

Polish-Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland

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**Polish-Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism
in Interwar Poland**

Proceedings of the International Seminar
Kyoto, January 7-8, 2018

Edited by Yuu Nishimura and Mari Nomura

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Preface

This is a compilation of essays and comments prepared for the international seminar “Polish- Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland” held at Kyoto University on January 7 and 8, 2018. The seminar was organized as a sequel to the international workshop “Yiddishism and the Creation of the Yiddish Nation” held in January 2017. This was part of the research project “Research Trend Investigations in Humanities Studies and the Formulation of Research Promotion Policies” (research representative: Mari Nomura), which was subsidized by the Research Center for Science Systems of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

In this seminar we focused on the rise of radical anti-Semitism in interwar Poland and on the reactions of Jewish youths to it. An animated discussion was held on the ideological, political, social and religious characteristics of Polish anti-Semitism. I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude to the lecturers who prepared the seminar papers, discussants, all seminar participants, and everyone who cooperated in realizing this seminar. I expect that research on the social and cultural history of Eastern European Jews will further develop in Japan.

Mari Nomura

The International Seminar on Polish-Jewish Relations and Anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland: Aims and Scope

Yuu Nishimura

The international seminar, “Polish-Jewish Relations and anti-Semitism in Interwar Poland,” held in January 2018, was organized as a sequel to the seminar, “Yiddishism and Creation of the Yiddish Nation,” held in January 2017.¹ Both events aimed at deepening the understanding of East European Jewish history and expanding the scope of Jewish studies in Japan.

For decades, studies on European Jews have attracted a significant amount of attention in Japan. Until relatively recently, however, studies on Jews in Eastern Europe have been overshadowed by research predominantly focusing on Western European Jews. In the first seminar, “Yiddishism and Creation of the Yiddish Nation,” we focused on Yiddishism, a variety of Eastern European Jewish nationalism that sought to establish a modern national identity and national community of Jews based on a common language, Yiddish. We explored Yiddishist ideas and the early history of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, an embodiment of the Yiddishist dream of a national academy for the Yiddish nation. In this, the second seminar, “Polish-Jewish Relations,” we tried to step further in the direction of expanding the scope to the history of Eastern European Jews, and to include their relationships with the surrounding population.

We established three goals for this seminar in connection with the previous seminar. First, we sought to shift the focus from the ideologies of Jewish political leaders or nationalist activists to the everyday experiences of ordinary Jews. Having Kamil Kijek as a lecturer was fascinating; his work on Polish Jewish youth in the interwar years, based on an analysis of a hundred autobiographies collected by YIVO during the autobiography contests it held in the 1930s, illuminates this aspect.²

The second goal was to delve into the relations between Jews and their Polish neighbors. This was a subject not satisfactorily covered in the previous seminar, but is obviously essential in analyzing the course of Jewish nationalism

and its influence on the Jewish society in general.

Whenever we attempt to investigate Polish-Jewish relations, there is an issue that can never be avoided: the question of anti-Semitism. The study of anti-Semitism as a general research field is not new in Japan, and has a relatively long history accompanied by many works including Japanese translation of some essential sources from other countries. The specific issue of anti-Semitism in *Poland*, or *Polish* anti-Semitism, however, remains almost unknown. Therefore, Polish anti-Semitism became a central issue for us, and to learn the latest approaches to studying it was the third goal in this seminar. Grzegorz Krzywiec, whose splendid work on Roman Domowski describes Polish anti-Semitism in conjunction with Polish nationalism, seemed a perfect choice as lecturer.³

How did the ordinary Jews in Poland, Europe's largest concentration of Jewish population at that time, live during the difficult era on the eve of WWII? How did Jews relate to their Polish neighbors and how did Poles relate to Jews? I hope the seminar did, and that this publication will, lead us to new insights into both Jewish and Polish history and promote further studies in this field.

* * *

The two-day seminar was held at Kyoto University. Participants included researchers and students of Polish or Jewish history as well as specialists of other Central and Eastern European countries. Researchers in other fields, such as literature and philosophy as they relate to either Jews or Poles, also participated.

The first day was devoted to the theme: "Dynamics of Modern Polish-Jewish Relations." Krzywiec's talk led us to the crucial period in the emergence of modern anti-Semitism in Poland, i.e., the era after the 1905 revolution, a period marked by the advent of mass politics and growing nationalism among both Poles and Jews. Kijek followed the relationship between these two groups in the context of the Second Polish Republic, a newly born nation-state, which held the promise of equal rights for all its citizens, but in reality betrayed it by prioritizing the ethnically and religiously defined "Polish nation" over other ethnic groups. Universal education among others made this paradox perceivable for both Polish and Jewish youth and exerted profound

influence on their changing mutual relationships.

The theme for the second day was “Anti-Jewish Violence on the Eve of WWII.” Here we focused on the pogroms that occurred in Polish provinces in the 1930s. Krzywiec demonstrated the process by which anti-Semitism, accompanied by physical violence, became part of the culture of the broader Polish right wing and was eventually absorbed by the post-Piłsudski *Sanacja* regime. Kijek’s talk, a case study of the Kielce voivodeship, clarified the mechanics how modern anti-Semitism, originally an urban phenomenon promoted by intellectuals, penetrated into the peasant population in the countryside. Both talks pointed to the existence of the well-devised political plan of the Polish radical right wing that combined its anti-regime political strategies with radical anti-Semitism and that consequently led to the eruption of the violent pogroms.

All lectures were followed by comments from discussants (Shigechika Suzuki, Haruka Miyazaki, Hisashi Shigematsu, and Yuu Nishimura). The comments printed in this volume were prepared from the lecturers’ preliminary papers that had been submitted before the seminar. The lecturers’ papers in this volume were revised after the seminar.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to the lecturers, discussants, and all seminar participants. Special thanks are due to Satoshi Koyama (Kyoto University) for kindly offering the venue and to Taro Tsurumi (The University of Tokyo) for gracefully assuming the role of moderator. The success of this seminar with its lively discussions owed much to his skillful and insightful moderation.

¹ Yuu Nishimura and Mari Nomura eds., *Yiddishism and Creation of the Yiddish Nation: Proceedings of the International Workshop* (Kanazawa, 2017). This proceedings is available online at Kanazawa University Repository for Academic Recourses: <https://kanazawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp>

² Kamil Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej w Polsce międzywojennej* (Wrocław, 2017).

³ Grzegorz Krzywiec, *Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 1886–1905)* (Frankfurt am Mein, 2016). See also idem, *Polska bez Żydów: Studia z dziejów idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk antysemitycznych na ziemiach polskich początku XX wieku (1905–1914)* (Warszawa, 2017). Krzywiec and Kijek served as co-editors of the special issue of *Kwartalnik Historii Żydów* [*Quarterly of Jewish History*] 28 (258) (2016) devoted to the problem of anti-Semitism in Poland from 1905 to 1939.

Part I

Dynamics of Modern Polish-Jewish Relations

A Clash of Two Nations?
The Post-1905 Revolution Trauma, the Rise of the Polish Jews
and the Founding Myths of Polish Modern Anti-Semitism

Grzegorz Krzywiec

The 1905 Revolution in Russian Poland: Enthusiasm, Shock and Trauma

The events of 1905, the so called the First Russian Revolution brought to light the stark division of social and political life in Russian Poland and then in the Polish land. Never before then had the imagination of the conservative part of Polish society been so deeply haunted by the spectre of a violent revolt fomented by a socialist-Jewish plot. Fears of the overturning of the natural order, along with suspicions and anxieties over the future of the national community were common amongst both the middle and higher classes – which is to say, the social and cultural establishment as a whole – and therefore the imagined figure of the Jewish revolutionary perfectly embodied these phobias. The ‘First Russian Revolution’ was very significant for the Polish political and social scene, even though few at the time were ready to acknowledge that at the outset¹.

In this regard the vision of a disciplined society governed by a ‘national organization’ as defined by Roman Dmowski and his political fellows seems to have offered some Poles hope for a genuine barrier against the chaos of revolution, anarchy, mass strikes, and above all the appearance of mobs on the streets and, first and foremost, the rise of the Jewish community². Dmowski, the principle ideologue and political leader of National Democracy (*Endecja*, the first and biggest nationalist party in Polish lands – its members were usually called national democrats or shortly *Endeks*), also presented his vision as the only way to preserve Polish national identity in times of deep crisis and political and first and foremost social upheavals³.

There can be no doubt that radical anti-Semitism based on racial thinking was central from the very beginning to Dmowski’s ideological project⁴. What is even far more interesting is how and to what extent he efficiently added to his agenda new political slogans. Dmowski first proclaimed his views and ideas in a

collection of essays entitled the 'Thoughts of a Modern Pole' (*Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 1903), wherein racial Social Darwinism was intermingled with a project for the modernization of the nation. Then when he got back from his journey to Japan (1905), deeply impressed by ethnic homogeneity of the latter, the leader of the national democrats added some new elements to his ideological framework: most of all a vision of a racial anarchy in which the Jews as the most racially alienated and hostile element wanted to appropriate the revolution in order to dominate the Christian environment⁵. To be sure, however, anti-Semitism was not a key to the *Endeks*' success during the revolution and shortly afterwards. The 'Jewish' question' in the *Endeks*' rhetoric and political strategy had there only secondary status⁶. Nonetheless, at the very outset the nationalist movement attained the status of a mass movement, but not so much through the agency of the National Democracy (ND) as a political party, but rather than due to the effective leadership of a coalition of vested interests.

By the end of 1905 the party had become the strongest mass political movement (ca. 50.000 members) in Russian Poland. At this time the *Endeks*' political structure was orchestrated by a handful of people, namely Dmowski and his inner circle, who paved the way to the creation of the first genuine political and propaganda war machine in Polish lands. In the early months of 1906 that machine with sophisticated party organization and its own nationwide press system would spread over nearly the entire country and go on to win a comprehensive victory in Congress Poland's first elections (1906) to the Russian State Duma⁷. The electoral victory of the nationalists was bound to lead to a fierce confrontation between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. What became crucial, if not decisive to the *Endeks*' success at this stage was, as one may assume, the political plan for challenging the Revolution as a case of violent anarchy from the left and an apocalyptic act against Christian order and, secondly, the nationalists' adroit management of counter-revolutionary fears and anxieties.

The early peak of this new mass politics in Russian Poland, a mixture of anti-socialist scaremongering and disciplinary rhetoric with some anti-Jewish motifs, may be said to have taken place in the Lodz (*Łódź*) uprising of 1906-1907.

For the very first time this new attitude turned from ideological and rhetoric battle in the press to a local civil war, and in the biggest industrial city in central Congress Poland. Much has been written about those events. Here it is worthwhile recalling just the simple facts and figures. In the rebellion of Łódź, from autumn 1906 to spring 1907, no less than 400 people were killed and many others wounded in fratricidal assassinations between rightist paramilitary squads inspired by the *Endeks*' political message and leftist activists from various circles. Dmowski, as the editor-in-chief of the main nationalist daily of the time (the Polish Gazette – *Gazeta Polska*), a capital ship of the campaign, was a crucial instigator and key personality behind the anti-socialist hysteria in the nationalist press. For the *Endecja* in the first decade of new century the exclusion of all 'non-Polish' groups from the national collectivity meant an uncompromising fight against them until their complete, both political and moral de-legitimization. In extreme cases this could lead to physical elimination.

Surely, the events of 1905-1907 empowered Dmowski's personal standing within the nationalist camp and among conservative public opinion, last but not least among Catholic middle classes. Indeed, it was not only the successes of the *Endecja* in elections (once in 1906 and twice in 1907) that demonstrated that nationalist ideas and disciplinary visions and phantasms had gained broad acceptance among Polish voters and amongst the general public. The leader of the National Democracy, as someone who had taken part in putting the Revolution down, was treated by some sections of the general public as a charismatic leader, one ready to assume responsibility for the whole country and the 'Polish cause' as such. Hand in hand with the acknowledgement of his role among the ranks of *Endeks*, a group of nationalist activists was formed in his camp. These people were strictly subordinated to him, and hence dubbed 'Dmowski-ites'. What is yet most interesting, they all became the moving power of all the *Endecja*'s later political and above all anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns.

After 1905 the political anti-Semitism of the National Democracy reached many aspects. First and the foremost, anti-Jewish slogans had a practical value that could mobilize some parts of society in Congress Poland against the Left and progressivist circles. The *Endeks* at this time effectively used those slogans not

only against the Jewish community as a whole, but in order to fight the Left and the Centre, and even the conciliatory, conservative circles, so called the *Realists*⁸. What is most striking is how rapidly and to what extent they adopted a negative disposition towards the Jews. This rhetoric linked all the roles of the ‘enemy within’ with the Jewish community. During elections to the Russian Duma, in the spring of 1907, the *Endeks* became even more radical and aggressive in their attitude towards the Jews, and began using political anti-Semitism as an instrument in their active fight against any opposition⁹. The Jews began to epitomize in this rhetoric all forms of aggression against Polishness, and the National Democracy nominated itself the sole depository and defender of Polish values – and the tactic worked very effectively.

The ‘Jewish revolution’: the 1905 and the rise of the East European Jewry

One has in mind, however, that the 1905 Revolution had a tremendous effect on the Jewish communities under the Tsarist rule as well¹⁰. There were at least a couple of significant waves of that rise which in fact reconfigured and then constituted the identity of the Polish Jewry of this time. A few phenomenon needs, though, special consideration in this regard. When in January 1905 a special Empire committee established to reform press law started its proceedings in St. Petersburg, the editors of nearly every newspaper in Russian Poland much as great many book editors had requested the abolition of the preventative censorship. And then effects were almost immediate. In early 1906 official state statistics noticed the appearance of over 160 new press titles throughout the Kingdom of Poland, of which as many as 100 were newspapers in Warsaw¹¹. A significant percentage of these were albeit Yiddish publications. Most of the names of their editors marked the milestones in the history of modern Jewish press: Noah Finkelshteyn, Noah Pryłucki, Shmuel Yatskan and many, many others. All they came under revolutionary times, however. E.g. St. Petersburg originated but mostly in Warsaw distributed daily *Der Veg* (*The Road*), was suspended in October 1905 just after a couple of months of internal conflict on the editorial board, permanent fights with the Tsarist censorship and a generally revolutionary turmoil just to appear again under the same name by the end of

following month. The daily reached a circulation over 10,000 copies in the days of the opening of the First State Duma (spring 1906). Another daily which started up in Warsaw as such as an effect of transformations and evolutions of many various titles, *Haynt (Today)* (1908) introduced into the Jewish culture a new format: modern layout on the front page, with a division among headlines and columns, all these allowed new readers easily to recognize the papers' content¹². This new world reached in months mass circulation growing up to more than 20,000. In some sense, the Yiddish press played crucial role in the development of the new Jewish identity. Moreover the editors of the press began to perform a role, which they had assigned to themselves: they prepared Jewish masses for existing in a modern nation-state¹³. As a result of the 1905 Revolution, as Scott Ury pointed out, 'the center of Jewish community and politics had passed from the *gmina* building to the editor's desk'¹⁴. And the editors and journalists became out of the blue both spokesmen and teachers of the Jewish masses.

Similar effect brought forth explosion of the new Jewish theatre. During the 1905 Revolution various Yiddish companies flocked to Warsaw and some other Russian Poland cities and began to perform at different locations. Some of them were the first ventures in intention to stage Jewish play in Polish for primarily Jewish audience. But for many others this was a part of a plan to enable Jewish audience to experience a new Yiddish theatre. Although throughout Eastern Europe professional and amateur Yiddish drama had arisen and flourished, Warsaw became for the next three decades the centre of the Jewish theatre. In fact then theatres, mass-circulation press and other cultural venues were only part of the larger development of a new phenomenon that appeared together with the Revolution: a modern Jewish popular culture focused on masses which in Warsaw and other cities came into being virtually overnight. This new Yiddish mass-circulation phenomenon, a kind of socio-cultural revolution among the Jewish community awoke among contemporaries various intense reactions. E.g. the popularity of the Yiddish mass-circulation press aroused distaste and shock among the milieu of the integrated Polish Jews. As Kalman Weiser, historian of the Jewish popular culture once noticed, 'the very notion of a modern Jewish in Yiddish was simultaneously oxymoronic and menacing, an open challenge to the

supremacy of the Polish language and culture on Polish soil'¹⁵. No doubt, all that was received by the Polish public with a growing skepticism. The Jewish political and cultural activists almost overnight became anti-heroes in the Polish imagination¹⁶.

'Anti-Litvak' hysteria as a case study of the demographic panic, mass media consensus and nationalist scaremongering campaign

When in the spring of 1910 nationalists became the actual winner of the Third Russian Duma, reactionary and chauvinist tendencies began getting the upper hand not only in the Russian establishment. A wave of cultural pessimism spread all over the Russian Empire and dominated public debates. Undoubtedly, this was the outcome of Stolypin's reaction, the ruthless and merciless fight against the revolutionary movement, but it was also the outcome of the government's struggle against the liberal Left and local national movements within the Empire. The various chauvinist slogans such as 'one, undivided Russia', and 'Russia for the Russians' proclaimed by the Right coincided with the meticulous and behind-the-scenes activities of the Tsarist administration. As early as May 1910 the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted to the Duma a project for municipal self-government, and in the autumn it came up eventually for debate.

The question that greatly stirred and then went wild Polish public opinion firstly in Russian Poland then in the end in all three partitions, was one of creating a new administrative *guberniya* outside the borders of the former Congress Poland called the 'Chelm project'. The project was received by Poles of various political viewpoints and strands as a new partition. The matter had also been instrumentally delayed by the Tsarist bureaucracy¹⁷. After Russian Prime Minister Peter Stolypin was assassinated (September 1911), the project for municipal self-government ended, and in fact it had never come into force. The Prime Minister's death in a terrorist bomb attack affected the whole Russian political scene in other ways, as well. The Tsarist administration decided to lash out at the Jewish community by forcing them into emigration. Some of this 'tide' of refugees (known as *Litvaks*) came to Congress Poland – and Polish public opinion was

more than horrified. However, Stolypin's assassination did not change the general nationalist trend in Russian policy. And to be sure nothing irritated patriotic feelings at this time of crisis as much as uncertainty. Polish patriotic anxieties of the first decades of 20th Century heightened by the adverse moves of the partitioning powers sought an outlet. This powerful sense of threat to the Polish cause, fears of uncertainty shared by many contemporaries on one hand was accompanied by a rise of patriotic feeling, connected in part with the nationalist persecution of the Polish population in Prussia, and in part with the general international unrest, which many saw as a prelude to a European-wide conflict on the other hand¹⁸. This was as well the atmosphere in which the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the First Battle of Tannenberg (*Grunwald*) – the biggest Middle Ages battle against German-Prussian Teutonic Knights widely recognized among Poles as a symbol of victory over Germaneness – were held in July 1910. What recurred then, side by side with the widespread anti-German feelings, were the even stronger 'anti-Litvak' phobias among Poles¹⁹.

From 1909, but especially from 1910 onwards these surges of feelings were dynamically and radically growing²⁰. Thus, for example, the Council of Polish Progressive Union (*Polskie Zjednoczenie Postępowe*), the main centre-left party claimed at a closed-door debate that the non-assimilated Jew should be treated as 'an internal enemy' of the whole Polish nation²¹. Thus, Leon Wasilewski, a leading ideologue of the Polish Socialist Party - Revolutionary Faction (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - Frakcja Rewolucyjna – PPS-FR*), the independentist socialist party warned in the same manner: 'Litvakism' is an abnormal, pathological, reactionary symptom, just as pathological and reactionary as its reasons' ²² . Warnings and scaremongering against the *Litvaks* recurred systematically in the press of the Party of Real Politics (*Stronnictwo Polityki Realnej*), a principal conservative party, which at this time was nearly free of popular anti-Semitism²³. And these stirrings and currents were merely the beginnings of the huge anti-Semitic tide, likely one of the most drastic rhetoric campaign against the Jews in Polish public life in the early 20th century.

What seemed to be most surprising even to contemporaries was that these aggressive anti-Jewish phraseology and images were spreading overwhelmingly

among the socialist and leftist milieux²⁴. The aforementioned Leon Wasilewski, a noted linguist and an expert on minority questions as well, a close fellow of Józef Piłsudski and one of the most prominent activist of Polish Socialist Party noticed that anti-Semitic impulses were growing rapidly among those socialists who strove for the independence of Poland. The party propaganda now adopted new anti-Semitic motifs and elements. For instance, the terms such as a ‘Levite’ – an adherent of the PPS Left (*PPS-Lewica*), the left wing of the Polish socialist movement – and ‘social-Litvakism’ appeared as descriptions for ‘Jewish nationalism in a socialist guise’²⁵. The fierce polemic between the fighters for Poland’s independence and the socialist Left had gone on for years, but now arguments with an appearance of factuality were ousted by anti-Semitic generalizations.

Juljan Unszlicht was another infamous author of long pamphlets on this theme²⁶. His essays appeared in *the Independent Thought (Myśl Niepodległa)*, the progressivist daily *Morning Courier (Kurier Poranny)*, but also in the socialist weekly *Pre-dawn (Przedświt)*, and they were then reprinted by the main Galician socialist daily *Forward (Naprzód)* and the socialist weekly *Workers’ Gazette (Gazeta Robotnicza)*, which appeared among the Polish diaspora in Berlin. All those were main socialist and left-radical Polish opinion-forming periodicals of the time. Unszlicht, a former international socialist, argued openly that another left-wing socialist group, the Social Democracy of Kingdom Poland and Lithuania (*Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy – SDKPiL*), was simply ‘an emanation of petty-bourgeois Jewish nationalism’. In his fierce attack ‘W. Sendeki’ (Unszlicht’s pseudonym as a publicist) accused the leaders of the Social Democracy of being the ‘Litvak Targowica’, in reference to the Confederation of Targowica established by Polish magnates and aristocrats, widely acknowledged as traitors of Poland, who opposed the 3rd of May 1791 Constitution in collusion with the Russian Empress Catherine II. He claimed they had provoked the violence of the partitioners and wished to subjugate the whole Polish nation. The overall atmosphere of fear of ‘the Litvak swarm’ reached its heights in the early autumn of 1910 when the attacks against the SDKPiL came to the knowledge of international socialist milieux²⁷.

The year 1910 also marked a turning-point in the nationalist movement. Within this camp were found the most extreme anti-Semitic publicists of the time: Ignacy Oksza-Grabowski, a writer and contributor to many influential cultural periodicals, and Stanisław Pieńkowski. Both contributed to the ND press with sophisticated elaborations meant to unmask the ‘moral corruption’ of Polish culture by ‘the Jewish racial element’. Pieńkowski, a poet, a famous translator of Nietzsche’s works into Polish, and an apologist of mystic Aryanism soon became the leading cultural critic of the *Warsaw Gazette* (*Gazeta Warszawska*), the main nationalist daily in that period. For all those authors – and there are many others of a minor kind – the fight against the ‘Jewish threat’ meant something more than the mere ousting of the hostile and parasitical element from the Polish national community. Getting rid of the Jews was seen as a remedy for the illnesses of ‘the whole Aryan world’, as the destruction of the source of evil that pestered the contemporary Western world²⁸.

Although this anti-Jewish scaremongering was directed and managed above all by the National Democrats and the nationalist press, which cleverly turned the Jews into the universal enemy of Poles and the Polish cause, the tide that flowed chiefly through the Warsaw press had a much wider extent and built a sort of moral consensus between the main Polish political groups²⁹. Some symbolic turning point could also be noticed in the Catholic press, which had earlier tried to moderate outspoken, especially racial-driven anti-Jewish ranting. The presence of overt and radical anti-Semites in the columns of the Catholic press became the order of the day then³⁰.

This anti-Litvak psychosis had gone far beyond the so-called ‘progressive anti-Semitism’, a trend symbolically connected with Andrzej Niemojewski, a leftist activist and noted poet, that was attached to the Left of the turn of the century³¹. Initially, the interests of this author in the Jewish question did not distinguish him from other progressives. His sporadic declarations in this regard located him among the adherents of the radical assimilation of Jews into Christianity. Up until 1905 he declared himself a friend of the Jews, which, according to him, on the one hand meant he was in favour of the complete integration of the Jewish population into Polish society, and on the other it

revealed his fascination with some elements of Jewish culture. In 1906 he established the periodical *Myśl Niepodległa*, which disclosed the paradoxes and inconsistencies of faith from the viewpoint of scientism.

