Ignorance of Epistemological Distance: Rhetorical Use of Non-Evidentials in the Work of Frank Kafka

The conceptual metaphor of distance plays a crucial role in current perceptions of the world and humans' various interactions within it. It hardly seems possible to conceptualize space and time, emotional involvement in events, and relationships with other people in terms other than "distance". As a consequence, this primarily spatial concept figures prominently in the verbal expression of these abstract notions, and is thus highly relevant for the analysis of linguistic phenomena. In recent decades, "distance" has been employed as a fruitful tool in different, primarily cognitive and functional, approaches. However, the explanatory power of this notion suffers from certain inconsistencies: On the one hand, very different linguistic phenomena are described in terms of "distance", while, on the other, the notion itself relates to disparate concepts.

By providing a thorough grounding of the metaphor of distance, the present volume makes this notion tangible and thus applicable in various domains of linguistic analysis. The contributions gathered in this volume provide a concise delimitation from neighbouring concepts, and explore the rich potential of this metaphor for the analysis of the semantics, usage conditions and discourse-pragmatic effects of both morpho-syntactic categories and syntactic structures. They also investigate the role of "distance" in understanding mechanisms of linguistic interaction. The languages covered in this volume include, amongst others, languages from the Germanic, Romance and Slavic families, as well as Japanese and Turkish.

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978-1-4438-7261-4
www.cambridgescholars.com
Cover image *Landscape with rainbow*,
oil on canvas by Caspar David Friedrich, 1810

9 781443 872614

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Grounding a Metaphor

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This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-4438-7261-X
ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7261-4

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CHAPTER SEVEN

IGNORANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISTANCE: RHETORICAL USE OF NON-EVIDENTIALS IN THE WORK OF FRANK KAFKA

YOSHINORI NISHIJIMA

Abstract

In a face-to-face communication, it is normal that the speaker utters what he or she thinks, as in (a) 'I think that her abstract will be accepted'. In contrast, it is somewhat odd if the speaker utters what the interlocutor thinks, as in (b) 'You think that her abstract will be accepted'. Utterance (b) is surely grammatical, but it seems to be strange pragmatically because it expresses to the interlocutor's face categorically what he or she thinks by ignoring the personal epistemological distance between the speaker and the hearer. However, it should be possible if utterance (b) is expressed in an interrogative form or with any evidentials as in (c) 'Do you think that her abstract will be accepted?' or (d) 'You seem to think that her abstract will be accepted'. In (c) and (d), evidentiality is considered. In Kafka's novels, however, utterances such as (b) are observed occasionally. They can be called 'seeing-through utterances' because the speaker expresses verbally what he or she sees into the mind of the interlocutor. In the present study, seeing-through utterances in the original German texts are compared with their translations into Japanese, a language with strong evidential constraints. In most of the Japanese translations, various evidential markers are added to the sentences to circumvent the personal restriction in formulating grammatical Japanese sentences. The effect of such translations, however, may alter and weaken the rhetorical effects of the seeing-through utterances presented in the original works. Without any evidential markers, however, the translations would sound unnatural, and the addition of these softening features is to some degree inevitable.

1. Introduction

In general, books on reading minds sell well and sometimes become bestsellers,[1] which suggests that a lot of people are very interested in others' minds. However, it is actually difficult or impossible for common people to know what their interlocutors think, for epistemological distance necessarily exists between speakers and hearers. However, in Kafka's work, a certain character can tell a second character exactly what they are thinking as if the former could see into the mind of the latter, and in that regard, it seems that the epistemological distance between them is ignored or erased. For example, in *The Judgment*, the father said to his son: "You think you have strength enough to come over here and that you're only hanging back of your own accord." (86). In this study, such an utterance is called a 'seeing-through utterance' because the speaker sees through the normal barriers and into the mind of the interlocutor.

The aim of this study is threefold: (1) to analyze 'seeing-through utterances' from several works of Franz Kafka that ignore epistemological distance between the characters; (2) to demonstrate that 'seeing-through utterances' are used rhetorically to display the power and/or empathy of the speaking character towards the interlocutor; and (3) to compare such 'seeing-through utterances' in German with their translations into Japanese, a language with rich expressions of evidentiality, and thereby reveal how they can be translated properly.

The results will shed new light on rhetorical aspects of fictional conversations in the work of Franz Kafka, and address problems associated with translating such utterances in the face of cross-linguistic differences in the treatment of evidentiality.

