāva*' type of negation, one of the four negations distinguished by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (see eg. *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, sutra 75).

ists, but with respect to which [other] could it be nonexistent (望誰為無)? When one closely examines (尋究) the real nature (實) of conventional realities, [one finds that] it is none other than the ultimate reality itself (真, *tattvam*). But an examination of the real nature of blue does not lead to the conclusion that it is yellow! Therefore, your example does not agree with what you intend to prove (所立法, *sādhya-dharma*). (246c27)

Moreover, the nature of conventional realities and the nature of the ultimate reality are not [two] separate [natures] (俗興真體不相離). How then could the nature of conventional realities (俗體) be nonexistent when seen from the viewpoint of the ultimate reality (望真)? It is as the Buddha says to Subhuti in the sutra: “Conventional realities and the ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) do not each have a separate nature (無各別體). The true nature (真如, *tathatā*) of conventional realities is itself the ultimate reality (勝義). There is no emptiness apart from material forms. The same applies to the other [aggregates] up to consciousness and its emptiness.”²³ (247a 2)

How can two contradictory meanings [‘exist’ and ‘not exist’], attributed to one and the same thing without there being any difference as to object and time (無別境時), both be called truths? This is [also] the reason why the ancient teachers (*ācāryāḥ*) have established two truths in view of the difference between the [deluded] common opinion and real things (情事不同).²⁴ The conventional truth consists of [all the] conventional opinions that are expressed by words (世俗諦語近顯俗情). The ultimate truth stands for the real things that are far removed from words (勝義諦言遠表實事). Although conventional things (世俗諸法) reflect (稱, *jñāpaka*?) the common opinion (俗情) [about what is real], they are false (事是虛, *abhūta, mṛṣā*?) and are therefore not truths (非諦實).²⁵ (247a5)

Furthermore, material forms and minds (色心) that arise from conditions (緣起) and are

²³ Cf. *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, T. No. 223, vol. 8, 378c10-13. E. Conze, *The Large Sutra On Perfect Wisdom*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, p. 529.

²⁴ 「事」 translates either *vastu* or *dravya*. I translate 「情」 and 「俗情」 (literally ‘conventional mind’) as ‘common opinion’, although these terms may also refer to the things that are taken for real by common minds. L. de la Vallée Poussin gives *ruci* as the Sanskrit equivalent of 「情」 and translates 「情有」 as ‘existent pour l’opinion’ as opposed to ‘n’existant pas en raison’ (理無) (see Siddhi, p. 523; translation of 成唯識論, T. vol. 31, 46a17).

Dharmapāla seems to be saying that the ‘ancient teachers’ did not make the mistake of attributing existence and nonexistence to one and the same thing, but made a distinction between ‘false’ identities that are imputed through language and the real nature of things that is beyond words. If this interpretation is correct, ‘ancient teachers’ most probably refers to the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in particular to the authors of *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (distinction between *vastumātra* and *prajñāptivādavasabhāva*).

²⁵ According to what I gather from the debate, Dharmapāla accepts two inseparable realities (conventional realities and ultimate reality) or two inseparable natures (*paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*) but only one true nature. In other words, all real things have two inherent natures, but one of them (*paratantra*) is false (similar to *māyā*), while the other one (*pariniṣpanna, tathatā, śūnyatā*) is their only true nature. Unlike Bhāvaviveka, Dharmapāla does not say that conventional realities ultimately lack an inherent nature. On the contrary, he seems to be saying that things ultimately have two inherent natures, a false one and a real one.

known by direct perception (現量證), cannot be expressed by words and are therefore not conventional truths. As the sutra says: “Whatever is designated (所詮) by the names and phrases (名句, *nāmapada*) that are used in the world, is called the ‘conventional truth’ (俗諦).”²⁶ The meaning of this sutra (*sūtrābhiprāya*) is as follows. All the meanings of things (法義, *dharmārtha*) that are based on the [arbitrary] connection between words and things (能詮所詮相廡) and are commonly known in the world (世共所知), and all the sutras (經書) written for the sake of making known (詮表) the meanings of things that are not commonly known, are called ‘conventional truth’. Now, material forms and minds, arising from conditions and known by direct perception, are not expressible by words (非言所詮) and are thus not [included in] the conventional truth. (247a10)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] These material forms and minds are also included in the conventional truth, because they are designated (所詮) by conventional language (假立名言, *prajñāptivyavahāra*)?²⁷

[**Dharmapāla:**] If so, the ultimate reality (究竟勝義) too will not be ultimately real (非眞), for it also is designated by conventional language. And if the ultimate reality does not exist, then material forms and minds will have no reality at all (眞理都無).²⁸ Real things (事) do however exist.²⁹ Hence, if real things are not included in the two truths, they will not exist and that will contradict what people know by direct perception. If you say that they exist but are not included in the two truths, you will have to posit a third [truth] which is neither the ultimate truth nor the conventional truth. (247a15)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Although the material forms and minds that arise from conditions are perceived (所得) by direct perception in the world, still they are not included in the ultimate truth. [Since] names are conventionally applied to them, they are included in the conventional truth (假說名為世俗諦攝).³⁰ (247a17)

[**Dharmapāla:**] If [you mean that] conventionally established names are arbitrarily (隨意, *yatheṣṭam*?) superimposed on things, but that material forms and minds really exist, then we have no quarrels.³¹ Defilement and purification will then indeed be established because these [real material

²⁶ Source not identified. From the *Akṣayamatīnirdēśasūtra*?

²⁷ See MHK/TJ V. 86: things that arise from conditions (*jāta*) necessarily become objects of speech and are therefore not ultimately real (Hoornaert, 2003, p. 155).

²⁸ For Dharmapāla, the fully established nature (*pariniṣpanna*) and the dependent nature (*paratantra*) of things are ontologically interconnected. If one of both does not exist, then neither does the other exist. See note 25 above.

²⁹ 「事有法故」. I interpret 「有法」 not in the sense of *dharmīn*, but in the sense of *sat*. Since real things do exist, they should exist either conventionally, or ultimately, or in both ways.

³⁰ Bhāvaviveka replies that he does not contradict perception and that there is no need for a third truth. All the objects of perception are included in the conventional truth because all of them are designated by names.

³¹ ‘Arbitrarily’ means ‘not according to what things really are’, ‘not according to their own nature’, ‘according to people’s imagination’.

forms and minds] will act as their support. But if you say that material forms and minds exist conventionally (世俗故) but do not exist and do not arise ultimately (由勝義故), what does a statement like that exactly mean? (247a20)

[Bhāvaviveka:] Just as the object (所行境界, *gocaraviṣaya*) of the [highest] nondual knowledge (無分別智, *nirvikalpajñāna*) is an absolute absence (究竟空無, *atyantābhāva?*), just so [material forms and minds] do not exist [as objects of the highest nondual knowledge]. We therefore say that they do not exist (非有) [in that sense].³² (247a21)

[Dharmapāla:] If so, the [highest] nondual knowledge will never arise, because its object will not exist at all. Even if it did arise [without having any real object], it would not be the knowledge of reality as it is (非真智), because it would then have nonexistence as its object, just like any knowledge of other nonexistent things [such as the perception of flowers in the sky, cannot be the knowledge of reality as it is]. And if that knowledge is false (非真), then its object will also be false (俗).³³ (247a23)

Thus, although you say that material forms and minds do not exist just like that [object of the ultimate nondual knowledge], [your argument] shows all the more clearly (彌顯) that material forms and minds really exist (實有). Since you argue that the [ultimate] nonexistence (非有) [of material forms and minds] is an absolute nonexistence (究竟無), there is no difference in character (無異相) [between the nonexistence of material forms and minds and the absolute absence which is the object of the highest nondual knowledge according to you]. Hence, these [material forms and minds] definitely ought to exist [just as the object of the highest nondual knowledge ought to be something real]. And if material forms and minds do exist, you will also have to admit that material forms and minds really arise, and so forth.³⁴ (247a26)

[Bhāvaviveka:] What we mean is that material forms and minds do exist and do arise, but not in the ultimate sense (非勝義).

