

J.S.ミルのコールリッジの受容

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J. S. Mill's Acceptance of Coleridge

Tomonori Yamanobe

In 1840 Mill published two significant articles: "Coleridge" (March) and "M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America" (October), where we can find that he had made great progress in the understanding of history. He placed his age in the context of history and fairly positively indicated the way man should take. The more he paid attention to the complicated social phases, the more he must have recognized the imperfection of a historical view that construed history only from the point of view of the present. In "Bentham", though he criticized Bentham for his want of imagination that would recognize the significance of history, Mill did not develop his own description of history yet. In articles such as "Coleridge" and "M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America", he developed an abundance of his own historical description, so that he might recompose his opinion in the context of history. It might be said that the organic relation between man and society, which was given in "Bentham" only as a formal possibility, was defined more substantially in these later articles.

In the following description, dealing with Mill's acceptance of Coleridge, I would like to reconstruct his understanding of history. In my view, this process might charge the phrase "national character", given in "Bentham", with some concrete qualities.

At the beginning of "Coleridge", referring to both Bentham and Coleridge, Mill distinguished their characteristic modes of understanding of history as follows: Bentham's would appear when he asked of any ancient or received opinion the question "Is it true?", and Coleridge's appear when he asked

“What is the meaning of it?”. Bentham’s standard for history was only what he thought true in his age, therefore he could hardly describe history without tracing it to former ages. Strictly speaking, it cannot be spoken of as history. On the contrary, Coleridge inquired of the things and thoughts in ancient ages why they did or could exist, so that his description of history might be said to be history. When Mill declared that the two different modes of understanding history were each other’s “completing counterpart”, he seems to have been distant from his old utilitarian point of view of tracing the historical present to the historical past. From this new point of view he would reconstruct the past and confirm the meaning of the present historically. His old Benthamism was about to be revised on a large scale by the introduction of Coleridge’s cognition of history. He said:

In every respect the two men are each other’s ‘completing counterpart’: the strong points of each correspond to the weak points of the other. Whoever could master the premises and combine the method of both, would possess the entire English philosophy of their age.¹⁾

Mill, as we saw in “Bentham”, from his own experience of participation in actual social and political problems, had already learned it was useless to maintain the optimistic utilitarian view that the progress of civilization would advance toward the perfect state of mankind. He had to recognize and grapple with negative phases of society which the progress of civilization had brought into being. It obliged him to change his mode of thinking. He found it insufficient to deal with those social problems according to new progressive things. He had to consider both new and old things as a whole, and it appeared to him not only logically and theoretically but also practically necessary to take both into consideration. At the end of “Coleridge” Mill said:

For ourselves, we are not so blinded by our particular opinions as to be ignorant that in this and in every other country of Europe, the great

mass of the owners of large property, and of all the classes intimately connected with the owners of large property, are, and must be expected to be, in the main, Conservative. To suppose that so mighty a body can be without immense influence in the common-wealth, or to lay plans for effecting great changes, either spiritual or temporal, in which they are left out of the question, would be the height of absurdity. Let these who desire such changes, ask themselves if they are content that these classes should be, and remain, to a man, banded against them; and what progress they expect to make, or by what means, unless a process of preparation shall be going on in the minds of these very classes; not by the impracticable method of converting them from Conservatives into Liberals, but by their being led to adopt one liberal opinion after another as a part of Conservatism itself.²⁾

In these sentences we can see Mill as an activist in anguish at a blind end of the Radical movement. At the same time, the deadlock of the movement made it necessary for Mill as a theoretician to change his old mode of thinking, including his appraisal of civilization, as follows:

All students of man and society who possess that first requisite for so difficult a study, a due sense of its difficulties, are aware that the besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking part of the truth for the whole. It might be plausibly maintained that in almost every one of the leading controversies, past and present, in social philosophy, both sides were in right in what they affirmed, though wrong in what they denied; and that if either could have been made to take the other's views in addition to its own, little more would have been needed to make its doctrine correct.³⁾