2. Description of problems

2.1 Personal restriction

In face-to-face communication, the speaker typically states what he or she thinks, as in the Japanese sentence (1):

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[1] For example, Thorsten Havener's *Ich weiß, was du denkst: Das Geheimnis, Gedanken zu lesen* 'I know what you think: the secret to reading minds'. Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2009. The book has been featured in mass-media highlights from TV-programs and newspapers according to the description of 'Amazon.de' (http://www.amazon.de/Ich-wei%C3%9F-was-denkst-Geheimnis/dp/3499625202/ref=tag_stp_s2_edpp_url, accessed November 1, 2014).

(1) watashi-wa watashi-no eigo-ga totemo heta-da to
I.TOP I.GEN English.NOM very poor.COP COMP
omou.
think.PRS
'I think that my English is very poor.'

Sentence (1) is a grammatical sentence in Japanese. However, sentence (2) is ungrammatical:

(2) *anata-wa watashi-no eigo-ga totemo heta-da to
you.TOP I.GEN English.NOM very poor.COP COMP
omou.
think.PRS
'You think that my English is very poor.'

In (1) the subject of the main clause is the speaker of the sentence. In contrast, the subject of sentence (2) is not the speaker of the sentence; the sentence violates 'personal restriction' in Japanese. 'Personal restriction' refers to a constraint on the selection of subjects with main-predicate verbs of thinking, as in (2) above. In general, only the speaker can be the subject of verbs of thinking as main predicates, because the speaker is not omniscient and cannot enter into the mind of the other (Kuroda 1973). The 'other' refers to the interlocutor-addressee here. In this sense, sentence (2) is regarded as ungrammatical.

2.2 Evidentiality

As we have seen in (1) and (2), in Japanese, epistemological distance between the speaker and the hearer is reflected in the formulation of sentences according to personal restriction. However, sentence (3) is considered to be grammatical, although the subject of the sentence is not the speaker but the interlocutor-addressee, as in (2) above. Why should this example be different? Because here, the aspect marker *teiru* (a progressive marker) combined with *omot* (derivation of *omou* 'to think') functions as an evidential marker (Sadanobu and Malchukov 2006). Evidentiality refers to linguistic means or grammatical categories indicating evidence for a statement.

(3) anata-wa watashi-no eigo-ga totemo heta-da to
you.TOP I.NOM English.NOM very poor.COP COMP
omot-teiru.
think.TEIRU.PRS
'You are thinking that my English is very poor.'

Originally, *teiru* is a form of the progressive aspect and functions as an evidential marker in Japanese because the progressive aspect is related to the perspective of objective observation of unfolding evidence (Sadanobu and Malchukov 2006). In this way, a sentence with a second-person subject and a verb of thinking as the main predicate is acceptable as long as the sentence contains such an evidential marker.

2.3 Seeing-through utterances

Unlike Japanese, most European languages like German and English have no personal restriction regarding the subject of sentences with a verb of thinking, cf. (4) and (5):

(4) Ich denke, dass mein Englisch sehr schlecht ist.
I.NOM think.PRS that my English very poor COP.PRS
'I think that my English is very poor.'

(5) Du denkst, dass mein Englisch sehr schlecht ist.
you.NOM think.PRS that my English very poor COP.PRS
'You think that my English is very poor.'

Sentences (4) and (5) in German above have the thinking verb *denken* 'think' as the main predicate verb and are written in the first and second person, respectively. Both sentences are grammatically correct. However, as regards its lack of evidential information, (5) seems to be pragmatically strange since the sentence is uttered by the speaker directly to the hearer, because the speaker expresses the thoughts of the interlocutor-addressee, represented by *Du* 'you', where it is considered that there is epistemological distance between the speaker and the hearer. It sounds strange for the speaker to state directly what the interlocutor-addressee thinks. In this sense, (5) in assertive form is epistemologically odd and therefore 'unspeakable' directly to the hearer without any evidentials, though it is grammatical (cf. Yamaguchi 1989). Evidentials indicate the source of information. If (5) is formulated with the evidential marker *scheinen* 'seem' like (5'), it can be pragmatically accepted because it indicates epistemological distance between the speaker of (5') and the interlocutor-addressee represented by *Du* 'you'.

(5') Du scheinst zu denken, dass mein English sehr schlecht ist.

However, such utterances can be observed in fictional dialogues between characters in the work of Franz Kafka. One such utterance can be cited from a scene in Kafka's *Das Urteil* 'The Judgment':[2]

(6) Du denkst, du hast noch die Kraft, hierher
you.NOM think.PRS, you.NOM have.PRS still the power, here
zu kommen und hältst dich bloß zurück, weil du
to come and withhold yourself only back, because you.NOM
so willst. (*Das Urteil*, 58)
so want.PRS
'You think you still have the power to come here and withhold yourself only because you want to do so.' (translation Y.N.)

