J.S.ミルのベンサム批判

J. S. Mill's Critique of Bentham

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J. S. Mill opens the seventh chapter (1840–70) of his *Autobiography* with the following sentences:

> From this time what is worth relating of my life will come into a small compass; for I have no further mental changes to tell of, but only, as I hope, a continued mental progress; which does not admit of a consecutive history, and the results of which, if real, will be best found in my writings. I shall therefore greatly abridge the chronicle of my subsequent years.[1)]

And it may be undeniable that after 1840 there were no more significant mental changes in his life. But as for the actual process of history after 1840, there were many great historical events in western countries. Even if the influences of the February Revolution in 1848 might be left unmentioned, at a glance over only British history, we can find such great social and political events as the Chartist Movement (1848), the Crimean War (1853–56), a conflict with China triggered by the Arrow (1856), and the Sepoy Rebellion (1857–59), and so forth.

That is to say, in England, as the result of the Industrial Revolution the growing power of its capitalism caused various kinds of serious social and political problems both in internal and foreign affairs. Moreover, in almost all the European countries the working class gradually began to claim its own rights, and in 1871, one year after the finish of Mill's *Autobiography*, the first commune in history was established in Paris by the working class and citizens.

Considering these things and matters, it cannot be said that those thirty years after 1840 were monotonous for anyone, especially for Mill, a man of most delicate mind and actual intelligence; nevertheless, why did he say that there had not been any mental changes?

It is of no use to suppose Mill had begun to lose his contact with actual affairs. Except during some intervals of his (and his wife's) illness, he kept his position as an active thinker among social and political groups; for instance in 1865 he was recommended as a candidate for the House and elected; it is well known that he endeavoured to improve the Reform Bill in those three years he stayed as a member. Moreover, he supported female suffrage and published his own writings as cheap-editions (people's edition) for the working class. Considering these activities we cannot say that he had less interest in social issues than before.

But he did say there had been no further mental changes after 1840. Therefore we may conjecture that by 1840 he had already gained the stnadpoint where he could keep his social and political belief steadfast in those agitated years after 1840, or that as a result of his mental working, Mill had already found his methods to solve such social and political problems as would occur in the following thirty years.

Mill fell into his "mental crisis"[2] suddenly in the autumn of 1826. During those several years of anguish he learned and absorbed the German idealistic philosophies and French thought, and gradually revised his Benthamism and at last got out of his "mental crisis" with new concepts of human nature and of the world. The description of the years of anguish and formation must be the most impressive one in his *Autobiography*. And it was in these years that what would determine his following way was cultivated. The process of forming new modes of thinking seems to have continued up to about 1835. We may find Mill's new standpoint and his perspective upon social problems in the writings between 1835 and 1840, especially in such articles as "Bentham" and "Coleridge". Confronting both Bentham's and

Coleridge's thought, Mill examined his new modes of thinking and systematized his own thought.

In the following description, dealing with Mill's critique of Bentham, I would like to try to describe his perspective upon social problems.[3)]

In 1838 Mill published an article titled "Bentham" in the *London and Westminster Review*. He had already contributed anonymously in 1833 an article titled "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy" as one of the Appendices to Bulwer's *England and the English*, but in the article on "Bentham" he confronted Bentham's philosophy to a far wider extent than in the earlier one; moreover, in that article he maintained his own positive opinion against Bentham's philosophy. Therefore, I should say, the article "Bentham" meant to him a kind of conclusion of what he had been thinking deeply about before. Since I wish to examine the perspective of Mill's new standpoint, it may be significant for me to inquire the reason that he criticized in Bentham's philosophy. Then I will follow his critique of Bentham in this article.[4)]