In 1909 there slowly emerged from among his not quite coherent views certain anti-Semitic motifs. At the time of the creation of the two most important Yiddish dailies, and the debate about national rights in the Duma, the *Myśl Niepodległa* waged a radical critique of Yiddish. The journal persistently repeated the clichés of that time, such as that Yiddish was an underdeveloped German serving everyday communication, but absolutely useless for the development of culture; or that there was no literature or even serious journalism in this language. Thus the year 1910 marked a qualitative point in Niemojewski's writings as a publicist and public figure. This change could be noticed even in the September attack of *Myśl Niepodległa* on the SDKPiL. Its polemic with the social-democratic press, not free of cavils and libels, triggered off a genuine avalanche of further accusations. The publicist specified: 1905 had been an important watershed in Polish history, as it signified a victory of the democratic idea that was thwarted by the Jews; their anti-Polish behaviour was the result of their caste character; they were not a nation, but an anachronistic racial-religious group of interest. As time went by, Niemojewski added new charges to these two accusations. In some sense, he did not say anything new: he just piled up more and more aggressive metaphors, which later took on their own life. On the eve of the First World War Niemojewski and his contributors were deeply absorbed by the racial and anthropological ties that allegedly connected the Jews, as well as by the 'ethic of the Talmud', which prevented any assimilation.

Niemojewski's ferocious attacks against the Jews were supported by another publicist well-known among the progressives – namely, Izabella (Iza) Moszczeńska. Her prolific contributions and commentaries from 1910 on in *Kurier Poranny* (a journal close to the progressives, but as well the unofficial tribune for the independentist socialists) turned 'the Jewish question' into the chief problem for the whole of educated Polish opinion³². In a more quiet tone, Moszczeńska argued that the presence of the Jewish population hampered the modernization of Polish society.

These tendencies found their reflection in popular culture. What appeared as a *signum temporis* was the popular anti-Semitic *belle-lettres* novels and fictions. The authors of those bestselling novels were generally absorbed by three problems: ‘the Prussian-Jewish plot’, ‘the *Litvaks* and *Litvakism*’, and eventually ‘the boycott of the Jews’³³. The literary critic, writer and above all the leading *salonfähig* anti-Semite Teodor Jeske-Choiński wrote about the leading exponent of this trend, Józef Weyssenhoff (the author, among other novels, of *Political Days* [*Dni polityczne*, 1910], and *the Hetmans* [*Hetmani*, 1911]), that ‘in *Hetmani* he broke away from the earlier tradition of writing about the Jews in local terms, and gave the picture of their general strivings’³⁴. About *the Awakening* (*Przebudzenie*) by Artur Gruszecki, a popular novelist e.g. of *the Litvak Swarm* (*Litwackie mrowie*, 1911), a contemporary critic says: ‘The Jew in this novel appears simply as a general category of threat and hatred, a personification of evil’³⁵.

In 1911 a tide of social tensions swept across the lands of the Russian partition. This coincided with the outbreak of Beilis’s anti-Semitic affair in Russia, but embraced even wider circles of local societies in the Russian Empire and re-awoke medieval anti-Judaic myths, as well³⁶. As the journalist Bernard Singer recalled about his childhood in Warsaw during those days: ‘Boys on the streets were already shouting ‘Beilis’ at bearded Jews’³⁷. Moreover, in the long term the economic crisis of 1907-1909 finally came to affect one of the basic groups that made up the ND electorate – namely, the Christian bourgeoisie and small entrepreneurs. It was then, as Robert Blobaum says, that a conviction took root among the ‘Christian middle class’ that the presence of their Jewish competitors was the main factor hindering economic development³⁸.

By the end of 1909 and the beginning of 1910 in Congress Poland the anti-Semitic jargon, with the Jew as the major threat to Poland, had entered the language and the imagination of the National Democrats completely and for good. Moreover, Dmowski wanted at every turn to define the Jews as an exotic and dangerous Asiatic race. He presented them and all their doings as the work of a parasite. ‘Parasitism’ as he once called it, was the genuine ideology of Jews. He emphasized that the Jews could simply not belong to the Polish nation. Ultimately,

he strove for the unification of all anti-Jewish thinking and ideologies under the *Endeks*' banner³⁹. The party and the *Endek*'s press propaganda machine in all partitions were actually ready for a final battle.

However, in political praxis, the dynamic of anti-Semitic rhetoric should above all be connected with the rise of the Jewish community. A phenomenon that especially affected the form and intensity of anti-Semitic attitudes after the 1905 Revolution was the migration of the Jews from Russia to the Congress Poland. Interestingly enough, resentments towards those groups were first voiced by the Polish Jews and reached Polish opinion from that angle. The enmity towards the *Litvaks* as a metaphor of the Jew-stranger with Russian roots was the only outlet for Russophobia openly permitted by the Tsarist system. Most Polish publications of the time viewed this Yiddish revival as either aggressive or provocative, the others as merely evasive. Although short-lived, the Litvak myth, together with the side-effects of the 1905 Revolution, had an enormous impact upon not only Polish anti-Semitism, but on the Polish politics as such.

Thus seen from various perspectives it is very true, as the eminent Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki once wrote, that by 1912 all the positions on this front had been taken and clearly delineated. Only the signal was missing⁴⁰. And this was when the elections to the Fourth Duma were to be announced.

The 1912 IV Warsaw State Duma electoral campaign as a nationalist blitz and the founding milestones of the new Poland

Quite a lot has already been written about the role of the elections to the Fourth Duma in 1912, the course they took, and their significance for Polish-Jewish relations⁴¹. Before addressing some of this propaganda campaign, one should review the background to Polish-Jewish relations in Warsaw at the time. Fin-de-siècle Warsaw was a real prism through which tensions could be seen throughout the whole of Congress Poland. As afore-mentioned Polish-Jewish relations were deeply affected for the very first time in the 1907 State Duma Election by the scare of 'Jewish domination'. Warsaw, with its Jewish community numbering over 200,000 thousand, was the most important centre of the Jewish

population in Europe⁴². But the public presence of the Jews began to irritate the ‘Christian’ majority.

By the decision of the Russian administration a requirement was made in the municipal electoral group to register candidates. Among the 83 electors of a deputy from Warsaw, there happened to be 46 Jews, which made 55 percent of all electors. When in mid-August the Tsarist government released information on eligible and registered voters, the news was a shock to Poles. For most of the Polish public, whether right or centre-left, the conclusion was to form a united front, including the Jews, to oppose any separate Jewish lists and insure the election of a Polish delegate. However, the National Democrats and first and foremost Dmowski himself rejected the idea that any sort of agreement with Jewish voters was possible on acceptable terms. The nationalist press then held that the only way to successfully combat ‘the Jewish threat’ was for all Poles to rally around National Democracy and then fiercely attack all opposition, claiming that all who opposed the *Endeks*, were taking their cues directly from the Jews.

However at the very beginning this indolent campaign – nobody believed in the victory of the *Endeks* in Warsaw – was instigated by Dmowski himself. It seems that by forcefully putting himself up as a candidate in order to provoke all his foes (since the 1905 Revolution he was likely the most hated political personality amongst the Left and liberals), he counted on splitting Polish voices into ‘national’ and ‘Jewish’, which was typical of his binary, apocalyptic vision of the world and society. Jan Kucharzewski, the alternative candidate of the united camp of the opposition dubbed ‘Concentration’ (*Koncentracja*), his main opponent, stood no chances if he was deprived of Jewish votes. But Jewish electors, irritated by Kucharzewski’s attitude, voted in the end for an unknown candidate from the workers’ electoral group.

In one of his speeches Dmowski claimed that a Polish delegate chosen with Jewish votes would represent Jewish, not Polish interests, and therefore by no means would be acceptable. Thus, over the last days of the campaign the *Endeks*’ propagandist machine was waging bitter polemical warfare with their Polish opponents, presenting the struggle with the Jews not only as the central issue, but as well as a moral battle and ultimately a ‘life and death question’. One of the

most frequently used weapons by the *Endeks* press was to tie their opponents with a ‘Jew-word’. The centre-right Concentration was therefore referred to as a ‘Jewish Polish Concentration’, and its members as ‘Jewish hirelings’ or puppets. All others as either ‘defenders of the Jews’ or representatives of ‘Judeo-polonia’, ‘Jewish flunkies’ or ‘Judaicized Poles’. As the liberal critic Józef Lange noted: ‘nowadays everything in the country is Jewish, with the exception of National Democracy’⁴³.

At the peak of this campaign the party began to publish the yellow daily *Morning Gazette Two Pennies* (*Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze*), soon a capital ship of the whole anti-Jewish campaign in Russian Poland, which proclaimed that ‘it accepted advertising only from Christians’, and ‘Workers! Don’t elect Jewish flunkies!’ and then called for an anti-Jewish boycott, and in the end waged war against the Jews. In contrast to the vigorous hate campaign of the *Endeks*, all parties within Concentration, not mentioning the socialist Left lacked either real unity, charismatic leadership, or a consistent program.

What was more than significant was that the *Endeks*’ aggressive agitation in the campaign was not especially directed against the Jews as such, but mainly against Dmowski’s Polish competitors, whom he blamed for being ‘Jewish puppets’. Both earlier and the most recent studies underline the limited influence of the economic boycott on the Jewish community⁴⁴. One must therefore bear in mind that the conflict had a wider effect in a more profound sense. Indeed, the nationalist mobilization was directed not only against Jewish trade and industry, but denounced all contacts between Poles with Jews or with people considered to be ‘Jewish’. And in that sense, it was the most successful.

The practical ‘fruit’ of the boycott campaign was the Society *Rozwój* (Development), the Society for the Development of Industry, Crafts and Trade (*Towarzystwo Rozwoju Przemysłu*), with its branches appearing in the whole area of the Russian partition. *Rozwój* ran its frenetic agitation in nationalist journals: the opinion-making *Gazeta Warszawska*, and the agitation spreading *Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze* (the authors of which included the nationalist élite of the next for two upcoming decades: Stanisław Kozicki, Ignacy Oksza-Grabowski, Stanisław Pieńkowski, Władysław Jabłonowski, to name a few), but also in

periodicals addressed to individual social groups. This campaign was also conducted in the Catholic ecclesiastical press (e.g. *Catholic Review* [*Przegląd Katolicki*], *Pole-Catholic* [*Polak-Katolik*], and *Sowing* [*Posiew*]) and in some conservative-clerical dailies, such as *Day* (*Dzień*), *Daily for Everyone* (*Dziennik dla Wszystkich*), and the *General Chronicle* (*Kronika Powszechna*) appearing in Galicia. *Rozwój* also issued its own publications such as *the Each to Your Own* (*Swój do swego*) and *the Boycott* (*Bojkot*) in Lwów; it also took up some smaller initiatives, such as *My Little Journal* (*Moje Pisemko*), or *Our World* (*Nasz Świat*) – journals primarily addressed to children and youngsters. The anti-Jewish boycott campaign seems to be the Polish largest and most branched social movement of the time.

Perhaps the most striking in this enormous campaign of hate was that in the provinces the election results did not differ much from the previous ones: in fact, they became but a pretext for the ND for their campaign against the Jews. The nationalist press had even earlier been full of boycott slogans. They frequently referred to Irish or Czech examples from the epoch, justifying the fight against ‘Jewish expansiveness’ by the defense of ‘the state of Polish possessions’. But this kind of rationalization could not conceal the fact that the goals of the fight against the Jews were more far-reaching. Stanisław Pieńkowski vociferated in October: ‘The boycott, or a ruthless though bloodless Polish-Jewish war is the beginning of a new era for Poland’⁴⁵. He declared that Jews stood behind every trend and tendency that seemed to threaten Poland’s existence – i.e., liberalism and progressivism, not to mention every kind of revolutionary movement. The publicist understood the prospects for a national revival of Polish society in militant anti-Semitism. What is really fascinating is that during the three years just before the Great War, the language of biological racism infiltrated and subverted Polish public culture, yet the tendency in the nationalist press (especially in *Gazeta Poranna 2 Grosze*) to think of Jews in racial and diabolic terms was more extreme, influencing even the centre-right press. Of course, there were distinctions between the cases. The further one went towards the political right the more virulent were the expressions of hatred.

Step by step, the nationalist rhetoric, which focused on the Jews, also became more aggressive. This kind of reasoning reduced ‘all the affairs of this world’ to the plotting and scheming of ‘international Jewry’ and then the free-masons. Under the wing of this campaign flourished the most extreme forms of anti-Semitism, from virtually medieval accusations of ritual murder up to strictly racist divagations about the degenerating influence of the Jewish race on the Poles. A manifesto of this kind of thinking was contained in the publications of Dmowski, who on the eve of the World War argued that a Poland without Jews was possible only in a Europe without Jews.

Though the boycott was started and instigated by the *Endeks* and then the Catholic press, it was supported by a large part of the progressive press, including the leading opinion-making titles of the time: namely *the Truth (Prawda)* and the *Polish Humanist (Humanista Polski)*. In a less overt way, the same ideas were propagated by a number of opinion-making periodicals (such as *Illustrated Weekly [Tygodnik Ilustrowany]*, or the conservative *World [Świat]*, published by the Jewish converts, established Olgerbrand family, and even by the centre-right *Warsaw Courier [Kurier Warszawski]*). However, the conservative journals (the conciliatory *Polish Courier [Kurier Polski]* and *Word [Słowo]*, connected with the Party of Real Politics) kept aloof from this campaign. The only big Warsaw daily that expressed condemnation of this anti-Semitic hullabaloo was *the New Gazette (Nowa Gazeta)*. The independentist socialist journals, whose readers were actually few, were also against the anti-Semitic agitation.

There were also certain personal protests, such as those by Adam Zakrzewski and Józef Lange, centre-left intellectuals who left the Polish Progressive Party. Much more significant were the public voices of condemnation of the anti-Semitic aggression and the boycott: apart from the Catholic journalist Teresa Lubińska and the leftist activist Stefania Sempołowska, worthy of note is also the attitude of Ludomir Grendyszyński, a conservative from Erazm Piltz’s political circle. Nothing, however, could be compared to the efforts of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, who until the outbreak of the war was dogged in the fight against anti-Semitism⁴⁶.

All segregationist slogans soon affected other 'Jewish enterprises'. *Gazeta Poranna* as well as *Gazeta Warszawska* called for boycotting and social marginalizing all the representatives of the intelligentsia of Jewish descent. These dailies along with the opinion-making *the National Review (Przegląd Narodowy)* became strongholds of the ND's vision of the world. Nationalist periodicals in the provinces, following in the footsteps of *Gazeta Poranna*, introduced special columns entitled 'Jewish Masquerade', which unmasked and then denounced the businesses whose owners or employees were of Jewish descent. The boycott also embraced the noted adversaries of anti-Semitic excesses, such as Ludwik Krzywicki, Ludwik Straszewicz or Jan Baudouin de Courtenay.

The campaign initiated in autumn 1912 most painfully afflicted the Poles of Jewish descent. A dramatic duality could be noticed among the assimilated Polish Jews, and this was most manifest in the daily *Nowa Gazeta*, or the liberal weekly *the Free Word (Wolne Słowo)*, whose authors, mostly connected with progressive democracy, found themselves at the cross-roads. The radicalization of anti-Semitism polarized opinion even among the Poles of Jewish descent.

While the journalists of *Nowa Gazeta* (among others, Stanisław Kempner, Józef Wascug, and the aforementioned Józef Lange) strongly opposed the anti-Jewish campaign, the majority of the progressive camp, including the most important grouping Polish Progressive Union and the Polish Progressive Party of Henryk Konic – supported the economic boycott of the Jews. Among the enthusiasts of this scaremongering were afore-mentioned Juljan Unszticht and Leon Brunn, a former liberal politician.

Résumé

However, the most important side-effect of the anti-Semitic campaign of 1912 was the firm embedding of anti-Semitism in the political culture of Congress Poland, and later on of all the Polish lands. The majority of endemic anti-Semitic initiatives in the Polish lands, various anti-Jewish sub-cultures such as Stojalowski's movement in the Western Part of Galicia, the weekly *Progress (Postęp)* in Prussian Poland, or the movement of 'land-tillers' (*rolarze*) followers of Jan Jeleński movements in Congress Poland – these were taken under the wing

of National Democracy. Anti-Semitism in various forms became one of the permanent elements of the cultural code of the conservative part of Polish society, with the negative attitude toward the Jews being the basic indicator of their national identity.

In this regard, more than any other political event of the time, the election and boycott campaign of 1912 marked a turning point in the further radicalization of the Polish right and of the implementation of various anti-Jewish discourses into public life. Furthermore, for the majority of Poles, the Jews as a community became a separate element, if not a hostile one, then at best a group who did not bother about 'Polish interests'.

But was it truly a vital question – or just a mental crutch? It was certainly still an era of post-revolutionary prostration, an undermining of belief in guiding ideas, an era of cultural pessimism, the years of Stolypin's reaction, a time of police and, last but not least, of economic crisis. When the Tsarist government revealed a proposal to separate Chelm province from Congress Poland and to nationalize the Warsaw-Vienna railway line, feelings of Polish impotence and of the failure of the Polish cause were overwhelming under the all partitions. All the same, one should ask here whether such conflict could have been avoided at all? And yet in doing so, we need take into consideration the mentality of that era, the ideas of nation and national territory, of the rights of the majority to this territory, and the place reserved for national minorities and compare that situation with what we know of the experiences of other countries, at least from the region.

Politically all these changes affected most strongly the progressivists and the Left. This was the real decline of the Polish version of liberalism. Nearly the whole new generation of Poles – i.e., those who entered the reborn Polish state in 1918 – echoed this xenophobic image of the Jews. In fact then, anti-Semitism became an integral part of the modern Polish identity.

As a matter of fact, the 1912 anti-Jewish boycott campaign was then a huge nationalist and anti-Semitic mobilization in all Polish territories. Yet without further research it is difficult to define to what extent these 'anti-Semitic sporting events' (as the Polish writer Zofia Nałkowska dubbed them, or '*furor polonicus*' by the Jewish historian Shimon Dubnov) had taken root in the provinces.

Another, no less important phenomenon that affected Polish-Jewish relations was the powerful revival and the rise of the Jewish community in the Polish lands. It was then that the Jews as a community wanted to appear as a legitimate society. This was a fact of enormous importance for the further Polish-Jewish debate. Icchok Perec (Itskhok Perets), the writer, stated at a meeting in 1907: 'The Jews want to be themselves'. The Jewish population *en masse* no longer wanted to communicate with the Poles with the help of middle-men, i.e., Poles of Jewish descent. Although this process did not elsewhere reach the same dynamic as in Congress Poland, in fact it could not be stopped. The period of Polish mono-culture, sustained by both sides, was no longer possible. The majority of the Polish political class did not want to recognize this fact – and this mono-cultural attitude among Polish elites had many names. For the National Democracy it meant the exclusion of all the 'non-Polish' groups from the national community, up to the wish to turn the fight against 'the Jewish threat', 'the enemy within' into the pivot of its entire ideological project. For other groups, also those referring to the tradition of the Enlightenment, it signified the factual hegemony of Polish culture and the absolute loyalty of the minorities.

Though this anti-Semitic mobilization in Polish lands turned out to be a crucial and telling episode in the annals of modern anti-Semitism in the region, it was for a long time completely neglected by Polish historiography and hardly known to others historians. The Polish lands in that period spawned a horrid upsurge of anti-Semitism and various other forms of xenophobia that seemed on the one hand a wave of archaic fantasies on the other pure ethnic and racial hatred. Popular anti-Semitism also played a role in it. In that sense, the blitz campaign of 1912 and the chauvinist mobilization against the Jews afterwards had more in common with what was to come: a fusion of old anti-Jewish prejudices, an elaborate paranoid ideology, and deluded *raison d'état* arguments.

¹ On the 1905 Revolution in Russian Poland see Robert E. Blobaum, *Rewolucja. Russian Poland, 1904-1907* (Ithaca and London 1995). On the place of the Revolution on Polish-Jewish relations in particular see as well Theodore R. Weeks, "1905 as a Watershed in Polish Jewish Relations", in: Stefani Hoffman and Ezra Mendelsohn eds., *The Revolution of 1905 and Russia's Jews* (Philadelphia 2008), p. 98; Idem, *From Assimilation to Antisemitism: The "Jewish Question" in Poland, 1850-1914* (Illinois 2006), pp. 129-146.

² On Dmowski's role during the 1905 Revolution see G. Krzywiec, *Polska bez Żydów (Studia z dziejów idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk antysemickich na ziemiach polskich na początku XIX wieku (1905-1914))* (Warszawa 2017), in particular, p. 159-170.

³ On the peculiarities of Polish politics of these days in Russian Poland see Robert E. Blobaum, "The Rise of Political Parties, 1890-1914", in: Mieczysław B. Biskupski, James S. Pula and Piotr J. Wróbel eds., *The Origins of Modern Polish Democracy* (Athens 2010), pp. 70-87. More synthetically see B. Porter-Szücs, *Poland in the Modern World: Beyond Martyrdom* (Chichester 2014), p. 43-64. On the Dmowski early visions of society see B. Porter, *Who Is a Pole and Where Is Poland and Nation in the Rhetoric of Polish National Democracy before 1905*, "Slavic Review", vol. 4 (Winter 1992), p. 639-653; Idem, *Democracy and Discipline in Late Nineteenth Century Poland*, "The Journal of Modern History" (June 1999), no. 2, p. 346-393 and G. Krzywiec, "Between Realpolitik and Redemption: Roman Dmowski's Solution to the Jewish Question", in: François Guesnet and Gwen Jones eds., *Antisemitism in an Era of Transition: Genealogies and Impact in Post-Communist Poland and Hungary* (New York 2014), pp. 69-71.

⁴ G. Krzywiec, *Chauvinism, Polish Style. The Case of Roman Dmowski (1886-1905)*, trans. Jarosław Garlicki (Frankfurt am Main, Wien and London 2016), pp. 93-146, pp. 266-309.

⁵ G. Krzywiec, "Ex oriente lux! The influence of Roman Dmowski's Japanese journey on his political thinking", in: Haruka Miyazaki ed., *Politics in Poland at the Turn of the 20th Century. Workshop. No.4* (Sapporo 2007), pp. XVII-XXXI.

⁶ On Endeck's anti-Semitism of these days see Israel Oppenheim, *The Radicalization of the Endecja Anti-Jewish Line during and after the 1905 Revolution*, "Shevut", vol. 9, no. 25 (2000), p. 32-66; Joanna Michlic, *Poland's Threatening Other: The Image of the Jews from 1880s to the Present* (London 2006), p. 46. In a more detailed way see Mieczysław Sobczak, *Narodowa Demokracja wobec kwestii żydowskiej na ziemiach polskich przed I wojną światową* (Wrocław 2007), pp. 149-162.

⁷ G. Krzywiec, *Polska bez Żydów*, in particular pp. 134-141.

⁸ See Agnieszka Kidzińska, *Stronnictwo Polityki Realnej* (Lublin 1997).

⁹ See I. Oppenheimer, *The Radicalisation of the Endecja Anti-Jewish Line*, p. 50-54. A. Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia Vol. II, 1881 to 1914* (Oxford and Portland 2010), pp. 103-105. Compare as well a brilliant analysis of this rhetoric in 1906 and first of all in 1907 elections in Warsaw S. Ury, *Barricades and Banner: The Revolution of 1905 and the Transformation of Warsaw Jewry* (Stanford 2012), pp. 214-263.

¹⁰ In particular S. Ury, *Barricades and Banners*, pp. 91-140. See also A. Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia, Vol. II; 1881 to 1914*, pp. 42-65.

¹¹ On this episode see Joanna Nalewajko-Kulikow, *Who Has Not Wanted to Be an Editor? The Yiddish Press in the Kingdom of Poland, 1905-1914*, "Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry", vol. 27 (2015), pp. 273-276. In more comprehensive manner; Idem, *Mówić we własnym imieniu. Prasa jidyszowa a tworzenie żydowskiej tożsamości narodowej (do 1918 roku)* (Warszawa 2016), pp. 96-1907.