Certainly Mill appreciated the benefits of civilization, such as the multiplication of physical comforts, the advancement and diffusion of knowledge, the great works accomplished by the co-operation of multitudes, the progressive limitation of the tyranny of the strong over the weak and so forth. No one

could deny these benefits of civilization, but if he should blind himself to the vices attached to its benefits, he must be criticized for his one-sided view. Considering the high price that man paid for its benefits, the loss of individuality or subjectivity, man could not worship the progress of civilization without qualification. Mill, a man of impartial mind, had to accept and cope with this difficult situation. Though the greater number of thinkers of his age would think the loss of man's worth and the progress of civilization were inseparably related, Mill would separate the former from the latter, and reconstruct the latter in history so that he might find a new possibility of resurrection for human beings. As Mill himself admitted, it might have been easier to choose one of these two antagonistic views of civilization and declare it the whole truth. Actually many difficulties still remained before he framed a practical maxim combining both views.

It seems natural that Mill approached Coleridge for a clue to the solution, considering that the problem for the idealists, especially G. W. F. Hegel, whom Coleridge expounded, was also to reconcile the old and long-lasting nation with the newly imported ideas of French Revolution.⁴⁾ Even though there might be a common concern in Mill and Coleridge or German idealists, the modes adopted by them were quite different from each other. There was no objective necessity for Mill to adopt such peculiar and mystical terminologies as Coleridge and the German idealists had invented so that they combine their abstract doctrines with concrete experimental truth. In Germany, one of the underdeveloped countries of those days, though the real society was far behind the ideas of the French Revolution and of English classical political economy, the German idealists, especially Hegel, would exploit those ideas and interpret their society into their concepts, only where they could justify the old and long-established nation as the end of the development of those modern ideas. It was inevitable that their philosophies would be ornamented with much mystical terminology. In England, the most advanced nation of the world, since the actual social situation had preceded theory and

brought new kinds of social and political problems into being, Mill had to plan his solution only according to the actual process of society. Therefore, his reconciliation of the two antagonistic ideas was realistic or practical than metaphysical.

Mill did spare some efforts for an examination of such typical ideas as the transcendental philosophies and the empirical ones regarding the traditional philosophical problem, i.e. the sources of human knowledge and the objects of which the human faculties were capable of taking cognizance, so that he might find a "purely abstract" way to reconcile them. But the efforts were not so important as those which he made for the sake of an examination of "the concrete and practical doctrines of the two schools". He said:

If we now pass from the purely abstract to the concrete and practical doctrines of the two schools, we shall see still more clearly the necessity of the reaction, and the great service rendered to philosophy by its authors.⁵⁾

This quotation will make it clear that Mill had to accept Coleridge.

When Mill criticized negative phases of society and pursued their causes, he would not resolve them into the most abstract ground of society, in other words, he would not deduce them from the concept of human nature. He seemed to have a premise that in history there continued something positive as society, which had been developed with the accumulation of stock, the diffusion of knowledge and the enlargement of the power of co-operation. From this basis of something positive as the original social union which was everlasting in history, Mill would reconstruct the present in the context of history. Therefore he had to discriminate between what was positive in the original social union and what was unnecessary or derivative in it. For instance, we can see a model of this mode of thinking in his political economy, where providing that the diffusion of property corresponds to the

positive for the historically developing mode of production, poverty or the inequality of distribution corresponds to the negative. From this point of view, he would examine the critical movement of the French Enlightenment so that he might reconstruct something positive what should remain thereafter. It meant reexamination of the Radical movement also.