In its short introduction, referring to the two contrasting philosophers Bentham and Coleridge, Mill called them "the great seminal minds of England in their age" (*CW*, vol. X, p.77). And he continued, "the two systems of concentric circles which the shock given by them is spreading over the ocean of mind, have only just begun to meet and and intersect." These expressions seem to be suggestive. Certainly Mill called himself progressive and put himself in the circle of Bentham, but at the same time he did say that the two cicrles of Bentham and Coleridge had begun to meet and intersect each other. It suggests that he recognized it had been impossible to solve all the social problems in his age according to only Bentham's thought. And such a starting point as was shown here is quite different from those of both James Mill and Bentham, who had regarded the interests of the conservatives as impermissible. What Mill intended to do here seems to be to reconcile these

two antagonistic circles, or, strictly speaking, to define the dimension where the antagonism between them would lose its reason for existence. He then concluded his short introduction as follows:

> The writings of both contain severe lessons to their own side, on many of the errors and faults they are addicted to: but to Bentham it was given to discern more particularly those truths with which existing doctrines and institutions were at variance; to Coleridge, the neglected truths which lay *in* them.[5)]

Moreover, in an article on "Coleridge", written in 1840, Mill stated again that these two philosophers were "each other's *completing counterpart.*" Therefore it may be possible to conjecture that to Mill it was one of the burning questions to reconcile these antagonistic circles which had lost mutual dialogue in stagnated dichotomy, and the dimension which would revive their mutual dialogue and reconcile them would be Mill's new standpoint.[6)]

At first Mill began his main description with praising Bentham for his "disposition to demand the *why* of everything" and honoured him as "the great questioner of things established." And Mill did not forget to add that a considerable number of thinking men influenced by Bentham's modes of thinking had broken the yoke of authority and protested against such opinions as had been resting on their laurels. But he continued as follows:

> We do not mean that his writings caused the Reform Bill, or that the Appropriation Clause owns him as its parent: the changes which have been made, and the greater changes which will be made, in our institutions, are not the work of philosophers, but of the instincts and interests of large portions of society recently grown into strength. But Bentham gave voice to those interests and instincts.[7)]

If a kind metaphorical expression may be granted, the subject of these sentences would not be Bentham but "the interests and instincts of large

portions of society recently grown into strength."

Two years before his release of the article "Bentham," Mill had contributed to the *London and Westminster Review* an essay titled "Civilization," in which he said:

> The most remarkable of those consequences of advancing civilization, which the state of the world is now forcing upon the attention of thinking minds, is this: that power passes more and more from individuals, and small knots of individuals, to masses: that the importance of the masses becomes constantly greater, that of individuals less.[8)]

While the importance of the masses increased more and more, on the other hand the

> torpidity and cowardice, as a general characteristic, is new in the world: but (modified by the different temperaments of different nations) it is a natural consequence of the progress of civilization, and will continue until met by a system of cultivation adapted to counteract it.[9)]

In Mill's opinion, that is to say, the word "progress" was losing such glories as it had gained among the people, probably including the younger Mill himself, in previous years. In reality, such great changes as the tremendous progress in the productive power after the Industrial Revolution had brought into English society were received as something double-edged: riches and poverty, liberty and restraint, progress and regress, and no one could extrapolate exactly the results coming after these changes. And, in Mill's opinion, it was the masses and "the interests and instincts of large portions of society recently grown into strength" that advanced the society irresistibly to a place which man had never experienced before. Therefore, the greatest of his concerns was to define the way they could take, and to describe the method by which they could take it.

In his critique of Bentham's philosophy, Mill seems to have examined Bentham's understanding of the masses in progressive societies. I suppose it might be a criterion of his critique to inquire whether or not Bentham did grasp the role of the masses in civilized countries. Certainly Bentham did give voice to the interests and instincts of the masses, and as a result they gained such changes as the Reform Bill and the Appropriation Clause and so forth. But such changes were only those in which the masses' *direct* interests and instincts had asserted themselves, and Bentham gave them nothing but voice. He neither showed them any historical directions to take, nor gave them any historical qualities required in progressive civilized countries. And there lay the reason why Mill dared to dispute Bentham's philosophy; for Mill the problems annoying him seemed to be the result of the changes brought about by the masses who were unconscious of history. Therefore his question was: how would the masses become conscious of their role in history and learn to act as historical entities?