¹² J. Nalewajko-Kulikow, "Di Haynt-mishpokhe'. Study of a Group Picture", in: François Guesnet and Glenn Dynner eds., *Warsaw: The Jewish Metropolis. Essays in Honor of the 75th Birthday of Professor Antony Polonsky* (Leiden and Boston 2015), pp. 252-260.

¹³ See J. Nalewajko-Kulikow, "Missionaries of Jewish Nation: Meeting Points between Russian and Polish and Polish Jewry before the First World War. Preliminary Remarks", in: Gennady Estraiikh and Mikhail Krutikov eds., *Three Cities of Yiddish: St. Petersburg, Warsaw and Moscow* (Oxford 2017).

¹⁴ S. Ury, *Barricades and Banners*, p. 170.

¹⁵ Kalman Weiser, *A Tale of Two Pryluckis. On the Origins of the Warsaw Yiddish Press*, "Gal-Ed: On the History of the Jews in Poland", vol. 22 (2010), p. 90.

¹⁶ On this ongoing process see in detail G. Krzywiec, "Prasa żydowska w zwierciadle polskiej opinii publicznej (1905-1914)", in: J. Nalewajko-Kulikow ed., *Studia z dziejów trójjęzycznej prasy żydowskiej na ziemiach polskich (XIX-XX w.)* (Warszawa 2012), pp. 267-298.

¹⁷ See Th. R. Weeks, *Nationality and Municipality: Reforming City Government in the Kingdom City Government in the Kingdom of Poland*, "Russian History" (Spring 1994), vol. 21,

no.1, p. 23-47. On the broader context of Tsarist administrative reforms idem, *Nation and State in late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification in the Western Frontier, 1863-1914* (De Kalb 1996), p. 59-64. Zygmunt Łukawski, *Koło polskie w rosyjskiej Dumie Państwowej w latach 1906-1909* (Wrocław 1967), p. 183-190 and Mirosław Wierzychowski *Sprawa Chelmszczyzny w rosyjskiej Dumie Państwowej*, "Przegląd Historyczny", vol. LVIII (1966), pp. 97-125.

¹⁸ See Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's 20th Century* (New York 1998), p. 20.

¹⁹ On the early phase of Litvak debate see F. Guesnet, "Wir müssen Warschau unbedingt russisch machen. Die Mythologisierung der russisch-jüdischen Zuwanderung ins Königreich Polen zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts am Beispiel eines polnischen Trivalromans", in: Eugen Behring et al. eds., *Geschichtliche Mythen in den Literaturen und Kulturen Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas* (Stuttgart 1999), p. 110-116; Frank Golczewski, *Polnisch-Jüdische Beziehungen 1881-1922: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Osteuropa* (Wiesbaden 1981), p. 97.

²⁰ On these years in detail see G. Krzywiec, "Prasa żydowska w zwierciadle polskiej opinii publicznej", p. 272-275. See as well T. R. Weeks, *Flaming the flames: The Jews in the Warsaw press, 1905-1912*, "East European Jewish Affairs", vol. 28, no. 2 (1998-1999), p. 79 on.

²¹ Quoted from Tadeusz Stegner, *Liberałowie Królestwa Polskiego 1904-1915* (Gdańsk 1990), p. 196.

²² Leon Wasilewski, *Litwactwo i kwestya żydowska*, "Przedświt" (February 1910), no. 2, pp. 65-68.

²³ Quoted from A. Kidzińska, *Stronictwo Polityki Realnej*, pp.156-157.

²⁴ Gerard P. Haupt, Paweł Korzec, *Les socialistes et la comapagne antisémite en Pologne en 1910: un épisode inédit*, "Revue du Nord. Histoire" no. 225 (1975), pp. 189-192. See also *Rosa Luxemburg. Nach dem Pogrom. Texte über Antisemitismus 1910/1911* ed. Holger Politt (Potsdam 2014), On the international context of these events see Christoph Gassenschmidt, *Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914: The Modernisation of Russian Jewry* (New York 1995), pp. 105-111.

²⁵ L. Wasilewski, *Słowniczek gwary partyjnej w Królestwie Polskim, Nadbitka. Materiały i Prace Komisji Umiejętności w Krakowie*, Vol. 5, (Kraków 1912), p. 377, p. 386.

²⁶ On the Unlischicht's presence in Polish public life see G. Krzywiec, "Antysemitizm postępowy. Przypadek Juliana Unszlichta", in: Jolanta Żyndul ed., *Parlamentaryzm, konserwatyzm, nacjonalizm. Sefer Jowel. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Szymonowi Rudnickiemu* (Warszawa 2010), p. 154-170. See as well idem, *Nadwiślański Weininger? Przypadki Juliana Unszlichta (1883-1953)*, "Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały", no. 5 (2009), pp. 243-253.

²⁷ G. P. Haupt and P. Korzec, *Les socialistes et la comapagne antisémite en Pologne en 1910: un épisode inédit*, pp. 191-192.

²⁸ On the Polish nationalist anti-Semitism of these days see G. Krzywiec, *Polska bez Żydów*, pp. 255-264.

²⁹ T. R. Weeks, *Flaming the flames: The Jews in the Warsaw press, 1905-1912*, pp. 81-82.

³⁰ On the particularities of Catholic anti-Semitic campaigns see R. Blobaum, "Criminalizing the Other: Crime, ethnicity, and antisemitism in early twentieth-century Poland", in: Idem ed., *Anti-Semitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca and London 2005), pp. 88-90.

³¹ G. Krzywiec, "'Progressiver Antisemitismus' im russischen Teil Polens von 1905 bis 1914: Ursprünge und Konzepte des polnischen politischen Antisemitismus", in: Manfred Hettling, Michael G. Müller and Guido Hausmann eds., *Die „Judenfrage“ – ein Europäisches Phänomen?* (Berlin 2013), pp. 127-142.

³² T. R. Weeks, *Polish 'Progressive Antisemitism', 1905-1914*, "East European Jewish Affairs", vol. 25, no.2 (1995), pp. 67-68.

³³ Krzysztof Stępnik, *Powieść antysemitcka w ostatnich latach Kongresówki*, "Krytyka", no. 39 (1992), p. 79.

³⁴ Teodor Jeske-Choiński, *Żydzi w literaturze polskiej* (Warszawa 1914), p. 32.

³⁵ K. Stępnik, *Powieść antysemitcka w ostatnich latach Kongresówki*, p. 79.

- ³⁶ On the Polish press reaction on to the Beilis affair J. Żyndul, *Bejlisy, czyli polska reakcja na proces kijowski*, "Kwartalnik Historii Żydów", no. 232 (2009), pp. 397-410.
- ³⁷ Bernard Singer, *The Yiddish Press*, in: *The Jews, the Left, and the State Duma Elections in Warsaw in 1912. Selected Sources*, trans. S. D. Corrsin, "Polin", vol. 9 (1996), p. 48.
- ³⁸ R. Blobaum, *The Politics of Antisemitism in the Fin-de-Siècle Warsaw*, "The Journal of Modern History", vol. 73 (June 2001), p. 281.
- ³⁹ On Dmowski's publication of these days see, T. R. Weeks, *Flaming the flames: The Jews in the Warsaw press, 1905-1912*, p.83.
- ⁴⁰ Jerzy Jedlicki, "The End of the Dialogue. Warsaw 1907-1912", in: Sławomir Kaprański ed., *The Jews in Poland*, II (Cracow, 1999), p. 110.
- ⁴¹ R. Blobaum, *The Politics of Antisemitism in the Fin-de-Siècle Warsaw*, "Journal of Modern History", vol. 73 (2001) p. 294-305; Pascal Tress, *Wahlen im Weichselland: Die Nationaldemokraten in Russisch-Polen und die Duma Wahlen 1905-1912* (Stuttgart 2007), p. 361-383; Stephen D. Corrsin, *Warsaw before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of Russian Empire, 1880-1919* (Boulder 1990), pp. 89-104; Idem, *Polish-Jewish Relations before the First World War*, "Gal-Ed", vol.11 (1989), pp. 31-53; P. Korzec, *Juifs en Pologne* (Paris 1980), p. 42-45. For the specific course, stages and dynamic of the 1912 campaign see G. Krzywiec, *Kampania wyborcza Romana Dmowskiego do IV Dumi Państwowej w Warszawie w 1912 roku. Przyczynek do studiów nad mobilizacją nacjonalistyczną*, "Kwartalnik Historii Żydów", no.1 (2015), pp. 22-52; Idem, *The Polish Intelligensia in the Face of the Jewish Question*, "Acta Poloniae Historica", no. 100 (2009), pp. 157-163.
- ⁴² A. Polonsky, *The Jews in Poland and Russia*, vol.2, p. 379 on. See also T. R. Weeks, *The City of Three Nations: Fin-de Siècle Warsaw*, "The Polish Review", vol. 49, no. 2 (2004), pp. 747-766.
- ⁴³ Józef Lange, *Postęp a nacjonalizm* (Warszawa 1913), p. 84.
- ⁴⁴ See R. Blobaum, *The Politics of Antisemitism in the Fin-de-Siècle Warsaw*, pp. 279-280. See as well T. Weeks, *From Assimilation to Antisemitism*, pp.166-168; Konrad Zieliński, „*Swój do swego*”. *O stosunkach polsko-żydowskich w przededniu Wielkiej Wojny*, "Kwartalnik Historii Żydów", no. 3 (2004), p. 335.
- ⁴⁵ Stanisław Pieńkowski, *Dwa żywioły* (Warszawa 1913), p. 12.
- ⁴⁶ On the opponents of anti-Semitism see J. Jedlicki, "Resisting the Wave: Intellectuals against Antisemitism in the Last Years of the "Polish Kingdom"" in: R. Blobaum ed., *Antisemitism*, pp. 64-65.

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**Children of Modernism:
Some Remarks on Jewish Youth Political Culture
in the Last Decade of Interwar Poland**

Kamil Kijek

The goal of this article is to present some insights and ideas on the political culture of the Jewish youth in interwar Poland. It is based on the new reading of the YIVO autobiographies of the Jewish youth. They will be analyzed as personal documents deeply rooted in the culture of radical political modernism of interwar period.¹ By new reading of the YIVO autobiographies, I will identify a few of crucial features of political culture, socialization and consciousness of the Jewish youth. In the second part of the text I will briefly refer to another group of sources related to the anti-Jewish violence in interwar Poland, which became important context of political socialization of the Jewish youth and exerted important influence on its political culture. What follows investigates fascinating problems of relation between patterns of socialization and cultural experience of interwar Jewish youth, its acculturation, as one of the main features of its experience, and finally, symbolic and physical violence that it was subjected to. I claim that violence not only affected “the material”, “physical” and “external” conditions of Jewish life but also became an internal element of interwar political Jewish culture.

Political modernism, crisis of tradition and political radicalization

Political modernism, in its radical interwar form, was filled out with feelings of insecurity, crisis, decay and collapse of the contemporary world. Tomorrow had become today, political modernism, in its radical left or radical right forms looked for and acted for the “new beginning”, for far reaching, revolutionary in its character change of the contemporary world. These ideas were accompanied by a specific form of chiasm or millenarism, convictions of inevitability of great cataclysm, revolutionary struggle, violent fight as preconditions of the coming of a new world and a new man. As such, modernist

political movements promoted uncompromised filiarhcy, superiority of the younger generations above the older ones, representing decay of the contemporary world. Modernist filiarhcy assumed a special role of “the youth” in necessary radical political and social action. Finally, a future modernist salvation was not possible without the struggle, hence not without ideological, cultural and also to some degree of physical violence.²

Young Jewish participants of the YIVO autobiographical contest organized in the years 1932, 1934 and 1939 were asked to write about the totality of their life, parents, primary surroundings, friends, school, work, their life plans and dreams. Politics, their potential activities in youth movements and political organizations, were only one of many aspects of their life that they were asked to touch upon in their autobiographies.³ Nevertheless, supposedly the “non-political” parts of young people writings should be of the most interest precisely to historians of Jewish politics and youth’s political consciousness. One of the most striking features of the descriptions of the primary surrounding, family, social and cultural space of *shtetl*, or Jewish neighborhoods of the larger city, provided by the YIVO contest participants, is their outmost modernist character. Decisive majority of the autobiographies describe their primary social space as marked by deep crisis, decay, anomy of traditional social norms, economical and gender roles, most often epitomized by the generation of their parents. Descriptions of the family life provided coherence between the descriptions of wider social space, both marked by modernist socio-political imagination. Here is one of many illustrative examples provided by a son of poor Yiddish speaking artisan family, growing up in Central Poland:

The Town where I was born was small (...) Here is the exchange and here are the Jews, with their heavy beards and cloth coats. Their hats sit on their heads like lids, once black, now faded to a reddish brown by the sun. They stroll with pieces of straw in their mouths, waiting, as always, for the car from the big city. And here it comes, honking from the distance to announce its arrival. The Jews quickly swarm about it, like flies around a lump of sugar on a hot summer day.⁴

“Greyno”, author of this quotation, while writing his autobiography was a devoted activist of illegal Polish Communist Party. But we can find very similar quotations describing older generations of parents and grandparents that have exactly the same, radical socio-political meaning in tens of autobiographies of different authors whose views were very remote from communism. Here is another example:

My parents. Father: Physically weak. Extremely religious, real fanatic (...) he was characterized by the cowardly worship for Jewish religious sages, holy stories, of every holy paragraph [*frumenpsuk*] wherever it was written (...) coward. Not cheerful, asocial, always complaining. Had no empathy for other people and their feelings. He was not interested in politics. That is why he was solely interested in his business, in financial issues, leaving all the family matters to his wife and children.⁵

We can find a very similar critique of the older generations, their narrow intellectual, cultural and political horizons, their preoccupation with mundane matters even in the autobiography of young teacher working in orthodox Beis Yankev school for Jewish girls:

All of this would have been bearable were it not for the interference of the parents. They expected their children to learn everything in one month (...) almost all the parents had the same complaint (...) It was simply the custom to complain. Apparently this was a way of passing the time (...) it hurt that these people were so limited (...) The children themselves were truly pleased and came to school eagerly. The parents were at fault for measuring everything according to its usefulness to them. Here, too, as with everything else in their little world, they wanted to “get the most for their money”.⁶

Interwar Polish Jewish society was characterized by a deep generational conflict. It was only deepened by the unprecedented politicization of the youngest generation who, contrary to their most often conservative, traditional parents,

were adherents of modernist political movements advocating one of many different modernist programs of radical transformation of the surrounding reality. As it was summed up by “Gamalielis”, scion of relatively rich, religious family, aspiring to local orthodox elite, who himself chose very different path and became active member of secularist, revolutionary political party Poalei Zion Left:

The young generation grows, and it is hard to characterize, lost in its longings, it is embittered. From what its embittered? It is hard to see!! Its social center is not any more the *Beit Midrash* or *Kloiz*, they belong to fathers and grandfathers, leaders of the society. Party and political fight, jealousy and hate rule in the midst of youth”⁷.

Jewish youth in interwar Poland doubtlessly also shared filiararchy of the interwar modernism. It saw itself and it was seen by the older elites of Zionist and their socialist *doikoyt* (Yiddish, means “hereness”) oriented rivals, by the new Jewish school systems, and finally by YIVO itself, as an only hope to bring the awaited, revolutionary “new” against decayed, present “old”. This modernism of thought was matched by new reality and indeed new and different socialization patterns of the young Jews in interwar Poland. This was the first generation that went to universal system of primary schooling, state or Jewish private one. This was the generation raised to have higher professional and private ambitions than their parents – unattainable in the country shaken by internal and external strife. Finally, this was the generation raised in the “democratic promise” of the Polish II Republic, of equality of all of its citizens, generation that experienced its upbringing and adulthood as a break of this promise. Rhetoric and physical anti-Semitism, professional and educational discrimination – all this made Max Weinreich rightful to describe the young generation of Polish Jews as facing “double discrimination” – on the one level as most of the young people in Poland facing lack of life perspectives and possibilities to attain their ambitions, on the second level, facing discrimination as Jews.⁸ In this situation it is not surprising that young people so enthusiastically responded to the call of these political parties and youth movements that propagated one of many modernist versions of

radical transformation of Jewish and general social reality. It is important to note that the role of these institutions in the lives of young people widely transgressed narrowly defined “politics”. Youth movements, among many other roles, were important educational institutions – their ideologies strongly affected the way in which young people looked upon the reality surrounding them. For many of them the ideologies were superior forms of social knowledge. All of this produced a phenomenon which after Pierre Bourdieu I call “radical habitus”: deeply internalized disposition of young people to think about and act upon their social and political surrounding on the basis of modernist categories of radical change.⁹

This “radical habitus” transgressed deep political fragmentarization of interwar Jewish society and superseded its ideological divisions. Again, we can find a proof of this phenomenon in most of the YIVO autobiographies. Let us look upon young Halutz, member of kibbutz in Grochów near Warsaw. In the final part of his work, where he was asked to share his life plans and dreams, he wrote instead:

I was born in the time of an eruption of a volcano. The question of today is, if one can hide from its lava? There is only one answer: to fight for different tomorrow. The moment of uprising of millions of workers is inevitable. They will start to act, they will shed their hot lava on cities and villages, and will build the new world based on the rules of socialism.¹⁰

Catastrophism expressed by this young Halutz attending *hahshara* in famous Grochów kibbutz characterized most of his peers taking part in the YIVO contest and was one of central markers of their radically modernist political imagination. As it was written by “Kola” in summer 1939, for the last of the YIVO autobiographical contests:

Struggle is everywhere and black clouds are approaching, shading the sun. If we, working masses, will not stand up, will not join our strength of the international proletariat, will not shed from our backs the bloodsuckers, for my generation there will be nothing but grey road of even bigger hunger

and suffering. We are full of lofty thoughts. Our eyes are dim, but our hearts are trembling, they are ready to burn any time, to become our torch in the final struggle.¹¹

What was characteristic for this generation was its modernist radicalism that made its young representatives often to cross narrow ideological boundaries of their parties and movements. Young radicals, on the level of political consciousness – described above as “radical habitus” – were much more similar than different. One example can be provided by the visions of the new men of the future, so prominently present in the autobiographies. Young communists many times declared their admiration for new Jewish men being born in Palestine, young right-wing members of Zionist Beitar were dragged by the appeal of the Red Flag and collective strength of proletariat marching under it, as it was in the case of “Hanzi”:

Quite unexpectedly, I experienced an ideological crisis. On one hand, I felt a sense of national pride, while on the other hand I felt enormous sympathy for the world proletariat and for Russia and its revolution. I had great respect for those who marched on the May Day, holding the red flag of the workers. I wanted to be like them and add my voice to the song of their uprising.¹²

Despite all of the party and ideological conflict, the “radical habitus” of the Jewish youth made its very different representatives to think and act in very similar categories. This, together with frequent social closeness of members of various conflicted movements, divisions between Poalei Zion Left Yugend and Ha Noar ha Ivri, between Bund “Tzukunft” and Dror, between Communist and Jewish nationalist, sometimes ran between siblings, friends from *heder*, in playgrounds of *shtetls* and Jewish neighborhoods. This modernist ideological similarity and social proximity made young people to constantly change their political affiliations. Out of 100 YIVO autobiographies that I have examined, more than half of their authors changed their political allegiance at least once,

sometimes drastically, like moving from Beitar to Communist Union of the Youth, or back. This situation was aptly exemplified by “Benjamin R.”, left-wing Zionist and active member of Right Poalei Zion, one of the authors characterized by the highest political awareness and proficiency in ideological nuances of interwar Jewish politics. In his autobiography he had described case of his *shtetl* peer, a friend from *heder* and at the same time, a political folly:

This was the time when people from various sides of political spectrum had stormed into the He Halutz. Winter 1933 “Tzukunft” was disbanded and its members went to He Halutz or to “the Reds”. One of “the Reds” already managed to become Halutz. It was my old acquaintance Shmulik Bergman. After he finished his studies in local *heder* he became a barber and a member of Freiheit. He spent here some time and then joined the Bund. In Bund he did not stay for a long time and became the member of the Communist Party. He would stay there if not his terrible economical situation. He did not have any other option but to emigrate. Because of this, he was even ready to join the Beitar... At the end some people had pity over him and took them into He Halutz.¹³

Common “radical habitus” of the youth can be seen also in the visions of future and directions of the social change. Radicalism was common denominator of all of such visions. Some of the authors concentrated on the mission of creating the new Jewish man in Palestine. According to them it was the only possibility and only positive program available to the Jews. Others believed in revolution taking place “here”, in Poland and Europe. For most of the authors, in opposition to the ideologues of their mother movements, these were not self-excluding, but complementary visions. Almost all of the authors shared imperative of radical, or even revolutionary transformation of the society. They argued about the place that should be taken in it by the Jews. But most of the participants of the YIVO contest agreed that it was unavoidable and necessary.