[Dharmapāla:] You should first give an accurate definition of what ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) is, and after that you can say that these [material forms and minds] are not ultimately real. (247a 28)

[Bhāvaviveka:] The ultimate reality is an absolute absence (究竟空無) which is the object (所行, *gocara*) of the [highest] nondual knowledge.

[Dharmapāla:] We have just refuted that when saying that, if its object is an absolute nonexis-

³² Bhāvaviveka intends to say that material forms and minds do not exist ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*) because they are not '*parama-artha*'. That is to say, they are not objects (*artha*) of the highest knowledge (*paramajñāna*).

³³ To be compared with Bhāvaviveka's arguments against the Yogācāra understanding of *nirvikalpajñāna* in Chapter 5 of MHK/TJ (see Hoornaert, *passim*).

³⁴ This paragraph has a complicated syntax. I am not not sure I have rendered its meaning correctly.

tence, then the nondual knowledge will not arise, and so forth. Moreover, that object (*gocara*) [of nondual knowledge] will not be the true ultimate reality (眞勝義), because it will be a non-entity (無, *abhāva*) just like the horns of a rabbit, or because it will not exist (非有, *asat*) just like flowers in the sky.³⁵ (247b3)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] The ultimate reality is that which should be thoroughly investigated (可研窮, *vicāraṇīyam?*)

[**Dharmapāla:**] That is again not correct, because the [ultimate reality as an] object [of investigation] is not different [from conventional realities (*saṃvṛti*)]. As a matter of fact, the thorough investigation of that [ultimate reality] is not a rejection of conventional realities (不捨世俗). Moreover, if conventional realities (世俗法) were not [the object] that needs to be thoroughly investigated, then [the ultimate reality as] that which needs to be thoroughly investigated will exist apart from conventional realities. But the ultimate reality does not exist apart from conventional realities. Hence, you should not say that the ultimate reality is the thing that needs to be thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, your definition of the ultimate reality is not correct. (247b7)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Our definition of the ultimate reality is correct, because the ultimate realities to which the other schools (宗) adhere do not exist at all.

[**Dharmapāla:**] That is again not correct. The other schools say that the ultimate reality is the nature [of things] which consists in their arising from conditions, their continued existence for some time, and so forth (緣生暫住等性). If you argue that [that nature] does not exist, you will contradict your own doctrine (違自宗, *svābhyupetavirodha, svapakṣavirodha?*), direct perception, and so forth.³⁶ (247b9)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] The defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the ultimate reality is [simply] ‘the truth’ (諦實, *satyam*).

[**Dharmapāla:**] If so, conventional realities will not be truths. Why then did you say before that conventional realities are truths? But let us admit that [you did not say that and] all you said was that ‘does not exist, does not arise’ is the truth, whereas ‘this exists, this arises’ is merely conventional speech (唯假言說, *prajñaptivyavahāramātra*) and, as a product of false imagination (妄分別立), is not a truth (非諦實). In that case, how could things that are merely conventional designations and products of false imagination engender the activities (作用) of defilement and purification? Therefore, your response to the objection [of the opponent] is not to the point (理

³⁵ Dharmapāla mentions these two examples to illustrate his earlier point that in Bhāvaviveka’s thought there is no difference (無異相) between ‘not exist (ultimately)’ (非有) and ‘not exist at all’ (無).

³⁶ ‘Other schools’ probably refers to the Vaibhāṣikas and other Abhidharma schools. Bhāvaviveka will contradict his own doctrine, because the Madhyamaka accepts that things arise, endure, change and cease to exist according to the conventional truth.

不成, *ayukta*). [We Mahāyāna Buddhists] do not teach that the hairs of a turtle are real and have the power to fetter the world!

[PART 2: DHARMAPĀLA'S REPLY and BHĀVAVIVEKA'S REJOINDERS] (247b15-249b13)

Other teachers [= the Yogācāras, in particular Dharmapāla himself] reply as follows to the objection [of the non-Buddhist in the Prologue].³⁷

[Dharmapāla:] The imagined (分別所執, *parikalpita*) nature of things (法體) does not exist, but their nature that arises from causes and conditions (因緣所生, *hetupratyayotpanna*) does exist. Based on this [dependent nature], there is generation of the propensities (*anuśaya*) for the defilements, fettering of the world, and transmigration in the triple world. It is also [based on this dependent nature] that there is practice of the preparatory path (*prayoga*), realization of the non-existence of the self and of the emptiness [of all things] (無我空, *anātmasūnyatā*), attainment of full enlightenment (*sambodhi*), and release from the sufferings of samsara. (247b18)

Although the things that arise from causes and conditions comprise both material forms and minds, the mind (心, *cittam*) is the source [of everything]. We therefore say (偏說, *brū*) that [only] false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpa*) fetter the world. By turning away from (厭, *nirvid*) these [false imaginations], one can cultivate the preparatory practices (*prayoga*) that lead to the realization of emptiness. If only the external world existed and the mind did not exist, false imaginations could not fetter [the world] and one could accordingly not turn away from them, cultivate [the insight into] the nonexistence of the self and the emptiness [of all things], attain full enlightenment, and be released from samsara.³⁸ To demonstrate this, we quote these words from the sutra: “Imagined (*parikalpita*) [things] do not exist, but the nature that arises in dependence on others (依他起性, *paratantrasvabhāva*) does exist. Those who deny the existence of false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpa*), fall into the two extremes of affirming too much (增, *samāropa*) and negating too much (減, *apavāda*).”³⁹ (247b24)

³⁷ Wonch'uk's account of the debate starts here.

³⁸ Dharmapāla adduces here one of the basic Yogācāra arguments for the real existence of the dependent nature of things. If the dependent nature of the mind does not exist, defilement (*saṃkleśa*) will not exist and the purification (*vyavadāna*) of the mind by following the Buddhist path will be meaningless. Bhāvaviveka introduces this Yogācāra tenet in MHK/TJ V.6 (Hoornaert, 1999, pp. 154-156).

³⁹ Quotation of LAS II.191 (X.305): *nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantrāsca vidyate/ samāropāpavādaḥ hi vikalpanto vinaśyati*. (For the identification of the LAS-verses quoted in CSV-Dh and for the variants of this verse in the Sanskrit text and the Tibetan and Chinese translations of LAS, see C. Kubota, “Ryōgakyō eyō no saisho no ronjitchi,” *Bunka* 52 (1989), pp. 147-178; pp. 151-152, and note 20 p. 173.)

This verse is also adduced as a scriptural proof for the ultimate existence of *paratantrasvabhāva* by Bhāvaviveka's Yogācāra opponent in the TJ-introduction to MHK V.69-71 (only first half of the verse quoted; cf. Hoornaert, 2002, p. 122) and in PP (P. Tsha, 305b2; D. Tsha 243b4-5; Lindtner, p. 83; Eckel, p. 56).

LAS II.191cd, as quoted here by Dharmapāla, differs considerably from the versions referred to above and

Some [= Bhāvaviveka] interpret the meaning [of this verse] as follows.