Now on the premise I mentioned above, I will follow Mill's critique of Bentham further. According to Mill, the philosophers were divided into two groups, positive and negative, and among them Bentham was acknowledged to have a claim to fame as a negative philosopher because of his consistent criticism and warfare against the absurdity, but he was not acknowledged as a positive one. At first glance, Mill seems to have acknowledged Bentham not only as a negative philosopher but also as a positive one. But in spite of his words, basically he would not agree that Bentham was a positive philosopher. Mill said:

> There was a deeper difference [between Bentham and the subversive thinkers of modern Europe]. It was that they were purely negative thinkers, he was positive: they only assailed error, he made it a point of conscience not to do so until he thought he could plant instead the corresponding truth. Their character was exclusively analytic, his was synthetic.[10)]

But he added:

> We should say... he was not a great philosopher, but he was a great reformer in philosophy. He brought into philosophy something which it greatly needed, and for want of which it was at a stand. It was not his doctrines which did this, it was his mode of arriving at them .... It was not his opinions, in short, but his method, that constituted the novelty and the value of what he did; a value beyond all price, even though we should reject the whole, as we unquestionably must a large part, of the opinions themselves.[11)]

Even though Mill called Bentham a positive philosopher, he would not judge Bentham's opinions as positive. It was sure, as Mill admitted, that Bentham had intended to be and had been a positive philosopher, and that he had succeeded in gaining a certain comprehensiveness. But, judging from Mill's appraisal of Bentham, the comprehensiveness which Bentham had gained had already lost its value for Mill. It was because Mill also was in need of some comprehensiveness different from Bentham's that he approved only the value of Bentham's method. Therefore, as the comprehensiveness which Mill intended to construct began to take shape in his mind, even the method of Bentham's philosophy inevitably lost its absolute value for him, since the method and its result should never be separable. And it was also because Mill and Bentham were different in their appraisal of the interests and instincts of the masses, that their comprehensiveness would be different from each other.

Mill made a short and clear explanation of Bentham's method, as follows: Bentham's method may be briefly described as the method of detail, of treating wholes

> by separating them into their parts, abstractions by resolving them into things, - - classes and generalities by distinguishing them into the individuals of which they are made up; and breaking every question into pieces before attempting to solve it . . . Whatever originality there was in

the method... in the subjects he applied it to, there was the greatest.[12)]

It cannot be denied that Mill approved Bentham's method of detail. But it was not because of his method itself, but because Bentham had applied it to ethics and politics filled with ambiguous and indefinite phrases. In fact, Bentham's method of detail itself, as Mill indicated also, may be called one of inductive logic, and even if Bentham flattered himself, without knowing it, that he had accomplished his original method, in Mill's view, Bentham could not make any claim to originality for it. But even though both his opinions and his method had lost their reputation, there still remained undeniable the fact that Bentham did apply this method to ethics and politics rigidly.[13)] And Mill praised Bentham on this point:

> He has thus, it is not too much to say, for the first time introduced precision of thought into moral and political philosophy. Instead of taking up their opinions by intuition, or by ratiocination from premises adopted on a mere rough view, and couched in language so vague that it is impossible to say exactly whether they are true or false, philosophers are now forced to understand one another, to break down the generality of their propositions, and join a precise issue in every dispute. This is nothing less than a revolution in philosophy.[14)]

Certainly Mill approved that Bentham had introduced precision of thought into moral and political philosophy, but, nevertheless, strange as it may sound, his critique of Bentham seems to have become much stricter from this point. But viewing from Mill's standpoint, it may be necessary for him to have done so, because Mill, a thinker who wished to surpass Bentham in the cognition of society, would never gain his independence in thought until he could surpass Bentham at the very point where Bentham had obtained the greatest result. Therefore Mill had to begin to criticize those fruits which Bentham had obtained. Mill said:

> It will naturally be presumed that of the fruits of this great philosophical improvement some portion at least will have been reaped by its author. Armed with such a potent instrument, and wielding it with such singleness of aim; cultivating the field of practical philosophy with such unwearied and such consistent use of a method right in itself, and not adopted by his predecessors; it cannot be but that Bentham by his own inquiries must have accomplished something considerable. And so, it will be found, ha has; something not only considerable, but extraordinary; though but little compared with which he has left undone, and far short of what his sanguine and almost boyish fancy made him flatter himself that he had accomplished. . . It is a security for accuracy, but not for comprehensiveness; or rather, it is a security for one sort of comprehensiveness, but not for another.[15)]