Young Jews, Polish State, the rise of popular anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish violence

Another fascinating and important context of the Jewish experience of the II Polish Republic was acculturation of the youth. Here I will discuss it with its relation to another central feature of the political modernism, its appraisal of power, strength and connection to rhetorical and physical violence. In 1930s 80% of young Jews studied in Polish state schools. Private Jewish schools also followed state curriculum and taught Polish culture and with that, symbols of Polish nationalism in the classes of Polish history, geography, literature or so-called “state lessons”. Almost all young Jews were subjected to the influence of Polish language through the participation in the modern mass culture, much more universal than it was in the case of former generations socialized in very different conditions of Czarist Russia or the Habsburg Empire. An important outcome of this process was what I call “symbolic acculturation”: deep internalization of Polish cultural and specifically nationalist symbols that went hand in hand with fervent, modern Jewish nationalism.¹⁴ “Ester”, describing herself as ‘proud Chassidic daughter’, in the moment of writing her autobiography she was teaching in Beis Yankev orthodox school system for Jewish girls that fought with language Polonization of its pupils. She recalled her childhood (she wrote her autobiography in Yiddish) during which the Polish acculturation was an important element of her own growing up experience:

I was reading historical novels of Sienkiewicz, Prus, Orzeszkowa and others (...) Polish books gave me much to think about. I saw life from a different perspective. For the first time I saw another kind of existence. I learned about the extraordinary heroism of historical figures (...) I was then in the seventh grade of public school. I kept diary in Polish. I was becoming more and more immersed in the Polish language. I especially loved Polish literature. I idolized Polish Romantic poets: Mickiewicz and Słowacki. Polish history was a subject that I loved and learned easily. I was enthralled by everything connected with Polish history. I was consumed

with the great martyrdom of Polish heroes in their struggle for Poland's independence. I venerated Marshal Józef Piłsudski.¹⁵

The strongest example of the interesting cultural identity processes taking place among the Jewish youth is provided by the autobiography of "Etonis". His case is quite an exceptional one. He belonged to the Lithuanian Jewry, before 1918 practically not exposed to the influences of Polish culture. As the son of an orthodox elite, he belonged to minority of authors who studied only in private Jewish orthodox institutions (traditional *heder*, *hedermetukan* and various *yeshivot* in the end), never went to a Polish state school. Despite all of this he ended his autobiography with the following characteristic fragment:

Finally, after much consideration and introspection, I did not return to the *yeshiva* in the winter of 1931-1932. I stayed in our town, where I found position in teaching Jewish religion in the public school. I began to study secular subjects on my own. (...) Still, I wanted to complete the entire course of the studies in a gymnasium (...) I decided to move to a city. And so this past summer I came to Vilna, where I prepared myself for the eight form of gymnasium, working hard all summer. Of all of my studies, I most enjoyed the poetry of Mickiewicz, which often stirred my own suffering soul."¹⁶

Ardent activist of the Zionist "Gordonia", living in the fully Jewish milieu, in her diary (attached to the autobiography) describing dull daily life defined by boring and hard work, found Juliusz Słowacki's poem as the most suitable for describing her sorrow: "Słowacki said the truth in his lament 'Father of the poverty stricken'. When one's heart is full of sorrow, when he feels the pain, it seems that the sun is not the sun, and the word is different, ugly, stupid and cruel. Yes, I feel the same way."¹⁷ Another author, follower of Beitar had filled large parts of his autobiography with reflections on the crisis of European culture. Modernist program of its renewal was, according to him, symbolized by the famous call of Mickiewicz: "Together, young friends!"¹⁸ Different author, from Galicia, described her childhood games with friends:

I am anxiously following Fryda's slow steps. How strange it is! Even when they are playing they quarrel over who will get more. Get more towns! Our mistress told us yesterday how the Poles had fought against their enemies, how the foes had divided Poland into three parts. Each took one part ... (The Poles) gathered at night and adopted the Constitution of May 3rd. The Constitution had laws which were very good for the Poles. This is why we rejoice. We will go to the synagogue. There will be a service there. But remember, be good. There will also be other schools from the town in the synagogue. Don't make me feel ashamed.¹⁹

This universal, although having very different scope and different dynamics in different Jewish milieus, process of Polish acculturation could connect youth to the state and integrate it with the dominant nation. In fact, situation was quite contrary. Growing acculturation of the Jewish youth had only deepened its social and political frustration, experience of discrimination and of exclusion. This was caused by another universal experience of the Jewish youth, anti-Semitism. Most often first social space in which they had consciously experience it was a Polish state school where young Jews confronted non-Jewish environment for the first time in their lives. One of the paradoxes of the era is the fact that school, which was to integrate national minorities and Jews among them, was the place where anti-Semitism was experienced most often. Anti-Jewish, traditional and modern racial stances were presented both by many non-Jewish pupils and teachers. Anti-Semitic experience was most vulnerably felt by the Jewish children aspiring to higher social positions and active adult life in a non-Jewish society, by the students of high schools and universities. These were the people characterized by the higher than average level of Polish acculturation, with the strongest belief in the promise of democratic Poland, and with the experience of breaking of this promise, feeling very strong resentment towards state institutions that allowed or sometimes even professed discrimination. In this context, the most important phenomenon of the Jewish growing up experience in the era of Polish II Republic is the fact that this specific experience, known to the

narrow Jewish elites already from the second half of XIX century, through XX century modernization, especially, through universal state education, became somehow universal. Now symbolic acculturation, and through it, stronger feeling of exclusion and resentment caused by anti-Semitism became a formative life experience for decisive majority of Jewish children, coming from traditional backgrounds previously not exposed to the Polish culture. One of the authors from Galicia wrote:

The biggest obstacle to find work was my religion. (...) I went to the director of the society that was running my trade school, who liked me very much. He was also major of Złoczów (...) He said to me, "I could help you, if you were not Jewish". It pained me a lot. Is this my fault to be born as a Jewish girl? Did somebody ask me for opinion, who were to be my parents, or who I would like to be? I was the best student in the school, my Polish papers were read in front of the whole class as an example of an excellent writing. How many devotion, love to the country in which I was born and I grew up was in those papers.²⁰

Boy from traditional religious home recalled his school experience:

One teacher (...) sticks in my memory. He caused me a great deal of trouble and used to make fun of my *peyes* and my long coat. He taught history and Polish. Today, he is the leader of the *Endek* Party in our area and is known to be very anti-Semitic. I was very fond of the director of the school, Mr. Kowalski, who in his time had gained a reputation as a great humanist. I had wonderful conversations with him (in the seventh grade) about the Bible and Talmud, which pleased him quite a bit. On the whole, I remember him a very refined person with great pedagogical abilities. However, he, too, has now moved over to the anti-Semitic camp, although he still holds the same post."²¹

Similar was experience of "Yesh":

Primary school [Szkoła Powszechna] where I went was a Polish school. Our teacher was extreme anti-Semite, she did not covered it at all. Despite that Jewish girls were majority in the class and were much more capable, she referred to us unpleasantly. She harassed us at any occasion. We were still too young to react in a proper way. Only our reaction was inner wrath and hidden hatred.²²

One of the most drastic descriptions of school anti-Semitism and violence that followed, were provided by Jewish student of Polish primary school from Lwów:

New anti-Semitic teachers have arrived. Their greatest joy was to torment Jewish pupils (...) During intervals between the lessons I was just looking for a hidden corner where I could hide from fists of catholic pupils. When classes were finally over, usually beside the school gates we were awaited by few plucky “*shaigetzim*” who would beat us with their fists, armed in wooden knuckle-busters. I would return from school beaten up, full of bruises, without any will to study and to live (...) School directors were mute to our complains, it seems that they were even satisfied with what was happening. When I had to get up in the morning, I would cry dressing up for school, knowing that I will go there to be tormented by pupils and teachers.²³

The anti-Semitic experience, paradoxically in large extent through Polish state school system, became “democratic” and universal, filled collective biography of the whole interwar Jewish generation. Schools, institutions of the state that declared itself as realization of democratic promises and universal equality, with its exclusive cultural model and even more with presence of anti-Jewish hatred, created much higher emancipatory aspirations that it was the case with older Jewish generations, and simultaneously, serving as a proof for this broken promise, created feeling of resentment towards the state. One of the most important features of the autobiographies, which has very deep and important

political meaning, is fact that youth almost universally felt that their right as Jewish individuals, and their collective national rights, were broken in interwar Polish reality. This feeling of resentment, discrimination and high emancipatory ambitions, together with mentioned previously radically modernist socio-political imagination, are the most important meta-political feature of youth consciousness, which had very important political meaning. In her important study of differences in response towards the modern anti-Semitism of German and Eastern Jewries before 1914 Shulamit Volkov had drawn a deep line dividing both of them. Acculturated German Jewry was to experience anti-Semitism in much more psychologically harmful way, “internally”, as threatening very foundations of their identity. Eastern Jewry may have been much more harmed physically, but its cultural separation, ethnic distinctiveness and finally newly developed modern nationalism protected it from this “internal psychological experience of anti-Semitism”.²⁴ My point is that, with all the differences between Jewish “East” and “West” in interwar period, Volkov division does not hold. I would like to quote one characteristic fragment from YIVO autobiographies:

In public school we were told to love Poland, we were taught to live and die for it. Something like a feeling of jealousy was awakened in me. Why we, Jews, cannot have our own country? (...) A thought about Palestine was not awakened in me by scholarly dissertations, books or propaganda, oh no! It was created as the reaction for the love for Poland that we were thought in the public school.²⁵

Polish culture was becoming important “mirror” through which young Jews looked at themselves and situation of Jewish nationalism. It played an unexpected role affecting how they had experienced anti-Semitic rhetoric and anti-Jewish violence that intensified in the last decade of interwar Poland. Symbolic acculturation made them much more offended by various anti-Semitic slurs of Jewish cowardice and weakness.

Political modernism and violence

Experience of anti-Semitism and humiliation, combined with modernism socio-political consciousness and “radical habitus”, called for response, for counter violence and through manifestation of Jewish strength for denial of the anti-Semitic stereotypes. Jewish counter-violence which was less self-defense and more symbolic denial of anti-Jewish stereotypes was present in the Bund Ordener Grupe and Tzukunft-Sturem activities in Warsaw or even in He Halutz activities in the Grochów or in Kowel kibbutzim.²⁶ Jewish nationalist party leaders from all sides were universally denouncing ongoing acculturation of the youth. One of its many vices was supposed to weaken Jewish pride, and consequently, response to anti-Semitism. This topic still awaits its extensive research but a glance on the anti-Semitic occurrences on the Polish universities, so often in 1930s, leads us to observation that Jewish students, in average most acculturated group among the Jewish youth, were most consistent group physically answering to the anti-Semitic attackers.²⁷

As a manifestation of the very same process, different generational patterns of behavior represented by Jewish inhabitants of small town Przytyk – which on 9th of March 1936 became the scene of one of the most famous anti-Jewish occurrences in interwar Poland – can be interpreted. Activists of Jewish self-defense came from very different political groups: revisionists, left-wing Zionist, Mizrachist (and finally former or active communist). It is the “generational” and not the “party” key that allows us to understand Jewish stances in Przytyk. Jewish self-defense in Przytyk was organized in November 1935 by young people against the strategy and even knowledge of the older elites. The former ones were petitioning authorities and police on their futility or sheer lack of will to react toward anti-Jewish violence, youth prepared for a fight for a “Jewish honor”.²⁸

At the same time, Jewish youth was engaged in political violence not only towards its anti-Semitic foes. The 1930s were the scene of sometimes dramatic internal clashes between representatives of various Jewish political movements. One of the YIVO contest participants, and his account was not exceptional, wrote in his autobiography about his activity as Poalei Zion Right activist breaking any gathering of Revisionist in his own *shtetl*:

Yesterday, there was a revisionist gathering (...) I've heard already a few revisionist speeches, but I have never listened to such lies, such demagogy. But what made me furious even more is the fact that I was not bold enough to break it. It was a small room, *Halutzim* were few and they had not decided to interrupt the speech. Then, I've made a decision. From this day on I will go to revisionist speeches and I will break them! My personal honor demands that! (...) In our *shtetl* we talk more about breaking of party meetings than on meetings itself. Each of them became something like a football game, each interruption was like a goal we scored.²⁹

Of course, the spirit of confrontation with ideological foes was often encouraged by the older generation. One of the most known cases of this is 1932 Vladimir Jabotinsky call "*Yo Brechn*" that caused clashes between Right and Left wing Zionist not only in Palestine but also in Diaspora. In October 1934 the card carrying members Revisionists and Labor Zionist were surprised by sudden "peace" concluded by their leaders. Many were in shock, as the author of the above mentioned quote who attacked Revisionist after the "peace" was signed. Condemnations of cowardice of the older elites, not readiness of fight and sacrifice, Fabian tactics of not meeting modernist ideals of struggle, we find in many YIVO autobiographies as well as in the other sources. For example, political police reports on the activities of the Jewish parties in Kielce voievodship from April 1935 have noted League for Working Palestine gathering in Kielce where 200 Left Wing Zionists condemned Ben-Gurion-Jabotinsky agreement.³⁰ The very same agreement was harshly condemned by one of the YIVO contest participants, Mendel Man (future famous Yiddish writer). With his own party, Poalei Zion Left in his native town of Płońsk (home town of David Ben-Gurion), he had organized mass meeting which condemned "left wing schemers" (that is Ben-Gurion, Mapai and Poalei Zion Right parties), "feeding on lack of consciousness of Jewish masses", which called people to fight revisionist in the past, and now they entered secret talks with them. Mendel Man was staunch supporter of the uncompromised fight with the "Jewish fascist" (as revisionist

were called by their left wing foes).³¹ Mendel Man's and many other YIVO autobiographies testify to the central characteristic of Jewish youth political culture in the 1930s. This was its ideological fervor, if not fanaticism, that came together with constant and deep political conflict, rhetorical and sometimes also physical violence. Some of this eagerness to fight, to show one's individual and collective strength stemmed from internalization of image of the Jewish weakness. Also, as all modernist violence, it was a kind of symbolic compensation of inability to fulfill modernist ambitions of radical transformation of the reality.

There is no doubt that these features of Jewish youth political culture of the 1930s stood behind the raising popularity of radical left (Bund, communists) or radical right. The latter was represented by revisionist youth movement "Beitar". It had stood for organic unity of Jewish nation, hierarchy and obedience. Central value of the movement was physical strength, military proves and self-defense. Many of these elements of "Beitar" ideology were taken from the arsenal of Polish national movement.³² In the situation of an ongoing universal process of Polish acculturation affecting Jewish youth, this characteristic of "Beitar" was another advantage and reason of its raising popularity. All of this can be plainly seen in description of Vladimir Jabotinsky provided by "Chwila", Polish language Zionist daily printed in Lwów.

Person and personality of Vladimir Jabotinsky became a symbol of bravery, energy and sacrifice (...) Vladimir Jabotinsky is the man of fight. He is a natural born soldier, in every centimeter of his body and in his every breath (...) His straightforward thought cuts like sharp damask steel, is guided by fair heart and is aimed against every weakness, compromise and trumpery³³

As it was written by Jabotinsky himself, goal of the revisionist youth movement was:

To form Beitar as a worldwide organism, which on the sign given from the center will be able to perform the same deed at the very same time by its ten thousands arms, the same deed in every country and in every city

(...) Because that is the most important achievement of the masses of free men, when they are capable of acting together with cruel accuracy of the machine³⁴

Modernist “radical habitus”, with its manifestation of power and readiness for struggle as its central feature from one side made ideological opponents so close to one another, but from the other, deepened the internal Jewish conflict as well. And many Jewish politicians of the time were aware of this malaise of political modernism that diminished the space for compromise, for pragmatic, cautious activity on behalf of whole Jewish community whose all members were threatened in the dire situation of the 1930s. But they themselves were caught in the ambivalence of the political culture of the time, they themselves participated in it and encouraged modernist radicalism of the young, and then faced its unwelcome consequences. Tragedy of modernism is another dimension of the Jewish tragedy in the 1930s Central-Eastern Europe and it still awaits to be thoroughly studied.

¹ On the YIVO autobiographies and the context of their creation see especially: Ido Bassok, “Le sheelat erchan ha histori shel autobiographiot bnei noar me osaf YIVO”, “Madei Yahadut”, vol. 44, תשס”ז [2007], p. 137-164; Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Coming of Age in the Thirties: Max Weinreich, Edward Sapir and Jewish Social Science”, “YIVO Annual”, vol. 23 (1996), p. 1-103; Kamil Kijek, “Max Weinreich, Assimilation and the Social Politics of Jewish Nation-Building”, “East European Jewish Affairs”, vol. 41, no 1-2 (2011), p. 25-55.

² See for example Roger Griffin, “Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of the Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler”, New York 2007, especially p. 1, 7, 9, 24, 39, 51, 100-101, 146, 183. These dominant features of interwar political culture, especially prominent in Central and East-Central Europe were clearly seen already by the contemporaries, who did not use the generic term of “political modernism”. See for example publication of interwar Jewish-Polish and Jewish sociologist: Aleksander Hertz, “Duch katastrofizmu a nacjonalizmy”, “Droga”, nr. 6 (1932); “Swoi przeciwko obcym”, “Wiedzai Życie”, nr. 6 (1934), reprinted in Aleksander Hertz, “Socjologia nieprzedawniona. Wybór publicystyki”, Warszawa 1992, p. 353-360, 367 and Stefan Czarnowski, “Ludzie zbędni w służbie przemocy” (1935), in: Stefan Czarnowski “Wybór pism socjologicznych”, Warszawa 1982.

³ YIVO Archives (YA), RG 4 #3880, p. 5-6; YA RG 584, #346 (unpaginated); “Yedies fun YIVO” nr. 1-3 (42-44) (1934), p. 5

⁴ YA, RG 4, #3590 (“Greyno”), Yiddish, 1934, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives. Autobiographies of Jewish Youth in Poland before the Holocaust”, New Haven 2002, p. 54-55.

⁵ YA, RG 4, #3718, Yiddish, 1934, p. 2.

- ⁶ YA, RG 4 #3559 (“Ester”), Yiddish, 1939, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives...”, p. 336-337.
- ⁷ YA, RG 4 #3548, Yiddish, 1934, p. 1-2.
- ⁸ Maks Weinreich, “Der weg tzu unzer yugent. Yesodes, metoden, problemen fun yidisher yugnt forshung”, Wilno 1935, p. 203-207.
- ⁹ For the various definitions of habitus relevant for this study, see: Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, “Zaproszenie do socjologii refleksyjnej”, Warszawa 2001, p. 106-107 (published in English as “An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology”, Chicago 1992); Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, “Reprodukcja. Elementy teorii systemu nauczania”, Warszawa 2006, p. 75 (published in English as “Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture”, Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1990); Itamar Even-Zohar, “Papers in Culture Research”, Tel Aviv 2005, p. [8]
- ¹⁰ YA, RG 4, #3623, Yiddish, 1934, p. 31.
- ¹¹ YA, RG 4, #3629, Yiddish, 1939, p. 100.
- ¹² YA, RG 4, #3618 (“Hanzi”), Hebrew, 1934, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives...”, p. 219
- ¹³ YA, RG 4, #3542, Yiddish, 1934, p. 68.
- ¹⁴ For more on this problem see: Kamil Kijek “Between love of Poland, symbolic violence and anti-Semitism: On the idiosyncratic effect of the state education system among the Jewish youth in interwar Poland”, “Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry”, vol. 30 (2018), p. 237-264.
- ¹⁵ YA, RG 4 #3559 (“Ester”), Yiddish, 1939, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives...”, p. 325-326.
- ¹⁶ YA, RG 4 #3845 (“Etonis”), Yiddish, 1932, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives...”, p. 18.
- ¹⁷ YA, RG 4, #3516, Yiddish, 1934, p. 55.
- ¹⁸ YA, RG 4, #3505, Polish, 1934, p. 63.
- ¹⁹ YA, RG 4, #3835 (“Zeń-Ka”), Polish, 1934, quoted in Alina Cała “Ostatnie pokolenie: Autobiografie polskiej młodzieży żydowskiej okresu międzywojennego ze zbioru YIVO Institute for Jewish Research w Nowym Jorku”, Warszawa 2003, p. 428.
- ²⁰ YA, RG 4, #3739 (“G.S.”), Polish, 1939, quoted in Alina Cała, “Ostatnie pokolenie...”, p. 235-238
- ²¹ YA, RG 4, #3707 (“Stormer”), Yiddish, 1939, quoted in Jeffrey Shandler, “Awakening Lives...”, p. 236.
- ²² YA, RG 4, #3735, Polish, 1934, p. 8-9.
- ²³ YA, RG 4, #3732, Polish, 1934, p. 8-9.
- ²⁴ Shulamit Volkov, “German, Jews and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation”, New York 2006, p. 20-32.
- ²⁵ YA, RG 4, #3816 (“Gina”), Polish, 1934, quoted in Alina Cała “Ostatnie pokolenie...”, p. 381.
- ²⁶ Bernard Goldstein, “20 yor in Varshaver Bund, 1919-1939”, New York 1960, p. 315-317; “Be Sadmot Grochow”, Beit Lochamei Getaot 1976, p. 196-197; Yosef Cohen, “Zichronot mi Yamei Ha Hahshara”, Beit Lohamei Getaot 1984, p 86.
- ²⁷ See for example parliament interpellation of Itzhak Grünbaum on the outburst of anti-Jewish violence at Warsaw University in November 1931, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN) Komitet Polityczny Radt Ministrów 502, 3A1, k. 198-210, quoted in Jerzy Tomaszewski “Dokumenty o zaburzeniach antysemitycznych na uniwersytecie warszawskim na jesieni 1931 r.”, “Biuletyn ŻIH”, nr. 3-4 (1997), p. 183-184.
- ²⁸ David Shtokfish (ed.), “Sefer Przytyk”, Tel Aviv 1973, p. 109-110, 158, 174-178.
- ²⁹ YA, RG 4, #3542, Yiddish, 1934, p. 5.

³⁰ AAN, Urząd Wojewódzki Kielecki 1379, 267/II- t. 13: 1935, p. 715.

³¹ YA, RG 4, #3802, Yiddish, 1934 [additional materials sent for the contest together with authors autobiography], p. 10.

³² Yaacov Shavit, "Politics and Messianism: The Zionist revisionist movement and Polish political culture", "Studies in Zionism" 6. 2 (1985), p. 229-246.

³³ "Chwila", 12 III 1927, p. 1. On the personal ideal propagated by the revisionist movement see also Vladimir Jabotinsky, "Slovo o polku. Istoria evreyskogo legiona po vospominaniam ego initsyatora", Paris 1928, p. 168-169.

³⁴ Włodzimierz Żabotyński, "Ideologia Bejtaru", Lwów 1935, p. 21-22. For the most comprehensive and meticulously researched study of "Beitar" in interwar Poland see Daniel K. Heller "Jabotinsky's Children: Polish Jews and the Rise of Right-Wing Zionism", Princeton 2017.

**Anti-Semitism in France during the Late 19th Century:
With a Focus on Édouard Drumont (1844-1917)**

Shigechika Suzuki

My specialism is modern French literature. At present, I am researching the role of journalism in the diffusion of anti-Semitism in France during the late nineteenth century. I am not an expert on Poland, but I would like to contribute to this workshop by commenting on French anti-Semitism. Regarding the insightful lecture just given by Professor Krzywiec, I was most interested in the fact that, in Poland after 1905, anti-Semites and Jewish communities both placed high value on journalistic activities. Journalism played a major role in the outbreak of anti-Semitism in France. In that sense, France at the end of the nineteenth century can be regarded as a precedent for interwar Poland. I would argue that if we are to consider the relationship between anti-Semitism and journalism, then France at the end of the nineteenth century is worthy of our attention. In my report, “Anti-Semitism in France during the Late 19th Century”, I have chosen to approach the characteristics of anti-Semitism in modern France by focusing on a certain individual. That person is the journalist Édouard Drumont also known as “The Pope of anti-Semitism.” By talking about the characteristics of French anti-Semitism, and by focusing on the person Drumont, a person mentioned several times in *Chauvinism, Polish Style: The case of Roman Dmowski* by Professor Krzywiec, I hope to present another aspect of the European anti-Semitism.

The French historian Léon Poliakov, in the renowned *The History of Anti-Semitism*, defined the end of the nineteenth century France as the era in which “the most amount of ink was used up on the Jewish question.” To attack on Jews using “ink” rather than direct violence – “anti-Semitism of words” – was the nature of French anti-Semitism. The “anti-Semitism of words” eventually caused the Dreyfus affair (1894-1906), one of the most infamous cases of anti-Semitism in European history. In those days, a huge number of anti-Semitic statements concerning Alfred Dreyfus were disseminated.

The growth of anti-Semitism in France in the latter half of the nineteenth century originates from the publication of one book. In April of 1886, the relatively unknown journalist Drumont published *La France juive* – “Jewish France” in English – which not only became a massive bestseller but was also translated shortly thereafter, finding success throughout Europe. In his book, which was released in Italian, Spanish, German and Polish, as well as in French, Drumont clearly painted the Jewish people as the enemy of those concerned about the direction of modern society. Jews were labeled as foreigners and characterized as Semites.

Against a backdrop in which Jewish people in the French Third Republic, where society had become more and more mobile as a result of modernization, were regularly made scapegoats, the “science” of the period that was authorized by academics was of crucial importance. In France, historian Jules Michelet and philologist Ernest Renan, who were considered academic authorities, created in their respective research fields a story of France as the pinnacle of civilization. Under the pretext of a “civilizing mission,” a policy of colonialism towards African and Asian nations came to be promoted. As a result of their work, the term “Shem” – the name of one of Noah’s three sons – came to refer to Jews in the nineteenth century France. The name Semite comes from Shem. Of course, this was a gross misuse. Within the binary opposition that resulted, the term “Aryan” was assigned positive values, while negative values were ascribed to the term “Semite.” Anti-Jewish sentiments had existed in Europe for a long time, and here they were reborn as anti-Semitism. Religious discrimination had gradually changed into a racial anti-Semitism. In France, this new type of anti-Semitism based on race theory was vulgarized by Drumont and thereby found its way to the masses.

France had been the first country in Europe to grant citizenship to Jewish people. By the late eighteenth century, French Jews who gained citizenship through the French Revolution, in order to be good citizens of the Republic, were well-known to have promoted an assimilation policy in which it was understood that there were no contradictions between performing one's duties as a French citizen and practicing Judaism. In this process of assimilation, known as “le

franco-judaïsme,” French Jews used French rather than Hebrew in the synagogue, and praised France as the “New Jerusalem.” By the latter half of the nineteenth century, many French Jews had developed a strong sense of belonging to the French Republic rather than the Jewish community. They did not call themselves “Juif” – Jew in English – but instead preferred the term “Israelites,” which had less of a religious tone. Three generations after Jewish emancipation, the “Israelites” who had risen up through the social classes – Alfred Dreyfus being just such a person – came to be beset by anti-Semitism.