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Names are imagined [things]. The objects (義, *artha*) [to which names refer] are [real] natures that arise in dependence on others. Names are nonexistent, because they do not exist in the objects [to which they refer]. The objects [they refer to] do however exist, because according to people in the world (隨世間) they are not nonexistent (非無). Therefore, you cannot quote this [verse] as a [scriptural] proof for the [ultimate] existence of the dependent [nature of things].⁴⁰ (247b27)

[**Dharmapāla:**] Your interpretation is not correct, because it is contradictory. If names do not exist because they do not exist in the objects [to which they refer], then given the fact that objects equally do not exist in the names [that designate them], how could objects exist? Or again, the names that are used to designate objects should [also] exist, because they arise from causes and conditions, just like the objects [they refer to]. If the nature of falsely imagined designations (能詮, *abhidhāna=nāman*) does not exist, how could the nature of falsely imagined objects (所詮, *abhidheya*) exist? According to the common opinion (隨世俗), names have the capacity to designate [things] (有詮表能), but you do not accept that they have a nature that depends on others. According to the [same] common opinion, objects equally have the capacity [to act] (有能). Why then don't you say that [objects too] are imagined things [just like names]? [In short], if the designating [names] and designated [objects] (能詮所詮) that are conventionally established by people in the world (世俗假立) do not exist, then both should not exist; and if they do exist, then both should exist. How could the [Lāṅkāvatāra]sutra be saying that one [of both] exists and the other does not exist? Your interpretation does therefore not agree with the true meaning of the sutra. Thus, you ought to admit [with us] that the imagined nature [of things] does not exist because it is established by the deluded minds of people in the world (諸世間妄情立故). The dependent nature, however, arises from causes and conditions and is not a fabrication of deluded minds. Hence, you should admit that it exists. (247c7)

In order to prove that his own interpretation [of *Lāṅkāvatārasūtra* II.191] is right, he [= Bhāvaviveka] quotes the following words from [another] sutra:

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] “By establishing such and such a name, [people in the world] designate such and such a thing. But the nature of all these [names] does not exist [in the things they designate].

may well have been adapted to the context (insisting on the real existence of ‘false imaginations’). Chos grub faithfully follows the Chinese text and translates as follows: “*yang dag ma yin rtog stong 'jig nal/ sgro 'dags skur 'debs mtha' gnyis lung bar 'gyur!*” (SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 31b6; D. Ti 28a6).

⁴⁰ Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of LAS II. 191 in this paragraph, and the references to *Bhavasamkrāntisūtra* verse 2 and LAS III.14 in his next two rejoinders, mirror exactly the order of discussion with the Yogācāra in PP (see Lindtner, pp. 83-84; Eckel, pp. 56-57). Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of LAS II.191 in the present debate also agrees with the TJ-commentary to MHK V.75 (quotation of *Bhavasamkrāntisūtra* verse 2); see Hoornaert, 2002, pp. 125-126.

Such is the true nature (法性, *dharmatā*) of all things.”⁴¹

[**Dharmapāla:**] This verse does not corroborate your interpretation [of the above sutra]. The [Āryabhavasamkrānti]sutra does not intend to say that names do not exist in the objects [to which they refer]. All it says is that things do not have the identities that are expressed [by the names that designate them] (所詮法性非有). [This verse] thus makes it clear that the [true] nature of things cannot be expressed by words (不可詮). Words designate only common characteristics (共相, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), but the individual characteristics (自相, *svalakṣaṇa*) of things are beyond the scope of words. Individual characteristics are not nonexistent (非無), and common characteristics are not existent (非有). In short, [this verse] says that the identities that are expressed [by words] do not exist, but it does not say that the nature of designating [names does not exist]. [As a matter of fact] that nature really exists (實有). That is why the verse just says “[all] these [designated identities] do not exist (彼非有).” If it were otherwise, the verse should have said “the nature of those [designating names] does not exist (此性非有).” (247c16)

In order to prove that dependent natures do not exist [ultimately], he [Bhāvaviveka] again quotes a verse from the sutra:

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] “Not a single thing arises and not a single thing is annihilated. When one views all things with a pure vision (淨見), [one sees that all things] are neither existent nor nonexistent.”⁴²

[**Dharmapāla:**] This verse also does not prove that the dependent nature [of things] does not exist. Why? The purport of this verse is to make it clear that, as far as their imagined natures and attributes (遍計所執自性差別, *parikalpitasvabhāvaviśeṣa*) are concerned, designating words and designated objects (能詮所詮) are all empty of inherent existence (其體皆空) and neither arise nor get annihilated. When one views the world with a pure vision that is free of grasping, [one sees that] things that arise from causes and conditions are neither nonexistent nor existent (非無

⁴¹ Quotation of *Bhavasamkrāntisūtra* verse 2: “yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo ‘bhilapyate/ na sa samvidyate tatra dharmānām sā hi dharmatā//” (For references, see note 40 above). Note that this paragraph and Dharmapāla’s reply in the next paragraph are omitted in SNSSt-Tib.

As Dharmapāla’s reply in the next paragraph shows, ‘na sa samvidyate tatra’ is interpreted differently by Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla. For Bhāvaviveka, ‘sa’ refers to ‘names’ which, simply because they are made up of syllables, do not exist in the things they refer to (see MHK/TJ V.75). For Dharmapāla, ‘sa’ refers to the imaginary identities (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa* = *parikalpitasvabhāva*) that are designated by names. Common people, accustomed to and deceived by the hypostatizing (identifying/differentiating) power of language, mistake these nominal identities for the real nature of things, thus failing to understand that the true nature (*dharmatā*) of things (*dharmā* = *svalakṣaṇa* = *paratantrasvabhāva*) cannot be designated by words.

⁴² Quotation of LAS III.14 (X.196): “yasya notpadyate kiṃcin na ca kiṃcin nirudhyate/ tasyāsti nāsti nopaiti viviktaṃ paśyato jagat//”. For the variants of this verse, see C. Kubota, reference in note 39, pp. 152-154. Note that the quotation of LAS III.14 in PP (Lindtner, p. 84; Eckel, p. 57) agrees with the above Sanskrit version. The verse quoted here in CSV-Dh again deviates. Chos grub translates the Chinese as follows: “cung zad skye ba’i chos ni gang yang med// cung zad ‘gag(s) par ‘gyur ba’i chos kyang med// mnam dag lta bas chos mams rab brtags nal/ yod pa ‘ang ma yin med pa ‘ang ma yin nol//” (SNSSt-Tib, P. Ti 32a7-8; D. Ti 28b5).

非有). Therefore, this verse does not prove that the dependent nature [of things] does not exist. (247c23)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] If the dependent [nature] really exists, why then does the sutra say: “There exists not a single thing that is not empty.”⁴³? Again, the sutra says: “The Buddha addressed Subhuti and said: ‘An inherent nature of material forms and of all other things does not exist.’”⁴⁴ Yet another sutra says: “The Buddha addressed Mahamati and said: ‘The inherent nature of all things does not arise at all, because it cannot arise either as existent before [its arising] or as nonexistent before [its arising].’”⁴⁵ (247c27)

[**Dharmapāla:**] These [sutras] have a hidden meaning (密意, *abhiprāya*).

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] What hidden meaning?

[**Dharmapāla:**] All these sutras negate only the imagined nature [of things]. They do not say that everything does not exist (非一切無). If [the meaning were that] things do not exist at all, that would be a pernicious view (邪見, *mithyādr̥ṣṭi*).

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] How do you know that [these sutras] have that kind of hidden meaning? (247c 29)

[**Dharmapāla:**] Because it is clearly stated in other sutras. Bhagavat has indeed declared as follows: “It is only with respect to the inherent natures [conceived on the basis] of the connection [of words with things] (相廡自性, *sāmyogikasvabhāva*?) that I have taught that the inherent nature of all things does not exist. If people cling to the literal meaning (如言, *yathāruta*) [of my words] and proclaim that the inherent nature of defiling and purifying dharmas does not exist at all, then that misunderstanding of emptiness (惡取空) is what I call a pernicious view (邪見).”⁴⁶

⁴³ From the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (passim, exact source not identified). SNSSt-Tib: “*chos thams cad mi stong pa gang yang med doll*”.