Herein the reason that Mill had thought it necessary to criticize Bentham has become clearer. I suppose that Mill had made it his great concern to gain such comprehensiveness as should be different from Bentham's. Bentham, in Mill's view, having applied the method of detail or the exhaustive method to some special fields, divided the whole into the details to reach what he had searched for, and then he composed these details into a certain comprehensiveness. But when Mill began to confront the social and political problems of his age as an active thinker, such comprehensiveness as Bentham's seemed to be one only of comprehensiveness and nothing else. Mill said:

> But this system, excellent for keeping before the mind of the thinker all that he knows, does not make him know enough; it does not make a knowledge of some of the properties of a thing suffice for the whole of it, nor render a rooted habit of surveying a complex object (though ever so carefully) in only one of its aspects, tantamount to the power of contemplating it in all.[16)]

Since Mill said at the beginning of this article that the systems of Bentham and Coleridge had begun to meet and intersect each other, it might

be easily expected that what he was trying to accomplish here was to form the theory or the system which should be different from Bentham's simple and unified theory of man and society. How would it be possible recognize this progressive society where many different senses of value were complicated with one another? To answer this question was his real purpose. Moreover, Mill had to try it in a new situation where the masses had grown into strength and, even though they still remained unconscious, their interests and instincts had brought many serious changes into society. Therefore the theory which Mill endeavoured to form, different from Bentham's theory of the static and stationary relation between men and society, should recognize the dynamic relation between the growing masses and the progressive society. On this account it was natural that Mill criticized Bentham's theory of human nature as follows:

> Man is conceived by Bentham as a being susceptible of pleasures and pains, and governed in all this conduct partly by the different modifications of self-interest, and the passions commonly classed as selfish, partly sympathies, or occasionally antipathies, towards other beings. And here Bentham's conception of human nature stops.[17)]

In Mill's view, it was because Bentham's ethics and politics were based on such a simple concept of human nature that his comprehensiveness remained narrow and partial. Mill had already, in the article "Civilization,"[18)] defined the characteristics of a state of high civilization as "the diffusion of property and intelligence, and the power of co-operation," and mentioned about the diffusion of intelligence that "it is the truism of the age, that the masses, both of the middle and even the working classes, are treading upon the heels of their superiors." Therefore the comprehensiveness which Mill tried to gain here should connote such knowledge and intelligence diffused among the masses. He said:

> Unless it can be asserted that manknind did not know anything until logicians taught it to them . . ., it must be allowed, that even the originality which can, and the courage which dares, think for itself, is not a more necessary part of the philosophical character than a thoughtful regard for previous thinkers, and for the collective mind of the human race. What has been the opinion of mankind, has been the opinion of persons of all tempers and dispositions, of all partialities and prepossessions, of all varieties in position, in education, in opportunities of observation and inquiry. No one inquirer is all this.[19)]

So far as he is concerned, his system of knowledge would lead neither to a certain homogenized inductive consequence drawn by means of abstraction and analysis, nor to a comprehensiveness deduced and developed from such a consequence, but it might lead to the acceptance of existing plural truths as they were. And in fact Mill said:

> The general opinion of mankind is the average of the conclusion of all minds, stripped indeed of their choicest and most recondite thoughts, but freed from their twists and partialities: a net result in which everybody's particular point of view is represented, nobody's predominant. The collective mind does not penetrate below the surface, but it sees all the surface; which profound thinkers, even by reason of their profundity, often fail to do: their intenser view of a thing in some of its aspects diverting their attention from others.[20)]

But even though he did say so, it seems too premature to conclude that Mill was satisfied with only the surface knowledge. In Mill's view, I suppose, the actual process of history seems to have been analogized with, so to speak, the abstracting process of logic. In his article titled "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It" (1836), he said:

> Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth; and aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind, living in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive . . were absolute ruler of all their actions.[21)]

And he added.

