

An Annotated Translation of *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā / Tarkajvālā V.8-26*

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Bhāvaviveka first briefly introduces the major Yogācāra tenets in MHK/TJ V. 1-7 and then devotes the remainder of his work to a detailed refutation of these tenets (MHK/TJ V. 8 -114). The following is a short outline of the content of MHK/TJ V. 8 -114.

Synopsis of Bhāvaviveka's refutation of the Yogācāra (*uttarapakṣa*) in MHK/TJ V.8-114

Basic method: The refutation of the Yogācāra tenets will be based primarily on inferential reasoning (*yukti*). (V. 8 - 9)

1. Refutation of the Yogācāra understanding of 'Reality' (*tattvam*) (V.10-13) and 'awareness of Reality' (*tattvajñānam*) (V.14-16). (Refutation of V. 2 - 3)

2. Refutation of the *viññaptimātra* tenet (V.17-38). (Refutation of V.4ab)

(2.1) '*viññaptimātra*' conflicts with scripture and with common sense. (V.17)

(2.2) Refutation of the argument from dream consciousness. (V.18-19)

(2.3) Refutation of four theories of consciousness as a twofold appearance (*dvayābhāsa*). (V.20-26)

(2.4) Refutation of the *samanantarapratyaya* argument. (V.27-28ab)

(2.5) Refutation of scriptural arguments. (V.28cd-30)

(2.6) Refutation of the negation of the existence of atoms. (V.31-38)

3. Refutation of the Yogācāra path (*mārga*) (V.39-54).** (Refutation of V.4)

[**Although MHK V.39-54 is included in the *viññaptimātra* section of MHK V, these verses are better treated as a separate section dealing with the Yogācāra *mārga*.]

(3.1) '*viññaptimātra*' cannot explain how the awareness of Reality (*nirvikalpajñāna*) could ever originate. (V.39)

(3.2) Reply by the Yogācāra and Bhāvaviveka's rejoinder that the Yogācāra theory of

consciousness is an *ātmavāda*. (V.40-42)

(3.3) The awareness of Reality, as taught by the Yogācāra, is not different from an ordinary direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). (V.43-44)

(3.4) Bhāvaviveka's own theory of consciousness can account for *saṃkleśa* (*bandha*) and *vyavadāna* (*mokṣa*). (V.45-50)

(3.5) *nirvikalpajñāna* can be accounted for if the existence of objects outside consciousness is accepted, but 'vijñaptimātra' cannot account for it. (V.51-53).

(3.6) Reply by the Yogācāra and Bhāvaviveka's rejoinder that the Yogācāra path deviates from the straight path to Buddhahood. (V.54)

4. Refutation of the Yogācāra tenet of the 'three natures' (V.55-112). (Refutation of V. 5)

4.1 Refutation of the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) (V.55-68)

(1) Refutation of the nonexistence of the imagined nature. (V.55-56)

(2) The origin of our attachment to the imagined nature. (V.57-58)

(3) Proof for the existence of objects outside consciousness. (V.59)

(4) Refutation of Dignāga's 'apoha' theory. (V.60-68)

4.2 Refutation of the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) (V.69-84). (Refutation of V. 6)

(1) The Yogācāra position: the imagined nature does not exist, but the dependent nature exists. (V.69-70a)

(2) General refutation: existence of the dependent nature is acceptable *saṃvṛtyā* but not *paramārthataḥ*. (V.70bcd)

(3) Refutation of *utpattiniḥsvabhāva*. (V.71-73)

(4) The dependent nature is the object of thought and speech. (V.74-75)

(5) The dependent nature does not exist *paramārthataḥ*. (V.76-79)

(6) The Mādhyamikas can account for conventional designation (*prajñapti*). (V.80ab) and final liberation (*mokṣa*) (V.80cd-81), and are therefore not nihilists. (V.82-84)

4.3 Refutation of the perfectly established nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) (V.85-112)

(1) Reality, as taught by the Yogācāra, is not the true Reality because it is not inconceivable (V.85), not inexpressible (V.86) and not the object of the true awareness of Reality (V.87).

(2) Refutation of the theory of the intrinsic purity and the adventitious defilement and purification of Reality. (V.88-90)

- (3) Refutation of the Yogācāra understanding of 'awareness of Reality' and 'Reality'. (V.91-98)
 - (4) Bhāvaviveka's understanding of 'Reality' (V.99-100) and 'awareness of Reality' (V.101-103).
 - (5) Inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) is indispensable for the elimination of false views regarding Reality. (V.104-110)
 - (6) Conclusion: the Yogācāra doctrine of 'Reality' and 'awareness of Reality' deviates from the teachings of the Buddha. (V.111-112)
5. General conclusion: Our Madhyamaka doctrine, as explained in Chapter Three of MHK/TJ, withstands the test of reason (*yukti*). (V.113-114)

Note about the footnotes to the translation

For the abbreviations used in the footnotes, see the List of Abbreviations included in my translation of MHK/TJ V. 1 - 8 in *Studies and Essays, Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, Faculty of Letters, Kanazawa University*, No. 19 (1999), p. 130. The following abbreviations should be added to the list.

AP *Ālambanaparīkṣā/-vṛtti*, E. Frauwallner ed., "Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen," *WZKM* 37 (1930), pp. 176-179.

MA (Bh) *Madhyamakāvatāra (bhāṣya)*, L. de La Vallée Poussin ed., *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétaine*. (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX), St-Petersbourg, 1912. Tib. D. Nr. 3862, Ha 220b1-348a7 (DBU MA 7); P. Nr. 5263, Ha 264b8-411b1 (vol. 98, pp. 108-166).

PS (V) *Pramāṇasamuccaya (vṛtti)*, Tib. D. Nrs. 4203-4204, Ce 1b1-85b7 (TSHAD MA 1).

ViK (ViV) *Viṃśatikākārikā (vṛtti)*, Sanskrit text included in **TrBh**; Tib. D. Nrs. 4056-4057, Śi 3a4-10a2 (SEMS TSAM 14), P. Nrs. 5557-5558, Si 3b1-11a1 (vol. 113, pp. 233-236).

1. Edited Tibetan text of MHK/TJ V.8-26

[Editions used: Cone (C.) Dbu-ma Dsa 202b4-207a6; Derge (D.) Dbu-ma Dsa 202b4-207a6; Peking (P.) Dbu-ma Dsa 223a2-228b4]

'dir bshad de bzhin gshegs bka' kun//

kho bo cag gi tshad ma yin//

tshad ma yid ches lung yin phyir//

bzang po dag ni sgrub par byed// (8)

[atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvaṃ tāthāgataṃ vacaḥ/

āptopadeśaprāmāṇyād bhadro hi pratipadyate// (8)]

ces bya ba ni bde bar gshegs pa'i bka' thams cad ni kho bo cag gi tshad ma yin te/ de dag ni de nyid gzigs pa rnam kyis gsungs pa yin pa'i phyir ro// dge legs kyi bsam pa can nyid dag ni de sgrub par byed cing mi mthun par mi byed do//

lung gzhan dag gis¹ the tshom dang//

log pa'i blo can gzhan mi byed//

de phyir de dag sgrub gzhug phyir//

rigs pa ldan pa'i tshul btsal bya// (9)

[nāgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatiḥ paraḥ/

tasmāt tatpratipattiyarthaṃ tanmṛgyo yuktimannayaḥ// (9)]

[C. 202b6, D. 202b6, P. 223a4] zhes bya ba la lung las gzhan pa'i lung ni lung gzhan dag go// de dag gis² the tshom du gyur pa ni de yin nam/ 'on te ma yin snyam du the tshom za bar gyur pa'o// log pa zhes bya ba ni grub pa'i mtha' 'di las gzhan pa dag la rnam par gyengs shing 'di la³ mi ltos pas de ni 'di lta bu nyid ma yin no zhes log par zhugs pa'o// gang dag la de lta bu'i blo yod pa de dag ni lung gzhan dag gis the tshom dang log pa'i blo can dag ste/ sun 'byin par byed pa byung rgyal du smra ba gzhan dag go// de dag gis tshad ma de sgrub par mi byed pas de'i phyir de dag sgrub tu gzhug pa'i phyir/ smra ba po rigs⁴ pa dang ldan pa'i tshul phyogs dang/ gtan tshigs dang dpe'i

¹ P. gi

² P. gi

³ C: lta

⁴ P rig

skyon med pa gzhan gyis smras pa'i nyes pa'i gnas su ma gyur pa'i mtha'i rigs pa'i lam
btsal bar bya'o//

khyed kyis brtags¹ pa'i gsung rab dang/ skur pa 'debs pa ji skad smras pa dag gis ni
rigs pa mi bzod pas de'i phyir/

gnyis med pa yi dngos po ni//

rigs pa ma yin 'gal ba'i phyir//

nam mkha'i me tog med dngos sam//

de dngos yin par brtag mi bya// (10)

[dvayābhāvasya bhāvo hi virodhitvān na yujyate/

khapuṣpābhāvasattā vā na vā tadbhāvakaḥkalpanā// (10)]

[C. 203a3, D. 203a3, P. 223b1] zhes bya ba smras te/ gal te re zhig gnyis med pa dngos
po yin na ni ji ltar med pa yin/ ci ste med pa yin na ni 'o na de lta ni² dngos po ma yin
no// de'i phyir gnyis med pa'i dngos po ni rigs pa ma yin te/ rang gi tshig dang 'gal ba'i
phyir ro// gal te gnyis med pa'i tshul kho nar rtag tu nges par gnas pa'i phyir med pa
nyid dngos po yin no zhe na/ de lta na nam mkha'i me tog med pa yang dngos po yin
par thal bar 'gyur ro// gal te nam mkha'i me tog med pa dngos po yin par mi 'dod na ni
gnyis med pa de yang dngos po yin par brtag par mi bya'o//

ci ste 'di snyam du kho bo cag gi tshul ni/ rnam par rtog pa gang gang gis// dngos po
gang gang rnam brtags pa// de ni kun brtags kho na ste// ngo bo nyid ni yod ma yin//
gzhan gyi dbang gi dngos nyid ni// rnam rtog rkyen las 'byung³ ba yin// de la rtag tu
snga ma shos⁴// bral ba nyid gang yongs grub yin// zhes bya ba ste/ gzhan gyi dbang
gi ngo bo nyid de la rtag tu snga ma shos zhes bya ba kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi
gzung ba dang 'dzin par brtags pa'i⁵ dngos po dang bral ba nyid gang yin pa de ni yongs
su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid yin te/ kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang la ltos nas med pa
gang yin pa de nyid yongs su grub pa la ltos nas dngos po yin pas de ltar na med pa
dang dngos po zhes bya ba gnyis dbyer med pa'i phyir tha dad pa nyid ma yin pas de'i
phyir 'gal ba med do snyam du pha rol po⁶ dag sems pa la brtags nas de dgag pa'i lan

¹ P: btags

² 'o na de lta ni' omitted in P.