⁴⁴ From the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (passim, exact source not identified). SNSSt-Tib: “*gzugs la sogs pa'i chos rnams ni rang bzhin gyis med doll*”.

⁴⁵ From the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*? Note that Chos grub's translation deviates from the Chinese text: “*chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid skye ba gang yang med pas/ sngon yod pa dang/ sngon med pa zhes bya ba'i ming yang mi dmigs pa'i phyir rol*” (SNSSt-Tib, P. Ti 32b4-5; D. Ti 29a2). The version that agrees with the Chinese text is quoted in the second account of the debate (see note 8): “*chos thams cad kyi dngos po ni skye ba med de/ sngar yod pa 'am sngar med pa yang skye bar mi rung ba'i phyir rol*” (SNSSt-Tib, D. Thi 196a5).

⁴⁶ Chos grub's translation of the next sentence is more explicit than the Chinese and informs us about the exact meaning of ‘connection’ (*saṃyoga*?) in this context: “*de la mtshungs par ldan pa'i rang bzhin* (=相廡自性) *zhes bya ba ni 'jig rten pa rnams kyi(s) kun tu brtags pa rjod par byed pa dang/ brjod par bya ba'i mtshungs par ldan pa'i rang bzhin nol*” (SNSSt-Tib, P. Ti 33a1-2; D. Ti 29a5-6). Common people mistakenly believe that the identities designated by words really inhere in the things to which words are applied (cf. *Mahāyānasūtrā-lamkāra* XI. 77: *yathānāmārthābhīniveśa*), and vice versa, that words accurately mirror the real identities of things (*yathārthanāmābhīniveśa*).

The use of 「相廡自性」 as a synonym of ‘*parikalpitasvabhāva*’ probably derives from the following passage in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*: 「相名相廡以為緣故。遍計所執相而可了知」 (T. vol. 16, 693b21-22). Following this sutra, the *Yogācārabhūmīsāstra* (*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*) says that the imagined nature of things should be known from the mutual connection between phenomena (*nimitta*) and names (相名相廡; *rgyu mtshan dang ming 'brel pa*; T. No. 1579, vol. 30, 703b5-7; D. Zi 18b4-5). Wonch'uk elsewhere refers to this text when explaining that the imagined nature is known from 相名相廡 (SNSSt-Chin, 377a). The Sanskrit

(248a3)

‘The inherent natures [conceived on the basis] of the connection [of words with things]’ are the things that are imagined [as real] by people in the world. As a result of the internal transformations of the mind (心轉變, *cittaparīṇāma*), [images of] quasi-external things appear [in the mind] (似外諸塵). Based upon these [images of] things, all kinds of mistaken attachments (倒執) arise. Based upon these mistaken attachments, people end up imagining that the self and others, and the inherent natures [conceived on the basis] of the connection [of words with things], really exist. ‘Defiling and purifying dharmas’ are [real things that are] dependent on others (依他). We thus know that such is the hidden meaning of the sutras [you have cited above]. (248a7)

Furthermore, in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* the Buddha himself has clearly explained the meaning of ‘exist’ and ‘not exist’ (有無義, *yod pa dang med pa’i don*). All the things that are imagined (遍計所執, *parikalpita*), constructed (所集, *saṃvardhita?*), imputed (所增, *adhyāropita*) and grasped (所取, *grhīta*) as permanent and unchangeable are said to be nonexistent, while all the things that arise from causes and conditions are said to exist.⁴⁷ Yet another sutra teaches that imagined natures do not arise, while all the things that are included in the dependent nature do arise from causes and conditions.⁴⁸ The *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra* further says: “Those who practice the perfect virtue of wisdom (慧度, *prajñāpāramitā*) know well the [imagined] nature of form (色性), know well the arising of form (色生), and know well the true nature of form (色如, *rūpatathatā*), and so forth.”⁴⁹ (248a13)

Moreover, although many sutras teach that all things lack inherent existence (*niḥsvabhāva*), do not arise (*anutpanna*), are not annihilated (*aniruddha*), and so forth, all of these [statements] should be properly analyzed (皆應分別) and one should not cling to the literal meaning (如言) as being the definitive meaning (了義, *nītārtha*). One must not say that all things do not exist as conventional truths also. That would be a misunderstanding of emptiness and would constitute a greatly pernicious view!” (248a15)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] What you say is not correct. Why? Because there is a different explanation as to

restoration *sāmyogikasvabhāva* is conjectural, but the term is used in Ārya Vimuktisena’s *Abhisamayālamkāravṛtti* (C. Pensa ed., p. 122 line 12). De la Vallée Poussin suggests *abhidheyābhidhānasambandha*, referring to LAS p. 131, stanza 193: “*nimittanāmasambandhāj jāyate parikalpitam*” (see Siddhi, p. 539).

⁴⁷ Included in Wonch’uk’s second version of the debate (see note 8). Wonch’uk adds that this scripture is quoted by Asvabhāva in his commentary to *Mahāyānasamgraha* and in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (大智度論, T. No. 1509): “*gzhan yang slob dpon ngo bo nyid med kyis theg pa chen po bsdu pa’i ‘grel pa dang/ ‘phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i ‘grel pa’i nang nas/ ‘phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mdo khungs su bstan pa las kyang kun du brtags pas bsags pa dang/ bskyed pa dang/ blangs pa dang/ rtag par rgyun du rnam par ‘gyur ba med pa’o snyam pa’i chos gang yin pa de dag thams cad ni med pa zhes bya’o// rgyu dang rkyen gyis bskyed pa gang yin pa de dag ni yod pa zhes bshad doll*” (SNSt-Tib, D. Thi 195b2-3; SNSt-Ch, vol. 34.5, 459a).

⁴⁸ Source not identified.

⁴⁹ Cf. E. Conze, *The Large Sutra On Perfect Wisdom*, p. 594.

[what] the sutras of definitive meaning [are] (於了義經異分別故).⁵⁰ The Blessed One himself has indeed declared as follows: “The sutras in which ‘empty’ (空, *śūnya*), ‘without perceivable marks’ (無相, *animitta*), ‘non-desirable’ (無願, *apraṇihita*), ‘without activity’ (無行, *anabhisam-skāra*), ‘without arising’ (無生, *anutpāda*), ‘without annihilation’ (無滅, *anirodha*), ‘without inherent existence’ (無有自性, *niḥsvabhāva*), the nonexistence of sentient beings (有情, *sattva*), living beings (命者, *jīva*), sovereign souls (主宰, *svāmin*) and individual persons (*pudgala*), the [three] gates to liberation (解脫門, *vimokṣamukha*), and so forth, are taught, are called sutras of definitive meaning.”⁵¹ (248a19)

[**Dharmapāla:**] My interpretation is correct, because in other sutras the Buddha himself has stated it clearly (決判) as follows: “It is with reference to the imagined nature [of things] that I teach in other sutras that all things lack inherent existence, do not arise, do not cease, are originally appeased (*ādiśānta*) and have nirvana as their nature (*prakṛtiparinirvṛta*). With reference to the dependent nature [of things], I teach that the minds of sentient beings do arise, do cease, do transmigrate, and so forth.”⁵² (248a22)