> Not that any political economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed.[22)]

Judging from these sentences, in Mill's view the age in which he lived was regarded as if it were the result of an abstracting process of history. Certainly it was not deniable that the more the productive powers progressed, the more mankind would lose its multiple attributes, and finally, even though mankind would become free from the shortage of goods, it would also become a simple and abstracted entity. But of course his opinion did not end here; at the same time his next step based on these facts was also prepared. At least, in his opinion, his age might have been regarded as the end of the inductive process of history, and at the same time as the beginning of the deductive process of history. Therefore I dare say that Mill seems to have conceived the general opinion or the surface knowledge of the common people as such at the end of the inductive process, and also he seems to have begun to construct the new comprehensiveness from here. On this account it seems too premature to conclude that he was satisfied with only the surface knowledge.

Generally speaking, it may be said that a considerable part of his writings after about 1835 seem to have been devoted to developing and describing concrete images of social and human affairs, or if a kind of metaphorical phrase may be allowed, he seems to have searched for the way to go upwards from the abstracted stage to the new concrete stage of history. For instance, it being well known that in his *Principles of Political Economy* (1848) he

made a rigid distinction between the theory of production and the theory of distribution, roughly speaking, the one would correspond to the abstracted stage, where men could not emancipate themselves from the shortage of goods without simplifying and abstracting themselves, the other would correspond to the process to the concrete images, where men would be given the possibility, even though it was not actual but logical, to construct freely the new system of distribution according to their experiences and their co-operation. For that reason, the three characters of a state of high civilization, which Mill presented in his article "Civilization," are very significant, because the diffusion of property seems to be indispensable as a prerequisite of the upward process, and the diffusion of intelligence and the power of co-operation, if they would be well arranged, as powerful moments should advance men and societies toward the new concrete image.

Judging from this point of view, it seems that the words of the collective mind or the general opinion of mankind should be worthy of notice. Mill once expressed in the sentence of "Civilization" quoted above that the situation that the masses surpassed individuals was the natural consequence of the progress of civilization, and here stated also that a comprehensiveness which a single thinker could gain for himself would not present what could be adequate for all the masses' demands in the same age. Moreover, it must be expressed here that, even if there were still many defects left in them, the masses should be expected to have good possibilities to construct their own systems of knowledge that had never been known in history. And in these words Mill seems to have suggested something different from former systems of knowledge which had been acquired by individual thinkers. By means of defining the masses, still unconscious of themselves, as the constituents of the collective mind, I should say, he intended to cultivate them into such subjects as would recognize the comprehensiveness required in his age.

If I may add a few more words to this conception, Mill seems to have been indebted to Goethe, whom he had often referred to after his mental

crisis. Certainly in Goethe's writings we may often find such words as the collective mind; for instance, in one of his letters to Schiller (February 24, 1798), he wrote, "nur sämtliche Menschen erkennen die Natur, nur sämtliche Menschen leben das Menchliche." It may safely be said that these words are very close to Mill's view on the collective mind.[23)]

From Mill's critique of Bentham which I have related up to this point, I should say that what he was concerned with was how to define and describe the masses who should grow into the support and driving force of society; it should be his greatest concern to give them their historical qualities and to indicate to them the ways which they should take. Therefore Mill criticized Bentham's philosophy so that he might reconstruct ethics and politics according to the appearance of the masses as the subjects of the cognition and the activity in history. Mill's abridgement of Bentham's concepts of men and society will continue:

> There remained, as a motive by which mankind are influenced, and by which they may be guided to their good, only personal interest. Accordingly, Bentham's idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three sources... the law, religion, and public opinion.[24)]

From such of Bentham's ideas of men and society as was abridged here by Mill, it would almost be impossible to derive something useful not only for the conduct of the individual but for his social life. By Bentham, society was only conceived as a collection of individuals; he divided society into its constituents or individuals so that he might get a concept of society, and then as a natural course of his logic he only developed directly the concept of individuals, which he had gotten, up to society. Therefore there were not any qualitative differences between men and society in his ideas.