(6') You think you have strength enough to come over here and that you're only hanging back of your own accord. (*The Judgment* [transl.], 86)[3]

The sentence in (6) is uttered by the father to his son Georg directly to show the power or dominance of the former (father) over the latter (son) by suggesting that the father is in a position to see into the Georg's mind. Until that scene, the father is depicted as a weaker person than his son. Then, suddenly, he becomes stronger than his son and seems to become stronger actually by uttering the expression indicating that he can see into the mind of his son. It is possible that the utterance is intentionally used in this situation to display the change in the power relationship between the father and the son. If so, then it can be said that the change in the power relationship between both characters is correlated with the use of the utterance because it expresses the power of the father over his son.

As seen in the example above, the speaker states directly and categorically to the interlocutor-addressee what the latter thinks. In order to make such an utterance valid, it is necessary to be able to see into the mind of the interlocutor-addressee. Is this actually possible? The following description can be observed in a passage shortly before the cited utterance. The father says that he is able to see into the mind of the son:

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2 Kafka, F. (2002). *Das Urteil*. In *Drucke zu Lebzeiten* (critical edition), edited by W. Kittler, H.-G. Koch, and G. Neumann. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.

3 As for the translation, Kafka, Franz. (1988). The judgment. In *The Collected Short Stories of Franz Kafka*, edited by Nahum N. Glatzer. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

(7) Darum doch sperrst du dich in dein Bureau niemand soll stören, der Chef ist beschäftigt—nur damit du deine falschen Briefchen nach Rußland schreiben kannst. Aber den Vater muß glücklicherweise niemand lehren, den Sohn zu *durchschauen*. (*Das Urteil*, 56, Italics for emphasis by Y.N.)

(7') And that's why you had to lock yourself up in your office—the Chief is busy, mustn't be disturbed—just so that you could write your lying little letters to Russia. But thank goodness a father doesn't need to be taught how to *see through* his son. (*The Judgment* [transl.], 85, Italics for emphasis by Y.N.)

In the italicized part, the verb *durchschauen* 'see through' is used. It means 'see into the other's mind'. Example (7) suggests that seeing into the other's mind, or stating to the other's face what he or she thinks, functions as a means to show superiority over the other. Therefore, utterances that express categorically what the other thinks can be called 'seeing-through utterances' (cf. Nishijima 2005, 2013).

It seems to be important in dialogues in the work of Franz Kafka for a character to show dominance over the other by uttering what the latter thinks. This is illustrated in the following excerpt from *Das Schloß* 'The Castle':[4]

(8) „Ich weiß nicht was Sie wollen", sagte sie [Frieda] und in ihrem Ton schienen diesmal gegen ihren Willen nicht die Siege ihres Lebens, sondern die unendlichen Enttäuschungen mitzuklingen, „*wollen Sie mich vielleicht von Klamm abziehe*n? Du lieber Himmel!" und sie schlug die Hände zusammen. „*Sie haben mich durchschaut*", sagte K. wie ermüdet von soviel Mißvertrauen, „*gerade das war meine geheimste Absicht*. Sie sollten Klamm verlassen und meine Geliebte werden. Und nun kann ich ja gehn. Olga!" rief K., „wir gehn nachhause." (*Das Schloß*, 64; supplementation and emphasis by Y.N.)

(8') "I don't know what you're after," she said and in her tone this time there seemed to be, against her will, an echo rather of countless disappointments than of past triumphs. "*Do you want to take me*

[4] Kafka, Franz. (2002). *Das Schloß* (critical edition), edited by M. Pasley. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. As for the translation, Kafka, Franz. (1974). *The Castle* (definitive edition), translated by W. and E. Muir with additional materials translated by E. Wilkins and E. Kaiser, and an homage by Th. Mann. New York: Vintage Books.

> *away from Klamm, perhaps?* Oh heavens!" and she clapped her hands. "*You're seen through me*," said K., as if wearied by so much mistrust, "*that's exactly my real secret intention*. You ought to leave Klamm and become my sweetheart. And now I can go. Olga!" (*The Castle* [transl.], 50; supplementation and emphasis by Y.N.)

The first italicized utterance in (8) is an interrogative sentence with an adverb expressing supposition and cannot by definition be categorized as a 'seeing-through utterance'.

(9) wollen Sie mich vielleicht von Klamm abziehen?
will.PRES you.NOM I.ACC perhaps from Klamm take.away
'Will you perhaps take me away from Klamm?'