What Mill pursued in history was neither history as it was nor abstract human nature running through history, much less the absolute idea by which Hegel developed history and society. What was necessary for him was to find and define the principle of society, which was qualitatively different from the principle of the individual. According to the principle he would arrange the past and reconstruct the present. From his old Benthamite standpoint, which would deduce society from the most abstract inductive principle, it was impossible to explain negative phases of society theoretically, even though they might be explained as what ought not to have appeared or something out of natural order. The theoretical explanation of grounds which caused them to appear historically could not be given by Bentham. But it was what Mill pursued in history.

In Mill's opinion, the original social union, as the criterion for examining many kinds of historical events, seemed to be the nation. Even though man could deduce mankind in general from a concept of human nature such as those of A. Smith or J. Bentham, he could not at all define the nation itself positively by it. In the middle of the 19th century, not only England but also France and Germany began to claim their own national interests and confront one another; these claims had demolished actually the premise of mankind in general. In the face of the new state of history, Mill had to reconstruct the concept of the nation, which had been denied in the concept of mankind by the French Enlightenment thinkers. Mill criticized them as follows:

The error of the philosophers was rather that they trusted too much to those feelings; believed them to be more deeply rooted in human nature than they are; to be not so dependent, as in fact they are, upon

collateral influences. They thought them the natural and spontaneous growth of the human heart⁶⁾ ...

In Mill's view, human society could not depend upon only human nature, so that, even though anciens régimes or evil system might be violently torn away, without anything else than human nature society could not be established again; "when the noxious weeds were rooted out, the soil would stand in ... need of tillage" (X, 132) Mill had to develop this idea in detail. He continued:

In this they committed the very common error, of mistaking the state of things with which they had always been familiar, for the universal and natural condition of mankind. They were accustomed to see the human race agglomerate in large nations, all...yielding obedience more or less strict to a set of laws prescribed by a few of their own number, and to a set of moral rules prescribed each other opinion ... Finding matters to be so generally in this condition, the philosophers apparently concluded that they could not possibly be in any other; and were ignorant, by what a host of civilizing and restraining influences a state of things so repugnant to man's self-will and love of independence had been brought about, and how imperatively it demands the continuance of those influences as the condition of its own existence. The very first element of the social union, obedience to a government of some sort, has not been found so easy a thing to establish in the world.⁷⁾

Judging from Mill's critique of the French philosophers, he seems to have recognized the qualitative differences between the logic of human nature and that of the nation as the real social union. Generally speaking, the reason for the existence of the nation must be beyond the concept of human nature. The concept of the nation must be deduced from something different from that of human nature or mankind in general. Moreover, seeing the actual process of history of those days, the defeat of Napoleon's ambition might be

a symbol that history would not advance toward the unity of various nations as mankind but in the converse direction of nationalism. In the face of the actual state of history Mill had to reconstruct the concept of the nation which had been neglected by the philosophers of naturalism. For Mill, with a good sense of actuality, the concept of man would appear as that of a national or a citizen, not as that of an abstract human being in general. Hereafter Mill began to deduce the concept of the nation from history.

If the relationship among the citizens is to be truly an original social union, there should be preserved an atmosphere of freedom among them, in spite of submission to law. In this case, it would not be the nation itself or the law itself but its negative appearances that should be criticized and denied. What was the positive aspect of the nation to be inherited from history? Here it became necessary for Mill to construct the concept of the nation, not of a nation as a special body. He tried to search for nations in history, in which vigour and manliness of character were preserved among citizens, and from which he would derive certain requisites for the nation. However he developed his opinion as historical facts, it seems natural to grant the nation which he found in history as ideal types of the nation. I should like to quote the requisites which he developed, although I am afraid they are rather long. Nevertheless they seem to me significant.