But judging from Mill's sentences in "On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation Proper to It" quoted above, it was because Mill conceived that man had become a simple entity only pursuing his interests or pleasures and that consequently society had become atomized and inorganic, that he felt a necessity to begin his new thinking process. For Mill the situation which he started from was as much a kind of realization of Bentham's ideas. Provided that Mill would inquire the relation between the individual and society on the fact of the appearance of the weakened individuals on one side, and of the masses strengthened only from a quantitative point of view on the other side, it was natural that Mill rejected Bentham's ideas of men and society. And Mill criticized Bentham's ethics, for Bentham had never recognized in human nature the wish or the power, according to which man himself would train his own affections and will. That is to say, contrary to Bentham's constant concept of human nature, Mill conceived human nature as changeable and formative according to its self-education or self-culture.

And now, after my rather long description, it is time to relate Mill's of the dynamic relation between the growing masses and the progressive society. It seems to be out of the context that Mill developed such words as self-education or self-culture here, but if we think over his opinions since his article "Civilization" again, I should say, we may find that self-education or self-culture were the key to cultivate the masses into the collective mind, or in other words, to combine the individual with society. In fact, in "Civilization" Mill mentioned, "There is not a more accurate test of the progress of civilization than the progress of the power of co-operation" (*CW*, vol. XVIII, p.122), and he tried to prove that co-operation and combination were indispensable to the progress of civilization. And these words of self-education or self-culture may become more understandable in the reference to his description given in "Civilization." So I should like to quote them, although I am afraid they are rather long. Nevertheless they seem to me significant.

...what makes all savage communities poor and feeble? The same cause which prevented the lions and tigers from long ago extirpating the race of men - - incapacity of co-operation. It is only civilized beings who can combine. All combination is compromise: it is the sacrifice of some portion of individual will, for a common purpose. The savage cannot bear to sacrifice, for any purpose, the satisfaction of his individual will.

It is not difficult to see why this incapacity of organized combination characterizes savages, and disappears with the growth of civilization. Co-operation, like other difficult things, can be learnt only by practice: and to be capable of it in great things, a people must be gradually trained to it in small. Now, the whole course of advancing civilization is a series of such training. ... The division of employments ... the accomplishment by the combined labour or several, of tasks which could not be achieved by any number of persons singly ... is the great school of co-operation. ... By these operations, mankind learn the value of combination; they see how much and with what ease it accomplishes, which never could be accomplished without it; they learn a practical lesson of submitting themselves to guidance, and subduing themselves to act as interdependent parts of a complex whole.[25)]

Considering these sentences, the words of self-education or "the training, by the human being himself, of his affections and will" would mean, if I may give a more concrete expression, to cultivate those affections and will so that man would inspire himself to combine and co-operate with others and to make a group. As far as such quality as co-operation with others was one of the characters of men in a state of high civilization, the self-education mentioned in the article "Bentham" should be evidence of man in civilized society. And at the same time, it seems to me that they were presented as a link which should connect man with society, and, moreover, that they might have been conceived as what would cultivate man to be a constituent of the collective mind or of the general opinion, which should represent a new comprehenssiveness of the masses.

According to Mill's concepts of man and society, on one side man in a state of high civilization, learning the value of combination, should constantly cultivate himself to co-operate with others and at the same time by this action he should socialize himself, and on the other side society should also constantly refresh itself by the same operation. In Mill's opinion society would not be composed as the consequence of such mechanical deduction from the individuals as in Bentham's opinion. And, moreover, the moments inspiring the individuals to self-education should not be provided from the inside of the individuals but from the outside of them, that is, from society; on this account the more the individuals would react to these moments, the more possibilities to improve society there would occur. Thus in Mill's thought both human nature and society were conceived as those which would improve and develop each other alternately with the progress of civilization.

But even though the relation between man and society might have been described as interdependent or dynamic, it did not mean the solution of the problem for Mill, because in his age, owing to such obstacles as the class interests, the process of socialization of the individuals could not bring them to the whole society but to the many kinds of social and political groups or bodies provided by their class interests. It must be because he perceived the society was divided into two large parts according to two typical systems of interests that he wrote at the beginning of this article that the circles of Bentham and Coleridge had begun to meet and intersect each other. Mill recognized that it was impossible to derive the way to lead the individuals to the whole society from only such priamary relations between man and society which he had described, and he felt a necessity to criticize Bentham's politics, especially the department of constitutional legislation, as well as the ethics.