Again, in another sutra the Buddha addresses the Venerable Sariputra as follows: “Material forms (色) are empty of inherent existence. Because they are empty of inherent existence, they neither arise nor cease to exist. Because they neither arise nor cease, they do not change. The same is true of [the other aggregates] feelings (受), conceptualizations (想), volitions (行) and consciousnesses (識).”⁵³ Here [the Buddha] has the imagined nature in mind when he says that [the aggregates] lack inherent existence, do not arise, do not cease, and so forth. Deluded people indeed make completely false judgments (周遍計度, *parikḷp*) about material forms and all the other things that are [merely] developments of their own minds (自心變, *svacittapariṇāma*) and they cling to the idea that [all things] have real inherent natures and real inherent properties (有真實自性差別, *bhūtasvabhāvaviśeṣa*?). It is with reference to these [imagined natures] that the Blessed One teaches that material forms and all other things lack inherent existence, do not arise, do not cease, and so forth. He also teaches that the dependent nature [of things] is empty in the sense that the imagined nature does not exist in it, but not in the sense that [the dependent na-

⁵⁰ The obvious translation of this phrase would be: “Because it is explained in a different way in the sutras of definitive meaning.” Chos grub also has understood it that way: “nges pa’i don gyi mdo las gzhan dang gzhan du nam par ‘byed pa’i phyr roll” (SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 33a8; D. Ti 29b3). I do think, however, that my rendering is compatible with the syntax of the Chinese and is preferable in view of the issue at stake here: Which sutras have a provisional meaning (*neyārtha*) and which have a definitive meaning (*nītārtha*)?

⁵¹ From the *Akṣayamatīrdeśasūtra*, quoted in Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (L. de la Vallée Poussin ed., 43.5-7; cf. J.P. Keenan, reference in note 10, p. 110, note 70).

⁵² Source not identified.

⁵³ Source not identified.

ture] itself lacks inherent existence, does not arise, does not cease, and so forth.⁵⁴ (248a29)

The Tathāgata has taught the three natures in various places, always saying that the imagined nature [of things] does not exist whereas the other two natures—the dependent and the fully established—do exist. We therefore know that the teachings about emptiness have a special intended meaning (別有意趣, *sābhiprāya*). One should not interpret them literally in the totally negative sense that all things do not exist. To understand their meaning according to the letter is to slander the Great Vehicle! That is why the sutra says: “If a bodhisattva understands [the Mahāyāna scriptures] according to the letter and does not seek after the real intent (*abhiprāya*) of the Tathāgata’s teachings, then that is called a mistaken reflection (非理作意, *ayoniśomanasikāra*) about the Dharma and a misguided adherence (非處信解, *asthānādhimukti?*) to the Great Vehicle. But if a bodhisattva does not understand [the Mahāyāna scriptures] according to the letter and seeks after the real intent of the Tathāgata’s teachings, then that is called the correct reflection about the Dharma and the proper adherence to the Great Vehicle.”⁵⁵ (248b7)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] If that is true, then how do you interpret the following words from the sutra: “The Buddha addressed the gods (天子, *devaputrā*) and said: ‘You should know that when the Buddha attained enlightenment, not anything at all was attained (都無所得). Not a single thing can be produced or annihilated (可生可滅). Why? Because all things neither arise nor cease to exist. That is why the Tathāgata appears in the world.’”⁵⁶ (248b10)

[**Dharmapāla:**] Some interpret this as follows. When the Buddhas attain full enlightenment, [their mind] is entirely free from objectifying and differentiating thoughts (分別戲論, *vikalpaprapañca*). Thus, although they appear in the world, one cannot say that they realize or attain [anything]. (248b12)

Others interpret this as follows. Because enlightenment is the [original] nature of the Buddha, nothing [new] is attained [when a Buddha attains enlightenment]. As the sutra says: “Enlightenment is the Buddha. The Buddha is enlightenment.”⁵⁷ Accordingly, nothing is attained [when a Buddha attains enlightenment]. Because awakening (覺知) thus accords with the original nature of things (法性)⁵⁸, [awakening] does not produce anything that was not yet there nor

⁵⁴ Chos grub’s translation of the last two lines of this paragraph is clearer than the Chinese text (CSV-Dh, 248a 28-29): “*gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid la kun brtags kyi ngo bo nyid med pa’i phyir stong pa nyid gsungs te* [P: *kyis/ rang bzhin gyis stong pa dang skye ba dang/ ’gag pa med pa la sogs pa ni ma yin nol/*]” (SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 33b8-34a1; D. Ti 30a2-3).

⁵⁵ Source not identified. The portion starting with this quotation (CSV-Dh, 248b3) up to 248b17 is omitted in Chos grub’s translation.

⁵⁶ Source not identified (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā?*).

⁵⁷ From the *Aṣṭadaśasāhasrikā* (cf. E. Conze, *Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom*, pp. 115-116).

⁵⁸ The construction 「如 . . . 而」 in the phrase 「如其法性而覺知故」 (CSV-Dh, 248b14-15) translates the Sanskrit “*yathā . . . tathā*” (see A. Hirakawa, *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Part Two Chinese-Sanskrit, Daizo Shuppan, Tokyo 1977, p. 370).

does it annihilate anything that was already there (不生先無不滅先有). Because the true nature of all things is beyond differentiations (*prapañca*) [such as ‘exist’, ‘not exist’, etc.], [things] neither arise nor cease to exist. Because supreme enlightenment (*anuttarabodhi*) is actually present (現在前故), it is said that the Tathāgata appears in the world. (248b17)

Furthermore, the sutra says: “Subhuti, you should know that ‘material form’ (*rūpam*) designates the inherent nature of material forms which is an absence of inherent nature (諸色無性之性). The same is true of [the other aggregates] feelings, conceptualizations, volitions, and so forth.”⁵⁹ Now, the meaning of this sutra is as follows. The inherent nature (自性) of the dependent nature [of material forms] is its true nature (法性) which is beyond the scope of words and consists in (所顯, *prabhāvita*) its lacking the nature (無性) of imagined material forms.⁶⁰ If [the meaning of the sutra were that] all things do not exist at all, why would the sutra talk about ‘an absence of inherent nature that is [itself] an inherent nature’? (248b21)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] [The sūtra intends to say that] the absence of an inherent nature in conventional realities such as material forms and so forth, is the ultimate true nature of material forms and so forth.⁶¹

[**Dharmapāla:**] That is not correct. Why? Because the ultimate reality (勝義) cannot be objectified and differentiated [from other things].⁶² How then could it have nothing (無) as its nature (自性)? If its nature consists in ‘nothingness’ (無性), it should not be called ‘ultimate reality’, just as other kinds of nothingness (庶類餘無不名勝義) [such as the horns of a rabbit, are not called ‘ultimate reality’]. Moreover, the attainment of supreme awakening will then be impossible and you will commit the serious error of contradicting your own [Mahāyāna] religion (違自宗)! (248b25)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] If the dependent nature really exists (實有), the teachings of the sutras will be contradicted. The sutra indeed says: “Things arise from conditions, but both conditions and things do not exist. Those who understand this correctly, are said to have understood the dependent arising of things (緣起, *pratīyasamutpāda*). Things that arise from conditions have no inherent nature at all (都無性). Things that have no inherent nature at all do not arise from condi-

⁵⁹ Source not identified.

⁶⁰ Chos grub apparently has not very well understood the original Chinese of this sentence (CSV-Dh, 248b18-20). He translates as follows: “*mdo sde'i dgongs pa ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ni kun tu brtags pa'i gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid med pas rab tu phye ba tshig dang bral ba'i chos kyi ngo bo nyid kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir/ ngo bo nyid med pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba gsungs sol!*” (SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 34a4-5; D. Ti 30a 6). The underlined phrase should be corrected into “*ngo bo nyid yod pa'i phyir*”.

⁶¹ 「色等世俗無性、即是色等勝義之性」(CSV-Dh, 248b21-22). This rejoinder and the following reply by Dharmapāla are omitted in Chos grub's translation.