³ P: byung

⁴ C: shes

⁵ P: rnam par btags pa'i

⁶ 'po' omitted in P.

yang gdab pa'i phyir/

gal te yang dag brtag med phyir//

de la dbye ba med snyam na//

mtshan gzhi mtshan nyid rnam gzhag la//

de ni mtshungs phyir lan ma yin// (11)

[tattvataḥ kalpitābhāvāt tadabhedo mato yadi/

lakṣyalakṣavyavasthāyāṃ tattulyatvād anuttaram// (11)]

[C. 203b1, D. 203b1, P. 223b8] zhes bya ba smras te/ kun brtags pa dang gzhan gyi dbang dag med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa la dbyer med du zin kyang gang gi tshe mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa byed pa na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi de nyid ces bya ba de'i mtshan nyid ni gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin no zhes bya ba de'i tshe na/ gal te re zhig gnyis med pa'i dngos po yin na ni ji ltar med pa yin/ ci ste med pa yin na ni 'o na de lta na dngos po ma yin no zhes 'gal bar sngar bstan pa de mtshungs pa'i phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i lan de ni bzang po ma yin no// gzhan yang/

gal te de'i dngos ma btang gang//

de ni de dngos yin 'dod na//

de ltar dngos nyid mi gtong ba//

de phyir de ni dngos ma yin// (12)

[svarūpātyagitā yasya sā cet tadbhāva iṣyate/

na ca bhāvo 'ta evāsau svarūpaṃ na jahāti cet// (12)]

[C. 203b4, D. 203b4, P. 224a4] zhes bya ba ni gal te pha rol po dag 'di skad ces gnyis med pa'i dngos po nyid yongs su mi gtong ba gang yin pa de nyid dngos po zhes bya'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa ni med do zhes zer na/ de la 'di skad ces de ltar ngo bo nid mi gtong na de'i phyir dngos po de ni med pa kho na yin pas de la dngos por brtag par mi bya'o zhes brjod par bya'o// de'i phyir/

des na de nyid gzigs rnam kyid//

mkhyen pa dngos med dmigs par 'gyur//

de yang chos bdag med min te//

med pa'i blo yi rgyu phyir ro// (13)

[abhāvāḷambanaṃ jñānam evaṃ syāt tattvadarśinaḥ/
na cāsau dharmanairātmyam asadbuddher nimittataḥ// (13)]

[C. 203b6, D. 203b6, P. 224a6] zhes bya ba ni theg pa chen po'i grub pa'i mtha'i¹ tshul gyis na sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ni dngos po yod pa dang/ med pa'i mtha' gnyis las rnam par grol ba yin par bzhed na/ khyed 'dod pa ltar na de dnos po med pa la dmigs pa yin par 'gyur bas lung dang 'gal lo// gal te mi 'gal te gang gi phyir zhe na/ kun brtags² pa'i chos rnams kyi bdag med pa'i dngos po ni bdag med pa nyid yin la/ de la³ dmigs pa nyid yin par khyed kyang 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhe na/ chos bdag med pa ni mtshan ma thams cad dang bral ba yin par 'dod na de yang med pa nyid kho nas med pa'i blo'i yul yin pa'i phyir chos bdag med pa nyid du mi rung ngo// bdag gi sgra ni ngo bo nyid du smra ba'i phyir dang/ bdag med pa ni dngos po'i ngo bo nyid dang/ dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyi ga'i ngo bo nyid med pa nyid yin pa'i phyir ro// 'dir pha rol po dag rnam par rtog⁴ pa ni 'ching ba yin par gsungs pas de dang bral na grol bar sems shing/

gal te dngos med dmigs pa'i blo//
rnam par mi rtog yin 'dod na// (14ab)
[abhāvāḷambanā buddhir avikalpā yadiṣyate/ (14ab)]

[C. 204a2, D. 204a2, P. 224b3] zhes bya ba ni 'di skad ces chos thams cad ni dngos po med pa'i ngo bo nyid du ro gcig pa'i phyir dngos po med pa la dmigs pa'i blos ci zhib la rtog par byed na rnam par rtog pa dang bcas par 'gyur/ rnam par rtog pa med pa'i phyir de ni don ji lta ba bzhin yin no zhes zer na'o// slob dpon gyis bshad pa/

des na gzugs⁵ blo mi rtog pa 'ang//
dam pa yin pa nyid du 'gyur// (14cd)
[tata evāvikalpāpi rūpabuddhiḥ samibhavet// (14cd)]

[C. 204a3, D. 204a3, P. 224b4] zhes bya ba ni gal te rnam par mi rtog pa nyid kyi blo don

¹ 'mtha'i' omitted in P.

² P: btags

³ P: yang

⁴ P: rtogs

⁵ P: gzung

ji lta ba nyid yin par 'gyur na ni/ de lta na 'jig rten pa'i blo gzugs la sogs pa rkyen las
 byung ba rtog pa dang rjes su dran pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang bral ba yang don ji lta ba
 bzhin nyid thob¹ par 'gyur ro// ' dir smras pa/ gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i rnam par rtog
 pa dang bral ba'i blo gang yin pa ni yang dag par na don ji lta ba bzhin yin² par 'dod kyi
 / gzugs la sogs pa'i blo ni rnam par mi rtog pa yin du zin kyang yang dag pa ma yin te/
 gzung bar snang ba'i phyir zla ba gnyis la sogs pa mthong ba'i blo bzhin no zhe na 'dir
 bshad pa/

gal te gzung bar snang 'dod pas//
 gzugs blo yang dag ma yin na//
 des na gtan tshigs 'khrul 'gyur zhing//
 dam bcas pa yang nyams par 'gyur// (15)
 [grāhyābhāsatayā ceṣṭā yadi bhūtā na rūpadhīh/
 hetuḥ syād vyabhicāry evaṃ pratijñā cāvahiyate// (15)]

[C. 204a6, D. 204a6, P. 224b8] zhes bya ba la 'khrul zhes bya ba ni 'gal zhes bya ba'i tha
 tshig ste/ ' di ltar gzugs kyi blo ni gzung bar snang ba nyid ma gtogs par logs shig ni³
 ngo bo nyid med pas gzung bar snang ba nyid du rjes su dpag pa yang dag pa ma yin pa
 nyid kyis yang dag pa bsal ba'i phyir chos can gyi ngo bo nyid log par bsgrub pas 'gal lo
 // ' dir dam bcas pa ni gzugs kyi blo yang dag pa ma yin pa'o// ' di la gzugs kyi blo
 gang yin pa de ji ltar na yang dag pa ma yin par 'gyur te/ mngon sum dang/ lung dang/
 ' jig rten la grags pas gzugs kyi blo yang⁴ dag pa nyid yin par yang dag pa nyid ma yin
 pa bsal ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal lo//
 de nyid mthong ba yongs grub pa'i// ngo bo nyid la lta ba yin// zhes ji skad smras pa
 de la yang skyon 'di yod do//

ngo bo nyid la dmigs yin na//
 ston pa'i byang chub rtog can dang//
 dmigs pa can du 'gyur ba dang//
 rnam par mi rtog blur mi 'gyur// (16)
 [savikalpā ca bodhīḥ syāc chāstuḥ sālambanāpi vā/

¹ P: 'thob

² C, D: ma yin

³ P: na

⁴ P: yang dag pa nyid ma yin pa gsal ba'i phyir rjes su dpag pa dang 'gal lo.

nirvikalpāpi dhīr na syāt svabhāvāmbikā satī// (16)]

[C. 204b2, D. 204b2, P. 225a4] zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pas so so rang rig¹ par bya ba yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i dmigs pa sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de lta bu cung zhig yod cing/ ngo bo nyid de la dmigs pa yin na ston pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub kyi ye shes rtog pa can du 'gyur te/ byang chub ni rtog pa mi² mnga' bar bzhed do// dmigs pa de la dmigs par byed pa yin na dmigs pa can du yang 'gyur bas dmigs pa med pa nyid du yang mi 'grub ste/ byang chub ni dmigs pa med pa nyid du bzhed do// de nyid la ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rnam par rtog par byed na rnam par mi rtog pa'i blur yang mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i tshig sbyar ro// 'di lta ste kham s gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam ste/ phyi rol gyi don med do zhes dam bcas pa gang yin pa de la yang/

sams tsam du ni dmigs pa dang//

gzugs la sogs pa mi 'dzin na//

khas blangs pa dang grags pa yis//

dam bcas pa la gnod par 'gyur// (17)

[cittamātropalambhena rūpādyagrahaṇaṃ na ca/

abhyupetapratitibhyāṃ pratijñā bādhyate yataḥ// (17)]

[C. 204b5, D. 204b5, P. 225b1] zhes bya ba la khas blangs pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni mig dang gzugs rnam la brten nas mig gi rnam par shes pa 'byung ngo zhes gsungs pa'i lung dang 'gal ba'o// grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba ni 'jig rten na gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa mi skye bar grags pas gnod par 'gyur ba'o// 'dir smras pa/ gzugs la sogs pa'i don med par yang rnam par shes pa skye bar mthong ste/ de lta bur snang ba 'byung ba'i phyir dper na rmi lam na gzugs la sogs pa'i blo skye ba bzhin no zhe na/ de dgag pa'i phyir bshad pa/

de lta snang ba skye ba'i phyir//

rmi lam gzugs sogs blo bzhin du//

gzugs la sogs pa don med par//

rnam par shes zhes byar mi rung// (18)

¹ P: rigs

² 'mi' omitted in P.

[nāpi rūpādivijñānaṃ vinārtheneti yujyate/
tadābhāsodayād yathā svapne rūpādibuddhayaḥ// (18)]

zhes bya ba ni de'i phyir pha rol po dag gis smras pa'i rjes su dpag pa de bzang po ma
yin no// ci'i phyir zhe na/

gang phyir rmi lam la sogs pa'i//
rnam shes chos la dmigs pa'i phyir//
de phyir dpe yang med pa dang//
yul la skur pa 'debs par 'gyur// (19)

[yasmāt svapnādivijñānaṃ dharmāmbanāṃ iṣyate/
drṣṭāntanyūnatā hy evaṃ ca viṣayāpavāditā// (19)]

[C. 205a2, D. 205a2, P. 225b5] zhes bya ba ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzung ba dang
'dzin pa'i bag chags kyis bsgos¹ pa'i shes pa dang ldan pa'i mig gis rmi lam na mthong
ba nyid kyī gzugs la sogs pa dag mthong ba yin gyi ma mthong ba ma yin te/ rmi lam la
sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa dag ni dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid yin te/ sngon mthong ba
la sogs pa mngon par brjod pa'i phyir² dran pa la sogs pa bzhin no// dmus long gi mig
gi mthu gtan nyams pa la yang tshe rabs gzhan na mthong ba'i bag chags kyī shugs
kyis³ rmi lam na kha dog dang dbyibs⁴ tha dad pa'i gzugs du ma dag snang bar 'gyur
bas de'i shes pa de la yang dmigs pa med pa ma yin te/ 'di ltar bzang skyong dmus long
des rmi lam na shes pa dang ldan pa'i mig gis gzugs de dag mthong ste/ sha'i mig gis ni
ma yin no zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o// shes pa'i mig gis ni chos la dmigs pa'i phyir rmi lam
la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa yang dmigs pa dang bcas pa nyid yin pas khyed cag gi
sgrub pa la dpe med pa'i skyon nyid du 'gyur ro// gzugs la sogs pa'i don gyi dngos po
sel bar byed pa'i phyir yul la skur pa 'debs pa nyid kyang yin no//
khyed 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar skye ste/ rang du snang ba
dang rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba'i phyi rol gyi yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa
de rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i yul nyid yin no zhes zer na de'i phyir bshad pa/

gal te yul du snang ba nyid//

¹ P: bgos

² P 225b7 : la sogs pa'i don par brjod pa'i phyir

³ P: kyī

⁴ C: dbyings

sems kyi dmigs pa yin 'dod na//
 yul du snang ba ma gtogs par//
 sems kyi bdag nyid gzhan ci yod// (20)
 [visayābhāsātā cet syāc cittasyālambanaṃ matā/
 viṣayābhāsatām projjhya cittātmānyo 'sti kīdrśaḥ// (20)]

[C. 205a7, D. 205a7, P. 226a5] zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar kho bo cag gis ni gzugs la sogs pa'i yul du snang bar skyes pa nyid rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid yin par mthong gi yul du snang ba ma gtogs par rang du snang ba gzhan ma mthong ngo// gal te yul du snang ba nyid las gzhan pa rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyis pa zhig yod na de gang yin ston cig/ gal te de bstan pa'i phyir 'di skad ces rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba dang/ yul du snang ba zhes bya ba'i ngo bo nyid gnyis yod de/ rang gi ngo bor gnas pa'i phyir dang/ gzhan lta bur skyes pa'i phyir shel gyi nor bu bzhin te/ dper na shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid las ni rang gsal la/ sngon po la sogs pa'i nye bar gzhag¹ pa'i khyad par las ni sngon po la sogs par² snang bar³ mtshon du rung ngo// de bzhin du sems rang⁴ du snang ba'i yul gyi rnam par yongs su gyur pa las yul du snang ba nyid du 'gyur ro zhe na/ de lta na bsgrub par bya ba dang dpe nye bar gzhag pa mi mthun te/ gang gi phyir zhe na/

gzhan ltar skyes phyir de gnyis snang//
 shel dang 'dra bar mi 'dod de//
 nye bar gzhag pas⁵ der skye ba//
 shel gyi skad cig min phyir ro// (21)
 [neṣṭā sphaṭikavat tasya dvyābhatānyanibhodayāt/
 upadhānāt tathā jāto yato na sphaṭikakṣanaḥ// (21)]

[C. 205b4, D. 205b3, P. 226b2] zhes bya ba ni shel gyi nor bu sngon po la sogs pa nye bar gzhag pa'i khyad par gyis⁶ rang gi ngo bor gsal ba nyid yongs su btang bas sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du yongs su 'gyur ba ni bden mod kyi/ shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma

¹ P: bzhag

² P: pa

³ P: ba

⁴ C, D: rang rang

⁵ P: bzhag las

⁶ P: gyi

snga ma gang yin pa de ni 'gags par gyur pas sngon po la sogs par gyur pa ma yin no//

de 'gags gzhan ni skyes pa la//

de yi blo ni 'khrul par 'dod// (22ab)

[tadapāye 'nyathotpatter bhrāntatā tanmater matā/ (22ab)]

[C. 205b5, D. 205b5, P. 226b4] ces bya ba ni shel gsal ba'i skad cig ma de 'gags pas na nye bar gzhag pa'i khyad par gyis sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid skyes pa la shel yin par dmigs pa'i blo ni 'khrul pa nyid yin no// ngo bo nyid gnyis ni med de/ gang gi phyir zhe na/ shel nye bar gzhag pa dang bral ba na snga ma'i ngo bo nyid kho nar snang ba ltar shes pa'i¹ rnam par shes bya'i rnam pa dang bral ba shel gyi rnam pa nye bar gzhag pa dang bral ba lta bu ni nam yang gzung du med pa'i phyir ro// rnam par shes pa rang du snang ba'i bdag nyid nyams su myong ba med kyang de yul gyi rnam pas nye bar² kha bsgyur ba'i dmigs par snang ba'i yul du snang ba nyid yin par rigs³ pa dang ldan pa ma yin no// dper na shel gyi nor bu nye bar gzhag pa'i tshon dang phrad pa na de lta bur snang bar mtshon du rung yang shel gyi nor bu yang nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur la nye bar gzhag pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang shel gyi nor bu'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur te/ shel gyi nor bu tshon yin pa 'am/ tshon kyang shel gyi nor bu nyid yin par thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro// de bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang rkyen ji ltar nye bar gyur pa'i yul du snang bar skye yang/ rnam par shes pa yang rnam pa thams cad du gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur la/ gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid du mi 'gyur te/ sa la sogs pa'i sems dang bcas pa nyid dam/ sems kyang⁴ sa la sogs pa bzhin du sems med pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir/ rnam par shes pa nyid gzung ba dang 'dzin pa nyid yin no zhes bya bar rang la byed pa 'gal ba'i phyir de shel bzhin du gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi rigs so//

[C. 206a3, D. 206a3, P. 227a4] 'dir smras pa/ yul du snang ba des⁵ rang dang rjes su mthun pa'i 'bras bu bskyed par bya ba'i phyir rim gyis rnam par shes pa'i rgyun nus pa dang ldan par byed cing lan 'ga' ni de'i rnam pa'i nus par gnas so// lan 'ga' ni nus pa yongs su smin pa las rnam par shes pa yul du snang ba'i rnam par skye'o// rnam par shes pa ni nus pa dang yul du snang ba de gnyis las gcig pa nyid dang tha dad pa nyid

¹ C. shes bya'i

² 'nye bar' omitted in P.

³ P. rig

⁴ P. kyi

⁵ C, D. der

du¹ brjod par mi 'dod de/ rnam par shes pa nyid nus pa dang yul gyi ngo bo nyid gnyis
su snang ba yin no zhe na/ ' dir bshad pa/

gnyis su snang med nus pa ni//

tha dad min phyir yul snang bzhin// (22cd)

[śaktyabhedān na ca dvyābhā viṣayābhāsatātmavat// (22cd)]

[C. 206a5, D. 206a5, P. 227a7] zhes bya ba la rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang ba ma
yin zhes bya ba ni phyogs yin la/ nus pa tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni
gtan tshigs yin/ yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'i bdag nyid bzhin no zhes bya ba ni
dpe yin te/ rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gzhan yin zhes bya bar yang de skye ba
na yul du snang ba kho na'i rnam par shes pa skye ste/ yul gyi rnam pa tha dad par
snang ba'i phyir dang/ yul du snang ba 'khrul pa med pa'i phyir ro// de 'gag pa na yang
rnam par shes pa'i rgyun dang ldan pa'i nus pa yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes
pa bskyed pa'i mthu dang ldan pa bzhag nas 'gag cing de yongs su smin par gyur pa las
yang yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa nyid skye bar zad kyi/ rang du snang ba'i
rnam par shes pa'i nus pa gang gis de bskyed par 'gyur ba bzhag pa ni 'ga' yang med
pas yul du snang ba nyid kyi rnam par shes pa la rang du snang ba nyid brtags² pas ci
bya/

[C. 206b1, D. 206b2, P. 227b4] ci ste yang 'di snyam du rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su
snang ba yin te/ lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba'i phyir gzugs dang gzugs brnyan bzhin te
/ gang la lhan cig 'byung ba'i ngang tshul yod pa de ni lhan cig tu 'byung ba ste/ cig car
'byung ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go// gang lhan cig 'byung ba dang 'dra ba'i ngang
tshul yod pa de ni 'dra bar 'byung ba ste/ lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba'o// dper na
gzugs dang lhan cig tu gzugs brnyan 'dra bar 'byung ba bzhin³ te/ de la gzugs lta bu ni
rang du snang ba nyid yin la/ gzugs brnyan lta bu ni yul du snang ba nyid yin par sems
na/ ' dir bshad pa/

sems ni rang dang gzhan snang ba//

lhan cig 'dra bar 'byung ba'i phyir//

gzugs brnyan bzhin du mi 'dod de//

¹ 'du' omitted in P.

² P: btags

³ P: bzhin no

de phyir gnyis su snang ma yin// (23)

[svaparābhāsātā neṣṭā cetasaḥ pratibimbavat/
sahakāryanukāritvāt tasmād dvyābhāsātāsati// (23)]

[C. 206b4, D. 206b4, P. 227b8] zhes bya ba ni lhan cig tu 'dra bar 'byung ba nyid yin du
zin kyang gnyis su snang ba nyid du mi 'grub pa kho na yin te/ gzugs brnyan ni dngos
po med pa'i phyir dang/ de'i blo yang 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyir ro//
'dir smras pa/ rnam par shes pa ni gnyis su snang ba kho na yin te/ tshad ma dang
'bras bu yin pa'i phyir ro// de la tshad ma ni 'dis rjes su dpog pa'i phyir tshad ma ste/
rang du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa'o// 'bras bu ni de'i yul so sor rtog pa ste/ yul du
snang ba nyid do// yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa 'ba' zhig la ni tshad ma dang
'bras bu dag 'thad par dka'o zhe na/ 'dir bshad pa/

gal te tshad ma 'bras yod phyir//
gnyis su snang bar 'dod ce na//
gzhan du 'ang¹ de dag 'grub pa'i phyir//
brtag pa de yang mi 'dod do// (24)
[pramāṇaphalatābhāvād iṣṭā dvyābhāsateti cet/
anyathāpi hi tatsiddhes tatkiṅptir api neṣyate// (24)]

[C. 206b7, D. 206b7, P. 228a4] zhes bya ba ni gnyis su snang ba nyid ma yin par gzhan du
yang tshad ma dang 'bras bu de dag 'grub pa'i phyir brtag pa de yang mi 'dod do// de ji
ltar na gzhan du tshad ma dang 'bras bu dag 'grub par 'gyur zhe na/ de'i phyir/

yul du snang ba 'dzin pa yi//
rnam par shes pa skye bzhin pas//
gzhal bya gang yin 'jal byed pa//
des na de ni tshad mar 'dod// (25)
[bibhratā jāyamānena jñānena viṣayābhatām/
pramīyate prameyaṃ yat pramāṇaṃ tena tan matam// (25)]

ces bya ba smras te/ 'di la² yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba'i rnam par

¹ 'ang' omitted in P

² P: yid la

'dzin par skye bzhin pa nyid kyis yul rnam par rtog par byed pa'i phyir/ shes pa skye
bzhin pa nyid gang yin pa de tshad ma yin par 'dod do//

de skyes pa na mthong ba'i phyir//

de grub pa ni 'bras bur 'dod// (26ab)

[tannirvṛttau ca drṣṭatvāt tannirvṛttiḥ phalam matam/ (26ab)]

ces bya ba ni rnam par shes pa de skyes pa na yul mthong ba'i phyir shes pa des mngon
par grub pa ni 'bras bu yin pas yul du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa nyid la tshad ma
dang 'bras bu gnyis yod par 'dod de/ dper na shing la sta res gzas pa dang btab pa'i
rkyen gyis¹ gnyis su gcod par byed pa nyid dang/ de dum bu gnyis su chad par gyur pa
nyid bzhin no/-/

bstan du med pa'i ngo bo nyid//

de bzhin rtog pa gang thob pa// (26cd)

[anidarśanarūpasya tathaiṅvādhigamo yataḥ// (26cd)]

[C. 207a4, D. 207a4, P. 228b2] zhes bya ba ni mngon sum gyi shes pa dngos po'i rang gi
mtshan nyid tsam la dmigs pa rtog² pa dang rjes su dran pa'i rnam par rtog pa dang
bral bas/ gzugs la sogs pa sngon po la sogs pa'i bdag nyid du bstan du³ med pa'i ngo bo
nyid la/ de bzhin du med pa'i ngo bo nyid kho na bzhin du rang rig pa'i rnam pas rtogs
par byed pa gang gi phyir de'i phyir yul nyid du snang ba'i rnam par shes pa gcig pu
kho na la tshad ma dang 'bras bu gnyi ga yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub
pas rnam par shes pa nyid gnyis su snang bar rtogs⁴ pa ni dgos pa⁵ med do//

¹ P: gyi

² P: rtogs

³ 'bstan du' omitted in P.

⁴ P: rtog

⁵ P: dngos po

2. Translation

We reply : "All the words of the Tathāgata are authoritative for us, because the teachings of a reliable person are authoritative. Good people accept that these are true." (8)

All the words of the Sugatas are authoritative for us, because they are spoken by those who see things as they really are (*tattvadarśin*). People who strive after excellence accept these words as true and do not contradict them.

Others who have doubts and erroneous ideas from other scriptures, do not [accept the truth of the Tathāgata's words]. Therefore, in order to induce [such people] to accept them as true, one should follow the path of reason. (9)

'Other scriptures' are scriptures which are other than [our Buddhist] scriptures. 'To have doubts' is to entertain doubts as to whether it is so or not. 'Erroneous' means that [one's mind] is confused by other [non-Buddhist] doctrines (*siddhānta*), so that one does not rely on this [Buddhist doctrine] and thus commits the error of thinking that this [Buddhist] doctrine is not right. People with this kind of mind are those who 'have doubts and erroneous thoughts because of other scriptures'. They are 'the others' who refute [the Buddhist doctrine] as they please. They do not accept the authority [of the words of the Tathāgata]. Therefore, in order to induce them to do so, the [Buddhist] teacher should follow the path of reason. That is, the [Buddhist] teacher should pursue the path of relentless reasoning [by adducing arguments] consisting of impeccable propositions (*pakṣa*), logical reasons (*hetu*) and examples (*drṣṭānta*) which are free from the errors that might be pointed out by others.¹

¹ It is not clear from the context who 'the others' are. According to the interpretation I have followed in the translation, Bhāvaviveka has the non-Buddhists in mind and admonishes the Buddhist teachers to use independent inferences (*svatantrānumana*) to convince non-Buddhists of the truth of the Buddhist teachings.

'The others' could also refer to the Śrāvakas who, according to MHK IV.7, argue that the Mahāyāna scriptures were not taught by the Buddha himself because they are not included in the three 'baskets' (*sūtra, vinaya, abhidharma*) or because they teach a different path similar to that of the Vedānta [see V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedānta-Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahrdaya," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 2 (1958) p 179]. Mahāyāna Buddhists should use logical arguments to prove that their scriptures are the *īpsissima verba* of the Buddha (*buddhavacanam*). This interpretation has the advantage of explaining why the verse emphasizes that *all* the words spoken by the Tathāgata, including the Mahāyāna scriptures, are true

Verse 8 can also be read as a direct reply to verse 7. 'The others' would then refer to the Yogācārin only. The purport of verse 8 would then be that the Mādhyamikas should use logical arguments to prove the truth of their interpretation of emptiness as taught in the Prajñāpāramitā sutras. Moreover, the scriptural statements quoted by the Yogācāra in the commentary to verse 7 should be

Since the doctrines put forward by you, as well as the accusation [that we Mādhyamikas commit the error] of overnegation (*apavāda*)¹, do not withstand reason, we say :

[Your tenet of] 'the presence of the absence of duality' goes against reason, because it is contradictory. Is the absence of flowers in the sky a presence? If not, stop thinking that this [absence of duality] is a presence! (10)

submitted to the test of reason in order to ascertain whether they can serve as valid corroborations (*pramāṇa*) of the Yogācāra tenets. Bhāvaviveka thus starts his *uttarapakṣa* with a general observation on methodology: his analysis and refutation of the Yogācāra tenets will be based primarily on reasoning (*yukti*) and secondarily on scripture (*āgama*) corroborated by reasoning.