First: There has existed, for all who were accounted citizens, —for all who were not slaves, kept down by brute force, — a system of *education*, beginning with infancy and continued through life, of which, whatever else it might include, one main and incessant ingredient was *restraining discipline*. To train the human being in the habit, and thence the power, of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to what were considered the ends of society; of adhering all temptation, to the course of conduct which those ends prescribed; of controlling in himself all the feelings which were liable to militate against those ends, and encouraging all such as tended toward them.⁸⁾

What was mentioned above may be close to the process, given in "Bentham", whereby the masses would cultivate themselves to the "collective mind". The phrase "self-education" for co-operation has been expressed more concretely as "restraining discipline" of citizens. He added also, whenever the strictness of restraining discipline was relaxed, the nation would be disorganized from within because of the natural tendency of mankind to anarchy. In his opinion it is noteworthy the natural tendency of mankind and the existence of the nation were incompatible with each other.

The second requisite which he gave seems rather vague.

The second condition of permanent political society has been found to be, the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty. This feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular form of government; but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy, its essence is always the same; viz. that there be in the constitution of the State *something* which is settled, something permanent, and not to be called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right to be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change.⁹⁾

It is rather difficult to understand what he said here. Compared to the other requisites, this seems much vaguer. To propose "something not to be called in question" as a requisite for society could hardly be expected in view of his usual rationalism. By those indefinite or sentimental phrases, what did Mill mean? In my view, it might be purpose to try to give some explanation for the nation of whose idea the component citizens were not conscious, in other words, the nation *an sich*. Everyone cannot choose his nation before his birth. The definition as a national which everyone receives by birth may be the most concrete and the most primitive one for human beings, apart from sex distinction. Given these facts, by those phrases Mill seems to have proposed and reaffirmed that the nation is the most original sphere where

man performs his actual social life. It seems acceptable to grant that Mill, by presenting the nation in this sense as the object of the universal feeling of allegiance and loyalty, transferred it into the consciousness of the citizens in a sense, so that the cultivation of their consciousness might improve the concept of the nation. I suppose, for Mill, the theme of his study of history was to give a definite method of the cultivation of their consciousness. In other words, in this way the nation would be reflected in its citizens and would be recognized its own essence or its historical quality. Therefore Mill said that the feeling of allegiance and loyalty might attach itself to the modern idea. He said:

Finally (and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter) it may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist only in a rudimentary state.¹⁰⁾

His third requisite is a principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or state.

The third essential condition of stability in political society, is a strong and active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or state. We need scarcely say that we do not mean nationality in the vulgar sense of the term . . . We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they set a value on their connexion; feel they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves; and do not desire selfishly to free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connexion.¹¹⁾

This quotation may remind us of the same word "sympathy" in A. Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. In Smith's idea, "sympathy" was a principle with which human nature was universally endowed, and by this principle Smith tried to construct the concept of modern civilized society. But in Mill's idea, "sympathy" was defined as a fellow-feeling of a certain society, not of human beings in general, so that it had its origin in that society, not human nature itself. Judging from the difference between Smith's and Mill's word "sympathy", we may recognize that Mill intended in "Coleridge" had become different from his old utilitarianism.¹²⁾ And also, I suppose, what he was concerned with here was not to conceive a universal concept of mankind in general, but to discriminate the individuality of each nation.

The three requisites quoted above tediously, seem necessary for a nation to keep its existence as an original social union. But, even though they might be said to be the principles of the nation, they were not from a certain idea, arrived at by induction, such as human nature. They were presented only as historical facts, qualitatively different from such principle as were deduced logically. A. Smith — whose efforts Mill could not but say to be premature, though he did consider them positive and constructive — defined the goods in general as the bonds of human beings, so that he could describe the process from individual to a harmonious society. But the society deduced there, logically though it was constructed, was far beyond the frame of the nation. It might be impossible to derive the principle of the nation from the natural laws. Therefore Mill had to reconstruct the method to cultivate the consciousness of the masses. On this account he had entered into the study of history which was conceived as the favourite territory of the conservative so that he should find the principle as historical facts. He appreciated Coleridge's achievement in the study of history.