⁶² Literally: “(Because) the ultimate reality is beyond all objectifying and differentiating thought (*vikalpaprapañca*). How could it then have ‘nothing’ as its identity (and thus be objectifiable and differentiable from other things that have ‘existence’ as their identity)?” (CSV-Dh, 248b22-23)

tions.”⁶³ (248c2)

[**Dharmapāla:**] These two sutras indeed say that things that arise from conditions have no inherent nature. Yet, they do not contradict [our position]. As a matter of fact, things that arise from conditions are of two kinds: imagined (*parikalpita*) [things], and [real] natures that arise in dependence on others (*paratantrasvabhāva*).⁶⁴ Now, these [two sutras] intend to say that the imagined natures [of things] do not exist. They do not say anything about the [real] dependent [nature of things]. If these sutras taught that the dependent [nature] has no inherent existence at all, they would be saying that both defiling and purifying dharmas do not exist at all. And that would be a misunderstanding of emptiness, which is harmful to both oneself and others! (248c6)

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Who will [ever] be able to eliminate false imagination (*abhūtaparikalpa*) [if its dependent nature really exists]?

[**Dharmapāla:**] When one attains the correct view (正見, *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), it will automatically cease to exist (自當能遣, *rang nyid kyis bsal bar 'gyur*).⁶⁵

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Allow me to ask you a few questions. By which knowledge is the dependent nature [of things] known?⁶⁶

[**Dharmapāla:**] By the pure mundane knowledge (世間淨智, *śuddhalaukikajñāna*) which arises from and after (所引生) the [highest] nonconceptual knowledge (無分別智, *nirvikalpajñāna*).

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] If [that knowledge] is already nonconceptual, why do you call it ‘mundane’ (*laukika*)?

[**Dharmapāla:**] Who says that this [pure mundane] knowledge is nonconceptual?

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] Well, if it is a conceptual knowledge (有分別, *savikalpa*), then it cannot know (應不能行) the real character of things (諸法實相). It should then have only their imagined [characteristics] as object. If you say that, although it is conceptual, it nevertheless knows the real character of things, then false imaginations (*abhūtaparikalpa*) also should be able to know the real character of things. (248c12)

⁶³ Source not identified. Quoted in Wonch'uk's second version of the debate (see note 8): “*chos rnams rkyen las gang skyes pa// rkyen dang chos ni gnyi ga med// de ltar yang dag gang skyes* [corr. into ‘shes’] *pa// rkyen ni rtogs pa zhes bya'o// chos ni rkyen las gang skyes pa// chos de dngos po ci yang med// chos dngos med pa gang yin pa// chos de rkyen las skyes ma yin!*” (SNSt-Tib, D. Thi 194b5-6; SNSt-Ch, vol. 34.5, 458d)

⁶⁴ Source not identified (*Yogācārabhūmi?*). The meaning must be that imagined things (*parikalpita*) arise from conditions in the sense that they are products of false imagination (*parikalpa*).

⁶⁵ This is the only instance in the debate where Chos grub (or Wonch'uk?) misallocates an objection and a reply. Instead of attributing this rejoinder to Dharmapāla, he includes it in the previous objection by Bhāvaviveka, which makes no sense. His translation: “*slob dpon bha byas yang smras pa/ yang dag pa ma yin pa'i rtog pa 'di su zhig bzlog par nus te/ yang dag pa'i lta ba thob par gyur pa'i tshé rang nyid kyis bsal bar 'gyur ro zhe'o // slob dpon chos skyong gis bshad pa/ ...*” (SNSt-Tib, P. Ti 34b4-5; D. Ti 30b4-5).

⁶⁶ The discussion that follows deals with the important question as to what kind of knowledge knows the existence of the dependent nature. The entire passage (CSV-Dh, 248c7-249a5) is omitted in SNSt-Tib.

Moreover, since [you Dharmapāla] have at present not yet attained the knowledge of the real character of things, which [in your opinion] follows upon [the attainment of] the [highest] non-conceptual [knowledge], how can you with certainty know that the dependent [nature of things] exists? If, [as you admit], the dependent [nature of things] does not exist the way it is actually perceived (如現見) and [if it thus] acts as the support of attachment to something different [than what it actually is] (他執所依), how can you with certainty say that this [dependent] nature really exists (實有)?⁶⁷ (248c14)

[Furthermore, your claim that] only the pure mundane knowledge, arising after the [highest] nondual knowledge, knows the dependent [nature of things as it is] contradicts with the treatise (論, *sāstra*) [of your own school]! That treatise indeed says: “[Question:] Which knowledge has the imagined nature [of things] as its object (所行, *gocara*)? The knowledge of ordinary people (凡智, *bārajñāna*) or the knowledge of the spiritually superiors (聖智, *āryajñāna*)? [Answer:] The imagined nature [of things] is not the object of either, because it has no [real apprehendable] characteristics (無相故, *nirlakṣaṇāt*?). [Question:] Which knowledge has the dependent nature [of things] as its object? [Answer:] It is the object of both [ordinary and superior knowledges], but it is not the object of the [purely] transmundane knowledge of the superiors (*lokottarāryajñāna-agocara*).”⁶⁸ (248c18)

Furthermore, [the same treatise] says: “[Question:] How many of the five categories of real things (五事, *pañcavastūni*) are objects of knowledge (所取, *grāhya*) and how many are subjects of knowledge (能取, *grāhaka*)? [Answer:] Three [namely, names, phenomena (*nimitta*) and the true nature of things (*tathatā*)] are [only] objects of knowledge. [The remaining two], [mundane] dual knowledge (分別, *vikalpa*) and correct knowledge (正智, *samyajñāna*), are both objects and subjects of knowledge.”⁶⁹ Names, phenomena and [mundane] dual knowledge are objects of [mundane] dual knowledge. There are two kinds of correct knowledge. The first [is transmundane and] has the true nature of things (*tathatā*) as its object. The second arises from and after that [transmundane knowledge] and is [therefore] not attained (今猶未得) [prior to transmundane knowledge].⁷⁰ Phenomena, and so forth, are dependent natures. Therefore, your treatise says:

⁶⁷ Parallel passage in MHK/TJ V.77-78. See Hoornaert (2002), pp. 127-128.

⁶⁸ Quotation from *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (to *Bodhisattvabhūmi*), T. vol. 30, 705a23-26; D. Sems Tsam 9, Zi 23a6-7.

The *Yogācārabhūmi* teaches that the dependent nature of things is the object of two knowledges: ordinary mundane knowledge and the correct knowledge (*samyajñāna*) that arises from and after (*prṣṭhalabdha*) the purely transmundane knowledge (= *nirvikalpajñāna*) and is characterized as ‘both mundane and transmundane’ (*laukikalokottara*) (see T. vol. 30, 696a11-13).

⁶⁹ Quotation from *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, T. vol. 30, 700c27-28; D. Zi 13a5-6.

⁷⁰ Based on *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, T. vol. 30, 696a6-9 and 696a15-17. The text (696a15-17) explains that *tatprṣṭhalabdhalaukikalokottarasamyajñāna* (696a12-13) is transmundane (*lokottara*) because it is never attained (未曾得, *ma 'ongs pa*) unless the transmundane knowledge has been attained for the first time. The term 未曾得 occurs also at 701a10 where the Tibetan translates it as *ma 'dris pa* (never ‘accustomed to’ by mundane minds).