Bhāvaviveka's basic stand regarding the probative value of scriptural statements in philosophical debates is as follows.

(1) Scripture is not a means of valid knowledge in its own right, because all the knowledge conveyed in scriptural statements is ultimately inferential knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā argues that scripture (*śabda* = *āgama*) is an independent means of valid knowledge, because scripture alone gives us knowledge about objects beyond the reach of the sense organs, such as heavenly bliss (*svarga*) and final liberation (*apavarga*) (MHK/TJ IX. 8-9; S. Kawasaki ed., *Issaichi Shisō no Kenkyū*, Tokyo: Shunju-sha, 1992, pp. 376, 409). Bhāvaviveka refutes this by arguing that the existence of heavenly bliss can be inferred as being a special retribution produced by special causes (*karman*), and that the existence of final liberation can be inferred as being the absence of rebirth due to the extinction of the causes of rebirth (MHK/TJ IX.50-54; S. Kawasaki ed., pp. 383-384, 423-424).

(2) If scripture were an independent means of valid knowledge, all the scriptures of all the philosophical schools would be true simply because of their being 'āgama', that is, simply because of their having been handed down (*āgata*) by tradition. If that were the case, when it comes to reasoning (*vicāra*) about the ultimately real (in distinction from conventional realities), it would be impossible to determine the truth or falsity of scriptures which teach mutually incompatible doctrines. Reason (*yukti*) is therefore the only reliable means to decide on the truth or falsity of the various scriptures. Hence, only scriptural statements in agreement with reason are acceptable as means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). (MHK/TJ IX.19-20; see also MHK/TJ V.107.)

(3) Only the scriptural statements which can be corroborated by means of an unmissaken inference (*anumāna*) are in accordance with reason. All the words of the Tathāgata meet this requirement, because they were spoken by somebody who sees things the way they really are (MHK V. 8). To be empty of inherent existence is the way things really are, as the Tathāgata has taught in the Prajñāpāramitā sutras. Hence, the emptiness of all things can and should be proven by means of inferences, provided that these are 'paramārthatah' inferences à la Bhāvaviveka, because emptiness cannot be known by direct perception, nor by 'conventional' inferences (which do not inquire about the ultimate nature of things), nor by mere scriptural statements.

(4) Bhāvaviveka is willing to accept the scriptures of other schools (for instance, the Vedānta) as means of valid knowledge, provided that they do not contradict the teachings of the Tathāgata. All other scriptural statements are liable to doubt. Reason should be used to investigate whether they are true or not. [MHK IV.56 replying to MHK IV.7; see V.V. Gokhale, "The Vedānta-Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Madhyamakahrdaya," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2 (1958), pp. 179-180].

In short, Bhāvaviveka subordinates scripture to reason. Strictly speaking, for Bhāvaviveka, inferences (qualified as 'paramārthatah') are the only means of valid knowledge when it comes to reasoning about ultimate reality.

¹ See MHK V.7.

If the absence of duality is a presence (*bhāva*), how can it be an absence (*abhāva*)? Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a presence. Accordingly, [your tenet of] 'the presence of the absence of duality' does not accord with reason, because it is a contradiction in terms (*svavacanavirodha*). You might reply that the absence [of duality in the mind] is [the true mode of] existence [of the mind], because that absence of duality is always and invariably there. If that is so, then the absence of flowers in the sky also will necessarily be a presence. If you do not accept that the absence of flowers in the sky is a presence, you have no reason to think that the absence of duality [in the mind] is a presence.

You might reply that your basic doctrine is as follows: "All the things which are conceived by any of the manifold constructive consciousnesses, are merely imagined [things]. The own-nature [of such things] does not exist [at all]. The dependent nature, on the other hand, is the constructive consciousness [itself] which originates from conditions. The perfectly established [nature] is the permanent absence of the former [imagined nature] in that [dependent nature]."¹ The permanent absence of the imagined nature [of the mind] —that is, the permanent absence of the imagined existence of the apprehended and the apprehending [aspects of the mind]— in the dependent nature [of the mind], is the perfectly established nature [of the mind]. In other words, what is an absence as far as the imagined and the dependent [natures] are concerned, that very same is a real presence as far as the perfectly established [nature] is concerned. Thus, [in this case] absence and presence are inseparable from each other (*abhinna*) and are therefore not two different things. Hence, there is no contradiction.²

Having explained the view of our opponents, we refute it again as follows:

¹ Quotation of TrK 20-21. "yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate/parikalpita eva asau svabhāvo na sa vidyate // paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpakḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ/niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā //". Cf. Yamaguchi, p. 182.

² There would be contradiction if the two contradictory attributes (*lakṣaṇa*) 'nonexistence' (or 'absence') and 'existence' (or 'presence') were predicated of the same thing (*lakṣya*) in the same respect. Such would be the case if the Yogācāra for example asserted that the perfectly established nature both exists and does not exist, or is both the existence and the nonexistence of the imagined nature. There is however no contradiction if one says that the perfectly established nature of the mind is its permanent existence or presence as devoid of the imagined nature or of the dependent nature as habitually misconceived by the ignorant.

The Yogācāra position, as Bhāvaviveka presents it here, is close to verses 18-21 of Vasubandhu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (cf. Yamaguchi, p. 183). Vasubandhu says there that the nonexistence of the imagined nature, and the nonexistence of the dependent nature as it appears in the mind of ignorant people (*yathākhyānam*), are not different (*abhinnalakṣaṇa*) from the presence of that nonexistence (=the perfectly established nature), and vice versa. Verse 13 of the same treatise puts it as follows: "The perfectly established nature of the mind is both a presence (*sat*) and an absence (*asat*), because

If you think that there is no difference [between absence and presence] because the absence of the imagined [nature] is the [ever-present] Reality¹, the same [error of contradiction] still occurs when one distinguishes between a definable [entity] and its defining characteristic. Your reply is therefore not correct. (11)

Granted that the absence of the imagined and the dependent natures is not different from the [presence of the] perfectly established [nature]. Nevertheless, if one introduces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic, then the definable entity here is "Reality" (*tattvam*) and its defining characteristic is "presence of the absence of duality." Now, if [the thus defined Reality] is the presence of the absence of duality, how can it be an absence? Or, if it is an absence, then it is not a presence. Hence, the above contradiction occurs. The reply of the opponents is therefore not to the point.² Moreover,

Suppose you argue as follows: "When something never rejects a certain iden-

it is both the presence of nonduality (*advayatvena asti*) and the absence of duality (*dvayasya abhāva*)."
MSA IX.78ab phrases the same tenet as follows: "The very nonexistence [of the imagined nature] is the highest mode of existence." (*yā avidyamānatā saiva paramā vidyamānatā*). Similarly, MSA XI.41ab defines the perfectly established nature of the mind as "absence, presence, and the sameness of presence and absence" (*abhāvabhāvatā yā ca bhāvābhāvasamānatā*). Vasubandhu comments: "The perfectly established nature is the unchangeable nature (*tathatā*) [of the mind]. And that is the absence (*abhāvatā*) of all imagined things. It is also presence (*bhāvatā*) because it is the presence (*bhāva*) of the absence [of imagined things]. And it is also the sameness of presence and absence because [in this case] absence and presence are not separate from each other (*abhinnavāt*)."
(MSABh, 65. 8 -10)

The Yogācāra tenet of the quasi-identity of the absence of the imagined nature on the one hand and the presence of that absence on the other hand, is based on the following two premises: (1) The absence of the imagined nature is an absolute and permanent absence (*atyantābhāva*); (2) The absolute negation of the existence of the imagined nature is an affirming negation (*paryudāsapratiśedha*); that is, the permanent absence of the imagined nature of the mind is affirmed as the only permanently present, true nature of the mind; in other words, the absolute absence of the apprehended/ apprehending duality in all conditioned instances of mind is the beginningless and endless presence of the true nature of mind in each and every single instance of mind.

¹ Literally: "... because the absence of the imagined [nature of the mind] pertains to the real nature (*tattvam*) [of the mind]" (*tattvataḥ kalpitābhāvāt*). This means that the permanent absence of the imagined duality of the mind is the truly permanent, noncontingent nature of the mind and is in that sense the ever-present Reality (*tattvam*) itself.

² The Yogācāra has argued that "the presence of an absence" is not a contradiction because the perfectly established nature of the mind is the permanent absence of the apprehended/apprehending duality in the mind. But to view the true nature of the mind that way is, at least in Bhāvaviveka's opinion, a reification of the true nature of the mind. Reality itself is then seen as an entity (*bhāva*) which can be known (*jñeya*) and objectified (*ālambya*). And if Reality is an entity, it will necessarily have an identity (*svabhāva*, *svarūpa*) which differentiates it from all other entities. Reality will then necessarily be a conceivable, definable and expressible thing (*lakṣya*). That is the reason why Bhāvaviveka here introduces the distinction between a definable entity and its defining characteristic. This distinction has also been used by the Yogācārins themselves, for example in MVK I.13 where "the presence of the absence of duality" is said to be the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of Emptiness.

tity, then it is [always] present as [not rejecting] that [identity].” [We reply:]

”If it does not reject that kind of identity [consisting in an absence], it can for that very reason not be a presence.” (12)

Our opponents might argue as follows: ”That which never ceases to be the presence of the absence of duality, is [truly] a presence. It does not have [another] second identity.”¹

We reply: ”If it does not reject that kind of identity, then for that very reason that [hypothetical] presence will be a mere [reified] absence. Hence, you should not conceive it as a presence.” Accordingly²,

[From your view of Reality] it follows that the awareness of those who see Reality will be a perception of [a reified] absence. Moreover, [Reality as conceived by you] will not be the absence of self-existence, because it will function as the cause of a perception of [reified] nothingness. (13)

According to a fundamental tenet of the Mahāyāna, the awareness of the Buddhas is free from [apprehending] the two extremes of [inherent] existence and [inherent] nonexistence. But your doctrine contradicts [the Mahāyāna] Scriptures, because it asserts that the Buddha-awareness is a perception of [inherent] nonexistence. Perhaps you will say: ”There is no contradiction [with the Scriptures] because the ’absence of self-existence’ (*nairātmyam*) is the presence (*bhāva*) of the absence of the self-existence of all imagined things (*parikalpīta-dharma*). Moreover, you [Mādhyamikas] also teach that [the awareness of the Buddhas] apprehends that [absence of self-existence].”

We reply: ” [The Mahāyāna] maintains that the absence of self-existence (*dharmānairātmyam*) [is a mere absence and therefore] lacks all apprehendable characteristics (*nimitta*) [such as ’exists, ’does not exist’, and so forth] . [But in your view] this [absence of self-existence] is actually a [reified] nothingness and consequently func-

But if Reality is a real entity and hence possesses an identity, it surely cannot have contradictory attributes such as ’nonexistence’ (’absence’) and ’existence’ (’presence’). It should then either exist or not exist and cannot simultaneously possess two contradictory natures ’Presence of an absence’ is therefore a plain contradiction.

Bhāvaviveka explains his own view of Reality on many occasions further in the text. He insists that Reality is a pure absence and should therefore not be conceived as an entity. As a non-entity, it has no apprehendable characteristics (*animitta*) and is therefore non-definable (*alakṣya*) and attributeless (*nihlakṣana*).

¹ In the preceding verse, Bhāvaviveka has pointed out that the Yogācāra understanding of Reality implies that Reality will have two contradictory natures or identities, namely existence (presence) and nonexistence (absence). The Yogācāra replies here that Reality, as they conceive it, has only one identity, namely that of a permanent presence in the sense of a permanently present absence (*pariyudāsa* negation).

² ”Accordingly” here means ”just because you conceive Reality as a reified absence.. ”

tions as the object-cause (*viṣaya*) of a perception of nothingness. Hence, [your view] does not agree with the [true meaning of] 'absence of self-existence'. As a matter of fact, 'self-existence' (*ātman*) means 'inherent existence' (*svabhāva*). And the absence of self-existence (*nairātmyam*) is the absence of inherent existence with respect to both presences (*bhāva*) and absences (*abhāva*)¹."