The peculiarity of the Germano-Coleridgean school is, that they saw beyond the immediate controversy, to the fundamental principles involved in all such controversies. They were the first ... who inquired

with any comprehensiveness or depth into the inductive laws of the existence and growth of human society. They were the first to bring prominently forward the three requisites which we have enumerated, as essential principles of all permanent forms of social existence ... They thus produced, not a piece of advocacy, but a philosophy, in the only form in which it is yet possible, that of a philosophy of history; not a defence of particular ethical or religious doctrines, but a contribution, the largest yet made by any class of thinkers, toward the philosophy of human culture.¹³⁾

It is naturally acceptable that in his view, the German philosophy of history seemed to give a key for pressing questions of his age, even though we cannot accept unconditionally his high esteem for German idealism. In his opinion, the citizens in Great Britain seemed to have no definite and universal idea of their own nation. It was necessary for Mill to conceive a method for them to acquire a new idea of their nation and he introduced the German philosophy of history so that he could show the nation as a sphere where the masses should cultivate their consciousness of the component citizens. In other words, for Mill the nation in the sense of an original social union was a place for the formation of the "collective mind", given in "Bentham". Broadly speaking, in Mill's concerns there were two serious problems. One was to explain the process of the formation of the "collective mind", in other words the process of the cultivation of the consciousness of the masses.¹⁴⁾ The other was to define the method for the masses to acquire an idea of the nation. He did not think these problems to be separable. It is well-known that he entertained misgivings about the despotism of the majority which was shown to be a result of the progress of civilization by M. de Tocqueville. At the same time he was struggling to find a key for dialogue between the conservative and the progressive who were stagnating in fruitless opposition. To contribute to the solution of these problems, he reaffirmed the principle of the nation, which was the real place both for the formation of the

consciousness of the masses and for reconciliation of the two antagonistic powers.

While the progress of civilization had brought the diffusion of property and intelligence, and shown the necessity of co-operation, the same process, eroding the old social order from within, and produced a new category of people. Mill called them "the masses" in "Bentham" or "the middle class"¹⁵) in "M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II]". They were the entities which were produced on a large scale in the modern industrial structure, and were quite different from the old classes. There were no social bonds among them, and they did not adhere to one another, as if they were "the sands of the seashore". Moreover, as a result of this process, "torpidity and cowardice" had become a general characteristic among them; on this account they seemed to be losing even their individualities. Since his "Civilization" and "Bentham", Mill had been struggling consistently to find the way the masses should take and to define the method of the formation of their consciousness. For this reason, as I mentioned in former note, he had tried to reconstruct a new "comprehensiveness" among the masses, which, reflecting the complicated phases of society, should consist of various kind of opinions, and so he developed the word "collective mind or general opinion"¹⁶). Though the logical possibility of the formation of the "collective mind" had been developed in his description of the relationship between man and society in "Bentham", its concrete quality still remained undeveloped. He did refer to the words "national character", which ought to have developed the quality of the "collective mind" or an ideal society, but his attempt there seems to have been premature.

In this article "Coleridge", Mill proposed three principles of the nation. These three principles defined the area where the "national character" should be cultivated and developed. The historically cultivated character of each nation would influence the future of the nation in the sense of an original social union. Therefore, in Mill's opinion, the masses' future, with which he

had been concerned since "Civilization" and "Bentham", was not conceived as that of mankind in general but as that of component citizens. In this case, it seems necessary for the masses to cultivate themselves to recognize the historical situation of their nation. Moreover, in this process of cultivation, they would become conscious of themselves as the component citizens, so that they could define themselves as historical subjects. By this words "historical subjects", I mean those who are conscious of themselves as historical entities and attempt to cope with the common social problem in co-operation with others in the same historical situation. In other words, they are those who inherit thir history as given, and shoulder it consciously and positively so that they would become the bearers of history and would make it advance consciously. On this account, it is a matter of course that, without the impartial discernment of history, no one could become a historical subject.