Referring to the power of legislation in such society as was divided into many partial interests, he said:

> it is next to be asked, in what body of persons this identity of interest with good government, that is, with the interest of the whole community, is to be found? In nothing less, says Bentham, than the numerical majority: nor, say we, even in the numercial majority itself.[26)]

Moreover, Mill questioned, "Is it, at all times and places, good for mankind to be under the absolute authority of the majority of themselves? Considering that in most European countries the common people, even if they were in the majority, were oppressed and trampled for a long time in their social and political lives by the powerful minorities, it was historically conceivable that Bentham tried to establish the power of the majority and that the Philosophic Radicals followed him. But Mill in 1838 could not but regard even the movements of Radicals as such struggles to substitute a new mistake for the old ones, so long as they would keep on persisting in their claims.

Mill in those years, as Tocqueville was in part responsible for it, had been already anxious about the despotism of the majority, and moreover he perceived it to be impossible to resolve the conflicts among the different interests unilaterally according to any special class interest. Therefore the way he searched for was not to abolish a special class interest and then to establish another, but to bring those interests, which had lost the possibility of dialogue and were stagnating in antagonism with one another, up to another dimension, so that they might revive their dialogie and find the new way which they should take. On this account, his principle of legislation had to be based on the "comprehensive consideration of the new state of society and its exigencies" (X, 101). But at the same time it should only follow from the masses' self-consciousness as the constituents of the collective mind that they could find the way to the comprehensive consideration. Because of this reason, in Mill's opinion, the process of socialization of the individual had to include the process to the comprehensive consideration of the individual, and it may be said that self-education or self-culture should support these processes.[27)]

In Mill's opinion, the moments of socialization of the individual, as I mentioned above, at first would be given from combination or co-operation, or in other words, from the process of production in the civilized society. But, as opposed to Karl Marx who also discerned the possibility of the emancipation of the proletariat in combination in the process of production, Mill, who also perceived the possibility of civilization of society in the same process, conceived this mode of production as the natural and inevitable process for mankind to emancipate itself from the shortage of goods, and conceived the area of its freedom outside of this process, that is, in the process of distribution, where mankind could select its social system according to its free judgment. Though Mill could forecast that the class conflict defined in the process of production would grow more and more intensified, nevertheless because of this same reason, he was struggling to search for the possibility of the new comprehensiveness beyond the class conflict. And it arose from the same reason that he attached weight to self-education and the organic relation between man and society supported by it. But, if both the process of production and distribution were conceived as above, even though the first moment of self-education might have been given from combination in the process of production, the self-education would gradually free from this process, and there might be the possibility that the organic relation between man and society would lose its roots in the process of production and repeat its reaction between them infinitely. And it might mean the collapse of the society.

Therefore Mill had to give another field for the dialogue between man and society: the conception of "national character." He said:

> That which alone causes any material interests to exist, which alone enables any body of human beings to exist as a society, is national character: *that* it is, which causes one nation to succeed in what it attempts, another to fail: one nation to understand and aspire to elevated things, another to grovel in mean ones; which makes the greatness of

one nation lasting, and dooms another to early and rapid decay. ...A philosophy of laws and institutions, not founded on a philosophy of national character, is an absurdity.[28)]

It is difficult to grasp the meaning of this phrase "national character." As this phrase is more fully developed in the article "Coleridge," I will treat it in detail in another note in which I will describe Mill's acceptance of Coleridge. And as far as the article "Bentham" is concerned, the phrase "national character" seems to have been brought into it too hastily. But as I mentioned above, by this phrase Mill seems to have charged the process of socialization of the individual with a quality, that is, a historical quality which was required in the self-education of the masses.