In this connection, our opponents think that liberation (*mokṣa*) consists in the absence of all conceptual grasping (*vikalpa*) because Scripture says that conceptual grasping is bondage (*bandha*). [Regarding that,]

If you maintain that the [Buddha-]mind, when perceiving the absence [of all imagined entities], is free of conceptual grasping, (14ab)

They argue as follows. All [dependently originated] instances of mind² have an 'identical taste' (*ekarasa*) [in that they all have] the same nature consisting in the absence (*abhāvasvabhāva*) [of imagined duality]. If the [Buddha-]mind, when perceiving that absence, apprehended [it as] something [in differentiation from other things], then it would be accompanied by conceptual grasping (*savikalpa*). But no such conceptual grasping exists [in the Buddha-mind]. That [mind] is therefore in accordance with Reality (*yathābhūtārtha*).³

The teacher replies⁴ :

Then, for the same reason, the nonconceptual perception of visible forms will also be the highest [transmundane awareness]⁵. (14cd)

If the [Buddha-]mind is in accordance with Reality just because it is free of conceptual grasping, then any ordinary (*laukika*) perception, originating from conditions such as [the presence of] visible forms and so forth and free of conceptualization (*nirūpaṇāvīkalpa*) and recollection (*anusmaranāvīkalpa*), will also be in accordance with Reality.⁶

[The Yogācārins] could object as follows : "We maintain that a mind which has

¹ The presence or existence of dependently originated things (*bhāva*) should not be conceived as an inherent existence. But neither should the absence of inherent existence (*abhāva*) in all dependently originated things be conceived as an inherent, reified absence.

² The text has 'all dharmas', but for the Yogācāra 'all dharmas' means 'all instances of mind'.

³ The Yogācāra replies to the previous objection by denying that the enlightened Buddha-mind perceives a reified nothingness. Although the Buddha-mind perceives the absence of the imagined nature of mind, and hence sees Reality as it is, it does not objectify that absence as 'nonexistence' or 'nothing'.

⁴ The occasional occurrence of sentences like this, where Bhāvaviveka apparently refers to himself as 'the teacher' (*ācārya*), is one of the reasons why Bhāvaviveka's authorship of TJ has been doubted. See Y. Ejima, *Chūganshisō no Tenkai - Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1980, pp. 13-15; id., "Additional Note" in Chr. Lindtner, "Adversaria Buddhica," *WZKS XXVI* (1982), pp. 182-184.

⁵ Based on the Tibetan text. The Sanskrit text reads: "... will be equal [to the highest awareness of a Buddha in that it will perceive things as they really are.]"

freed itself from all conceptual grasping of apprehended objects and apprehending consciousnesses (*grāhyagrāhakavikalpa*) is truly in accordance with Reality. But a perception of visible forms and so forth, although it is nonconceptual, does not accord with Reality because images of [nonexistent, external] objects appear in it, as is the case

⁶ According to the Abhidharma (Vaibhāsika) theory, the five perceptual cognitions are free from conceptualization and recollection. These two forms of apprehending belong to the sixth mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) only. Perceptual cognition perceives its object as it is, without conceptually differentiating it from other objects (*nirūpaṇāvikalpa*) and without identifying it with previously perceived objects (*anusmaranavikalpa*). But perceptual cognition is still an objectifying and differentiating cognition (*vikalpa*) in as much as it grasps the individual identity (*svalakṣaṇa* = *svabhāva*) of its object exactly as it is. [On these three kinds of *vikalpa*, as distinguished by the Vaibhāsikas, see AK I. 33ab (pp 60-61), Siddhi p. 390.]

If Reality is conceived as a reified absence, as is the case in the Yogācāra doctrine according to Bhāvaviveka, Reality will be an entity capable of acting as the producing object-condition of a knowledge in its own right. The awareness of Reality (*nirvikalpajñāna*) will then be a caused knowledge (*samskrta*). And whether the Yogācārins accept it or not, that knowledge will necessarily have to appropriate a visual image (*ābhāsa*, *ākāra*) of Reality in order to perceive Reality as it is. As a result, that knowledge will be accompanied by *svabhāvavikalpa*, just like any ordinary visual perception. It will therefore not be the true non-objectifying awareness of Reality.

The inference in MHK V. 14 is a *prasanga* inference. It reoccurs in the form of an independent syllogism in PP, as follows: "Knowledge which apprehends an object cannot be called 'non-objectifying' (*nirvikalpa*), because it contains an image of an object (*visayābhāsa*), even when it does not identify [that object-image] through concepts, as in the case of visual cognition." (PP, D Tsha 247b2-3, P. Tsha 310b2-3, Eckel, p. 72.)

Bhāvaviveka also criticizes the Yogācāra view of the nonconceptual awareness of Reality (*lokottaranirvikalpajñāna*) in his *Karatalaratnāśāstra* (『大乘掌珍論』, T. vol. 30, 268a-278b). According to the Yogācāra, the transmundane awareness of Reality arises when the conceptual apprehensions of object and subject (*grāhyagrāhakavikalpa*) are completely eliminated (T. vol. 30, 276c17-19). Bhāvaviveka criticizes this position as follows: "Granted that, when that knowledge arises, it will be free from conceptual apprehension in the sense just explained. Nevertheless, because that knowledge produces an image of its formless object (= Reality), and because it is accompanied by a [nonconceptual] objectification of its object (*svabhāvavikalpa*), and because it is conditioned (*samskrta*), it cannot be the [true] transmundane non-objectifying awareness [of Reality], just like any other [ordinary] sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) which is accompanied by objectification (*savikalpa*)" (T vol 30, 276c19-22; L de La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamaka, III. Le Joyau Dans La Main*, MCB II (1932-33), p. 128)

These texts clearly show that Bhāvaviveka's understanding of *nirvikalpajñāna* is fundamentally different from that of the Yogācāra. For Bhāvaviveka, *nirvikalpajñāna* is not a nonconceptual awareness, a direct perception or a vision of Reality, but is merely the non-perception (*anupalambha*) of everything that is not Reality. In other words, the negative term *nirvikalpa* functions as a non-affirming (*prasajya*) negation, in which case it means "absence of each and every kind of objectification." In contrast, in the Yogācāra view of Reality - as Bhāvaviveka understands it - *nirvikalpa* functions as an affirming (*paryudāsa*) negation. It then means "the nonconceptual vision of Reality which arises as a new knowledge in its own right after all the conceptual or nonconceptual apprehensions of things that are not ultimately real have been eliminated from the mind." The Yogācāra understanding of *nirvikalpajñāna* is one of the main targets of Bhāvaviveka's critique of the Yogācāra doctrine not only in Chapter Five of MHK/TJ, but in PP (see Eckel, pp. 72-73) and *Karatalaratna* as well. As for Chapter Five of MHK/TJ, see also especially verses V 16, 43-44, 91-94, 97-98, 101-102, 111-112.

with the perception of a [nonexistent] second moon.”¹

We reply :

If you argue that a perception of visible forms does not accord with Reality because it contains an image of [nonexistent, external] objects, then the logical reason [in your argument] is mistaken and your thesis also collapses. (15)

‘Mistaken’ (*vyabhicārin*) means ‘contradictory’ (*viruddha*). A [veridical] perception of visible forms never occurs unless the image of the perceived object appears in the mind.² But you deny the veracity [of all perceptions of external objects] by inferring that [any cognition in which] images of [external] objects appear is not veridical. Hence, [your logical reason] is contradictory because the reality of the subject of your thesis (*dharmin*) is not properly established.³

The thesis (*pratijñā*) of your inference is : “A perception of visible forms does not accord with reality.” But how could a [veridical] perception of visible forms not be

¹ The Yogācāra admits that an ordinary visual perception is indeed free from the conceptual grasping of the real existence of its object and of itself as the apprehender of that object. It is nevertheless a false (*abhūta*) cognition, because images of nonexistent external objects appear in it. In contrast, the nonconceptual awareness of Reality is not only free from the conceptual grasping of nonexistent external objects but also from the images of nonexistent external objects.

² Literally : “A [veridical] perception of visible forms has no substance or reality (*ngo bo nyid*) apart from the appearance of the image of the perceived object [in the mind].”

³ This paragraph explains why the logical reason in the Yogācāra inference is mistaken. As far as the conventional truth (*samvṛtisatya*) is concerned, Bhāvaviveka follows the Sautrāntika theory of perception. According to that theory, a veridical perception occurs only when the image of the perceived object appears in the mind. Hence, the reality or substance (*ngo bo nyid*) of a veridical visual perception is “appearance in the mind of the image of the external object by which that perception is produced.” The logical reason in the Yogācāra inference assumes however that all the cognitions which contain an image of external objects are false because external objects do not exist. And that logical reason is in contradiction with the subject of the proposition (“perception of visible forms”), because it excludes the reality or substance (*ngo bo nyid*) of visual perception which consists in “having the image which is produced by and agrees with the perceived external object.” By assuming that external objects do not exist and that all cognitions in which images of external objects appear are consequently not in accordance with reality, the Yogācāra simply denies the reality of valid visual perceptions. The first of the three rules of the logical reason, which stipulates that the logical reason should be a property of a real subject, is thus violated.

One could also say that the inference of the Yogācāra is mistaken because it is tautological. It simply says : “All the perceptions of visible forms are false, because all the cognitions which contain an image of external objects are false [given the fact that external objects do not exist].” Bhāvaviveka’s rejoinder in MHK V.15 is explained in that sense by the Ge-luk scholar Jang-gya (1717-1786): “...it is not a correct reason because the subject—an awareness [apprehending] forms—and the reason—a perceiver of objects—are not different because when the meaning of the reason is established, the entity of the subject is already established as false [because the establishment of the subject must be separate from the establishment of the reason] .” (see D. S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, Snow Lions Publications, Ithaca, New York, 1987, p. 306). Correct reasoning requires that the logical reason is a genuine predicate of the subject of the thesis and does not permit that the subject and the reason are identical. If the identity of subject and reason were allowed, Bhāvaviveka could simply invert the ar-

in accordance with [conventional] reality? As a matter of fact, your thesis "visual perception is not in accordance with reality" is contradicted by inference (*anumāna*) because it can be refuted in virtue of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), scripture (*āgama*) and the general opinion (*lokaprasiddha*) according to which any [veridical] perception of visible forms is certainly in accordance with reality.¹

Your statement "The seers of Reality see the perfectly established nature [of the mind]"² is also wrong for the following reason:

If the enlightened mind of the Teacher perceives an inherent nature, it will perceive a definite entity. It will then also have an object and will consequently not be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of Reality]. (16)

That inexpressible nature, which [according to you] is the object to be realized personally (*pratisvasamvedya*) by the Tathāgata and which you call 'the perfectly established nature [of the mind]' (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*), must be something that exists. Accordingly, if the enlightened knowledge of the Teacher-Tathāgata perceives that nature, it will apprehend a definite entity (*savikalpa*).³ But it is stated [in scripture] that an enlightened mind does not apprehend anything. Further, if the enlightened mind takes that [nature] as its object, it will also have an object (*sāmbhāva*) and will consequently not be without object. But it is stated [in scripture] that the enlightened mind has no object. And if the enlightened mind identifies that same object as 'absence of the [imagined] nature', it will also not be [the true] non-objectifying awareness [of Reality].

Likewise, regarding your thesis that "The three [samsaric] realms are mind only

gument and say. "[Conventionally speaking], a veridical visual perception accords with reality, because the image of the perceived object appears in it"

¹ This paragraph explains why the thesis is mistaken. The Yogācāra thesis can be refuted by the following inference. "A [veridical] perception of visible forms is in accordance with reality, because the contrary assertion violates direct perception, scripture and the general opinion." Or, the Yogācāra thesis is mistaken (*pakṣābhāsa*), because it is contradicted by direct perception and the general consensus (see *Nyāyamukha*, T. vol 32, 1a15-21, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2).

For Bhāvaviveka, any perception which has the image of the object that produced it, is in accordance with conventional reality. Following the Sautrāntika theory of knowledge, Bhāvaviveka argues that the existence of such an object can be established by an inference which reasons from the occurrence of an effect to the existence of its cause. The presence of the image of an external object in the mind at a particular time and place cannot be explained unless the external object to which that image corresponds actually exists outside the mind and has acted as the producing cause of that particular image (see MHK V.59). The thesis of such an inference is valid because it is not contradicted by direct perception, scripture and the general consensus. As for scripture, Bhāvaviveka must have the following statement in mind. "Visual perception originates in dependence on the visual organ and the presence of visible forms." (Quoted in the commentary to verse 17 below)

² See verse V.5cd.