Incidentally, many researchers refer to France at the end of the nineteenth century as the “golden age of the press.” It cannot be ignored that it was in this context that sales of Drumont’s *La France juive* exploded. Several factors had led to this “golden age.” On the 29th of July in 1881, the “Law on the Freedom of the Press,” which was to become one of the Third Republic’s most important laws, was enacted. The law guaranteed full freedom for the establishment of media, preventing the government from performing any censorship, admonitions, or punitive measures in relation to publication. Additionally, elements such as the innovation of printing technology, improved levels of literacy thanks to educational reform, and the development of railway networks led to an unprecedented boom in the publishing world in France.

With the great success of *La France juive*, Drumont became a celebrity in the publishing world, and in April of 1892, he launched a daily newspaper, *La Libre Parole* – “The Free Word” in English. *La Libre Parole*, the first anti-Semitic newspaper in France, would associate every issue with the Jews and repeat slanderous reports against Jews. “France for the French,” the slogan of *La Libre Parole*, has currently been taken up by the National Front, by the way. No matter how unfounded and absurd the newspaper’s allegations were, freedom of the press was guaranteed by law. Drumont’s journal was catapulted into fame about two years after its launch following the arrest of a French Jewish officer in 1894. *La Libre Parole* achieved a scoop when it reported that Alfred Dreyfus had been arrested on charges of being a spy.

La Libre Parole printed this image, entitling it “About Judas Dreyfus (Figure 1).” The person at the center facing towards us is the editor-in-chief of *La Libre Parole* himself, Drumont. He is shown lifting up a man with a hooked nose, a traditionally stigmatized Jewish image, who is wearing a German military cap and whose forehead is labeled “traitor.” This tiny person is obviously Dreyfus. Drumont, proudly showing off his “prey,” has picked up this “traitor” with tweezers and is set to dispose him of down the drain. Dreyfus was




Figure 1, "About Judas Dreyfus", *La Libre Parole illustrée*, November 10, 1894.

depicted and connected with Judas Iscariot throughout the Affair. Drumont is unable to suppress his joy over a Jewish officer being arrested on suspicion of spying, and no image better captures the grotesque level of his anti-Semitic excitement and desire, illustrating what he hopes will happen to Jews.

The caption reads “French people, for eight years I have repeated this to you each day!!!”. In the eight years between the publication of *La France juive* in 1886 and the arrest of Dreyfus in 1894, Drumont took every possible opportunity to spread his image of the Jews: the image of a “Jewish spy.” Indeed, in *La France juive* he often depicts the “Jewish spy secretly working for Germany,” as if predicting the Dreyfus Affair. A French Jewish military officer named Dreyfus – a common Jewish surname in France – was arrested for betraying France to Germany, and readers of *La Libre Parole* came to believe that Drumont’s prediction had come true. Drumont said that as the French Jew, Dreyfus was a foreigner and that as an Alsatian Jew, he was linked to Germany. The “reality” of

the arrest of a Jewish officer gave Drumont an unshakeable credibility. Thereafter, *La Libre Parole* took center stage when it came to coverage of the Dreyfus Affair. That is to say, Drumont and his readers needed Dreyfus; without the Jew, the anti-Semite has no basis to exist.

Through the anti-Semitic campaign of *La Libre Parole*, public opinion was shaped, and people became certain that Dreyfus was guilty. *Le Petit Journal*, the most popular newspaper in France at the time, reported his public military degradation on January 5, 1895, with a caption branding Captain Dreyfus a “traitor (Figure 2).” The stereotype of the Jewish people as “traitors” was scattered throughout France through the famous image created by *Le Petit Journal*.



Figure 2. "The traitor", *Le Petit Journal*, January 13, 1895.

French anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century, originating from the publication of *La France juive*, spread among the masses in a golden age of press, and finally those behind these sentiments found their desired “prey” in Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus. As far as the importance of journalism in the construction of anti-Semitism is concerned, there is no better illustration than this case. As an aside, I also must add that it was journalism that came to Dreyfus’s rescue. About

four years after the officer’s arrest, on January 13, 1898, the author Émile Zola published *J'accuse* in the daily newspaper *L’Aurore*, which started a campaign on

behalf of Dreyfus. In the ensuing confrontation between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, Drumont became less significant, and is now all but forgotten. However, his anti-Semitism “by words” continues to live on, crossing both borders and periods of history.

Finally, I will conclude my comments by asking Professor Krzywiec the following question. Roman Dmowski stayed in Paris from 1891 to 1892. I suppose the French anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century may have also had some influence on the Polish anti-Semitic movement following 1905. Did Dmowski’s stay in France during this period have any impact on his thoughts about Jewish people? I would particularly like to know whether he had interactions that you consider significant during his stay in France.

From “Radical Habitus” to Physical Violence

Yuu Nishimura

A brief overview of Kamil Kijek’s work on Jewish youth’s radicalism in interwar Poland

Beginning with my personal story, I first learned about Kamil Kijek’s fascinating research at his lecture at the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw in 2014. The lecture was about the radicalism of Jewish youth in interwar Poland, which was a part of his doctoral dissertation that is now published as a book¹ and forms the basis of today’s lecture. I was then working on my thesis on the Jewish Labor Bund, focusing on its educational network involving many young Jews. His approach to the youth’s radicalism was very stimulating to me, who, similar to many other researchers on the Bund, tended to seek a specific character or originality of the Bundist movement and ideology that attracted supporters including youth. In contrast, he analyzed Jewish youth’s politicization not from the point of view of individual political ideologies, but as a generational phenomenon that could be observed across the ideological boundaries between various Jewish political movements such as Bundism, communism, Orthodoxy (Agudat Yisrael), and various factions of Zionism.

The youth’s radicalism or the high level of their politicization has long been noted by both contemporaries and present-day researchers as characteristic of the Jewish society in interwar Poland. Kijek’s approach is novel in his successful adoption of the notion of “radical habitus,” which illuminates the common features of Jewish youth’s ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. These include distaste for a disrupting traditional world, sense of collective inferiority, admiration for strength and order, and aspiration for a radical change, the latter half of which specifically is summarized as political modernism. While previous studies ascribed the radicalization of the youth to a general tendency such as the economic crisis and anti-Semitism, Kijek analyzes the mechanisms of the creation of this “radical habitus” in a detailed and convincing manner from the point of view of cultural and social interaction between Poles and Jews, which developed

in the completely new context of the Second Polish Republic, a modern Polish nation state that neither Poles nor Jews had ever experienced until the end of WWI.

As indicated in the first part of the lecture, the Second Polish Republic had an ambivalent character, particularly according to non-ethnic-Poles. It was a democratic nation state promising equal citizenship and the possibility of social advancement to its “nation,” i.e., all the citizens within the state border. In reality, however, Poles and non-Poles could never be the same – Poland was supposed to serve only the interest of the ethnically defined “Polish nation.” This was the country where the Jewish youth in question was socialized. The overwhelming majority were enrolled in public schools, a medium of national integration, where they internalized the Polish national symbols such as national(ist) historical narrative and heroes, as well as the Polish language and culture. The schools, which represented modernity such as scientific order and secular universal knowledge in contrast to traditionalism and backwardness of Jewish society, were also the place where admiration for modernity was cultivated in Jewish children’s minds in an irreversible manner. Radicalization occurred in the course of their further socialization after finishing school, or even as early as in school years, when they realized that, as Jews, they were excluded from the “Polish nation.” Many of them returned to their own Jewish community; however, they did not return to an old traditional one but to a newly reconstructed one in a modernist sense – for example as a “Jewish nation” – which was propagated by various Jewish political groups. Here, ideology itself had less importance than the modernist way of thinking and activism. This is proven by the frequent change in the youth’s political affiliation.

In this time’s lecture specifically, I was deeply impressed by the manner in which Kijek expanded his scope to include the issue of violence in both physical and symbolical terms that was associated with anti-Semitism. Modernism as a referential framework here is more refined than in the book that I mentioned. This is probably an essential process to reconsider anti-Semitic violence and Jewish counters to it in a broader contemporary context of the perceived crisis of modernity. This is a promising approach in that it makes it possible to describe

the dynamics of the changing relationships between Jews and non-Jews in a wider scope, potentially beyond Poland.

Below is my feedback and some questions on the second half part the lecture.

Possibility of interplay between violence in Poland and that in Palestine

Kijek's point is that the counter-violence of Jewish youth toward anti-Semitic violence – both physical in the form of pogrom and symbolical in the form of verbal assault and defamation – was affected by a modernist way of thinking whose essential components included admiration for power and strength, as well as belief in the need for violent struggles for a radical change to the world. I suppose that Polish youth too were affected by this modernist idea, particularly when they envisioned the future of the Polish national community. We could even say that it was characteristic of the contemporary ethno-nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe in general. I found his argument that this trend was internalized by Polish Jewish youth and had primal importance in their radicalization and positive attitude toward violence to be convincing, but simultaneously, I cannot help thinking about another factor that may have had no less importance than political modernism in Poland and contemporary Europe – influence of the events in *Yishuv* in *Eretz Israel* (Palestine).

Although in a very different context, attacks toward Jews by Palestinian Arabs had intermittently occurred from the early 1920s, about a decade before the rise of anti-Semitic violence in post-Piłsudski Poland. They culminated as the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936–1939, which coincided with the period of brutalization of Polish anti-Semitism. As we know, the bloody situation in Palestine, most famously symbolized by the death of Joseph Trumpeldor, was one of the causes of growing militarism among Polish Zionists. My question concerns the potential impact of the violence in Palestine, its image, and interpretation on Jewish response toward the ongoing violence in Poland. More concretely, I would like to raise two questions. The first is “How and to what extent did the Jewish youth in Poland in general, regardless of their Political affiliation, perceive the violence in *Yishuv*?” Was this type of news familiar to them in their everyday life

(via newspaper, etc.)? How did they interpret it in their modernist imagination? The second is “Is there any possibility that the Jews-Arabs relations that young Jews in Poland imagined ought to be in the future affected the way in which Jews related to Poles as their current neighbor?”

As for the second question, I am also curious about the inverse effect, that is, the potential impact of the changing Polish-Jewish relations in Poland in the 1930s on determining the manner in which Jews related to Palestinian Arabs at that time and afterward. This might be difficult to estimate, since most of those radicalized Jewish youth perished during the Holocaust, without ever arriving at Palestine. However, even so, I cannot help assuming some continuity between the political culture of young Polish-Jews on the eve of WWII, which was characterized by radicalism and militarism, and that of the newly born Israel. This might be an oversimplified analogical assumption, but as indicated in the paper – or so I understood –, if we could assume that the “radical habitus” driven by political modernism was a far-reaching phenomenon beyond the borders of Poland, we may be able to consider seriously the possibility of exportation of this current into *Yishuv* in somewhat diverse ways and of its long-term impact on Jews-Palestinians relationships. If Polish culture, or Polish nationalism in particular, was a “‘mirror’ through which young Jews looked at [...] the situation of Jewish nationalism,” as Kijek points to in his paper for the lecture, I think the Poles-Jews relationships may have been a mirror as well through which they looked at, interpreted, and envisioned the Arabs-Jews relationships.

Counter-violence: generational gap and social strata

Another interesting part of the lecture is about the generational gap in the attitude toward real physical violence. Especially interesting point to me in Kijek’s argument is that the Jewish Labor Bund’s determined gesture against the Przytyk pogrom, which was shown in organizing the well-known general strike², was rather of symbolical character, and that they did not take real actions of counter-violence or self-defense at the places where the violence occurred. Taking into consideration the fact that the Bundist *militia*, an official self-defense group under the control of the Bund Central Committee, had been actively involved in

physical confrontation with anti-Semites on such occasions as May Day demonstrations and rallies at which the right-wing Poles attacked the Jews, the Bundist attitude toward anti-Semitic violence is not to be characterized as only symbolical. It is true, however, the protest strike after the Przytyk pogrom had highly symbolic meaning; calling for the strike, and for a socialists and workers' general congress to combat anti-Semitism after that (eventually banned by Polish authority), they protested not only against pogrom itself but also against such anti-Semitic policies as boycott of Jewish labor force and promotion of emigration of Jews from Poland. More significantly, they called also for Polish workers' solidarity in a determined manner. In my view, this Bundist (symbolic) attitude was consistent with the party's fundamental idea of *doikeyt* (hereness), or their program of national cultural autonomy, for it showed clearly their emotional ties to their Polish neighbors and their will for further coexistence with them.

If this assumption is correct, it will be interesting to consider the place of the notion of *doikeyt* of the Bund specifically, and the vision of so-called diaspora nationalism in general, in the light of Kijek's argument that underscores the "generational key" in understanding a Jewish stance on violence. If symbolical resistance against anti-Semitism – in the Bund's case it was basically determined by the veteran party leaders – can be interpreted as demonstration of will to coexist, can we assume that physical counter-violence including revenge actions, which were initiated by youth in the Przytyk's case, indicate abandonment rather than holding of this will? The radicalization of Polish-Jewish youth that can be seen in their increasing positive attitudes toward physical confrontation with Poles may indicate a deep perception gap between younger and older generation on the future of Jews in Poland. It seems that the vision of so-called diaspora nationalism that had been held not only by the Bund, but also to some extent by the entire older generation of Jewish political activists including Zionists, was lost sight of among the majority of the younger generation socialized in the Second Polish Republic.

While this is merely a statement of my impressions, what follows includes my questions on the same part of the lecture. Whereas Kijek's analysis based on "generational" key is convincing, as for physical counter-violence and not

symbolical one, I suspect that there might have been some difference in the attitudes among the younger generation itself, corresponding to the social strata they belonged to and their degree of acculturation. It is true that symbolic acculturation, as well as exposure to symbolic violence, was a universal experience among Jewish youth, particularly because of their enrolment in Polish public schools. However, the degree of acculturation differed according to accessibility to advanced education, which depends on the economic condition of individual family the youth came from. This also determined the frequency and quality of their social contacts to Poles in everyday life. Taking vocational life as an example, the range of social contacts of Jewish lower classes engaged in small business such as handicraft and retail, which absorbed the majority of Jewish workers, including an increasing number of young and even child workers, was limited almost exclusively within the Jewish environment (except for contacts with customers), due to the virtual segregation in the labor market of the Second Polish Republic³. Their contact with Poles must have been different from that of Jewish university students, who Kijek mentions in the paper as “in average most acculturated” and “most consistent group physically answering to the anti-Semitic attackers.” If so, how was the attitude toward anti-Semitic attacks of Jewish youth who belonged to a lower or the lowest class with limited degree of social contacts to Poles and of cultural acculturation? I do agree that radicalism or political modernism was shared by the entire younger generation beyond the class borders, but isn't radicalism as thoughts and gestures different from resorting to real physical violence? – If so, there would be little wonder if attitudes toward the latter differed among the same generation. In connection to this question, I am also curious about the social structure of membership of self-defense groups formed during the Przytyk pogrom. Kijek indicates that they were associated with revisionist Zionism, left-wing Zionism, Mizrahi, or communism. Did the social structure of the membership of these political groups then have any specific features?

¹ Kamil Kijek, *Dzieci modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej w Polsce międzywojennej* (Wrocław, 2017).

² On the half-day general strike called by the Bund in protesting Przytyk pogrom, and on the Bundist response to other anti-Semitic incidents including organizing self-defense groups, see, S[ofie] Dubnov-Erlikh et al. eds., *Di geshikhite fun bund*, vol 4 (New York, 1972), 203–10; Emanuel Nowogrodzki, *The Jewish Labor Bund in Poland: From its Emergence as an Independent Political Party until the Beginning of World War II, 1915–1939*, trans. and ed. Markus Nowogrodzki (Rockville, MD, 2001), 217–54; Bernard Goldstein, *Twenty Years with the Jewish Labor Bund: A Memoir of Interwar Poland*, trans. and ed. Marvin S. Zuckerman (West Lafayette, IN, 2016), 359–77; Bernard K. Johnpoll, *The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943* (Ithaca, NY, 1967), 211–6; Gertrud Pickhan, ‘Gegen den Strom’: *Der Allgemeine Jüdische Arbeiterbund ‘Bund’ in Polen, 1918–1939* (Stuttgart and München, 2001), 304–14; Emanuel Melzer, *No Way Out: The Politics of Polish Jewry, 1935–1939* (Cincinnati, OH, 1997), 58–60.

³ Cf. Bina Garncarska-Kadary, *Żydowska ludność pracująca w Polsce 1918–1939* (Warszawa, 2001).

討論 1 日目

グジェゴシュ・クシヴィエツ（以下 GK）報告

◆ 討論者（鈴木重周）への応答

ーフランスの反ユダヤ主義のポーランドへの影響について。

GK：私はこれまで西欧・中欧を含むヨーロッパ的文脈での比較研究の視点からポーランドの反ユダヤ主義を研究しており、近著 (*Polska bez Żydów: Studia z dziejów idei, wyobrażeń i praktyk antysemitycznych na ziemiach polskich początku XX wieku (1905–1914)*, Warszawa, 2017) では 1905 年から 1913 年のポーランドの状況を扱った。『リーブル・パロール』や『アクション・フランセーズ』といったフランスの反ユダヤ的新聞は、ポーランド、ロシア、ルーマニアの学生の間で読まれており、私が確認した限りでは、『リーブル・パロール』にはルーマニアから少なくとも 2 本の記事が寄せられていた。フランスの反ユダヤ主義は、ポーランドのみならず、ルーマニアの政治家、知識人、ジャーナリスト、大学人にも影響を与えていた。

ポーランドの排外主義者やナショナリストは、フランスであれドイツであれ、西欧の反ユダヤ主義に影響を受けていた。だがそれは 1905 年革命以前のことであり、その後ポーランドで起こったことは、西欧の現象の単なる繰り返しではなかった。1905 年革命以降、ポーランドでは大衆政治が始まったが、その中で反ユダヤ主義の論理と力学は、西欧とは全く異なる形で展開した。フランスでは、反ユダヤ主義は人々をドレフュス派と反ドレフュス派の 2 陣営に分かった。ドイツでは、ハインリヒ・フォン・トライチュケのような一群の反ユダヤ知識人のエスタブリッシュメントがいた一方で、政治的にはやはり、反ユダヤ主義者とその反対者の 2 陣営が存在した。近代フランスの政治的アイデンティティは、排外主義と反ユダヤ主義に対峙する中で形成され、ドイツについてもある程度同様のことが言える。しかし、ポーランドやルーマニアでは状況は異なった。すなわち、反ユダヤ主義者の集団ないし陣営は支配的な政治勢力となるまで成長し

続け、これに対し、反ユダヤ主義の反対者は個人のレベルで見られるに留まった。

—エドゥアルト・ドリユモンをはじめとするフランスの反ユダヤ主義者のドモフスキへの影響、個人的交流関係について。また、ドレフュス事件の影響について。

GK: ドモフスキが影響を受けたフランス人の中に、自然人類学の研究において社会ダーウィニズムを唱えていたギュスターヴ・ル・ボン (Gustave Le Bon, 1841–1931) がいる。彼は反ユダヤ的ジャーナリストでもナショナリストでもなかったが、ドリユモンよりもはるかに優れた政治思想家であった。ドモフスキが反ユダヤ主義を受容するにあたって、ル・ボンをはじめとするフランスの書物を読んだことは考えられるが、ドリユモンその人に魅了されていたわけではない。

フランスの反ユダヤ主義者との個人的な交流については、一部のポーランド人は一部のフランスの反ユダヤ主義者と交流があったが、後者は概して、ロシアを除いては——フランスとロシア帝国の反ユダヤ主義者は国際的な繋がりを持っていた——東欧諸国にさほど興味を持たなかった。『リーブル・パロール』にルーマニアからの通信が2本掲載されたことは述べたが、フランスから見れば、ブカレストはやはり反ユダヤ主義の文脈においても片田舎に過ぎなかった。

ポーランド人右派に対するドレフュス事件の影響は、これまでの研究では懐疑的に捉えられている。国外から見ると、ドレフュス事件は責任の所在が見通し難い曖昧な事件であった。ウィーンの自由主義系新聞の特派員であったテオドール・ヘルツルの例に見られるように、この事件を深刻なものとして受け止めたのは、右派ではなく、むしろ左派、進歩主義者、および同化ないし社会的統合を遂げたユダヤ人であり、このことは全ヨーロッパでそうであった。

◆ フロアからの質疑と応答

―反ユダヤ主義はどのように社会に広がったのか。今回取り上げられたのは知識人の言説であるが、今日のようにメディアが発達していない中で、彼ら書いたものを大衆が読んだのだろうか。

GK：重要なのは、1905年革命は大衆政治のはじまりであったということだ。知識人の唱える反ユダヤ主義に地方の大衆が反応する際、私が最も重要な伝達手段であったと推定しているのは、人々の会話であり、定期刊行物による大衆的コミュニケーションである。反ユダヤ主義はたしかに知識人の言説であった。だが一方で、民衆が彼ら「政治家」たちの発言を信じなかったとも思えない。中下層階級の人々が、高度な水準の知的発言を聞き、その中から自分たちの好む内容を理解する——いわば反ユダヤ主義の教育が行われていた。ポーランドにおいてもっともポピュラーな反ユダヤ主義者は、大衆の教化において影響力のあるキリスト教の聖職者たちであった。知的な反ユダヤ主義と民衆を結びつけたのは、様々な形の大衆的政治活動であった。例えば、ジャーナリストや政治活動家は鉄道で各地を移動し、行く先々で反ユダヤ主義について語った。新しい形態のコミュニケーションの到来とともに、伝統的な反ユダヤ教感情とは異なる反ユダヤ主義が、近代的な現象として生じたのである。

―革命期や不況期の危機感がポーランド人・ユダヤ人関係を悪化させたという議論に深く同意する一方、そうした時期に、反目ではなく協力が生まれる場合もあったのではないか、ということ了指摘したい。たとえば、1905年革命期から1912～13年の不況期に活動したウッチの市民委員会（Komitet Obywatelski）は、カトリックのポーランド人、プロテスタントのドイツ人、そしてユダヤ人からなり、ウッチの失業者をエスニシティ、宗教、政治的信条に関わりなく援助すると宣言していた。この事例は、ポ

ーランド人とユダヤ人の交流に、エンデツィア的なそれに収斂しない多様な方向性があったことを示しているように思われる。このことはどのように捉えうるだろうか。

GK：ご指摘の点は、事実のレベルにおいて正しい。ウッチは、ポーランド人（全人口の約40%）、ユダヤ人（20%）、ドイツ人（20%）、およびロシア人などのマイノリティからなる多民族都市で、ロシア国会選挙においてはユダヤ人議員が選出されるなど、ポーランド人とユダヤ人の協力がこの時期になお可能であった。しかし、ポーランドの状況全体から見れば、ウッチの事例はやはり例外であったと言わざるをえない。1912年はポーランド史の一つの転換点であり、そこにはまだ、歴史の別の可能性を示すような多数の例外が存在した。1907年の時点では、ポーランド人とユダヤ人の利害関係は類似していたというポーランド史の若手の指摘もある。私自身はこの指摘が的確であるかどうかの判断を留保しているが、今後、彼らがこうした例を取り上げ、協力や共生というもう一つの歴史を描きだすまでに洗練させていくかどうかには、関心を持っている。

ードモフスキは、その政治的キャリアにおいてごく初期から反ユダヤ主義者だったと言えるのだろうか。個人的には、1890年代の彼はそこまで反ユダヤ主義には関わっておらず、1920年代に熱心な反ユダヤ主義者となったという印象を持っていた。時間の経過とともに彼の考えに何らかの変化や発展はあったのだろうか。また、彼の率いた国民民主党についてはどうだろうか。

GK：ドモフスキは1867年の生まれで、彼についてのあらゆる伝記は、彼がごく初期から反ユダヤ的な人間であったことを証拠立てている。だが、国民民主主義運動そのものについては、話はまた別である。国民民主主義はナショナリストの運動で、当初は主に知識人からなる組織であった。ポーランド全土から集まった400から500人の構成員のうち、地方を行脚し、