However, by using a question as in (9), the speaker, i.e., Frieda, tries to prompt the interlocutor-addressee, K., to confirm whether she (Frieda) could see into his mind or know what his intention was. Then, in the second italicized utterance (10), K. confirms this.

(10) Sie haben mich durchschaut
you.NOM have.PRS I.ACC see.through.PTCP
'You have seen through me.'

Furthermore, in the third italicized utterance (11), his intention is stated clearly.

(11) gerade das war meine geheimste Absicht
just that.NOM be.PST my secret.SUPR intention
'Just that was my most-secret intention.'

In this scene, it is Frieda who takes on a position of superiority by pointing out the intention of the interlocutor-addressee. Seeing into the mind of another and expressing what one sees there clearly, can elevate the speaker to a superior position. Note that the verb *durchschauen* 'see through' is used as a past participle in the second italicized sentence, (10).

2.4 Definition of seeing-through utterances

A seeing-through utterance can be characterized formally as follows:

- second person as subject of the utterance;

- thinking verbs as the main predicate or *wollen* 'want' as the modal or main verb;
- present tense form;
- assertive form;
- no epistemic modal particles such as possibility

These features make up a seeing-through utterance, in which the speaker states the interlocutor-addressee's mind categorically.

2.5 Rhetorical use of seeing-through utterances

If seeing-through utterances are used intentionally, i.e., rhetorically, between characters in Kafka's work to show that the speaker is in a position to see into the mind of the interlocutor-addressee, then it is expected that their function cannot be restricted to displaying the power of the speaker over the interlocutor-addressee. Seeing-through utterances can have an affiliative or empathic function, too: when the speaker understands the mind or intention of the interlocutor-addressee, this does not necessarily establish power or dominance of the speaker over the addressee, it can also indicate understanding and sympathy.

In fact, Nishijima (2013) investigated whether and how seeing-through utterances were used in rich conversational sections of three novels by Franz Kafka: *Der Verschollene* (*Amerika*) 'The man who disappeared (America)', *Der Proceß* 'The trial', and *Das Schloß* 'The castle'. Two types of function could be confirmed: (1) displaying the speaker's dominance or power over the interlocutor-addressee; and (2) showing the speaker's empathy towards the interlocutor-addressee (cf. below for an illustration of both functions). In previous studies of Kafka's work, analysis has often focused on conflicts between characters (Jagow and Jahraus 2008). In certain scenes in *Der Proceß* and *Das Schloß*, a seeing-through utterance can be used as a valid means for strategically displaying dominance over the interlocutor-addressee. However, there are also utterances that express the empathy of the speaker towards the interlocutor-addressee, as observed in *Der Verschollene* (*Amerika*). By definition, the use of these two types of seeing-through utterances presupposes that the speaking character understands what the interlocutor-addressee thinks. The two types of use of seeing-through utterances can be recognized as opposition and solidarity, respectively, and they are contrary aspects of the same basic action of understanding the workings of the mind of the interlocutor-addressee.

2.6 Research question

As we have seen in 2.1 und 2.2, the Japanese language has a personal restriction on the formulation of a sentence with a verb of thinking as the main predicate. Therefore, it is difficult or impossible in Japanese for the speaker to make a seeing-through utterance, i.e., to utter what the interlocutor-addressee thinks directly to the latter. In this sense, it is also difficult to translate a seeing-through utterance in Kafka's works into Japanese literally. Because the language is characterized by a rich system of evidential markers, functionally equivalent rhetorical means are typically sought. Such translations, however, could also alter the possible rhetorical effects of the seeing-through utterances in the original works. However, without any evidential markers in Japanese, the translations would sound unnatural and alien. It is worth asking, then, how equivalent translations can be devised.

3. Methods

3.1 Materials

Each seeing-through utterance identified in Nishijima (2013) from the three novels, *Der Verschollene* (The Man Who Disappeared), *Der Proceß* (The Trial), and *Das Schloß* (The Castle), was included as material for the present comparison. German originals were taken from the following critical editions:

- Kafka, Franz. (2002). *Der Verschollene (Amerika)* (critical edition), edited by J. Schillemeit. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Kafka, Franz. (2002). *Der Proceß*, edited by M. Pasley, Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Kafka, Franz. (2002). *Das Schloß* (critical edition), edited by M. Pasley. Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.