“Imagined natures are not included in any of the five categories. Dependent natures are included in four categories.”⁷¹ (248c23)

If [as your treatise says] the dependent [nature] is thus the object of mundane knowledge and you still say that it is not empty (非空) [of inherent existence ultimately], you make us burst into laughter! As we have repeatedly argued before, the true character of things (諸法實相) is not the object of mundane minds and knowledges. Therefore, you should not teach that the dependent [nature] really exists. (248c25)

[Dharmapāla:] When the treatise says that the dependent [nature] is also the object of the knowledge of ordinary people (凡智), it says so with reference to the self-awareness (自證受, *svasaṃvedanā*) [accompanying every knowledge]. [Our position] does therefore not contradict [the treatise]. At the very moment when dependent natures, that is to say, minds and mental factors, arise from their conditions, then there is self-awareness of the reality (實) of the various images of things (塵, *artha*), such as phenomena, names, and so forth, that develop from and appear in [the mind].⁷² Selfconceited [people] (增上慢, *ābhimānika*), however, say that they perceive [real] external objects. In that way, external objects are purely imagined things (*parikalpita*). Lacking real substance and real characteristics (無體相), they are not an objective condition (所緣緣, *ālambanapratyaya*) [of any knowledge]. They are therefore not objects (所行境) of either superior or ordinary knowledge (聖凡智). (249a1)

All impure (有漏, *sāsrava*) minds and mental factors directly experience (能證受) only the [images of the] objects that appear to themselves (自所現塵). They cannot directly experience the content of other minds as it actually is (未能如實證餘心境). The mental states (心品) that accompany a pure mundane knowledge (無漏世智, *anāsravalaukikajñāna*), however, experience [the content of] both their own and others' [minds], because their nature is free from stains (由性離染故). Thus, when we say that the dependent [nature] is known by pure [mundane] knowledge, we do not contradict the principles stated in the treatise. (249a4)

Your statement that [our view] makes you burst into laughter reveals your own stupidity, but it does not show that our view conflicts with reason. If the mind and the mental factors that arise from conditions were entirely void of an inherent nature, just like imagined [things], how then could they—being similar to flowers in the sky—fetter sentient beings of the triple world and make them revolve in the cycle of birth and death? Therefore, the dependent [nature of minds and mental factors] really exists (非無體實). (249a7)

⁷¹ Based on *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, T. vol. 30, 704c23-25; D. Zi 22b1-2.

⁷² 「變似種種相名等塵實自證受」(248c27-28). Complicated syntax. How to construe「實」in this sentence? Other possible translation: “... then the mind is really aware of itself as developing images (變似) of things, such as phenomena, names, and so forth.”

And that, without any doubt, is what the author of this treatise [= Āryadeva] intends to say. If it were not so, why would he say [in verse 23] that ‘the realization of emptiness sets us free from the bondage of false imaginations’? Has anybody ever seen hairs of a turtle making [mistaken] judgments and fettering [the minds of people](能計能縛)? And who has ever seen horns of a rabbit realizing [the truth] and eliminating [all obstructions](能證能除)? Thus, it should be understood that the mind and the mental factors do exist, while all the things that are grasped as existing outside the mind do not exist.⁷³ (249a10)

[Bhāvaviveka:] How do you know with certainty that all things are only [representations in the] mind (唯識, *vijñaptimātra*)?

[Dharmapāla:] The sutras teach it in many places. So, what doubt could there be about that? For instance, a sutra says: “The Buddha addressed Subhuti and said: ‘There exists not any real thing (實物), even of the size of the tip of a hair, that can act as the support [of one’s actions]. When deluded people (*bālaprthagjana*) engage in all kinds of [good and bad] actions, only mistaken views (顛倒, *viparyāsa*) act as the support of [their actions].’”⁷⁴ ‘Mistaken views’ are ‘false imaginations’ (*abhūtaparikalpa*), and ‘false imaginations’ are the minds and mental factors [that exist in the triple world].

Another sutra says: “Not any inherent nature of things (*dharmasvabhāva*) can be found. Only constructions (能造) exist.”⁷⁵ ‘Constructions’ refers to the minds and mental factors [of the triple world]. Yet another sutra says that “the triple world is mind only”(三界唯心).⁷⁶ There are numerous sutras like these. It is therefore established (*yukta, siddha*) that all things are only [representations in] consciousness. (249a17)

[Bhāvaviveka:] To cling to the idea that all things exist only as [representations in] consciousness is definitely also a mistaken view (*viparyāsa*), or not? If so, you will have to conclude that [consciousness] does not really exist(其體實無), because it is the object of a mistaken view, just as visible forms (*rūpa*) and other [external] objects [do not exist, according to you, because they are objects of mistaken views].

Furthermore, if external objects (境) do not exist, how could consciousness exist? It cannot be that one [instant of] consciousness is a composite of two [real] parts (二分合成). Otherwise, the mind will lose its own unitary character (自一相)!⁷⁷ (249a20)

[Dharmapāla:] The nature of consciousness (識體) does not really consist of two parts, because

⁷³ Wonch’uk’s account of the debate ends here.

⁷⁴ Source not identified.

⁷⁵ Source not identified.

⁷⁶ From the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*: “*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*” (J. Rahder ed., p. 49, E).

⁷⁷ Bhāvaviveka refutes the Yogācāra theory of “two aspects in a single consciousness” in MHK/TJ V. 20-26. See Hoornaert (2000), pp. 103-111.

both the subjective and objective aspects (能緣所緣行相, *ālambakālambyākāra?*) [of consciousness] are [ultimately] empty [of real existence]. When teaching ‘consciousness only’, we just follow the opinion of common people (世俗) who all agree (同所了知) on the existence of the mind as a knower (有能緣心).

[**Bhāvaviveka:**] In that case, you should also teach that external objects exist (境界非無), because people in the world equally know that there exist objects outside the mind. If you maintain that the nature of consciousness really exists, you must explain what that nature is like. But you cannot even explain [the difference between] consciousness as a knower and the objects that are known by consciousness (能識所識, *vijñānavijñeya?*)⁷⁸ How then can you so decidedly say that only consciousness exists? (249a25)

[**Dharmapāla:**] The sutras say that only consciousness exists in order to have [people] abandon [all attachment to and perception of] objects outside consciousness by focusing their mind upon consciousness [alone](觀識). Once [the perception of] external objects has been abandoned, the deluded mind (妄心) ceases to function (息). When the deluded mind has ceased to function, one realizes the middle way. That is why the sutra says:

“As long as one has not yet realized that [all perceived] objects are mind only, two mistaken perceptions arise. Once one has realized that [all perceived] objects are mind only, mistaken perceptions do not arise anymore.”⁷⁹

“By knowing that all things are mind only, one abandons all [mental] images of external objects (外塵相). Thus one puts to rest all mistaken perceptions and realizes true emptiness which is the same [everywhere].”⁸⁰ (249b2)

Deluded people covet (貪着) the taste of [external] objects. They take delight in sensual pleasures (欲樂) and cannot clear their minds of them (無捨離心). Revolving in the cycle of birth and death, they sink into the ocean of triple existence where they experience all kinds of intense suffering, and are bereft of the causes of liberation. The Tathāgata, full of compassion, uses a skillful means (方便, *upāya*) and teaches that all things are only [representations in] consciousness, in order to have them abandon [their attachment to] external objects. When [their attachment to] external objects has been fully abandoned, their deluded consciousness (妄識) accordingly ceases to exist. And when their deluded consciousness ceases to exist, they attain nirvana.

⁷⁸ Since the Yogācāras teach that the objects of consciousness are themselves of the nature of consciousness, they cannot even explain the difference between knower and known!

⁷⁹ Quotation of LAS III.75: “*cittadṛśyāparijñānād vikalpo jāyate dvidhā/ cittadṛśyāparijñānād vikalpo na pravartate!*”. For the variants, see C. Kubota, reference in note 39, pp. 154-155.