その政治理念を説いたような 200 名程の活発なメンバーは、政治家やジャーナリストなどの知識人であった。ドモフスキはナショナリストであり、知識人であり、反ユダヤ主義者だった。興味深いのは、彼がユダヤ人やドイツ人、ロシア人などに対する自分自身の感情的な見方や態度を合理化しようとしたことだ。その手段は人種主義、すなわち民族（nation）の人種的優劣の概念であった。これによれば、イギリス人やドイツ人はよく組織された揺るぎない民族で、ポーランド人は未だもっぱら農民からなるが、進化のとば口にある民族であった。ドモフスキは 1904 年に日本を訪れ、日本が発展しつつある有望な国であり、ヨーロッパのイデオロギー地図に照らしてユニークな特性をもつ人種——文明的ではないが、政治的、軍事的力をもつ人種——の国として高く評価した。これは知的な賛嘆で、彼はポーランド人の農民たちを新しい文化に組織するために、日本の例を取り入れるべきだと考えていた。

ドモフスキは政治家であるだけでなく、知識人だった。私が著書等で明らかにしようとしてきたことは、ポーランドの地方的文脈で生まれたこのナショナリストが反ユダヤ主義者になり、ポーランド人一般を反ユダヤ的にする過程、すなわち、反ユダヤ主義の考えが、ある 1 人の人物から 200 人の集団に、さらに大規模な大衆動員へと翻訳される過程だ。1907 年の選挙キャンペーンにおいて、ポーランド人、とりわけ知識人は、彼らのシンボリックな首都であるワルシャワから帝国の中心地であるサンクトペテルブルグの国会に、ポーランド人ではなくユダヤ人の議員が送られる、という考えに恐怖した。ポーランド人にとって、これはあんまりだった。この恐れは全ポーランドを覆ったわけではなかったが、たしかに一定の役割を果たした。

ここまでを要約すれば、ドモフスキはごく初期から過激で感情的な反ユダヤ主義者であり、反ユダヤ主義は彼の私的な問題であった。私はかつて、あるポーランド人ナショナリスト集団のメンバーの孫にあたる人物から、ドモフスキが 1911 年を境に、ユダヤ出自のポーランド人との一切の交流を絶ったということ聞いた。このことはドモフスキ個人にとってきわめて

重要なことであった。彼は個人的な心情と政治的イデオロギーが融合した自身の精神世界から、ユダヤ人を排除しようとしたのである。1918年に彼はワシントンを訪れ、ユダヤ人とも会っているが、彼らをもっぱらポーランドの大義と彼自身にとっての敵として扱った。

ーポーランドのナショナリズムについて。ポーランドではエスノ・ナショナリズムのみが発展し、シヴィック・ナショナリズムには発展の余地がなかったように思われる。報告の中で興味深かったのは、反ユダヤ主義の発展における選挙の役割だ。選挙があるたびに、反ユダヤ主義が増長した。選挙には投票者の動員が不可欠である。ポーランド人候補者がユダヤ人投票者を動員しようとし、ユダヤ人候補者がポーランド人投票者を動員しようとするすれば、選挙はシヴィック・ナショナリズムの装置ともなりえたはずだが、ポーランドでは逆にエスノ・ナショナリズムが強化された。このことは、矛盾しているようで興味深い。

GK：私はこれまで、ポーランドの歴史におけるシヴィック・ナショナリズムの試みを見つけ出そうとしてきたが、これは極めて困難であった。残念なことに、多くの場合、シヴィック・ナショナリズムの試みは効果がなく、成功に至らなかった。ポーランド人社会主義者のカジミエシュ・ケレス＝クラウズ (Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz, 1872–1905) は、ポーランドの独立とユダヤ人や他の民族の統一と権利を結びつけたある種のシヴィック・ナショナリズムを定式化したが、彼の死後、この思想は受け継がれることはなく、その他の小さな試みも失敗に終わった。

選挙が人々をエスノ・ナショナリズムへ動員したということは、ポーランド史についてのみならず、ユダヤ史についても同様のことが言える。Scott Uryの研究 (*Barricades and Banners: The Revolution of 1905 and the Transformation of Warsaw Jewry*, Stanford, 2012) は、選挙においてユダヤ人がポーランド人と同様の投票行動をとったことを指摘している。彼らはポーランド人ではなく、ユダヤ人に投票した。他に選択肢を見出せなかった

からだ。

カミル・キエック（以下 KK）報告

◆ 討論者（西村木綿）への応答

ーパレスチナにおける暴力のポーランドのユダヤ人への影響について。

KK: それは確かに非常に重要だ。ダニエル・ヘラーの近著（Daniel Heller, *Jabotinsky's Children: Polish Jews and the Rise of Right-Wing Zionism*, Princeton and Oxford, 2017）は、修正主義シオニストの青年組織ベタルが「攻撃による防衛」、すなわち、ポーランドのユダヤ青年は攻撃的であるべきで、反ユダヤ主義者と戦うことで物理的に彼らを否定すべきだとの考えを打ち出すに至った背景に、ポーランドとパレスチナ双方における暴力があったことを指摘している。この考えが非常に興味深いのは、修正主義シオニストが保ってきたサナツィア政府との同盟関係を否定していることであり、世代間の差異を浮き彫りにしていることだ。老年世代の卓越した政治家であれば、ユダヤ人が反ユダヤ主義者を力によって否定すべきだと認めたとしても、それを実行に移すことはしなかったであろう。

Nasz Przegląd、*Haynt*、*Der moment*、*Unzer veg* 等々、ポーランドで発行されたユダヤ新聞を見れば、1935～1938年のパレスチナでのアラブ人の蜂起——ちょうどポーランドの田舎で反ユダヤ的暴力の最大の波が生じた時期（1935年～1937年、ピークは1936年）と重なる——が、パレスチナにおけるポグロム、といった形で報じられているのが分かる。両者は繋がっていると捉えられていた。このことは、ポーランドのユダヤ人にとって普遍的な体験だった。というのは、これらの新聞は全て、党の支部や青年運動において読まれ、議論されていたからだ。

もう一つ重要な点は、1930年代にユダヤ社会内部の各勢力の間でも——例えばベタルと共産主義者の間で、共産主義者とブンド間で——暴力が起

こっていたということだ。パレスチナの労働運動組織ヒスタドルートへの対抗姿勢を明らかにした 1932 年のジャボティンスキーの著名な呼びかけ「分裂に賛成す (Yo, brekhn)」(1932 年 11 月 4 日にポーランドのイディッシュ語新聞 *Haynt* に掲載) は、ポーランドにおいて直ちにシオニスト左派と右派の間の暴力的衝突を引き起こした。したがって、パレスチナとポーランド、そして反ユダヤ暴力とユダヤ人同士の暴力の間には関連がある。というのは、これらは、ユダヤ人が他の集団より弱くはないということ、ユダヤ人には力があるということを物理的に誇示するものであったからだ。ポーランドの文化を一つの重要な要素とする日常を生きていれば、反ユダヤ主義者に対しても同じポーランドの文化のカテゴリーで答える必要を感じただろう。ユダヤ人は弱いと言われれば、そうではないと物理的に誇示する。これは、ポーランド・ユダヤ人の重要な経験であった。

ーブンドの doikoyt の理念の世代間の差異の有無。

KK : 1930 年代に物理的な自衛に携わった若いブンディストたちもまた、老年世代に違わず doikoyt を信じていた。彼らは、自分たちがポーランドに居続けると信じていたし、故郷であるポーランドで革命を起こし、ポーランドの反動主義者や反ユダヤ主義者と戦うべきだと考えていた。したがって、doikoyt という理念については世代間の差異はないと考える。ブンドは 1905 年革命期に都市部で自衛グループを組織しており、その意味で物理的な自衛を自制してはいなかった。戦間期の変化は、力による抵抗というラディカルな文化が、都市部のみならずシュテットル（農村部に見られた小規模な都市的機能を備えたユダヤ人の集住地）にも到来したということで、これは第一次世界大戦前には見られなかった現象だ。

ー社会階層と反ユダヤ暴力への応答との関係について。

KK : 文化的適応の度合いと暴力の関係については、研究があまりない。

1931年に大きな波が始まった、大学における反ユダヤ暴力についての議会資料から分かるのは、最もよく文化的適応を遂げた層が反ユダヤ暴力と物理的に対峙した前衛であったということだ。この層はヴィルノやワルシャワその他の地域でも活発であったが、ただこれらについての詳しい研究はない。プシテイクの自衛については次のように言える。プシテイクは確かに小さなシュテットルで、ユダヤ人の大半は伝統的で、若者の大半は職人や商店主の子弟だった。つまりは素朴なユダヤ人たちだった。だが、自衛の先頭に立ったのはベタルのメンバーで、ポーランドの最良の教育を受けたシオニストのエリートだった。靴職人や共産主義者が彼らに加わった。シュテットルの全てのユダヤ人は、世代で分かれた。ポグロムが起こっている間は、もちろん全てのユダヤ人が自衛に関わった。だが、自衛のための組織を作るということは、政治や文化や社会階層の境界を越えて、若者たちが行ったことだった。だがこうした世代的な現象の問題については、いまだ研究が待たれている状態だ。

◆ フロアからの質疑と応答

ーモダニズムの定義とは。

KK：私が使用しているモダニズムという概念は政治的モダニズムのことであるが、定義はロジャー・グリフィン（Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, New York, 2007）に依拠している。政治的モダニズムとは、19世紀末から第二次世界大戦までの近代（modernity、つまり当事者たちにとっての同時代）が退廃、崩壊しており、危機に瀕しているとの認識に立ち、今ある近代とは別の、もう一つのより良い近代を模索した政治的イデオロギーのことである。グリフィンや他の論者の定義によれば、1930年代のファシズム、共産主義、急進的社会主義などのラディカリズムは、ベクトルこそ異なれ、すべて政治的モダニズムの一形態であった。なぜなら、これらはいずれも、現実の近代

に対するオルタナティブの模索や、現在の危機への応答という態度を共有しているからだ。ブンドもベタルもこの一部であったし、ユダヤ人、非ユダヤ人を問わず多くのイデオロギーは政治的モダニズムの一形態であった。

ベタルについて付け加えれば、私はその祖であるジャボティンスキーがファシストであったと言うつもりはない。実際のところ、最新の研究（Daniel Heller 前掲書）は、ベタルがジャボティンスキーその人の影響からはかなり離れていたこと、他の外部のモデルを熱心に模倣していたことを明らかにしている。外部のモデルとは、ピウスツキのサナツィア政府であり、ポーランドの反ユダヤ主義的右派でもあった。ベタルが人種、エスニシティ、軍事主義、暴力についてどのように考えていたかを読めば、エンデツィアの影響は明らかで、彼らはまさにユダヤ人版エンデツィアになろうとしていたという印象を受けるであろう。パレスチナにおける修正主義シオニストの軍事組織イルグンのメンバーの大半がポーランド出身であったことから推測されるように、これらの思想はポーランドからパレスチナに移植されたはずである。このことは一つの重要なトピックだ。

一公教育を受けた初めての世代、という指摘は大変興味深く、台湾（1895年）、朝鮮（1910年）を併合した頃の日本の状況分析にも援用可能な議論だと思われる。ソ連でも1930～40年代に公教育が導入されたが、人々はどのように反応しただろうか。一方、ポーランドについては、ガリツィアで公教育が導入されたのはポーランド分割期、つまり1、2世代前であり、他地域とは違いがあったのではないか。

KK：公教育を通じた文化的適応は、ユダヤ人の全てのミリューで同じように進んだわけではもちろんない。1930年代のポーランドについて言えば、ユダヤ人は完全にポーランドの文化に溶け込んだわけではなく、ユダヤ人の文化をも生きていた。彼らの大半はポーランド語やポーランドの文化資本を手にいれたが、家庭ではイディッシュ語を話し、いくつかのミリュー

ではシオニズム運動を通じてヘブライ語を学んでいた。それぞれのミリューがどのような文化状況を生きていたかについては自著 (*Dzieci modernizmu: Świadomość i socjalizacja polityczna młodzieży żydowskiej w Polsce międzywojennej*, Wrocław, 2017) で書いているが、普遍的な現象として指摘できるのは、公教育を受けた世代の全てが、ポーランド語の技能と詳しい知識を獲得したということだ。第一次世界大戦以前には、リトアニアではポーランド語はほとんど外国語とみなされていたし、ガリツィアではドイツ語のほうが支配的だった。これらを考えれば、ポーランド語がかくも優勢な言語となったのは全く新しい現象だった。もちろん、ポーランド語が実際にどのように用いられたかは、例えば、正統派の女学校である「ヤコヴの家」の女子生徒と、リトアニアのハシディズム（ユダヤ教敬虔主義）のイエシヴァ（神学校）の学生、ワルシャワ大学の学生との間で、かなり異なっていた。

1930年代のイディッシュ語またはヘブライ語によるユダヤ人の定期刊行物は、若者たちがますますポーランド語を話すようになり、イディッシュ語で話者が減ることを嘆くナショナリストの声で溢れている。パレスチナからのシュリヒーム（使者）は、シオニストの学校を見て、状況は壊滅的だと言った。学校では美しいヘブライ語が教えられていたが、休み時間になると子供たちはもうポーランド語を話していた。ポーランドで1931年に行われた人口調査には母語を問う項目があり、ユダヤ人の8割近くはイディッシュ語と回答していたが、これは言語使用の実態を表すものではなく、民族的アイデンティティの宣言として解釈すべきと考えられている。前回の人口調査（1921年）にあった民族性を問う項目がウクライナ人ナショナリズムの高まりを背景に削除されたため、母語がその代わりとみなされ、ナショナリスト政党によって、イディッシュ語またはヘブライ語と回答するよう盛んに宣伝されたからだ。YIVO（ユダヤ学術研究所。1925年にポーランド領ヴィルノに設立された）はユダヤ人大学生が何語で話しているかを調査していたが、ポーランド語と答えた学生の数は、1930年代よりも1920年代の調査でずっと多かった。この件も同様に、ユダヤ人大学

生がポーランド語を話すのをやめたということの意味してはいない。実際にはポーランド語を話していたとしても、ナショナリストになればなるほど、自分はイディッシュ語を話していると宣言するようになったのである。

ソ連では、ユダヤ人の言語面での文化的適応はずっと早く進んだ。しかし、近年の多くの研究は、ソ連のユダヤ人はそれでも自らをユダヤ人と感じており、自らのユダヤ性をロシア語で表現していたということを明らかにしている。ポーランドでは、ポーランド・ユダヤ性（Polish-Jewishness）あるいはポーランド語で表現されたユダヤ性（Jewishness in Polish）というものが作られつつあった。これは両大戦間期の後半に新しく始まった現象で、第二次世界大戦によって突如打ち切られてしまい、我々はその先を知ることができない。だがおそらく、ポーランドのユダヤ人の経験とソ連のユダヤ人の経験は、多くの確かな相違にも関わらず、類似していたと思われる。

◆ 全体討論

一農村と都市の関係、あるいは、都市化や産業化といったロシア帝政期以来の社会的変化は、今回の報告にはどのように関連するであろうか。例えば、ロシア帝政末期の産業化の進展を背景に、ユダヤ人の中では、仲買人という職業を介して担ってきた都市と農村の仲介者としての伝統的役割が弱まり、プロレタリア化が進んだ。一方、ユダヤ人は大工場から排除され、小さな作業場に集中せざるをえなかったことから、ユダヤ人独自の社会主義運動が生まれた。シオニストも、ユダヤ人の経済活動が衰退していると考え、新たな民族経済の創出が必要だと考えた。つまりユダヤ人自身もこうした社会的変化に自覚的であったわけだが、これらは今回の報告とどのように関わるであろうか。

KK：19世紀の専門家ではないので紹介にとどめるが、農村と都市の関係については、ポーランド啓蒙期から第一次世界大戦後までの西欧・東欧に

おける農村と都市についての言説を扱ったイェジ・イェドリツキの『ポーランド人にはいかなる文明が必要か』が、英語版もあり、ご質問の一部に答えていると思う (Jerzy Jedlicki, *Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują: Studia z dziejów idei i wyobraźni XIX wieku (Polska XIX i XX wieku)*, Warszawa, 1988 / *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*, Budapest and New York, 1988)。ここではユダヤ人の問題と戦間期のポーランドに話を絞りたい。

都市と農村を峻別し、ユダヤ人を都市 (city) の住民と捉える視点に立つと、扱いが難しいのがシュテットルである。シュテットルは町 (town) であるが農村部にあり、農民経済の上に成り立っていた。戦間期のポーランドでは、産業化がさらに進み、近代的教育政策が導入されたことで、シュテットルはロシア帝政期に持っていた特徴を次第に失い、そこでのユダヤ人とポーランド人の関係も変わっていった。同時に、シュテットルから都市部へのユダヤ人の移住の大きな波が生じた。大都市へ移住したいという考えはユダヤ人の間で強固なものであり、米国への移民の大きな波、パレスチナへのより小さな移民の波とも関連していた。第一次世界大戦以前にロシア帝国、ハプスブルク帝国においてユダヤ人の大都市への移動が起こったのと同様に、彼らは新しい環境を求めたのである。米国、パレスチナへの移民の機会が閉ざされると、同じ人たちがウッチやワルシャワ、ヴィルノなどポーランド国内の都市部へ移ろうとした。

こうした現象は、シオニズム運動のあり方にも影響を与えた。ヘハルーツ運動についてのロナ・ヨナ (Rona Yona) の研究が興味深い事実を明らかにしている (ヘハルーツはヘブライ語で「開拓者」を意味し、パレスチナでの労働に備えて農業に重点を置いた訓練を行ったシオニスト組織を指す)。ポーランドにおけるキブツ (農業を基礎とする生活共同体) 運動は 1920 年代には東部国境地域における農村共同体を基盤としていたが、1930 年代になると、ワルシャワやウッチのような中央ポーランドの大都市近郊にキブツを集中させることが最大の政策となった。キブツのメンバーを都市の工場に就労させるためである。シオニストは大都市におけるユダヤ人

の生産化（商業や金融業ではなく、農業や製造業に従事させること）に関心があった。伝統的な仲買人のあり方は、あらゆる潮流のシオニストが否定しており、ブンドもまた同様であった。誰もがユダヤ人は仲買人としては存続できないと考えていた。ここで想起しておきたいのは、ポーランドからのパレスチナへの移民の大半が、パレスチナにおいてキブツではなく、テルアビブやエルサレムに定住し、イシューヴ（パレスチナのユダヤ社会）における都市の発展に参加したということである。農村開拓は前衛的イデオロギーとして重要であったが、実際に推進されたのは都市化や都市政策、工場労働を通じた生産化であった。

ユダヤ人の都市性（アーバニズム）と、都市性についてのポーランド人ナショナリストのイデオロギーの関係についていえば、一つの大きな都市にユダヤ人とポーランド人が共生し、それぞれポーランド語とイディッシュ語を話し、ポーランド文化とイディッシュ文化が共に繁栄するような近代的なポーランド＝ユダヤ社会の形成という展望が、ポーランド人とユダヤ人の間で合意を得たことは一度もなかった。1930年代に緊密な同盟関係にあったポーランド社会党員とブンドの間でもそうである。わずかな例外を除いて、前者はユダヤ人の言語的同化を望んでおり、後者はこれを拒んでいたからだ。つまり、ポーランド人とユダヤ人の関係には、反ユダヤ主義の他に、ナショナリズムや都市性イデオロギーに起因する深い問題があったといえる。ポーランドの近代的都市文化とユダヤ人のそれとが共存できないというのは、1905年革命期、つまりユダヤ・ナショナリズムの台頭を背景としたリトヴァク脅威論の中ですで見られた言説で、ホロコースト期まで解決されずに続いた。私は今、第二次世界大戦直後のポーランド・ユダヤ人の歴史に取り組んでいるが、民族的マイノリティなきモダニティというポーランド人の夢は、共産主義体制の初期の言説にも現れている。

ー1970年代にポーランドに滞在したが、ユダヤ研究を専門とする研究者には会ったことがなかった。ユダヤ歴史研究所（Żydowski Instytut

Historyczny) はすでにあつたが、共産党政権下では活動が限定されていたと認識している。ポーランドにおけるユダヤ研究は現在どのような状況であろうか。また、今後どうなっていくであろうか。

GK : ユダヤ研究は発展しており、これはある意味で新しい現象である。それはいわば灰から蘇り、発展してきたといえるが、魅力的なことには、その担い手はユダヤ人自身というよりは——もちろんユダヤ系の研究者も一部にはいるが——主にはユダヤ系ではないポーランド人の研究者であることだ。彼らは、ポーランド史やポーランドのアイデンティティに新しい波を起こしたと言える。他方で、カチンスキ政権においてそうであったように退行的な波もあり、これも国に根付いたポーランド文化の一つである。つまり、反ユダヤ的ではないにせよ、ポーランド史の不可欠な一部としてのユダヤ史という考えに反対する傾向がある。エンデツィアをナチスに類似したものと描くような私のアプローチに反対する者も多い。

KK : 1989 年から今日にかけて変革が起きてきたことは事実だ。ポーランド国内には6つのユダヤ研究の拠点がある。ヴロツワフ大学では30人の学生がユダヤ研究に従事している。ポーランド全体ではその数は毎年数百に上るだろう。ユダヤ研究の発展は、社会の民主化や、自由主義的・多文化主義的なポーランドという理念の発展と結びついている。クシヴィエツ氏の指摘の通り、ユダヤ研究を発展させてきたのは主にユダヤ系ではないポーランド人で、彼らはドイツ人、ウクライナ人、ユダヤ人等々の歴史を含み込んだ多文化主義的なポーランド性を打ち出そうとしている。一方、ポーランド性についての古い理念は非常にエスニックなもので、確かにポーランド人のアイデンティティの核心を掴んでいる。それゆえ、カチンスキ現象は特異なことではなく、一般的な症状であった。

ユダヤ研究は発展し、その成果は多く出版されているが、それらは主に国外で読まれており、ポーランド史研究者はあまり読まない。その意味でポーランド史とユダヤ史は分かれていて、まだ互いに緊密には結びついて

いない。もう一つ、特にクシヴィエツ氏のような研究者にとっての大きな問題は、ユダヤ研究を行うこと自体には問題はなくとも、我々がいま議論しているような問題、つまり、反ユダヤ主義や、1930年代ないし第二次世界大戦中のポーランド人・ユダヤ人関係といった論争を呼ぶテーマに触れると、反応は良くなく、ある種の抑制がかかる。たとえばヤン・グロスの著書への反応は否定的だった。私のポーランド人の友人もそうだが、彼らには、そこに書かれたことを受け止める用意がまだできていないのである（イェドヴァブネ事件を検証した Jan Tomasz Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, Princeton, 2001 のこと。ポーランド語原著は 2000 年刊行。なおグロスの別の著書には邦訳がある。『アウシュヴィッツ後の反ユダヤ主義——ポーランドにおける虐殺事件を糾明する』染谷徹訳、白水社、2008 年）。

ユダヤ研究に未来はあるが、ポーランドで助成を得て行うのが難しい領域もある。だが、大きな変化はあって、私はポグロムについての大きな研究プロジェクトに参加していたが、このプロジェクトは国からの助成を得るのに成功した（ワルシャワ大学を拠点とした国際研究プロジェクト「19～20 世紀ポーランドにおけるユダヤ人への集団的暴力と、ポーランド人・ユダヤ人関係へのその影響。歴史、記憶、アイデンティティ」のこと。研究成果をまとめた論集が刊行されている。Konrad Zieliński and Kamil Kijek eds., *Przemoc antyżydowska i konteksty akcji pogromowych na ziemiach polskich w XX wieku*, Lublin, 2017）。

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Part II

Anti-Jewish Violence on the Eve of WWII

**The Polish ‘Borderlands’ (Kresy) as a Space without the Jews?
The Jewish Menace, ‘National Revolution’ from Below and Above
at the Eve of WWII**

Grzegorz Krzywiec

Fascist sub-culture on the Polish soil?