These works are available in many translations. In this study, the following translations have been used:

- Kafka, Franz. (1976). *America*, translated by W. and E. Muir, with an introduction by E. Muir, and a postscript by M. Brod. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

- Kafka, Franz. (1969). *The Trial* (definitive edition), translated by W. and E. Muir. Revised, and with additional materials translated by E.M. Butler. New York: Vintage Books.
- Kafka, Franz. (1974). *The Castle* (definitive edition), translated by W. and E. Muir, with additional materials translated by E. Wilkins and E. Kaiser, and an homage by Th. Mann. New York: Vintage Books.

3.2 Method

In general, when translating it is important that the text in the source language and that in the target language are equivalent to one another. According to Koller (1987, 186–191), equivalence in translating can be evaluated from five viewpoints: denotation, connotation, text norms, pragmatic equivalence, and forms. In the present study, pragmatic equivalence is of particular concern because it deals with the communicative effects on target readers. Therefore, corresponding utterances between original texts and their translations will be compared and special attention paid to equivalence and communicative effect.

Because of the personal restriction in Japanese, seeing-through utterances in Japanese are quite uncommon. However, corresponding equivalents to German seeing-through utterances would be possible in Japanese if evidential markers were added to them. Therefore, it will be investigated how and which evidential markers are added in Japanese translations.

4. Results and discussion

4.1 *Der Verschollene* (America)

Nishijima (2013) discusses five examples of seeing-through utterances from *Der Verschollene* (*Amerika*), and all of them function as displays of a deeper understanding of the interlocutor-addressee or empathy towards him/her. In this section, the discussion begun in Nishijima (2013) is continued, focusing on the function and translation of one of the five examples, in which Karl, the main character, issues the following utterance to his colleague Robinson:

(12) [...] *Du aber denkst, weil Du der Freund des Delamarche bist, darfst Du ihn nicht verlassen*. Das ist falsch, wenn er nicht einsieht, was für ein elendes Leben Du führst, so hast Du ihm gegenüber nicht die geringsten Verpflichtungen mehr. (*Der Verschollene*, 314)

(12') '[…] *But because you're Delamarche's friend you think you can't leave him*. That's nonsense; if he doesn't see what a wretched life you're leading, you can't have the slightest obligation to him.' (*America* [transl.], 219)

The speaker, Karl, states categorically what his addressee thinks and that what he thinks is wrong. The characters both belong to a low social class, and no power relationship exists between them. The 'seeing-through' is expressed by the author as follows:

(13) Du aber denkst, weil Du der Freund des
you.NOM but think.PRS, because you.NOM the friend the.GEN
Delamarche bist, darfst Du ihn nicht verlassen.
Delamarche are may.PRS you.NOM he.ACC not leave
'But you think you may not leave him because you are the friend of Delamarche.'

The word *denkst* in the utterance is the conjugated form of the infinitive *denken* 'think'. The sentence expresses what the interlocutor-addressee, Robinson, thinks. Therefore, the sentence can be formally regarded as a seeing-through utterance. The item *aber* 'but' can be considered to be an emphatic particle. This utterance is clearly categorized as a 'seeing-through utterance' (cf. the definition given in section 2.4); however, it does not function as a display of dominance of the speaker over the interlocutor-addressee as in the other novels. Rather, it can be interpreted as a deeper understanding of the situation of the interlocutor-addressee or empathy towards the interlocutor-addressee.

The novel *Der Verschollene* has at least five translations into Japanese, each of which offers an example of 'seeing-through' rendered into grammatical, evidentially marked Japanese. The five translations can be divided into two types with respect to evidentiality: 1) objective observation (2 examples) and 2) possibility (3 examples).

- Type 1: Seeing-through utterances of objective observation (2 examples)[5]

[5] Translated by Y. Harada, K. Watanabe, and S. Ishinaka. In *Kafka-Zenshū II Shinpan and Amerika*. Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1953, p. 423.

(14) anta-wa shikashi doramarushu no tomodachi da kara,
you.TOP but Delamarche of friend COP.PRS because,
kare-o misutete-wa naranai to kangae-teiru
he.ACC abandon.PART.TOP become.not COMP think.TEIRU.PRS
kedo
though
'but because you are friend of Delamarche, [you] are thinking that abandoning him does not become'

The progressive form *teiru* functions as an evidential marker to describe an objective fact or common knowledge here (cf. Sadanobu and Malchukov 2006), and the particle *kedo* 'though' softens the expressed stance. In *Der Verschollene* (Amerika), seeing-through utterances show the empathy of the speaker towards the interlocutor-addressee, in contrast to their function in the other two novels. However, *teiru* is considered as an objective expression, and the emotional tone of the utterance is downplayed.