If I roughly look back upon Mill's critique of Bentham again, I would say he saw the possibility of cognition of the whole society neither in a single philosopher nor in a special intellectual group but in the collective mind, and by this idea he defined the masses as the subject of history, and according to such series of trials as he made in the process he tried to gain the method to construct the new comprehensiveness. And, I suppose, the phrase "national character" should form a counterpart to such series of his trials. If these trials were concerned with the extension of quantity, the phrase "national character" might be concerned with its quality.

But a full discussion on this point shall be held in my next note.

1. *Collected Works*, vol. I, p. 229
2. There are many kinds of interpretations of Mill's "mental crisis." Professor J. M. Robson interpreted it as a result of Mill's hard schedule in those days. (See J. M. Robson, *Improvement of Mankind, p.22*). Professor A. Ryan says as follows: "Mill's depression was a reaction to his deep but repressed hatred for his overmastering father". (See A. Ryan, *J. S. Mill*, p. 31). Both interpretations seem to be generally

accepted. But as for me, it is pretty difficult to reject such interpretation as R. J. Halliday developed in his *John Stuat Mill* (p. 13–18).

3. I cannot conclude whether or not he should keep holding this stand point, to his later years. I have no qualification to say something about his later thought. So, for my following description, I must restrict myself to the early or middle Mill's thought.
4. In *Autobiography*, Mill says, that he had gone far in his criticism of Bentham. But I cannot say from only these words, whether or not Mill had returned to Benthamism in his later years. Professor Halliday says that Mill did not return to Benthamism worth speaking of. (See Halliday, ibid. 17)
5. Collected Works, vol. x, p. 78
6. Professor J. Hamburger suggests that Mill attempted to organize a neo-radicalism which was neither narrow nor doctrinaire, in order to emancipate the old philosophic Radicals from the reproach of sectarian Benthamism.
7. *Collected Works*, vol. X, p. 78
8. *CW*, XVIII, p. 121
9. *CW*, XVIII, p. 132
10. *CW*, X, p. 82
11. *CW*, X, p. 83
12. *CW*, X, p. 83
13. See J. M. Robson, "John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, with some Observations on James Mill", in M. MacLure and F. W. Watt, eds., *Essays in English Leterature from the Renaissance to the Victorian Age*, pp. 267-8.
14. *CW*, X, pp. 87-88
15. *CW*, X, p. 88
16. *CW*, X, p. 89
17. *CW*, X, p. 94
18. Professor R. J. Halliday says that the essay on "Civilization" was the first attempt to sketch out Mill's new philosophy of movement and very clearly shows the continuing importance of the eclectic stance. (See R. J. Halliday, *John Stuart Mill*, p. 53.)

19. *CW*, X, p. 90
20. *CW*, X, p. 91
21. *CW*, IV, p. 322
22. *CW*, IV, p. 322
23. See R. J. Halliday, *John Stuart Mill*, p. 44, where he says, "In Mill's view, many-sideness, which was the motto of Geothe and the crucial electic virture, would be either unlikely or impossible if reason alone were relied upon."
24. *CW*, X, p. 97
25. *CW*, XVIII, pp. 123-124
26. *CW*, X, p. 106
27. Professor J. Habermas says in his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit"* as follows:

    Andererseits behielt die Ideologiekritik an der Idee der bürgerlichen Öffentilichkeit so augenscheinlich recht, daß unter den veränderten sozialen Voraussetzungen der ≫ öffentilchen Meinung≪ um die Jahrhundertmitte als der ökonomische Liberalismus seinen Höhepunkt eben erreichte, dessen sozialphilosophische Repräsentanten genötigt sind, das Prinzip der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit noch wo sie es feierten, fast schon zu verleugnen. Diese ambivalente Auffassung der Öffentlichkeit in der Theorie des Liberalismus gesteht sich zwar den strukturellen Konflikt der Gesellschaft, aus dem sie selbst resultierr, nicht ein; der sozialistischen Kritik ist aber die liberalistische Apologie in der anderen Hinsicht überlegen (ibid. SS. 158-159)

    I will not deny to accept such method as J. Habermas developed in this writing, which seems to be one of those ways to revive J. S. Mill today.
28. *CW*, X, p. 99