In his article "Bentham, Mill deduced and constructed the "collective mind" as the subject which should compose together the new comprehensiveness. Here in "Coleridge", taking a step forward, he defined the "collective mind" as the component citizens, who should bear the future of the nation. If I dare to arrange briefly his logic in these articles, it may be as follows. In his opinion, the nation in the sense of an original social union was premised or set up as the real place where many different kinds of opinions would repeat the antagonism and the compromise incessantly. Then on one had (in "Bentham"), he described the process in which the masses would cultivate themselves to the "collective mind", stimulated by their recognition that they were producers and bearers of the new comprehensiveness, and on the other hand (in "Coleridge"), he derived the principles of the nation from history, so that he charge the former process with the meaning of the formation of the component citizens. As a result, he seems to have reached the clue to the solution of the two problems with which he had been concerned, the cultivation of the masses and the revival of the dialogue

between the conservative and the progressive.

Considering the conflict between classes which increased with the progress of capitalism, the inability of the possible historical subjects, the masses, scattered like "the sand of the seashore", to bear the society consciously, it is natural that Mill sought for the solution in the concept of the nation, which may always consist of many kinds of conflicting components. But his attempt might be a very dangerous bet, even though he definitely distinguished his opinion from the vulgar nationalism. It is a point which deserves some attention that he had never attempted to infuse the masses directly with any solid idea of the nation. It was only the method or the place that he developed here, while the consequence, that is the idea of the nation which the masses should take, was completely left in the consciousness of the masses. For this reason, I suppose, he devoted himself all his life to cultivating the masses into entities with individualities and subjectivities, as we see in his *On Liberty*.

In this way, Mill entered into the study of history in order to seek for the special historical subject, that is the nation. For Mill the nation seemed to offer a certain solution for the problems of his age. But the nation derived there was not searched for only to affirm a real nation, such as England. It seems to be an ideal type of the nation as an original union among real human beings, so it may deserve to be called a basis for the judgement of a real nation. Accordingly, what was conceived by him was quite different from either Hegel's philosophy of history with its specific end to affirm the Prussian absolute monarchy or some French thought, based on the existence of the rather weak bourgeoisie, which conceived a certain irresistible tendency to equality in history. Reflecting the flourishing English capitalism, Mill's perspective on history was based on the idea that the citizens should subjectively take part in or be concerned with the history of their own nation, led by the newly-risen class, a commercial class, that is the middle class. On this account, in his article "M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America [II]", exerting himself to diffuse the idea of democracy, he attempt-

ed to cultivate the middle class into the bearer of history. The theme of this article basically seems to be common to that of "Coleridge". At the concluding part of this article he said:

No rank in society is now exempt from the fear of being peculiar, the unwillingness to be, or to be thought, in any respect original. Hardly anything now depends upon individuals, but all upon classes, and among classes mainly upon the middle class. That class is now the power in society, the arbiter of fortune and success.¹⁷⁾

Moreover he said about the ordinary defects of the middle class in England:

The evil is not the preponderance of a democratic class, but of any class. The defects which M. de Tocqueville points out in the American, and which we see in the modern English mind, are the ordinary ones of a commercial class. The portion of society which is predominant in America, and that which is attaining predominance here, the American Many, and our middle class, agree in being commercial classes. The one country is affording a complete, and the other a progressive exemplification, that whenever any variety of human nature becomes predominant in a community, it imposes upon all the rest of society its own type; forcing all, either to submit to it or to imitate it.¹⁸⁾

Judging from these quotations, in Mill's view, the middle class predominated over the whole society. All social and political life and even intellectual life seemed to depend the intention of the middle class. They bore the society practically and were making history actually, whether or not they were conscious of these facts. But at the same time, the middle class was a jinx who brought some serious evil, for instance the despotism of the majority or the loss of individuality or the loss of human worth. It was of no use to criticize them from the old conservative standpoint. It seemed to be necessary for Mill to define them in terms of the nation as the original social

union, and hereby to give them the social and historical definition, by which they could cultivate themselves into entities consciously making history. In this way he had tried to conceive the possibility of separating the loss of human nature from the progress of civilization. He said:

Economical and social changes, though among the greatest, are not the only forces which shape the course of our species; ideas are not always the mere signs and effects of social circumstances, they are themselves a power in history. Let the idea take hold of the more generous and cultivated mind, that the most serious danger to the future prospects of mankind is in the unbalanced influence of the commercial spirit — let the wiser and betterhearted politicians and public teachers look upon it as their most pressing duty, to protect and strengthen whatever, in the heart of man or in his outward life, can form a salutary check to the exclusive tendencies of that spirit ...; there would... gradually shape itself forth a national education, which, without overlooking any other of the requisites of human well-being, would be adapted to this purpose in particular.¹⁹⁾

I suppose, what Mill intended in "Coleridge" was to liberate the views on the nation from the vulgar conservatives' hands, so that he could reconstruct the nation as the place of the social union where men could reflect themselves through their social lives. He tried to show a certain method for those people to cultivate themselves, who had lost themselves and wasted their energies in fruitless conflicts. In his view, this cultivation would bring the possibility of reviving the vigorous relationship between men and society. It might thus have been possible for every nation, regarding the individuality of each nation, to keep its friendly relationship to the others. Nevertheless, unfortunately actual world history, sweeping away not only Mill's idea but also Marx' idea of internationalism, advanced in a straight line toward the vulgar nationalism. However that may be, we have to appreciate that it was not any solid idea of the nation but the method or the place for men to

reflect themselves, that Mill conceived of and developed here. Considering that he would not develop any solid idea of the nation but devoted himself to cultivating the consciousness of the masses, his thought seems to include still more significant things which we have to learn today.

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1. *Collected Works*, vol. X, p. 121
2. *CW*, X, p. 163
3. *CW*, X, pp. 122-123
4. cf. Joachim Ritter, *Hegel und die französische Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main, 1965) and Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, 1954)
5. *CW*, X, pp. 130-131
6. *CW*, X, p. 131
7. *CW*, X, p. 132
8. *CW*, X, pp. 133
9. *CW*, X, pp. 133-134
10. *CW*, X, p. 134
11. *CW*, X, pp. 134-135
12. Professor R. J. Halliday says in his *John Stuart Mill* (London, 1976), that Mill gained a new standpoint by the publication of the essay on "Coleridge", which was different from his earlier Benthamism. Also he

maintains that this new one did not change into Benthamism again. In regard to this subject – whether or not Mill in later years returned to his old standpoint –, there are other opinions. Professor J. M. Robson develops an opposite opinion in his *The Improvement of Mankind* (London, 1968). For instance, he says that Mill in his middle age returned again to his earlier enthusiasm for Bentham (*ibid.* p. 35). But at least as for now, I have no qualification to identify who is right.

13. *CW*, X, pp. 138-139
14. It probably reminds us of something like the class consciousness of the working classes, but in Mill's opinion it was education in a wider sense of the word that should cultivate the consciousness of the masses and lead it to a new comprehensiveness. See, in regard to Mill's idea of education, F. W. Garforth's *Educative Democracy* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 38-57.
15. It is very difficult to interpret those words such as the middle class. I am afraid they may introduce some confusions. They do not belong to such categories as K. Marx deduced from the process of production. In Mill's case, the category of the middle class means sometimes the masses and sometimes the commercial and industrial class in general. It seems to me that Mill used this category in order to discriminate the modern classes, which had come into existence as a result of the development of civilization, that is, as a result of the diffusion of property and intelligence, from the old ones based on the society of preindustrial revolution.
16. cf. J. Habermas *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, SS. 158-171
17. *CW*, XVIII, p. 194
18. *CW*, XVIII, p. 196
19. *CW*, XVIII, pp. 197-198