- Type 2: Seeing-through utterances of possibility (3 examples)[6]

(15) jibun-wa doramarushu no yūjin da kara, yūjin-o
self.TOP Delamarche of friend COP.PRS because, friend.ACC
suterare-nai to omot-teiru-n
abandon.able.not COMP think.TEIRU.NMNL
darō
COP.AUX[POSSIBLE].PRES
'because self [you] is friend of Delamarche, [you] will be thinking that [you] cannot abandon him'

Here, the evidential marker *teiru* is followed by the nominalizer *n[o]* and by the copula and auxiliary *darō*, which means possibility. Therefore, this sentence conveys suggestion rather than assertion. In *Der Verschollene*, it was demonstrated that certain seeing-through utterances could function as displays of empathy that the speaking character has for the interlocutor. The interpretation seems to be realized by using objective expressions and possibility.

[6] Translated by O. Ikeuchi. In *Kafuka-Shōsetsu-Shū 1* [*The collected stories of Kafka 1*]. Tokyo: Hakusui-sha, 2000, p. 251.

4.2 *Der Proceß* (The trial)

In *Der Proceß* (The trial), eight examples were regarded as 'seeing-through utterances', and they all function as displays of power of the speaker over the interlocutor-addressee. One of these utterances is italicized below, within its context:

(16) „*Und Sie wollen nicht befreit werden*", schrie K. und legte die Hand auf die Schulter des Studenten, der mit den Zähnen nach ihr schnappte. „Nein", rief die Frau und wehrte K. mit beiden Händen ab, „nein, nein nur das nicht, woran denken Sie denn! Das wäre mein Verderben." (*Der Proceß*, 86; emphasis by Y.N.)

(16') "*And you don't want to be set free*," cried K., laying his hand on the shoulder of the student, who snapped at it with his teeth. "No," cried the woman, pushing K. away with both hands. "No, no, you mustn't do that, what are you thinking of? It would be the ruin of me." (*The trial* [transl.], 72–73)

The seeing-through utterance emphasized is glossed as follows:

(17)	Und	Sie	wollen	nicht	befreit	werden
	and	you.NOM	want.PRS	not	release.PTCP	AUX[PASSIV]

In this scene, the main character K.'s seeing-through utterance is addressed to the woman who was just led away from K. by the student. His utterance establishes a mentally dominant position over his addressee. However, the dominance is immediately subverted through the student's intervention of physical violence and the woman's adherence to the student. This can be interpreted as follows. The student has a relationship to the court where K. will be tried, and on the basis of the power structure arising from this relationship, the student can deny the dominance of K. As for the woman, she does not have any power over K.; however, she can indirectly influence K. through the student's relationship to the court.[7]

The eight translations of seeing-through utterances identified in *Der Proceß* (The trial) can be divided into three types: 1) assertion, 2) possibility, and 3) rhetorical question.

[7] After the conversation, K. conceded his defeat to the student and the woman. K.'s defeat is symbolically expressed by the denial of K.'s seeing-through utterance (86).

- Type 1: Seeing-through utterances of assertion (4 examples)[8]

(18) soshite anata-wa, hanashi-te moraitagat-te-wa-
and you-TOP, take.away.and get.want-TOP
inai-n-da!
TEIRU.not.NMNL.COP.PRS
'and you will not be wanting to get taken away'

The form *te-wa-inai* is a negative form of the progressive *teiru* and likewise expresses objective observation. It is followed by the nominalizer *n[o]* and the assertive form *da*. This type of sentence presents what the interlocutor-addressee thinks as objective fact.

- Type 2: Seeing-through utterances of possibility (3 examples)[9]

(19) de kimi-wa, hanasaretaku nai-n
and you-TOP, take.away.PASS.want not.NMNL
da-rō!
COP.AUX[POSSIBLE].PRES
'and you will not want to be taken away'

Here, the word *takunai*, which is a negative expression of *tai* 'desire', is followed by the nominalizer *n[o]* and the possibility-expressing copula and auxiliary *da-rō*. Therefore, the assertive function of the original sentence seems to be weakened.

- Type 3: Seeing-through utterances as rhetorical question (1 example)[10]

(20) jibun datte hanasare yō to shi-nai
self even take.away.PASS intend COMP do.not
ja-nai-ka
COP.not.PRS.Q[RHET.Q]
'even self don't intend to be taken away'

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8 Translated by H. Tsuji. In *Sekai-Bungaku-Taikei 58 Kafuka* [*World literature outline 58 Kafka*]. Tokyo: Chikumashobō, 1960, p. 37.

9 Translated by Y. Harada, K. Watanabe, and S. Ishinaka. In *Kafuka-Zenshū II Shinpan to Amerika* [*The complete works of Kafka II Proceß and Amerika*]. Tokyo: Shinchō-Sha, 1953, p. 56.