The questions about the nature of Polish right wing radicalism or Polish fascism as such and its role in Polish political life in 1930s are more easily asked than answered, mostly because research is thin on the ground¹. Apart from ideology and political thought analytical studies of party membership and party leadership not mentioning every day activism are in fact very scarce, indeed. Moreover, historians, and social scientists at large, generally ignore the Polish contribution to the legacy of fascism in the broader region (e.g. R. Griffin, A. Kallis, R. Paxton, and S. G. Payne²). Expert literature typically treats the fascist movement in Poland as a footnote with little bearing on the political or cultural history of Poland. In most cases the relevant researchers focus on the National Radical Camp (*ca.* 5,000 active members), which was outlawed in 1934 after a couple months of legal activity³. Thus, my talk wish to make a revision to this paradigm, and therefore challenges the presumptions of the marginal role and imitative character of the Polish fascist movement. My approach repudiates the strictly political and somehow ‘reductionist’ lens of present-day historiography – indeed, I maintain that Polish fascism flourished in a plethora of vibrant cultural and social *milieux*. Fascism in Poland and in Eastern Europe continues to be an extremely slippery ground for research. Notwithstanding the numerous works on the nationalist movement in Poland, and the far fewer interpretations of it (among recently exceptions see M. S. Kunicki), Polish fascism has proved to be a conundrum, both in Poland and abroad⁴. Scholarship concerning fascism and right-wing radicalism is still singularly vulnerable to subjective viewpoints and is often abused as a weapon in current polemical battles. No mentioning that even though some specialists acknowledged the gravity of the problem, for a long time there was no need for any further discussion.

Therefore the attitude presented here is rather to concentrate on local rightist sub-culture and the biggest political party in the Polish lands at the same time than all transitions of ideas, exchanges and straightforward borrowings either from Mussolini's Italy or later on from Nazi Germany⁵. At the very beginning, it's worthwhile to introduce a certain number of facts about one of the lesser known fascist movement or better to say phenomenon of the thirties, and then using that other data in an attempt to begin a sort of discussion of which problems or topics need more thorough analysis and deeper understanding.

Therefore the focus here is getting at the late 1920. One of the nationalist camp's early reactions to Józef Piłsudski's *coup d'état* was to establish the Camp of Great Poland (*Obóz Wielkiej Polski – OWP*) in 1927. Initially a coalition of rightist groups opposing Piłsudski quickly commenced to transform itself into a para-fascist mass movement. In accord with the intentions of its founder and the main ideologue of Polish right Roman Dmowski, it was patterned on Italian fascism⁶. Dmowski wielded direct power in it from the beginning. At the ideological level, the Camp was the realization of his pre-war ideas: the belief that the political scene was broken into two antagonistic camps and that one, the 'anti-national', was composed of 'destructive elements' with the Jews at the first place and should be systematically marginalized and subjected to 'moral terror'. The Bolshevik Revolution, which was regarded among National Democracy circles, as a 'Jewish product', gave this approach an even more radical, not to say extreme, dimension. All these recommendations were to be found in Dmowski's two most important publications of this period, *Government Issues (Zagadnienie rządu)* and *Church, Nation and the State (Kościół, Naród i państwo)* (1927).

One of the first steps toward building a mass antiparliamentary grouping was to work for the favour of the Catholic Church. However, Dmowski's own defense of the Church was characterized by a certain ambiguity. It seems that he saw the Catholicism primarily as an ally in the struggle against all tendencies taking their roots from the tradition of the Enlightenment and as the sole power that had successfully resisted the influence of the 'Jewish spirit'. It may also be supposed that the genesis of this document was Pious XI's condemnation of the 'Action Française' doctrine. For European Catholics, Eastern European the same,

this was a shock. It is worth remembering the very practical dimension of Dmowski's texts. In contrast to their religiously indifferent predecessors, the new generation of nationalist youth which appeared in the early 1920s wanted to combine their nationalist credo with their attachment to Catholicism⁷.

The appearance of the Camp of Great Poland (*OWP*) and its further sharp rise led to changes in Piłsudski's semi-dictatorship as well. When parliamentary elections took place in March 1928, the result exceeded the worst expectations of the *Endeks*; National Democracy as an umbrella movement had lost more than half of its mandate in parliament, coming far behind the groups supporting Piłsudski's regime. This defeat finally buried the conservative line in the movement, giving a green light to the radical youth led by Dmowski himself.

In the early 1930s – the symbolic date here is 1931 and the first wave of university strikes and massive anti-Semitic unrest organized by the young generation of nationalists – the Camp of Great Poland took the initiative for the whole *Endeks*⁸. Dmowski's plan for 'organizing politics' and 'a new selection' with the necessity for introducing a single-party dictatorship in the form of a government of the 'national oligarchy', in order to moral and biological regeneration of the nation, received a broad response, particularly from the youth. In the spring 1928 was established the Youth Movement of the *OWP* (*Ruch Młodych Obozu Wielkiej Polski – RM-OWP*) that became a way of registering anger and economic tensions about the changes in the reborn Poland among young generation. Most energetic followers of whole movement have come from both towns and cities, mainly the middle-class youth, white-collar workers, largely from the upper and well-off layers of society. But first of all they were students. Nearly all chairmen, high-ranking officials hailed from university-student milieu from the early 1920s. They all fought in the reconstruction wars, but the most numerous group was that of the veterans of the Polish-Bolshevik war of the 1920s. Crucial point in their program was of the total elimination of the Jews from Polish public life (*numerus nullus*). Tadeusz Bielecki, one of the main leaders of *OWP*, at this time also a private secretary of Dmowski once declared: "We cut ourselves definitely from the Jews. We made a pure Aryan student's republic"⁹. Ever since the late 1920 he was very right: the university was divided

into the dominant Polish majority and the other minority groups. There was no chance to be a Jew even self-declared Polish patriot and the member of nationwide student's mutual aid organization (*Bratnia Pomoc*) at the same time.

For the very first time it turned out a generation that imagined not only its homeland but also a world without Jews. A combative anti-Semitism of this group served not only as anti-Jewish measure but also as a tool of keeping its members in constant readiness for coming national revolution and showdown also with the ruling regime. There came first attempts to create a genuine, healthy Polish-Catholic and a new modern culture appropriate for the reborn, racially purged national community and the task of creating an alternative total 'culture' based on the organic nation. 'Youth' in contrast to the whole Camp was based in paramilitary organization (60-80 thousands armed young members bearing batons and sometime firearms, marching with flags and emblems through towns and villages and brawling with leftist organizations)¹⁰.

In a couple of years the Camp became a powerful movement, in 1930 reaching the enormous number (also taking under account that it was in opposition to the ruling power) of 250,000 members. From the very beginning, the Camp was organized by paramilitary rules and standards. It included a 'fighting organization' constructed by secretive, hierarchical rules. At every lowest local branch of the Camp were created two independent departments: 'Jewish department' producing a mass anti-Semitic propaganda and 'Economic action department' (*Wydział Gospodarczy*) respectively focusing on solely a anti-Jewish boycott campaigns as such.

Toward a 'national revolution'

Although a new political offensive at the beginning of the 1930s left the country facing a civil war, the *Sanacja* regime successfully stifled that nationalist mobilization. An attempted repeat of Hitler's 'nationalist revolution', which had made a great impression on the Polish 'nationalist camp' like elsewhere in Europe of those days, especially in Eastern Europe – that is, the tactic of dividing public opinion and presenting the ruling elite and namely Piłsudski as the guardian of the Jewish population – never got off the ground¹¹.

The Camp of Great Poland did not achieve much in political sense of the word. It did not manage to unite the right in opposition to Piłsudski. It did not acquire the unequivocal support of the Catholic Church and although a large part of the lower clergy supported the group, the hierarchy as whole maintained a certain reserve. Nevertheless, as it expanded, this early version of Polish fascism revealed its social and ideological physiognomy. Then the students' rebellion of the early 1930s broke up in university's centres as a protest against overcrowding and poor material conditions in higher education. The young nationalist leaders, amongst them all future Polish fascist leaders (e.g. Tadeusz Bielecki, Jan Mosdorf, Jan Rembieniński, Zdzisław Stahl, Wojciech Wasiutyński), succeeded in reducing a set of actual problems into a simple political message: ridding of 'foreigners' from universities. There was only one group that composed a visible scapegoat there. There were Jews or Poles of Jewish origins.

At the end of 1932 and beginning of 1933, the creeping nationalist revolt was put down by the *Sanacja* who gradually made the Camp illegal in various regions of the country. For many of the 'Youngs' this spectacular defeat of the nationalist movement was the signal that they had to do something on their own. That rebellion of the new shoots against the old roots set the stage for the emergence in 1934 of the National Radical Camp (*Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny – ONR*)¹², the first openly fascist political party in Poland, and also for the breakdown of the nationalist right, which lasted to the end of the 2nd Republic. After banning the organization much of these activists with Dmowski's blessing leaked to the mainstream National Party.

The Polish nationalist right of the second part of 1930s composed of nearly all main trends of authoritarian and proto-fascist and fascist that existed all over the Europe, from an extreme nationalist, *par excellence* anti-Semitic but still anti-German Dmowski's the National Party (*Stronnictwo Narodowe – SN*), openly-totalitarian and populist in Strasserian manner – Bolesław Piasecki's *ONR-Falanga*, Catholic corporal, authoritarian *ONR-ABC*, the *Zadruga* movement – a racialist group rooted in the pre-historian mystic Slav history to name a few. For a nearly entire generation the Camp was a crucial training school of ideas and values but as well a reservoir of leadership cadre. First of all, crucial among these

activists and believers was a belief in violence, as well in physical terror, as an ethical and a regenerative force in itself and as the main key to national renewal and future unity.

Paradoxically enough, on the other side, the *Sanacja*'s regime after Piłsudski's death in 1935 has assumed a shape of more fascist politics. This para-fascist style, or 'fascisation' on the post-Piłsudski-ites'side was to have its brief heyday in 1937 with the foundation of the Camp of National Unity (*Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego – OZN*) and so called the 'consolidation process'¹³. In general, from the late 1930s the *Sanacja* camp began to disintegrate. The only one binder for all diversified groups of interest was self-preservation. The threat from Nazi Germany after March 1939, was reinforced this tendency. Yet, you have keep it in mind a general trend still seemed to go in to direction from policy state and autocracy to totalitarian, homogenous ethnic regime.

Interestingly enough, many former members of the Camp of Greater Poland (one can assume 1/3 of the whole generation) leaked somehow into the *Sanacja*, eventually. Some of them officially as the members of the Association of Young Nationalist (*Związek Młodych Narodowców*) that began to cooperate with the regime since 1934 on, many others on the more unofficial basis. The fervent, radical anti-Semitism of all these groups was one but the constant feature. So called the 'national revolution' (*rewolucja narodowa*), that meant a Jew-hatred treated not only as a chief instrument for public persuasion but as well a sort of world-view, was in common in all these movements. By radically diminishing 'Jewish influence' or put it directly as 'Jewish menace' or 'non-Poles' it postulated a creation of radically new society and new people inhabiting them (the new Poles), free from social and cultural ills that were born by 'false' modernity (in its 'pathological' version largely being 'Jewish creation'). This sort of anti-Semitism had deeply, one might reckon, if not as a 'redemptive' at least of eliminationalist nature.

Here it is a space to make a stop for some methodological explanation. As a matter of fact neither political nor institutional keys seem to be enough to explain how and what extent in fact radical rights ideas turned out both in main opposition party, and in the government at the same time. And how one could

explain such tremendous appeal of extreme nationalism to the Polish youth specifically, and how one might better situate the Polish case alongside other mass rightist movements of the day?

‘Cultural’ instruments adopted to the Polish case facilitates to grasp why both paramilitary nationalist activists of various kinds and the influential grouping among the *Sanacja* regime share a desire for a regeneration which ought to be simultaneously spiritual and physical, moral and political. In this particular situation a political violence was not a mean to a particular end, but it was as well model of a living.

***The nationalist revolution and anti-Semitic terror of the mid-1930s from below:
The Lublin province as a part of Borderland phenomenon***

By the second half of the 1930s Poland had become the scene of widely publicized pogroms and waves of mob violence directed against Jews. Among the better known are the events in Grodno on June 7, 1935, Odrzywół from November 20-27, 1935, Przytyk March 9, 1936, Mińsk Mazowiecki on June 1, 1936, Brześć on May 13, 1937, Częstochowa on June 19, 1937, and Bielsko-Biała between the 17th and 25th of September 1937, along with a great deal of minor events and cases. Between 14 and nearly 100 deaths, far more than 150 acts of collective violence, over two-thousands severely beaten and badly cut up persons, an inestimable amount of the material loss. Nonetheless, no precise map nor dynamic of this anti-Semitic violence has ever been systematically scrutinized¹⁴. To be sure, the above is only a small part of a broader picture of the political violence that erupted in the mid-1930s. However, it shows how a paramilitary nationalist sub-culture overshadowed practically the whole of political life not only in the centre of the state, but as well in the provinces.

Not challenging and denigrating the importance of factors such as the Great Depression, the deep economic crisis in the Polish countryside, the aforementioned authoritarian, if not a para-fascist turn of the late *Sanacja* regime, overwhelming peasant dissatisfaction with government, and the huge scale of popular protests, widespread anti-Jewish prejudices among the local populace, the place of anti-Jewish prejudice in the actions of government and among local elites,

the political fragmentation and radicalization of Poland's Jewish community, and a great many other particular endemic factors, the fundamental question which returns here is how all these ideas constituted and developed among elites and were catapulted from the cities and academic centres into the countryside. The next is how and to what extent the *Sanacja* regime changed as such.

On more practical terms, the Poland of those days was an overwhelmingly peasant country (nearly 70% of the population lived in the province). What were the mechanisms that led from words to deeds; from speeches, pamphlets, and one-day publications, the nationwide hate campaigns of newspapers and the mass media to physical terror and daily assaults on Jews?¹⁵

In this regard one has to take a step back to the first massive wave of anti-Jewish violence at the beginning of 1930, and which began at Polish universities¹⁶. In order to demonstrate how, when, and to what extent anti-Semitic propaganda became a part of the meticulous tactics and systemic political strategy directed to foment clashes between the Jewish and non-Jewish population in the province, between 'the enemy of the nation' and 'the Christian national community'. According to this scheme, the possible escalation of violence could become a self-perpetuating social process that could be easily explained to peasants through the anti-Semitic ideology of the Camp of Great Poland and then the National Party still dominant political organization. Thus violence was not only a physical, generational experience for many, but also a cognitive and emotional act¹⁷ through which a telltale radical anti-Semitic ideology and regenerative project following closely behind could be popularized in the country.

According to the government reports, in the province, especially young peasants and young clergy, there were two social groups among which 'Young' *Endeks* succeeded in finding the biggest number of new followers. The years 1930-1932 were a time when the world economic crisis was already strongly felt in the Polish countryside, in particular among peasants. Peasants felt the economic collapse of early 1930s most deeply and for the longest time. But despite all this, and despite traditional superstitions that the Christian peasants had about Jews, their economic activity, and in general about the modern 'Jewish economic oppression', these matters did not seem central for the local *Endeks*'

political rhetoric until 1931¹⁸. The idea of Jews being the overriding cause of the plight of ‘Christian’ peasants did not have to be invented, but rather brought back to the centre of peasant-oriented political communication. ‘The Jew’ as the deadly ‘enemy within’ hiding behind everything that was harmful was therefore taught. And this ‘translation’ (K. Kijek) was done through intense agitation, and then first and foremost by physical violence¹⁹. Similarly among the Catholic priest fears and dissatisfaction arose especially when the left of the *Sanacja* establishment tried to enforce civil wedding procedures (1932). This was a trigger point not only for the Catholic hierarchy, but also for many young priests who had just appeared for the very first time on the public scene. A huge moral panic campaign overshadowed the Catholic mass media of those days²⁰.

However, the idea of Jews as the main ‘problem of the Polish economy,’ and the main reason for the misery in the countryside, had started to appear in the local *OWP* gatherings at the end of 1931. Just before, in the summer of 1931, crucial political decisions had been made at the top of *Endek* hierarchy. On the Central Council of *OWP* in Poznań, the main leader and ideologue of ND, Roman Dmowski, called for an urgent initiation of ‘anti-Jewish riots’ in order to sustain an anti-revolutionary mood among the ‘Christian populace’²¹. In the central *Endek* press such as *Myśl Narodowa* were published articles such as Stanisław Pieńkowski’s calling for ‘*numerus nullus*’ for the Jews.²² The ‘Youth’ supported these callings overwhelmingly. On November 26, 1931, the Warsaw-based Central Board of the Camp sent a memo to all of the *OWP* provincial and regional branches. The circular instructed party activists to use it to promote the new policy with the simplest possible slogans. Short sentences, a few emotionally loaded words were perfect in attracting the attention of the lowest classes, mainly peasants, of whom many in the middle and older generations were either functional illiterate or outright illiterate.

The spring of 1933 saw organized boycotts that promoted a large amount of leaflets in the villages and provincial town centres, usually during weekly fairs, fest days, and public holidays²³. In 1933 when Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and right away introduced anti-Jewish policies, he was attentively and widely observed by the Polish right wing, which sought examples that many

would be eager to follow²⁴. Already by the spring of 1933, Nazi successes were widely hailed as examples to follow during political meetings throughout the entire Kielce, Częstochowa, and first and foremost the Mazovian voivodeships²⁵.

In this regard the dissolution of the *OWP* (March 1933) and the integration of its young and radical members into the 'adult' National Party (*SN*) had a crucial, long-standing importance. Against the intention of the authorities this introduced the most extreme version of anti-government opposition and radical anti-Semitic ideology into the midst of the adult, nationalist mainstream political party. After wave of anti-Semitic events at the universities and the murder of Minister of Internal Affairs Bronisław Pieracki on June 15 1934 which was at first falsely attributed to *ONR*, the latter was disbanded by the authorities. The organization went underground, but in various regions it tried to act through connections with their 'Young' colleagues who decided to stay in the mainstream *SN*. And the *SN* itself, practically speaking, had moved into an even more openly fascist direction in April 1934. An even more striking evolution took place in the local ground, in Kielce voivodeship, as Kijek has meticulously documented and analyzed, and in Podlasie (the north- eastern part of the Lublin voivodeship)²⁶ and in Lublin itself²⁷, Masovia, Łódź in the centre of Poland, and almost everywhere.

It is important to note that both anti-Jewish radicalism and political violence as used by the 'Young' of all groupings were one of most important tools for gaining dominance in the whole National Party. Frequent communications with the larger public to advertise their activities gave the urban and peasant youth in particular reason to 'fight' the Jewish threat and the 'Jewish puppet' (*żydowskie wojtki*), that is, the *Sanacja* regime.

In this regards, political violence or better to say everyday acts of physical terror were an inseparable part of the anti-Jewish boycott campaign. From the very beginning the 'Jews' had 'overwhelmed' pages of the boycott bulletin and party leaflets which scared its readers from every possible corner. Among many other things they were accused of making police attack the Camp gatherings, of 'de-Polonizing Poles' through sensational press and other forms of popular culture, pornography, film, and even radio, still being real rulers of the country.

The propaganda either openly or by default advocated the usage of violence against the police, left wing, and the Jews.

Jews threatened with attacks would defend themselves, either through appealing to the state authorities, or through direct physical self-defense²⁸. The authorities' interventions were presented by nationalists as proof that the *Sanacja* regime 'serves the Jews' (some police reports from the head of Garwolin county cited that the leaflets name the government as 'Judeo-sanacja' (*Żydo-sanacja*)²⁹. This was supposed to happen in crowded places, the best ones would be the fairs where large numbers of locals convened. Physical confrontation in crowded places created confusion, chaos, and the engagement of bystanders. This was also to make use of prevailing traditional ethno-religious division; fights between 'Jews' and 'Polish-Catholics' would inevitably bring more and more peasants into the fray.

Although all these publications, as well as the leaflets and speeches of the young *Endek* activists in the other parts of province had slowly translated 'boycott' into 'fight' and 'struggle'. It had consistently presented figures like the dead student Stanisław Waclawski ('stoned to death by the Jews' as leaflets said) or Jan Grotkowski, who were murdered during the anti-Semitic wave of violence in Wilno and Lwów, respectively, and many other victims of nationalist brawls as national heroes and martyrs to educate locals about the events taking place at Polish universities and in the cities. Next to the martyrs (e.g., Waclawski was depicted as a peasant but at the same time a hero and martyr who strove for 'a better future'³⁰), boycotters as such were presented as new men imbued with the qualities of the 'national soldier': discipline, the spirit of sacrifice for their country and the cause (Greater Poland, *Wielka Polska*), certain spirit of camaraderie, and obedience to flag, to the national hierarchy, to the Church, and to the leaders.

As police and the other governmental reports show, the use of summer vacation and subsequent arrivals of many students and older school pupils from cities like Lublin and Zamość (the two academic centres in the region), visiting their families, they tried to organize anti-Jewish riots³¹. As time these rather grassroots initiatives went on there would suddenly become a full-blown

nationwide strategy. The Jews were widely attacked and then beaten in trains and in public transport, in parks, in the open, and on the roads³². This also frequently happened after anti-Semitic lectures organized by the nationalist agitators. Jews would be attacked in order to cause violent reactions of the state police against attackers. Then, the police and authorities could be embarrassed and accused of fighting with Christian, ethnic, 'indigenous' (as it was often said) Poles. Therefore the supposedly 'peaceful fight' in the form of economic boycott was presented along with the categories of most radical form of anti-Semitism, where the Jew was an absolute and deadly menace; a phantom threat standing behind the gravest calamities and sins of the world. In this regard the summer of 1933 (right before outlawing of the *OWP*), and creation of the National Radical Camp (*ONR*) (1934), and some further seismic events on the Polish political scene, seem to be a crucial, if not decisive for the creation of the new political culture of violence.

This lesson of the years 1931-1933 and the generational experience marked a significant improvement of this political strategy via nationalist scaremongering and first and foremost via violence. An 'economy department' was established in every district of the National Party and was devoted strictly to the anti-Jewish campaign. Any conflict and fight in which Jews took the initiative or just defended themselves was to be widely publicized. In fact the nationalist press did not hide those events. On the contrary every single episode was disseminated on a nationwide level. This solution helped to cover the violent initiative of the 'Young', and show it as a mere act of self-defense, not of their own, but of peasants and 'simple fellow Christians' not even connected with the nationalist movement. The second part of this new strategy was to focus on social space where anti-Jewish and pro-nationalist agitation would take place. This had appeared in village and small town fairs before, but now it became a systemic solution, a conscious act of building a particular way of political communication³³. The *Endeks* would not always indulge in violence openly, but would secretly provoke it, trying to affect its non-sympathizers. Here looms the huge problem of various groups engaged in acts of violence.

The police and the *starosta's* reactions to this violence, and Jewish examples, whether in the form of police complaints or in the form of self-defense,

were very much welcomed. They helped to promote the main elements of the nationalist ideology, of the 'idea of Jewish rule' in Poland and in the state institutions, police among them, serving their interests against the interests of 'Christian society'. In this way the *Endecja* ideology started to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, finding its confirmation in 'facts', and as such, it was now easier to promote it among the peasants³⁴. During all these actions the agitators were also talking about 'lousy Jews killing true Poles', resorting to the image of nationalist martyrs. Other posters and leaflets distributed at the countryside had slogans such as 'Poland for Poles, not for Jews' and 'Down with the Jews. It is time to finish them off' and 'As long as Jews will be in Poland, people will be poor. Beat up the Jews!' or 'Death to Judeo-communism' and even 'Death to the Jews'³⁵. Besides that means of agitation, the National Party also used the annual Corpus Christi processions or pilgrimages to Jasna Góra (Clarus Mons, a Marian sanctuary in the south of Poland). During them the 'Young' under the safekeeping of young priests, usually marched in their organizational uniforms in military style. Almost every state holiday as e.g. August 15th as a remembrance day for the victory over Bolshevik Russia in 1920 and the main festivity in the *Endek's* calendar, was used to beat the Jews in public places. According to the police reports in Lublin and its neighbourhood, such as Bychawa, a small town in the Lublin county, a typical example of the provincial settlement where Poles, Jews, and some other minorities lived side by side from ages in an ambivalent symbiosis³⁶, a band of the nationalist students, mostly visitors from Lublin, on that day beat almost 100 Jews unconscious³⁷.