³ That is, as a perception of a definite entity, it will necessarily be accompanied by *svabhāvavikalpa* (see note 6, p 96).

(*cittamātram*). Objects outside the mind (*bāhyārtha*) do not exist.” :

It is also not correct that there is no perception of visible forms and so forth as a result of perceiving [everything as] phenomena appearing only in the mind.¹

That thesis is refuted because it conflicts with the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine and with common sense. (17)

[That thesis] is refuted by reason of the accepted [Buddhist] doctrine because it contradicts the following teaching from scripture: ”Visual cognition originates in dependence on the visual sense organ and the [presence] of visible forms.”² It is also refuted by common sense, because people in general agree that visual cognitions and so forth do not originate when objects such as visible forms and so forth are not present [outside the mind].³

At this point [the Yogācārins] object: ”[Perceptual] cognitions originate even when [external] objects such as visible forms and so forth are absent, because the images of such objects appear in the mind [even when these objects are absent], as is for example the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream.”⁴

To refute this, we say:

It is also not correct to argue as follows: ”There is perception of visible forms and so forth in the absence of [external] objects, because images [of visible forms and so forth] appear in the mind [even when external objects are absent], as is the case when we perceive visible forms and so forth in a dream.” (18)

This inference of our opponents is not correct. Why not?

[Your inference] lacks a correct example, because consciousness in a dream and so forth apprehends [real] phenomena. Moreover, you mistakenly negate [the existence of] objects [outside the mind]. (19)

¹ See verse V.4ab.

² *Samyukta* 9, 6 (quoted in AK IX, p. 241).

³ See note 1, p. 98. The thesis is mistaken because it contradicts another accepted Buddhist tenet and the general consensus. Bhāvaviveka here challenges the Yogācāra to come up with valid arguments to prove the ’mind only’ tenet because that tenet is manifestly in conflict with Buddhist doctrine and common sense. In PP also, Bhāvaviveka points out that the nonexistence of external objects is not evidenced by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and should therefore be established by scriptural arguments (*āgama*) and inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) (see Eckel, p. 61).

⁴ The argument from dream consciousness is found in MS (T. vol. 31, 138a20-25) and ViK 15. The closest parallel to the present argument is ViK 1, except that the mistaken perceptions of a ’tāmirika’ are there used as the example instead of dream consciousness: ”This [entire triple world] is merely an appearance in the mind, because images of non-present objects appear [in the mind], as is the case when someone who suffers from cataract sees [non-present] slings of hair and so forth.” (*vijñapti-mātram evedam asadāthāvabhāsanāt/yadvat tāmirikasya asatkeṣaṇḍrakādīdarśanam//*)

A similar argument is introduced and refuted in PP (see Eckel, p. 61).

It is not so that visible forms and the like are not perceived in a dream. In fact, they are perceived by the cognitive eye (*jñānacakṣus*)¹ which has been permeated (*paribhāvita*) from time immemorial by the impressions (*vāsanā*) of apprehended [external] objects (*grāhya*) and [their corresponding] perceptual cognitions (*grāhaka*). Dream consciousness and the like do therefore have a [real] object (*sāmbhava*). What is seen [heard, smelt, etc.] in a dream is a reappearance (*abhidhāna*) [of the objects] that have previously been perceived [heard, smelt, etc.] [during waking life]. Dream cognitions are therefore similar to recollections (*smṛti*) and the like.

Even in the dreams of people who are blind from birth and whose power of vision is entirely impaired, many kinds of visible forms —colors as well as shapes— appear by the power of the impressions (*vāsanā*) of what was perceived by them in their previous lives. Thus, even the [dream] consciousness of persons who are blind from birth is not without object. This accords with the following words from scripture: "Protector of Virtue (Bhadrapāla), in his dreams a person who is blind from birth perceives these visible forms with his cognitive eye and not with his fleshy eyes." Thus, because [in dreams] the cognitive eye perceives phenomena (*dharma*), even dream consciousness and the like do have an object [that exists separately from the mind]. Hence, your argument (*sādhana*) is defective because it lacks a correct example.² And since

¹ The cognitive eye is the mental organ (*manas*). It acts as the support (*āśraya*) of mental perceptions (*manovijñāna*) which have mental phenomena (*dharma*) as their object. See Yamaguchi, p 231.

² Bhāvaviveka here argues that, from the point of view of the *conventional truth*, the perception of visible forms in a dream is a mental cognition which has a real mental object (*dharma*) and is only possible as a recollection of previous perceptions of real external objects in the waking world. Bhāvaviveka thus uses the dream simile to show that, conventionally speaking, both consciousness and its object are real entities, each being a product of its respective causes and each having a dependently originated own-being (*paratantrasvabhāva*). In PP (see Eckel, p 62), he refutes the same argument from the point of view of *both* truths. First, if the Yogācāra reasons about what is ultimately the case (*paramārthataḥ*), the example of dream consciousness is not established, because dream consciousness - or any consciousness for that matter - ultimately does not originate from itself, from others, etc. And if the Yogācāra reasons conventionally, his 'mind only' thesis conflicts with the common-sense view (*prasiddhabādhā*) that perceptual cognitions originate in dependence on conditions which are not of the nature of mind such as external objects and sense organs.

People with normally functioning sense organs perceive colors, shapes, sounds and so forth while they are awake. According to Bhāvaviveka, when such people perceive images of external objects in their dreams, they perceive real mental phenomena (*dharma*). These phenomena have an existence of their own because they originate from the impressions (*vāsanā*) produced by the perceptions that occurred during waking life. They are replicas of previously perceived objects. As real entities, they act as the producing object-condition of the mental cognition that cognizes them. Even the dream consciousness of people who are blind from birth perceives images of colors and the like. Although blind people cannot perceive colors while they are awake during their *present* existence, their stream of consciousness has retained the impressions of the visual perceptions that occurred during their *previous* existence(s) when their visual sense organ was functioning normally. Hence, the example of dream consciousness is no evidence for the nonexistence of objects outside the mind. On the contrary,

you deny the existence of [external] objects such as visible form and so forth, you also mistakenly negate (*apavāda*) the existence of the objects (*viṣaya*) [of perceptual cognitions].¹

You might argue as follows : "Consciousness itself originates as the [simultane-

the appearance of images of colors and shapes in dream consciousness is based on recollection and cannot be explained unless real external objects have been perceived during waking life either in this existence or in a previous existence.

Sthiramati discusses the same problem in MVT 25.20-26.18 (cf. Yamaguchi, pp. 231-232). He introduces and refutes three objections against the Yogācāra argument that waking consciousness is similar to dream consciousness in that it originates without a real external object. The third objection (26.8-10) says that the dream consciousness of people with normal eyesight does have an object, namely the object that has been perceived (*anubhūtārtha*) during their waking life. If the Yogācārin refuses to accept this, he will be unable to explain why the dream consciousness of people who are blind from birth (*jātyandha*) does not perceive colors and shapes. Sthiramati refutes this objection as follows (26.10-18). First, images of colors and shapes appear also in the dream consciousness of persons who are blind from birth. However, since these persons cannot perceive real colors during their waking life, they are not familiar with the linguistic conventions (*saṃketa*). That is to say, they do not know that the images of the colors they perceive in their dreams are conventionally designated as "red", "blue", and so forth. They are therefore unable to communicate their perceptions of colors to other people. This explains why it is mistakenly thought that persons who are blind from birth do not perceive images of colors in their dreams. Second, the opponent's premise that only previously perceived objects are seen during a dream, also applies to the dreams of persons who are blind from birth, because such persons have had perceptions of colors and the like during their previous existence(s). Sthiramati thus uses the same argument as Bhāvaviveka, but he uses it to establish 'mind only' whereas Bhāvaviveka uses it to refute 'mind only'. For Bhāvaviveka, only perceptions in a dream originate from impressions that were produced by perceptions during waking life, whereas all the perceptions during waking life originate from external conditions and not from impressions in the mind. For Sthiramati, all our perceptions originate from impressions in the mind; all these impressions are products of an intra-mental process of transformation, and none of them is the product of previous perceptions of real external objects.

Candrakīrti discusses the 'dream simile' argument in MAV VI. 48-55. On that occasion, he also criticizes Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of the dream simile in MHK V.19. According to Candrakīrti, a Mādhyamika should not refute the 'mind only' tenet by arguing that, conventionally speaking, external objects are as real as consciousness itself. A true Mādhyamika should argue that both consciousness and its object are ultimately unreal. He voices his criticism of Bhāvaviveka as follows: "Somebody [=Bhāvaviveka] reasons as follows: '[Images] of visible forms are present in dream consciousness. They are mental phenomena and are apprehended by a mental cognition (*manovijñāna*). A consciousness without object does therefore not exist anywhere.' This reasoning [is not only inappropriate for a Mādhyamika, but it] is also wrong, because in dream consciousness the three [=object, sense organ, consciousness] do not exist [as self-established entities]. He might say that he affirms [the existence of objects] for the purpose of refuting the doctrine of others [=of the Yogācāra]. In that case, however, the example will be meaningless [for the purpose of refuting the Yogācāra and establishing the Madhyamaka thesis that all things lack inherent existence]. Why? Because you cannot show that the entities [of the waking world] are unreal (*alīka, mṛṣā*) by means of an example [=dream consciousness] of which [you assume] the object to be real." (Commentary on MA VI.51cd-52a in MABh 143. 5 -13, D. Ha 265a3-5)

¹ This is an epistemological objection. How can perceptual cognition originate without object? For the Madhyamaka, epistemological questions deal with conventional truths, in casu the origination of perceptual cognition. Bhāvaviveka's point is that the 'mind only' tenet cannot account for the origination of perceptual cognitions because it denies the conventional truth that perceptual cognitions arise only when external objects are present.

ous] appearance of two things (*dvayābhāsa*), namely the appearance of [consciousness] itself (*svābhāsa*) [as an apprehender of objects] and the appearance of an image of an [external] object (*viśayābhāsa*) due to an [internal] causal process (*pariṇāma*) by which consciousness assumes the form (*ākāra*) of an external object (*bāhyaviśaya*). Just this latter appearance is the object (*viśaya*) of consciousness as self-appearance.”¹

¹ The Yogācāra replies to Bhāvaviveka’s objection that the ‘mind only’ tenet cannot explain how perceptual cognitions originate. Bhāvaviveka adheres to the Sautrāntika position that we never perceive external objects directly. What we perceive directly are only images of external objects (see note 1, p. 98). The Yogācāra says the same. But the Yogācāra does not accept that the appearance of these images in the mind is caused by the presence of real objects outside the mind. For the Yogācāra, both the perceiving consciousness and the images it perceives originate simultaneously as the outcome of a strictly internal causal process (*viññānapariṇāma*, see TrK 1) by which their respective seeds in the store-consciousness obtain causal efficiency. Hence, for the Yogācāra, perceptual cognitions do have an object, but their objects are all of the nature of mind.

The terms *svābhāsa* and *viśayābhāsa* are most probably borrowed from Dignāga’s *Pramānasamuccaya* [PS] I.9-10 (see M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 28-29). But Dignāga’s theory of knowledge in PS differs in three important respects from the theory which Bhāvaviveka introduces here. First, Dignāga does not adhere to the ‘mind only’ tenet in PS. Second, he does not teach that the subjective and objective aspects of consciousness are two separate entities, each being produced by their own causes (see PS I.10). Third, he distinguishes a third aspect of consciousness, namely that of self-awareness (*svasamvitti*). Strictly speaking, only Dharmapāla’s theory of consciousness, as explained in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, seems to fit with the content of MHK/TJ 20ab.

S. Yamaguchi (pp. 237-238) mentions MVK/MVBh/MVT as another possible text source of the theory presented here. According to these texts, consciousness is intrinsically free from the subject-object (*grāhaka, grāhya*) duality. Nevertheless, as long as it is affected by defilements and cognitive obstructions (*klesajñeyāvaraṇa*), consciousness originates as a dualistic subject-object appearance (*grāhyagrāhakapratibhāsa*). Perceptual cognition then not only has an image of external objects (*grāhyapratibhāsa = grāhyākāra = arthasattvapratibhāsa*), but it simultaneously manifests itself as the perceiver of such an image (*grāhakapratibhāsa = grāhākākāra = ātmavijñaptipratibhāsa*) (MVK I 3, see also MSA XI.40).