10 Translated by S. Okazawa. In *Soshō* [*Proceß*]. Tokyo: Kōbun-Sha, 2009, p. 96.

In this utterance, *yō to shi-nai*, a negative form of will-expressing *yō to suru*, is followed by the rhetorical question form *ja-nai-ka* and therefore expresses assertively what the interlocutor-addressee thinks. As pointed out earlier in the article in *Der Proceß* the function of seeing-through utterances is to show the dominance of the speaking character over the interlocutor. Some translations are formulated adequately whereas others do not necessarily express the different distributions of dominant power in an equivalent manner.

4.3 *Das Schloß* (The castle)

Nine examples of seeing-through utterances were identified in *Das Schloß* (The castle), and, as in the examples from *Der Proceß* (The trial) all of them function as displays of power of the speaker over the interlocutor-addressee.

In the following text, Frieda, who worked as a waitress at the *Herrenhof inn*, categorically expresses K.'s expectations of her.

(21) Und wenn Du kein Nachtlager bekommst, *willst Du dann etwa von mir verlangen, daß ich hier im warmen Zimmer schlafe* während ich weiß, daß Du draußen in Nacht und Kälte umherirrst. (*Das Schloß*, 150; emphasis by Y.N.)

(21') And if you don't manage to find a roof for the night, *do you really expect me to sleep here in my warm room* while I know that you are wandering about out there in the dark and cold? (*The Castle* [transl.], 120; emphasis by Y.N.)

This seeing-through utterance, glossed below in (12), suggests that Frieda is in the dominant position and K is not.

(22)	willst	Du	dann	etwa	von	mir	verlangen,	daß	
	will.PRS	you.NOM	then	PART	from	I.DAT	request,	that	
	ich	hier	im	warmen	Zimmer	schlafe			
	I.NOM	here	in.the	warm	room	sleep.PRS			

After the utterance, K. states his decision to take a position as school janitor. Frieda's seeing-through utterance points out what K. thinks, and because of this he seems to change his intention to comply with Frieda's wishes that K. becomes a janitor. Tsuji (1971, 154) realizes that Frieda's utterance shown in (22) triggers a change in K.'s mind in this scene, and he takes a job as a janitor against his initial intention. In this way, seeing-

through utterances can define the relationship between the participants of a conversation as well as play an important role in developing the story.

There are eight translations of this utterance from *Das Schloß* (The castle) into Japanese. They can be divided into three groups: (1) assertion; (2) questioning; and (3) possibility.

- Type 1: Seeing-through utterance as softened assertion (3 examples)[11]

(23) atashi-niwa koko-no atatakai heya-ni neruyōni, to
I.DAT.TOP here.GEN warm room.LOC sleep.to COMP
osshatteru yōna mono-nan-desu-wa
tell.HON.TEIRU like something.NMNL.COP.HON.PRS.PART
'to me something like that [you] tell to sleep here in warm room'

In this translation, *osshatteru* is initially composed of the honorific form *ossharu* 'tell' and the objective progressive form *teiru*, which combine into *osshatteru* in conversational speech. The expression is followed by similarity-expressing *yōna* 'like', the nominalizer *mono*, the honorific assertive form *nan*[*o*]-*desu*, and the softening particle *wa*. These features of indirectness are characteristic of prototypical women's speech in Japanese fictional discourses.[12]

- Type 2: Seeing-through utterance as questioning (3 examples)[13]

(24) atashi-niwa kono atatakai heya-de nukunuku
I.DAT.TOP this warm room.LOC comfortably
nemurette ossharu-no?
sleep.IMP.COMP tell.HON.PRS.Q
'Do you tell me to sleep comfortably in this warm room?'

In this example, the honorific form *ossharu* 'tell' is followed by the nominalizer *no* and the absence of a questioning particle *ka*—an omission that is considered to soften the directness of an interrogative utterance. As in the last example, the expression has a sweetened, womanly tone in Japanese.

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[11] Translated by H. Tsuji, K. Nakano, and Y. Ogiwara. In *Kafuka-Zenshū I Shiro* [*The complete works of Kafka I Schloß*]. Tokyo: Shinchō-Sha, 1953, 109.

[12] In Japanese, especially in fictional texts or dramas, women's utterances are conventionally expressed more politely than those of men. In actual conversations by younger generations, this is not necessarily the case.

[13] Translated by K. Maeda. In *Ketteiban Kafuka-Zenshū 6 Shiro* [*The definitive edition of complete works of Kafka 6 Schloß*]. Tokyo: Shinchō-Sha, 1981, 107.