⁸⁰ Quotation of LAS X.358: “*cittamātrāvabodhena bāhyabhāvā vyudāsayā/ vinivṛttir vikalpasya pratipat saiva madhyamā!*”. For the variants, see C. Kubota, reference in note 39, p. 155.

Thus, the sutra says:

“Just as a skillful physician in the world uses wondrous drugs to cure all kinds of diseases, just so the Buddhas teach ‘mind only’ for the sake of living beings.”⁸¹ (249b9)

Although it has been taught that atoms are further divisible because of their spatial directions (方所), just like a house or a jar, we have our reservations (此難) [about this way of reasoning to establish ‘mind only’].⁸² Atoms certainly consist of many parts and are therefore nominal entities (*prajñaptisat*) and not real entities (*dravyasat*), but it is not the case that they do not exist at all. Otherwise [one could also reason as follows]: “Because a single instant (*ekakṣaṇa*) of the mind and of the mental factors consists of [still smaller] units of time (時分), it is composed of many parts (衆分合成), just like a year, a month, and so forth. Consequently, it also does not exist at all.” And that would be a very grave error! (249b13)

[EPILOGUE: Dharmapāla summons to abandon all disputes] (249b13-249c14)

In matters like these (等類, *sādrśya*), [Buddhists] adhere to different views and thus divide (分隔, *vibhaj*) the sacred teaching (聖言, *āryabhāṣā*) [of the Buddha] and make it say many different things (令成多分). [If we] dispute each other, each party clinging to one of the extremes (一邊, *ekānta*), it will be impossible to eliminate the stains (塵垢, *mala*) of [pernicious] views. Who could then be devoted to the pure essence (妙旨, *maṇḍa*, *maṇḍasāra*) of the Great Vehicle that was taught by the Buddha-Bhagavats (249b16)?

People who have not yet realized the truth (真理) and just follow their own selfish opinions (隨己執情), declaring themselves right and others wrong (自是非他), are greatly to be feared! Let us therefore abandon all attachment to the two extremes of nonexistence and existence (空有兩邊) and let us gain a correct understanding (領悟) of the non-dual middle way of the Great Vehicle (大乘不二中道). (249b18)

It is as the sutra says: “A Bodhisattva should know that all the [mistaken] views that are rooted in the mistaken view about the existence of self (身見, *satkāyadrṣṭi*) result in actions that harm the Dharma and fetter the world. [People who] thoughtlessly [adopt] the pernicious view that negates the existence of all things and who extol this view and spread it around, engage in

⁸¹ Quotation of LAS II.123 (X.406): “*āture āture yadvadbhīṣagdravyaṃ prayacchati/ buddhā hi tadvatsattvānām cittamātram vadanti!*”. For the variants, see C. Kubota, reference in note 34, pp. 155-156. Also quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* (L. de La Vallée Poussin ed., p. 196.8-11; see C. Kubota, p. 156).

⁸² Dharmapāla refers to Āryadeva’s discussion of atoms in Chapters 9 and 13 of *Catuhśataka* (see Tom J. F. Tillemans, *Materials for the study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, Wien 1990, pp. 135-141, esp. p. 139). Since the context here is ‘mind-only’, he must also have in mind the negation of the existence of atoms in Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśatikā* or Dignāga’s *Ālambanaparīkṣā*.

actions that harm the Dharma. For endless ages they will be reborn again and again in the unfortunate destinies of hell where they will experience immense sufferings. If, due to the small amount of good they may have done in the past, they happen to be reborn as a human being, they will experience all kinds of misery, such as being stupid, blind or deaf. People will find it unpleasant to look at their ugly and filthy bodies and no one will be pleased to listen to their vulgar, clumsy speech. Or, if they have planted superior roots of virtue in the past, they may receive the excellent reward of rebirth as a human being. Even then, due to their past actions of slandering the Dharma, they onesidedly cling to the Tathāgata's teachings about emptiness as the negation of [inherent] characteristics (破相, *lakṣaṇaniṣedha?*) while entirely ignoring his discourses (法門, *dharmaparyāya*) that reveal the real (實) [character of things]. In that way, they lead people into mistaking what is not my teaching (非法, *adharmā*) for my teaching, what is my teaching for what is not my teaching, what is not the meaning [of my teaching] (非義, *anārtha*) for its true meaning, and what is its true meaning for what is not its meaning. Harming themselves, they also harm others and are deeply to be pitied!"⁸³ (249b28)

Indeed, all the teachings of the Buddha are extremely profound. Among them, the discourse about the two truths is the most difficult to understand. But let us take our courage in both hands (自勵) and, basing ourselves on the scriptures of explicit meaning (*nītārthasūtra*), let us briefly explain [the two truths] and [thus] put an end to all disputations. (249c1)

The conventional truth (世俗諦) comprises all the mundane and supramundane (世出世間) things that arise from conditions, such as material forms, minds, and so forth. As directly experienced (親證), these [things] are apart from words (離說), but they can be expressed by words in an indirect way (展轉, *parampāryeṇa?*). Immediate experience comes first and only after that does speech arise. These conventional realities do exist and do arise. Yet, although (假令) they are real (所成, *siddha*), they are similar to things that are fabricated by magical tricks (幻事, *māyākṛta*). [On the other hand], although they arise from false imagination (*vikalpa*), like things that appear in a dream, they do have perceivable characteristics (有相, *sanimitta*) and can be expressed by words and are [therefore] called conventional truths. (249c4)

The ultimate truth (勝義諦) is known by superior knowledge (聖所知, *āryajñeya?*). Inaccessible to differentiating consciousness and words (分別名言, *vikalpavyavahāra*, *vikalpa-abhilāpa?*), it is to be realized by each for himself (自內所證, *pratyātmedya*) without relying on others (不由他緣, *aparapratyaya*). Because it has no perceivable marks (無相, *animitta*)

⁸³ As J.P. Keenan notes (reference in note 10, p. 122), there are resemblances between this text and some passages in the 'niḥsvabhāva' chapter of *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (esp. T. vol. 16, 695c12-696a26). Still, the present text is not a quotation from that sūtra.

and suspends all speech (絶言), it is called the ultimate truth.⁸⁴ (249c6)

The above is a brief exposition of the [Buddha's] discourse on the two truths. For students of the True Dharma (正法, *saddharma*) [this discourse] is not an object of disputes. Based on the former conventional [truth], states of defilement and purification do arise. Based on the latter ultimate [truth], there is attainment of nirvana (寂滅). That is why the sages have taught that there are three kinds of objects of the mind (心境, *cittaviṣaya*): (1) objects that are expressed by words and have perceivable marks (有言有相), (2) objects that are not expressed by words but have perceivable marks (無言有相), and (3) objects that are not expressed by words and have no perceivable marks (無言無相). The first are objects [of a mind] that knows how to use language (有覺悟) and has the [accumulated, karmic] propensities (有隨眠) for language. The second are objects [of a mind] that has the propensities for language but does not [yet] know how to use language. The third are objects [of a mind] in which both the propensities and the actual use of language are forever absent. The first two have conventional realities (*saṃvṛti*) as their object, while the third has ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) as its object. Moreover, once the propensities for language have forever disappeared [from the mind], then the subsequently attained mind (後所得心, *pr̥ṣṭhalabdha-citta*) [simultaneously] knows the two truths.⁸⁵ (249c14)

⁸⁴ Compare with the definition of 'tattvam' in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18.9.

⁸⁵ This passage about the three kinds of objects of the mind is actually a quotation from the *Yogācārabhūmīśāstra* (T. vol. 30, 700c29-701a7; D. Zi 13a6-13b2). Although the text that follows after the present paragraph (249c14-20) can also be included in the Epilogue, I prefer to treat it as the introduction to CS XVI. 24.