It is important to note that, at least prior to Dignāga, the doctrine of consciousness as a dual appearance was taught as a purely soteriological doctrine and was not concerned with epistemological issues. The purpose of the doctrine was not to explain how perceptual cognitions originate, what their object is, how their object is cognized, and so forth. The purpose was to explain what defilement (*samklēśa*) is, how it originates and how it can be eliminated. Sthiramati, in particular, emphasizes the point that any instance of defiled consciousness (*abhūtaparikalpa*) necessarily (*avāśyam*, MVT 26.1-2) originates as the appearance of an unreal subject-object duality, because one could otherwise not explain why and how people mistake the unreal for real and thus become attached to the imagined nature of the self (*ātman*) and other things (*dharma*). If consciousness did not originate as the appearance of unreal duality, the origination of *samklēśa* simply could not be explained. The following passages from Sthiramati’s MVT illustrate this point:

(1) The nature of defiled consciousness (*viññānasvabhāva*) consists in being a false consciousness (*abhūtaparikalpa*), that is, a consciousness which produces images of unreal objects and simultaneously manifests itself as the apprehender of these images. (MVT 17.7-8)

(2) Because external objects do not exist, consciousness itself does not exist as the knower (*viññātṛ*) of such objects. But consciousness does exist as the real cause and locus both of the appearance of images of unreal objects and of the appearance of itself as the unreal apprehender of such objects. This is because the nature of defiled consciousness (*viññānasvabhāva*) consists in ‘appearance of unreal subject-object duality’ (MVT 20.1-5)

We rejoin :

If you say that the images of [external] objects [in the mind] are the object apprehended by the mind, we ask you what other nature (*ātman*) the mind could have in addition to [just] being the appearance [of images] of [external] objects? (20)

To us [Mādhyamikas] it is evident that, [conventionally speaking], the nature (*svabhāva*) of consciousness consists in its origination as the appearance of [images of] objects such as visible forms and so forth. But except for the appearance of object-images, we do not see any other appearance [of consciousness] as itself (*svābhāsa*). If there exists a second nature of consciousness, other than the appearance of object-images, you should tell us what it is.¹

To show [what that second nature is], you will perhaps argue as follows.² Consciousness has two natures: it is the appearance of itself (*svābhāsa*) and the appearance of object-images (*viśayābhāsa*). This is because consciousness not only continues to exist with its own nature but also originates [in various ways] as resembling other [things] (*anyanibha*), just like a crystal jewel (*sphaṭika*). A crystal jewel is by nature

(3) The appearance of the unreal subject-object duality in consciousness is the basis or cause (*kāraṇa*, *nibandhana*) of the mistaken identification (*niyama*) or designation (*abhilapanam*) of and attachment to (*abhiniveśa*) the imagined existence of objects and of itself as the selfsame apprehender/owner of such objects. (MVT 17.4-5, 17.10-11, 26.1-2, 218.18-20).

¹ According to Bhāvaviveka, the nature (*svabhāva*) of consciousness, or the specific quality in virtue of which something is a consciousness as distinguished from non-conscious things, is that it originates as an entity which possesses an image or form of an object (*viśayābhāsa*). 'To know an object' means 'to have an image of that object'. But in addition to that, consciousness does not have any 'second' nature in virtue of which it would also manifest itself (*svābhāsa*) as the apprehending subject of that object-image.

Sthiramati apparently agrees with Bhāvaviveka on the nature of consciousness: "In addition to its origination as the possessor of an image of an object, consciousness performs no other act [of knowledge] in virtue of which it would apprehend that object ..." (MVT 24.14-16: *na ca viśayapratibhāsātmanotpattiṃ muktvā vijñānasya anyā kriyā 'sti, yām kriyāṃ kurvat vijñānaṃ viśayam ālabate*....). The agreement is however only apparent. True, Sthiramati says that consciousness does not really apprehend its object-images. But he also says that consciousness manifests itself (*svābhāsa*) as if it were the apprehender of its object-images (see note 1, p. 102).

² In the verses that follow, Bhāvaviveka discusses and refutes four theories of consciousness as a dual appearance. The order of discussion is as follows.

Theory 1: Consciousness, although intrinsically formless (*nirākāra* = *svābhāsa*), assumes the form of different objects (*viśayābhāsa*) (21ab). Refutation of this theory (21cd-22ab).

Theory 2: Consciousness is both the capacity (*śakti* = *svābhāsa*) to produce object-images and the actual appearance of object-images (*viśayābhāsa*) (22cd).

Theory 3: Consciousness simultaneously manifests both itself (*bimba* = *svābhāsa*) and an image produced by itself (*pratibimba* = *viśayābhāsa*) (23).

Theory 4: Consciousness is both the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa* = *svābhāsa*) and the constituted knowledge itself (*pramāṇaphala* = *viśayābhāsa*). Introduced in 24ab and refuted in 24cd-26.

self-transparent (*svapṛakāśa*) [and hence intrinsically colorless], but it can assume the appearance of a blue thing and so forth, depending on the different [colors of the] things that are placed near to it. Similarly, the mind, while continuing to be the appearance of itself (*svābhāsa*), also becomes an object-appearance (*viśayābhāsa*) by assuming the form (*ākāra*) of [various] objects.¹

[We reply:] If you argue like that, your example is not similar to the proposition you want to prove (*sādhya*). Why not?

It is wrong to assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it originates as similar to other things, just like a crystal. The moment at which [a crystal] originates as a colored thing because some colored object is placed near to it, is in fact not the [same as the previous] moment of that crystal. (21)

It is true that a crystal jewel, because of the special property of the object that is placed near to it, such as a blue object and so forth, loses its own transparent nature and changes into a blue thing and so forth. But it is not the case that the previous moment of the transparent crystal changes into a blue thing, because that previous moment has then already ceased to exist.

¹ According to Yamaguchi (p. 241), this theory is akin to Dignāga's theory of the three aspects of consciousness in PS. Yamaguchi is wrong. The theory introduced here is in fact just the opposite of Dignāga's theory. Dignāga holds that consciousness is intrinsically *sākāra* (= *viśayābhāsa*). The present theory however says that consciousness is intrinsically transparent, similar to a crystal, and hence intrinsically free from object-images (*nirākāra*). Consciousness becomes an object-appearance as long as it is affected by defilements and cognitive obstructions, but all that while its intrinsically pure nature remains unaffected by these extrinsic appearances. This theory is thus close to the theory of the intrinsically pure but adventitiously defiled nature of consciousness, as taught in MVK, MSAL and DDV. Bhāvaviveka refutes this theory in detail in MHK V 88-91.

Bhāvaviveka's most likely text source is the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* where the comparison of the crystal is used to explain the relationship between the three natures (SNS, Lamotte VI. 8-9, pp. 61-62; T. vol 16, 693b2-20). Just as a crystal appears as if it were a sapphire, a ruby or an emerald, depending on whether the object it comes in contact with is blue, red or green, just so the dependent nature of things appears as if it were an independently established nature. And just as a crystal retains its intrinsically transparent nature in spite of its colored appearance, just so the dependent nature is intrinsically empty of inherent existence in spite of the fact that it appears not to be empty of it.

When read in the light of the above passage from SNS, the present theory says that consciousness is intrinsically empty of object-images (*nirākāra* = *svābhāsa*) but nevertheless becomes the locus where object-images appear (*sākāra* = *viśayābhāsa*) as long as the conditions of this false appearance are present.

The comparison with a crystal is also used in a different context by Sthiramati in his commentary on MVK V.15cd (MVT 217.20-218 1) (cf. Yamaguchi, p. 242). Sthiramati says that false consciousness (*abhūtaparikalpa*) originates as a subject-object appearance (*grāhyagrāhakākāra*), but not in the same manner as a crystal which assumes a colored appearance when a colored object is placed near to it. The purport of Sthiramati's statement is the following. Unlike a crystal which becomes colored by an object existing in its own right apart from the crystal, the subject-object appearance of consciousness is not caused by external objects but is the result of internal causes (*bija*) present in consciousness itself.

It is a mistake to think 'the same transparent crystal is still there' with respect to a different thing that originates after that [crystal as a transparent thing] has already ceased to exist. (22ab)

It is a mistake to think that the [same transparent] crystal is [still] there when, due to the special property of an object that is placed nearby, something having the nature of blue and the like originates after that moment of the transparent crystal has ceased to exist.¹

The two natures [of consciousness, asserted by you,] do not exist for the following reason [also]. When nothing is placed nearby the crystal, only the former [transparent] nature of the crystal appears. But, whereas the form (*ākāra*) of the [transparent] crystal can be observed [even] when nothing is placed nearby, one can never observe the form of [consciousness as a] knower (*jñānākāra*) unaccompanied by the form of a known object (*jñeyākāra*). And it is against reason to think that, although its nature as a self-appearance (*svābhāsa*) is [never] experienced [in isolation from an object-appearance], consciousness could [at some time exist as a mere self-appearance and subsequently] come to exist as an object-appearance (*viśayābhāsa*) by assuming the appearance of a known object (*ālambanābhāsa*) after the form of that object (*viśayākāra*) has been approached.²

¹ The point of Bhāvaviveka's refutation is as follows. The instant at which a crystal turns blue because of the presence of a blue object in its vicinity, is different from the preceding instant at which the crystal existed as a colorless, transparent entity. Similarly, the instant at which consciousness manifests only itself (*svābhāsa*) and the instant at which it contains the image of an object (*viśayābhāsa*) are two different instants of consciousness and are therefore two different entities. Consequently, one cannot say that one instant of consciousness has the twofold nature of *svābhāsa* and *viśayābhāsa*. Bhāvaviveka thus substantiates his own position that the nature of consciousness consists only in 'having images of objects' (*viśayābhāsa*). Apart from that, consciousness does not have any second nature in virtue of which it would manifest itself (*svābhāsa*).

² After having excluded the possibility that consciousness could at one and the same instant have the twofold nature of appearing as itself and appearing as an object, Bhāvaviveka now considers whether such is possible at two consecutive instants. As for a crystal, we can observe it as transparent at one instant and as colored at the next instant. But consciousness, in as far as it is the knower of something and hence excluding the non-objectifying awareness of Reality, can never be an objectless knower at one instant and subsequently apprehend an object at the next instant. In other words, consciousness is always object-appearance (*viśayābhāsa* = *sākāra*) and that is its only nature according to Bhāvaviveka.

Jang-gya (see D. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika*, p. 311) has interpreted the present passage as a refutation of self-awareness (*svasamvitti*). That, however, does not seem to be the true purport of the text. The text says that a consciousness without object-images is never experienced, but it does not specify whether such a consciousness is never experienced by another consciousness or by that consciousness itself. The present passage could be interpreted as an explicit denial of self-awareness only if it explicitly stated that consciousness itself cannot experience or apprehend itself as an objectless knower. Moreover, the standard theory of self-awareness, as developed by Dignāga, defines self-awareness as the capacity of consciousness to experience not only itself as a knower but also its known object!

[Further], although it is true that a crystal jewel obtains the quality of appearing as a colored thing when it is placed near a colored object, it is not the case that the [nature of the] crystal jewel actually changes into the nature of the nearby placed object, nor does the nature of the nearby placed object change into the nature of the crystal jewel. If that were the case, it would absurdly follow that the crystal jewel is a colored object or that the colored object is identical with the crystal jewel. Similarly, although a consciousness originates as the appearance of a nearby object (*visayābhāsa*) when the [other necessary] conditions [of perception] are present, that consciousness in no way changes into the nature of a visible object and so forth, nor does the nature of the visible object change into the nature of consciousness. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that earth and so forth are sentient, or that the mind is insentient like earth and so forth. [Moreover,] to say that one and the same consciousness is both the apprehended object (*grāhya*) and the apprehending subject (*grāhaka*), is to state the contradiction of 'a thing acting on itself' (*svātmani kriyāvirodha*). It is therefore not right that consciousness is a twofold appearance just like a crystal.¹

At this point, the Yogācāra objects as follows. [Consciousness as an actual] object-appearance gradually provides the stream of consciousness with the capacity (*śakti*) for producing an effect similar to itself, and thus continues to exist for some time as the capacity of such a [future] object-appearance. At a [later] time, when that capacity has fully matured, consciousness actually originates as having the form (*ākāra*) of that object-appearance. Now, one cannot say that consciousness is either identical with or different from both the capacity and the [actuality of] object-appearances. One and the same consciousness is therefore a twofold appearance [in that it appears both] as the capacity and as the actuality of object-appearances.²

¹ This paragraph again excludes the simultaneous coexistence of two natures in consciousness. The crystal jewel and the colored object are two different things. Similarly, the object apprehended by consciousness cannot have the nature of consciousness, nor can consciousness ever exist in the mode of an object. Bhāvaviveka adheres to the Sautrāntika position that consciousness and its object are two different things, each having its own nature and existing independently of each other. The nature of consciousness is to apprehend objects. That is, its nature is to originate as object-appearance. When there is no object-appearance, there is no consciousness, as is the case during dreamless sleep or non-objectifying awareness of Reality.