- Type 3: Seeing-through utterance as possibility (2 examples)

(25) watashi-niwa kono atatakai heya-de nemurette
I.DAT.TOP this warm room.LOC sleep.IMP.COMP
ossharu no deshō
tell.HON NMNL COP.HON.PRS.AUX[POSSIBLE]
'you shall tell me to sleep in this warm room'

In this translation, the honorific form *ossharu* of *iu* 'tell' is accompanied by the possibility-expressing copula *deshō*, which similarly functions to soften the utterance and suggest the indirectness characteristic of Japanese women's speech.

4.4 Changes in rhetoric

The comparison of the German seeing-through utterances with their Japanese translations reveals that the rhetorical force of the original utterances is weakened when evidential markers are added to circumvent the personal restriction in Japanese. The German seeing-through utterances we have examined here take the following forms in Japanese translation:

- *Der Verschollene*: 5 translations (possibility 3, observation 2)
- *Der Proceß*: 8 translations (assertion 4, possibility 3, rhetorical question 1)
- *Das Schloß*: 8 translations (assertion 3, questioning 3, possibility 2)

Thus, in total, the Japanese seeing-through utterances comprise 8 cases of possibility, 7 cases of assertion, 3 cases of questioning, 2 cases of observation, and 1 case of rhetorical question.

Possibility and assertion constitute 38% and 33% of all the translations, respectively. The seeing-through utterances in the original texts in German assertively express what the interlocutor-addressee thinks. However, assertive forms emerge in only a third of the Japanese translations. The other forms are possibility, questioning, observation and rhetorical question. Essentially, some evidential markers are added to the translations so that the seeing-through utterances can accommodate the epistemological distance that is required by the Japanese personal restriction.

The seeing-through utterances in the novel *Der Verschollene* function differently from those in the other two novels. The function of the former is to show empathy towards the interlocutor-addressee, whereas the function of the latter is to display dominance over the interlocutor-addressee. Therefore, it is understandable that, unlike in the other two novels, no assertions emerge in the translations of *Der Verschollene*.

As in all languages, utterances in Japanese are formulated with consideration to the social and psychological relationship between conversational participants as well as the sociolinguistic conventions for communication. The seeing-through utterances of a female character in the original German were therefore translated into utterances containing features of indirectness associated with prototypical women's speech in Japan.

5. Conclusions

This study focused on epistemological distance in sentences with a second-person subject and a thinking verb as the main predicate. Such an utterance can be called a seeing-through utterance, because the speaker expresses verbally what the interlocutor-addressee thinks, as if the speaker could see into the mind of the interlocutor-addressee. These sentences in Japanese are usually regarded as ungrammatical because of that language's personal restriction regarding the use of mental verbs, while corresponding expressions in German are grammatical, but seem to be pragmatically marked. In this sense, they seem to be 'unspeakable' in German. However, such utterances are observed in Kafka's works.

On the basis of Nishijima (2013), seeing-through utterances were analyzed with respect to their function. Two functions were identified: 1) showing the empathy of the speaker towards the interlocutor-addressee, and 2) displaying the dominance of the speaker over the interlocutor-addressee. Seeing-through utterances of both types were used rhetorically in Kafka's fictional conversation scenes. The use of these two types of seeing-through utterances presupposes that the speaking character understands what the interlocutor-addressee thinks. The two types of seeing-through utterances can be recognized as indicating opposition and solidarity–contrary aspects of the same basic action, namely, understanding the mind of the interlocutor-addressee.

Finally, seeing-through utterances in the original German texts were compared with their translations into Japanese. In most of the Japanese translations, various evidential markers were added to the sentences to circumvent the personal restriction required for the formulation of grammatical sentences in Japanese. However, such translations may alter

and weaken the rhetorical effects of the seeing-through utterances presented in the original works. Yet without any evidential markers, the translations would sound unnatural and the addition of these softening features is to some degree inevitable.

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Appendix: List of abbreviation for glosses

ACC	accusative	HON	honorifics
AUX	auxiliary	PASS	passive
COMP	complementizer	PTCP	participle
COP	copula	POSSIBLE	possible
DAT	dative	PRS	present tense
GEN	genitive	PROG	progressive
IMP	imperative	Q	question particle/marker
LOC	location	RHE.QUEST	rhetorical question
NOM	nominative	SUPR	superlative
NMNL	nominalizer	TEIRU	teiru-evidential form
PART	particle		(originally: progressive)
PST	past tense	TOP	topic