² This is the second theory of consciousness as a twofold appearance. The commentator in TJ introduces it as a Yogācāra reply to the objection that the theory of consciousness as a dual appearance implies the error of consciousness being simultaneously subject and object and thus 'acting on itself' (*svātmani kriyā*). That objection is obviously based on the premise that the object of consciousness, as one of the producing causes of consciousness, should exist prior to the consciousness it produces. The Yogācāra reply focuses on this prior-posterior relationship between the object of consciousness as a cause and consciousness itself as its effect.

We reply :

[Consciousness] does not exist as a twofold appearance, because the capacity is not different [from consciousness itself], just as the nature (*ātman*) of being an object-appearance [is not different from consciousness itself]. (22cd)

”Consciousness is not a twofold appearance” is the thesis (*pakṣa*) [of our inference]. ”Because the capacity [of an object-appearance] is not different [from consciousness]” is the reason (*hetu*). ”Just as the nature of [actually] being an object-appearance [is not different from consciousness itself]” is the example (*dyṣtānta*). You assert that consciousness as an appearance of itself (*svābhāsa*) is different [from consciousness as an object-appearance]. However, when a consciousness originates, it originates as an object-appearance only, because it appears in various ways [in accordance with] the form (*ākāra*) of its object, and because [such] an object-appearance is not erroneous (*avyabhicārin*).¹ And when that consciousness [as object-appearance] perishes, it perishes after having deposited in the stream of consciousness a capacity or power to produce a [new] consciousness which will be an object-appearance only. When that capa-

As S. Yamaguchi (p. 250) has pointed out, the present theory is found in Dignāga’s *Ālambanaparīkṣā*. After having demonstrated that the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of a perceptual cognition is the object-image appearing in consciousness (AP, verse 6), Dignāga considers the following objection: ”How can the image in consciousness, while being a part of consciousness and arising simultaneously with it, be the object-condition of consciousness?” Dignāga gives the following two answers.

First, one can say that a cause and its effect are simultaneous in the sense that they always occur together. Thus, although the object-image arises simultaneously with its effect (that is, with the perceptual cognition it produces), one can say that it is one of the causes of perceptual cognition because perceptual cognition never originates unless an object-image is present (AP, verse 7 a).

Second, one can also say that the object-image and its effect (=the perceptual cognition it produces) do not exist simultaneously but successively (*kramena*, AP verse 7 b). This theory, followed by Dignāga himself, corresponds exactly to the second theory considered here. Dignāga explains it as follows. The object-image (*arthāvabhāsa = viśayābhāsa*) appearing in a present perceptual cognition deposits a capacity (*nuspa*, *śakti*) in the stream of consciousness from which another perceptual cognition, having a similar object-image, will arise later. The object-image of the initial perceptual cognition is therefore the object-condition —via the capacity it has deposited in the store-consciousness — of a similar perceptual cognition arising at a later time.

In the concluding verses of AP (vv. 7 cd- 8), Dignāga identifies the capacities, from which the different perceptual cognitions actually originate, with the sense organs (*indriya*). These capacities and the object-images of actual perceptual cognitions mutually cause each other. Dignāga adds that the capacities and the object-images can be regarded either as different from consciousness or as not different from consciousness.

In short, the second theory says that consciousness is a twofold appearance because it exists both as a capacity (*śakti = svābhāsa*) of perceptual cognition and as an actualized perceptual cognition in which object-images appear (*viśayābhāsa*).

¹ For Bhāvaviveka, the conventional truth is that external objects exist and that any perception in which an image of an external object appears is non-erroneous. Error occurs when that image is conceptually and verbally misidentified, as is the case when we imagine to see a snake when the image of a rope actually appears in our consciousness. See also MHK V.15 above.

city has fully matured, a [new] consciousness which is only an object-appearance originates. That is all there is to it. A capacity from which consciousness could originate as an appearance of itself is never deposited [in the stream of consciousness]. It is therefore useless to imagine an additional aspect of self-appearance in a consciousness which is only an object-appearance.

The Yogācāra might again object as follows. Consciousness is a twofold appearance because [the object-appearance] originates together with and in resemblance to [the self-appearance], as is the case with an original object (*bimba*) and its reflected image (*pratibimba*). When something has the natural tendency (*śīla*) to originate together [with something else], then it originates together with it; that is to say, it originates simultaneously. And when something has the natural tendency to originate together with and in resemblance to [something else], then it originates as similar to it. Thus, it originates together with and in resemblance to [another thing], as is for example the case when a reflected image originates together with and in resemblance to an original object. In the case of consciousness, its appearance as itself (*svābhāsa*) is comparable with an original object, and its appearance as object (*viśayābhāsa*) is comparable with the reflected image [of an original object].¹

We reply :

We do not assent to [your argument that] "Consciousness is both appearance of itself and appearance as another, because [the latter] occurs together with and in resemblance [to the former], as is the case with a reflected image [and an original object]." Consciousness is therefore not a twofold appearance. (23)

Even if it were granted that [consciousness as an object-appearance] occurs together

¹ Whereas theories 1 and 2 explain the subject-aspect and object-aspect of consciousness as consecutive instants of consciousness, this third theory says that these two aspects arise simultaneously. Just as an object (*bimba*) in front of a mirror simultaneously manifests both itself and a mirrored image of itself (*pratibimba*), just so consciousness manifests itself as a knower (*svābhāsa*) and simultaneously produces an image of the known object (*viśayābhāsa*).

This theory seems to be saying that the object-image produced by consciousness is an off-print or copy of consciousness itself. It is not clear from which Yogācāra text source Bhāvaviveka has borrowed this third theory. The *bimba/pratibimba* simile is used in the *vijñaptimātra* section of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (SNS, T. vol. 16, 698a27-b13, Lamotte, Tib. ed., pp. 90-91), but the context in which it is used there is not that of the simultaneousness of the two aspects of consciousness. The simultaneous origination of the two aspects of consciousness is taught explicitly in AP (verse 7 a, see note 2, p. 106-107) and in Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* (T. vol. 31, 401c5-7), but the *bimba/pratibimba* simile is not used in either of these texts. The most likely source of this third theory is perhaps Dharmapāla's theory that the object-images we perceive in our perceptual cognitions are copies of the original images of the 'objective' world which are constantly but only dimly perceived by our store-consciousness (see Siddhi, p. 445 and 447, T. vol. 31, 40c14-21, 27ff.).

with and in resemblance to [consciousness as an appearance of itself], consciousness would still be unestablished as a twofold appearance. This is because a reflected image is not a real entity (*avastu*) and because consequently also the perception of such a non-entity is erroneous.¹

[The Yogācārins] object [again]: "Consciousness is certainly a twofold appearance because it is [both] the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resultant knowledge (*pramāṇaphalam*) itself. The instrument of knowledge is that through which [new, certain knowledge] is acquired (*anumā*); this is consciousness as the appearance of itself (*svābhāsa*). The resultant knowledge is the distinct apprehension of an object by consciousness; this is [consciousness as] an object-appearance (*viṣayābhāsa*). It is difficult to account for [both] the instrument of knowledge and the resultant knowledge if consciousness were merely an object-appearance."²

We reply :

If you assert that [consciousness] is a twofold appearance because it exists [both] as the instrument of knowledge and as the resultant knowledge itself, [we reply that] this theory also is unacceptable because [these two] are established even if it is otherwise. (24)

The instrument of knowledge and the resultant knowledge are established even if it is otherwise, that is, even if [consciousness] is not a twofold appearance. Hence, this theory also is unacceptable. If you ask us how the instrument of knowledge and the resul-

¹ The meaning of Bhāvaviveka's refutation here is not clear and is perhaps not to the point. The Yogācāra would in fact agree that object-images are not images of real objects outside the mind and that all our perceptual cognitions are consequently illusions (*bhrānti*, 'khrul pa).

² According to Dignāga (PS/PSV I. 8cd and I. 9cd ; M. Hattori, *Dignāga. On Perception*, pp. 28-31), the instrument of knowledge and the resultant or constituted knowledge are one and the same entity. On Dignāga's theory, a constituted knowledge is a knowledge which possesses the image of an object. It is knowledge of this or that particular object, because it possesses the image of this or that particular object. When a consciousness possesses the image of a blue object, this ipso facto means that it perceives a blue object and not a red or yellow object. If 'to know an object' thus means 'to possess the image of that object', it follows that the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) cannot be anything else but the act by means of which consciousness appropriates the image of an object. Accordingly, the consciousness which as a constituted knowledge (*pramāṇaphalam*) possesses the image of an object, is also the instrument of knowledge because it itself has acquired knowledge of that object by appropriating the image of that object. The consciousness in which the image of an object appears is therefore both the constituted knowledge and the instrumental cause of that knowledge.

Dignāga adds however that these two aspects of cognitive consciousness are distinguished for the sake of explanation only. In reality, each instance of a cognitive consciousness is a unitary entity. It does not consist of two independent parts. Since the theory introduced in MHK V. 24ab hypostatizes the *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphalam* aspects into two real parts of cognitive consciousness, it does not correspond to Dignāga's theory in PS/PSV. The most likely target of Bhāvaviveka's critique is therefore again Dharmapāla's theory as set forth in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (cf. p. 102, note 1).

tant knowledge are established when [consciousness exists] otherwise, we say :

The act of apprehending a knowable object is performed by consciousness when it assumes [the form of] an object-appearance at the very moment of its origination. Hence, that [nascent consciousness] is considered to be the instrument of knowledge. (25)

At the very moment of its origination, consciousness assumes the form (*ākāra*) of [consciousness as] an object-appearance and in doing so it makes an object distinctly known. We therefore hold that consciousness at the very moment of its origination is the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

And when that consciousness has originated, [the object] is actually perceived. We therefore hold that [the actual perception of the object] which is thus accomplished, is the resultant knowledge. (26ab)

When that consciousness has originated, the object is perceived. Hence, that which has been produced (*abhinirvṛtta*) by that [nascent consciousness] is the result (*pramāṇaphalam*). We therefore hold that both the instrument of knowledge and the resultant knowledge exist in one and the same consciousness which is an object-appearance [only]. This is similar to the cutting of a tree with an axe: there is the act of cutting the tree into two halves through the downward movement of the axe, and there is [the result consisting in the tree's] having been cut into two halves.¹

[It is the resultant knowledge] because [consciousness] has [then] acquired knowledge of the nondefinable nature [of its object] exactly as it is. (26cd)

A perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣajñāna*) apprehends only the individual characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of its object and is free from conceptualization and recollection.² Thus, by means of a strictly individual and direct awareness (*svasamvedanākāra*)³, it knows the

¹ Bhāvaviveka's position is in short as follows. Cognitive consciousness is object-appearance only. When a cognitive consciousness originates (*jāyamāna*), it appropriates the image of an object and thus acts as the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) (V.25). And when that consciousness has originated, it possesses an object-image, which is to say that it knows an object and is thus a constituted knowledge (*pramāṇaphalam*) (V.26ab). Hence, consciousness as object-appearance (*viśayābhāsavi-jñāna*) only is both the instrument of knowledge and the constituted knowledge itself (V.26cd).

² See p. 96, note 6.

³ For Bhāvaviveka, '*svasamvedana*' does not mean 'self-awareness' in the sense that a cognitive consciousness would be directly aware of its own act of apprehending an image of an object. It rather means that consciousness is the direct and strictly individual (*sva*) awareness of the image of the object itself. Just because consciousness is object-appearance only according to Bhāvaviveka, the appearance of an object-image is itself already the awareness of that object-image. There is no separate act of awareness of an object in addition to the appearance of the image of that object. And consciousness certainly has no awareness of itself as an apprehender of object-images. For Bhāvaviveka's rejection of 'self-awareness', see also MHK V.95

[individual] nature of visible forms and so forth, which cannot be identified as 'blue' and so forth, exactly as such a non-identifiable nature. Hence, both the instrument of knowledge and its result exist in one and the same consciousness which is object-appearance [only]. Since the meaning of the reason [in your argument]¹ is thus not established, your theory of consciousness as a twofold appearance is unfounded.

¹ Reference to the logical reason of the argument in verse 24.