This scenario was systematically reproduced after 1935 in many events, mostly in so-called pogroms (from Odrzywół in 1935 to Brześć in the autumn 1937) with but one significant change, when the state authorities (meaning police officers, the state system of justice, for example the *starosta*) stepped back and actually ceded at least a certain monopoly of violence to the paramilitary groups. Especially the infamous 'Indeed' speech of the Prime Minister Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski from June 4 1936 when he accepted the 'economic struggle' against the Jews, but not the physical attacks and destruction of their property, needs to be taken in consideration. The government announced openly its preference for

the emigration of about 90% of Poland's Jews which were meant to prevent the pogroms organized by the nationalists. The police still tried to curb attempts of mass-violence but treated the boycotts of Jewish businesses as a legitimate economic alternative. At the same time the parliament passed a ban on kosher slaughter, although it was never implemented full-scale and the professional organizations had massively to register their 'Jewish' members. For instance, the 'Aryanization' of the doctors' association in the Lublin voivodeship was implemented entirely. At the Catholic University of Lublin, which had no Jews within student body at all, the rector nonetheless still called for *numerus nullus*.

It should not be surprising that the local state representatives understood the shift in the government in very ambiguous way: in a few cases they reacted brutally as earlier in the early 1930s, in others they even assisted the boycott agitators and nationalist armed groups and thugs, in most cases they just observed³⁸. In some districts such as in Zamość in the eastern part of the Lublin voivodeship the police functionaries officially guarded the boycotters and treated complaints submitted by the Jews as acts of provocation³⁹. This triggered a scale of violence and an amount of petty acts of aggression to an extent not seen before.

The national revolution from above: The Borderland's experience

As mentioned earlier, the flow of 'Young' politicians also changed the late *Sanacja's* politics as such. There were various levels of this engagement of the regime in radical rightist politics. The second half of 1936 in particular witnessed several major transformations in Polish political culture. For considerations here, the most important and meaningful seems to be two of them: the role and position of Edward Rydz-Śmigły and his inner circle in the political establishment and the cooperation of different segments of the nationalist political scene with the regime.

Most spectacular in this process that proceeded until WWII seems to be the creation of the youth branch of the *OZN*, the Union of Young Poland (*Związek Młodej Polski – ZMP*) and the appointment of Jerzy Rutkowski, the *OWP* former activist and then Bolesław Piasecki's close associate as its boss. In Rutkowski's own words the aims of the new organization would be the implementation of the

‘national breakthrough’ by the youth into public life and the constant struggle with communists, freemasons, and all ‘enemies within the nation’. As regards the ‘Jewish question’ the ‘chief of staff’ of the Union called for the complete elimination of the Jews from the public sphere and saw the ‘Jewish problem’ to be solved through mass and forced emigration. The publications of the new organization demanded that responsibility for the ‘new Poland’ has to be taken by the soldiers and first and foremost by the young generations. All these groups were to form a coalition of pro-state nationalist forces in order to crush the *Folksfront*, the purported united camp of the Left and the Jews strictly behind it. Apart from numerous obstacles and setbacks from the very beginning (some of the *OZN* officials tried to undermine *ONR-Falanga* activists’ influences), the *ZMP* grew in size claiming 40 thousand in the fall of 1937, and over 60 thousand in the spring of 1938⁴⁰. However, after attacks from the left of the *Sanacja* regime, the ‘chief of the nation’ Marshall Edward Rydz-Śmigły resolved to end cooperation with the nationalist radicals and forced them, at least the cream of the crop, to resign. On April 22 1938, Rutkowski and his close fellows left the *ZMP*, which alongside Bolesław Piasecki’s own defeat to gain real political power in the state is always conjured up as a typical failure of East European fascists to take power in an environment dominated by conservative authoritarians. But how did matters look in the Lublin voivodeship? Interestingly enough, the *ZMP*, as the young organization of *OZN* still growing via systematically recruiting new members, acquired its main influences in the city Lublin and only in some districts of the voivodeship (e.g., in the Garwolin district or in Zamość). The organization did not give up the intention to take on the trappings of the other fascist, or para-fascist organizations. The *ZMP* member donned a paramilitary uniform and was expected to accept a hierarchical form of leadership. The *ZMP* from the very beginning proceeded with frenzy in rivalry with the other radical rightist groups for a government of souls among the younger generation. The organization conducted an anti-Jewish boycott until the outbreak of WWII and actively took part in state-sponsored acts of violence against other minorities (like the Ukrainians). Alongside with the army in eastern part of the voivodeship the *ZMP* was the major force in implementing the ethnic cleaning policy against the

Ukrainians and Orthodox local communities which began in the spring of 1938 under the banner of ‘national consolidation’⁷⁴¹. For example, in February 1939 the organization forced the state inspectorate to segregate the Jewish pupils from the ‘Christians’ in Garwolin schools into separate branches. On the eve of WWII the *ZMP* was if not the largest, surely the most influential youth organization in the region.

A special role in building a consensus within the national community on the riddance of the ‘Other’ was played by the Polish Catholic clergy or even Catholic Church as such, which coupled popular nationalism with anti-Semitism and xenophobia with anti-Orthodox attitudes. This arose from the long-term vision for the Polish nation and state, which itself was deeply tied to the clergy’s belief that it occupied and should occupy a special position in Polish society. After the formation of the Second Republic both the Catholic Church as a whole in the Lublin province and the most Catholic clergy of the region wholeheartedly supported an idea of the ‘Catholic State of Polish Nation’ (*Katolickie Państwo Narodu Polskiego*). In that sense of the word, the Catholic clergy, but also popular Catholic opinion, could not promote the vision of the nation on the basis of legal equality, which meant that non-Catholics, not mentioning the Jews and even non-ethnic Poles such as Ukrainians, could not be genuine ‘Poles’. The Jews from the very beginning were the pivotal element in this hierarchy of foes. For centuries, the Polish Jews, by and large, not only had remained culturally and socially distinct, but moreover constantly rejected conversion to the true-faith-Catholicism. Not surprisingly, after the re-establishment of Poland after over 123 years of partitions, the Catholic Church considered the ‘Jews’ as an eternal outsider, a foreign folk that willingly separated itself from other ‘Christian societies’. The position of the Church in eastern parts of the country, where national and religious minorities and groups had lived side by side for centuries, and the hegemony of Catholicism was neither obvious nor easy to maintain, seemed to be, however, even more fragile. It is also important to keep in mind that this discourse of Church-nation identification also derived from the clergy itself with its perception of Catholicism as the genuine defender of the Polish ethnic community. From a socio-cultural perspective, the Lublin clergy perceived

itself as the soldiers of the 'Polish cause' and the Church as a bastion of Polishness on the eastern borders⁴². It is no wonder that for first rector of the Catholic University of Lublin was appointed Rev. Józef Kruszyński, one of the most aggressive Catholic pamphleteers and vitriolic anti-Jewish writers of the time⁴³.

In early 1930s two social-economic processes affected this often-mentioned outlook. On one hand, the Great Depression struck the Catholic clergy like any other segments of intelligentsia. Moreover, local priests had to maintain their parish churches, cemeteries, and other religious properties, and at the same time contribute monies to the curia for its needs, pay state taxes, and support their parishes' religious, social, and last but not least charitable activity. If the hierarchy, thanks to its social and economic position, did not worry much about its personal material needs, local priests, especially newcomers found it difficult to fulfill all these obligations because their salaries were relatively low and they could not rely on their parishioners for contributions, particularly in the period 1930-1935 of intense economic hardship. On the other hand, in regions like the Lublin province where the priesthood remained to the vast majority of populace the only accessible way to social advancement and emancipation, economic and ideological issues were bound up inextricably. In this situation, a multitude of lesser clergy began to give its acceptance to radical rightist politics.

Thus, especially after Piłsudski's death in 1935, the Lublin Catholic Church and its functionaries felt under threat, and indefatigably attacked all such 'mortal evils' as every form of secularism, liberalism not mentioning socialism and communism on the basis that they actually believed these were permanent threats to the Polish nation and its mission. Yet as a diocesan publication such as *Lublin Diocesan News (Wiadomości Diecezjalne Lubelskie)* even tried to distance the Church from aggressive actions, the periodical constantly reported on 'Jews... tendency toward revolution, cheating, and swindling'⁴⁴.

The most outstanding example of this 'holy' alliance with the nationalists and the *Sanacja* was the widespread participation of the Catholic clergy both in the anti-Jewish boycott in the region and then enthusiastic support for eliminating

over the 100 'superfluous' Orthodox churches in 1938 in the eastern part of the Lublin voivodeship.

Résumé

To sum up, it has been assumed here that this fascist sub-culture of anti-Jewish terror which was imported into almost every part of the Polish countryside (with some significant exceptions) and doubtlessly had far reaching consequences during WWII and immediately afterwards. In the province, such in the *Kresy* demolished almost completely ambivalent symbiosis among ethnic and religious groups and led them at the eve of WWII to extremely polarized and antagonistic state of affairs. In interwar Poland in contrast to Germany and Italy but as well to Romania and Hungary the nationalist right after 1935 remained much heterogeneous in nature and in institutional shape, that means e.g. that any one single, political leader reached dominant position to prevailed the whole rightist, or even only nationalist scene. Moreover, the popularity enjoyed by each leader appeared broader than it really was. The most dynamic personality of the *ONR-Falanga*, Bolesław Piasecki, the only party leader who seems to have appreciated this possibility, remained only a kind of a student's nationalist movement spokesman. Yet fascism as such was always a movement of youth and because of that was able to obtain its particular revolutionary impetus. On the other side, if it would be successful, it had not to be only a youth movement.

Other radical leaders – e.g. such as Adam Doboszyński and Kazimierz Kowalski of the largest National Party (*SN*) or Jan Mosdorf a co-founder of *ONR* exercised some power at local level while remaining almost unknown at national level. The radical nationalist youth had gained a tremendous influence in its own generation but failed to win direct political power in the state. All in all, the fascism as a political and socio-cultural movement did not score such tremendous political results in the other countries but in fact overshadowed political life in the whole country. Most of all it was an effect of consequent years of agitation that slowly became transformed into more sophisticated 'political-social engineering' as Kamil Kijek named it⁴⁵. Violence was used by the 'Young' to promote their city born and based ideology at the country side, to the first generation of

peasants socialized in the Polish Second Republic, first that was studying in Polish national schools and was receptive towards ideas of radical, ethnic nationalism and the pure community. The Polish ‘Young’ version bore important similarities to European fascist movements and right wing political modernism such as utopia of organic ethno-nation, total reorganization of institutions governing societies, deep feeling of degeneration of the current world, cult of uniform, military discipline and organization, obedience and physical power. Finally, central for ideology and praxis of the ‘Young’ was issue of political violence or even the utopia of terror. Inseparably connected with violence was not only paramilitary organization of the ‘Young’, their inner-organisation of, and this kind of model of society and a everyday way of life that they had promoted.

¹ On discussion on Polish fascism see Jerzy Holzer, *The political Right in Poland, 1918-1939*, “Journal of Contemporary History”, vol. 12 (1977), no. 3, in particular, p. 401-414; Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland: The Crisis of Constitutional Government* (Oxford 1972), p.540-560; Piotr S. Wandycz, “Fascism in Poland, 1918-1939”, in: (ed. Peter F. Sugar) *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945* (Santa Barbara 1971), pp. 92-97; Henryk Wereszycki, “Fascism in Poland”, *idem*, pp. 85-91.

² Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London 2004), p. 201-206.

³ Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945* (Madison 1993), p. 290.

⁴ Mikołaj Stanisław Kunicki, *Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentieth-Century Poland – The Polish of Bolesław Piasecki* (Athens 2012), pp. 34-50.

⁵ See e.g. Pascal Trees, “Zwischen Empfänglichkeit und Resistenz: Die Rezeption von Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus in der Zweiten Polnischen Republik”, in: (eds. Ulrich Schmid) *Schwert, Kreuz und Adler: Die Ästhetik des nationalistischen Diskurses in Polen (1926-1939)* (Wiesbaden 2014), p. 83-106.

⁶ Antony Polonsky, “Roman Dmowski and Italian Fascism”, in: (ed. Roger Bullen, Hartmunt Pogge von Strandmann and Atony Polonsky) *Ideas Into Politics Aspects of European History 1880-1950* (London, Sydney 1984), in particular pp. 142-144.

⁷ See G. Krzywiec, “Roman Dmowski and Polish Nationalism until 1939”, in: (eds. Bartłomiej Błesznowski, Marcin Król and Adam Puchejda) *Geneology of Contemporaneity: History of Ideas in Poland, 1815-1939*. Introduction by Timothy Snyder (Warsaw, Wien 2016), p. 198.

⁸ See Monika Natkowska, *Numerus nullus, getto lawkowe, numerus nullus, “paragraf aryjski”. Antysemityzm na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim 1931-1939* (Warszawa 1999), p. 75 on; Szymon Rudnicki, *From ‘Numerus Clausus’ to ‘Numerus Nullus’*, “Polin”, vol. 2 (1987), p. 257-258.

⁹ Tadeusz Bielecki, *W szkole Dmowskiego* (Gdańsk 2000 reprint from first edition from 1933), p. 258.

¹⁰ On the social profile of the OWP see first of all Szymon Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, Geneza i działalność* (Warszawa 1985), p. 126-132.

¹¹ See Karol Grünberg, *The Atrocities against the Jews in the Third Reich as seen by the National-Democratic Press (1933-1939)*, “Polin”, vol. 5 (1990), in particular pp. 103-106. On more general discussion see Andreas Kotowski, *Hitlers Bewegung im Urteil der polnischen Nationaldemokratie* (Wiesbaden 2000).

¹² See first of all S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Radykalno-Radykalny*, p. 212-254; M. S. Kunicki, *Between the Brown and the Red*, pp. 23-27

¹³ See Edward D. Wynot, *Polish Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-1939* (Athens 1974), pp. 71-89.

¹⁴ On the introductory discussions see Jolanta Żyndul, *Zajścia antysemityczne w Polsce w latach 1935-1937* (Warszawa 1994); eadem, *Cele akcji antyżydowskiej w Polsce w latach 1935-1937*, "Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego", vol. 169 (1992), no. 1, p. 60-72; Joanna Michlic-Coren, *Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1918-1939 and 1945-1947*, "Polin", vol. 13 (2000), p.39-44.

¹⁵ In this part of the paper I made ample use of Kamil Kijek's concept of anti-Semitic violence as a sociotechnique and a form of political communication. See: K. Kijek, *The Road to Przytyk: Agitation and Sociotechnique of Violence in the Kielce region, 1931-1936*, "Gal-Ed", vol. 26 (2018) (in print)

¹⁶ Tomasz Marszałkowski, *Zamieszki, ekscesy i demonstracje w Krakowie 1919-1939* (Kraków 2015), p. 245-266; M. Natkowska, *Numerus clausus, getto ławkowe, numerus nullus*, p. 75 on; S. Rudnicki, *From 'Numerus Clausus' to 'Numerus Nullus'*, p.257-258. Specifically in Lublin as an academic centre see Rafał Dobrowolski, *Akademicka młodzież obozu narodowego w Lublinie w latach 1919-1939* (Toruń 2006), pp. 198-201; Adam Kopcowski, *Wos Hertz ich in der Prowinc? Prasa żydowska na Lubelszczyźnie i jej największy dziennik "Lubline Tugblat (Dziennik Lubelski)"* (Lublin 2015), p. 433-434.

¹⁷ See Randall Collins, *Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory* (Princeton, Oxford 2008), p. 413-415.

¹⁸ Kijek, *The Road to Przytyk. Ibidem.*

¹⁹ Kijek, *Ibidem.* On the role of the violence among ideological groups see R. Collins, *Three Faces of Cruelty: Towards a Comparative Sociology of Violence*, "Theory and Society", vol. 1 (1974), no. 4, pp. 415-440.

²⁰ Ronald E. Modras, *Catholic Church and Antisemitism in Poland, 1933-1939* (Chur 1994), p. 50 on.

²¹ Józef Zieliński, *Reorganizacja Obozu Wielkiej Polski z 1931*, "Studia Historyczne", no. 2 (1975), pp. 267-268. S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, p. 135-136.

²² See S. Pieńkowski, *Numerus nullus*, "Myśl Narodowa", no. 55 (1931), p. 1. On the anti-Jewish campaign of the nationalist press see Urszula Jakubowska, *Oblicze ideowo-polityczne "Gazety Warszawskiej" i "Warszawskiego Dziennika Narodowego" w latach 1918-1939* (Warszawa, Łódź 1984), p. 125.

²³ Kijek, *Ibidem.* See as well Krzysztof Waldemar Mucha, *Obóz narodowa w łódzkiem w latach 1926-1939* (Łódź 2009), p. 123-125.

²⁴ On the role of Nazi example for Polish *Endeks* see R. Wapiński, *Narodowa Demokracja na Pomorzu w latach 1920-1939* (Wrocław 1980); M. Marasek, *Narodowiec, katolik, radykał. Życie i działalność Kazimierza Kowalskiego (1902-1942)* (Zgierz 2012), p. 83.

²⁵ Kijek, *Ibidem.* See as well S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, p. 150. Adrian Tyszkiewicz, *Obóz Wielkiej Polski w Małopolsce 1926-1933* (Kraków 2004), p. 241-249.

²⁶ See Mariusz Bechta, *Narodowo radykalni. Obrona tradycji i ofensywa narodowa na Podlasiu w latach 1918-1939* (Biała Podlaska 2004), p. 190 on.

²⁷ See R. Dobrowolski, *Akademicka młodzież obozu narodowego w Lublinie w latach 1919-1939*, p. 200-206.

²⁸ Kijek demonstrated in detail how this communication via boycott smoothly melted into physical assaults on the Jews. See *Ibidem.*

²⁹ *Urząd Wojewódzki Lubelski-Wydział Społeczno Polityczny* quoted from Z. Łupin, *Zasięg organizacyjnych i politycznych wpływów endecji w województwie lubelskim w latach 1927-1930*, "Rocznik Lubelski" (1968), p.93.

³⁰ See Jacek Misztal, *Związek Akademiki Młodzież Wszechpolska 1922-1939* (Krzeszowice 2012), p. 222-223.

³¹ R. Dobrowolski, *Akademicka młodzież*, pp. 176-180.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 205.

³³ Kijek, *Ibidem*.

³⁴ Kijek, *Ibidem*.

³⁵ See S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, p. 292, 303, 306.

³⁶ See Rosa Lehmann, *Symbiosis and Ambivalence: Poles and Jews in a Small Galician Town* (New York and Oxford 2001), p. 3-5.

³⁷ *Archiwum Państwowe w Lublinie. Urząd Wojewódzki. Wydział Społeczno-Polityczny. Stronnictwo Narodowe- akcja czynnego bojkotu Żydów (1935-1936)*, Sygn. 2128, k. 20-22. On this drastic episode in 1936 very vaguely see Albin Koprukowniak, "Bychawa w latach 1864-1939", in: (ed. Ryszard Szczygiel) *Dzieje Bychawy, pod red. Ryszarda Szczygła* (Lublin 1994), p.136.

³⁸ On this mechanism in the western Galician province see Jan Grabowski, *Hunt for the Jews: Betrayal and Murder in German-Occupied Poland* (Bloomington 2013), pp. 17-21.

³⁹ Zygmunt Klukowski, *Zamojszczyzna, 1918-1959* (Warszawa 2017), p. 117-118.

⁴⁰ S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, p. 313-318.

⁴¹ See also Z. Klukowski, *Zamojszczyzna 1919-1959*, p. 117-118.

⁴² K. Sadkowski, "Clerical Nationalism and Antisemitism: Catholic Priests, Jews, and Orthodox Christians in the Lublin Region, 1918-1939", in: (ed. Robert Blobaum) *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland* (Ithaca and London 2005), p. 182-183.

⁴³ On Józef Kruszyński's activity see Dariusz Libionka, "Antisemitism, Anti-Judaism, and the Polish Catholic Clergy during the Second World War, 1939-1945", in: *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland*, p. 260-261.

⁴⁴ Quoted from K. Sadkowski, "Clerical Nationalism and Antisemitism", p. 183.

⁴⁵ Kijek, *Ibidem*.

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**Beyond “Objective Factors”,
towards Political Mobilization and Radical Anti-Semitism:
Remarks on Anti-Jewish Violence in Kielce Voivodeship, 1931-1936**

Kamil Kijek

Introduction

This article is based on a research on anti-Jewish violence in Kielce voivodeship from 1931 until 1936.¹ The best known event of this kind that happened in the area of central Poland was a pogrom (or as some prefer “Jewish-Christian riot”) in Przytyk that took place on 9th of March 1936.² This was preceded by the 20th-29th of November 1935 occurrences in Odrzywół and the 19th-21st of June 1937 pogrom in Częstochowa.³ Besides, Kielce voivodeship had witnessed tens of other individual and collective anti-Jewish attacks that are scarcely known not only by wider public but still await their academic literature. There is still a large research gap concerning not only identification and description of many other events, still not discussed by scholarship, but also concerning proper genesis and explanation of these different events, which together lead to a wave of an anti-Jewish violence. The goal of this text is to formulate some new research perspectives for further research on anti-Jewish violence in Poland in the last decade before the Holocaust that can be derived from the case study of Kielce voivodeship. I will do that by presenting some new archival materials, a new reading of the existing academic literature, outlining some new research questions, propositions and guidelines for further research.

***Beyond general category of anti-Semitism and “objective” economic factors,
toward fascism and radical anti-Semitism***

First of all, the progress in research demands the deconstruction of a few basic notions regarding the reasons for and the context of the interwar anti-Jewish violence. On the one hand, there is anti-Semitism as a single, uniform and encompassing factor. On the other hand, there are “objective” economic and structural causes of violence inflicted upon the Jews. My intention is not to claim

that various forms of prejudice or hatred against the Jews, the peculiar social structure of the Second Polish Republic, and the economic hardships do not matter here. They do matter, but in a different way than it has been understood so far. As it has been masterfully shown by David Engel, the category of “anti-Semitism” in the political discourse of the 19th and 20th centuries could mean almost anything and everything. Likewise, if used unreflectively in scholarship, it could also explain almost anything.⁴ In the case of interwar Poland, anti-Semitism can be everything from traditional, pre-modern ethno-religious prejudice; through aversion to Jews as a modern political and national subject threatening the universal Polish nation and the power of the Polish state; up to the millennial or redemptive, modern and radical anti-Semitism.⁵ The latter should be understood as a modern *Weltanschauung* (rather than a strict, sophisticated ideology) – anti-Jewish hatred in its most radical form. Its “millennial” character means that Jews were considered as an encompassing threat to almost all of the spheres of life of their non-Jewish neighbors. They threatened their morals and economic survival. They were both a hidden and an open enemy. They brought with them all of the calamities of modernity. Another important element of this kind of anti-Semitism is its open, or hidden, racial character. This kind of *Weltanschauung* was a modern phenomenon. It could utilize and cast anew old traditional forms of anti-Jewish prejudice, such as, for example, the blood libel. But these “traditional” notions were always recycled, reworked and put into motion by the cultural and social forms of modernity – by the press and the propaganda of mass politics. They always acted in a modern social context.

The above mentioned understanding of specific character anti-Semitism that indeed played crucial role in the events taking place in Kielce voivodeship in the years 1931-1936, was a particular *Weltanschauung*, or cultural code, characteristic of European political modernism, which swept across the continent and beyond. It was redemptive by calling for the radical break with the contemporary reality and a need of building new modernity, cleansed of its “Jewish features”. The politics of post-1933 Nazi Germany was only one of many fascist and other right wing manifestations of this kind of anti-Semitism present in the whole continent. Of course these manifestations differed very much, but

they had common, modernist, millennial and redemptive core. And this kind of radical anti-Semitism was characteristic for the biggest and the strongest Polish opposition party of the 1930s, the Stronnictwo Narodowe, or the National Party, popularly known as “Endecja” in Polish. This kind of a radical anti-Semitism had guided activities especially of the youngest generation of National Party and at the same time was a form of new, political ideology propagated by the modern, urban nationalistic movement in the Polish province and countryside. Only by understanding how this new, radical form of anti-Semitism was taught to Christian peasants and small, middle provincial town dwellers, how successful was its propaganda, we can understand the role of another social and cultural factor of the anti-Jewish violence: Jewish and Christian socio-economic structure and impact of the 1929 Great Depression on the Polish countryside, very few possibilities of upward mobility, and finally, a collision of the old forms of anti-Jewish prejudices with the parallel Jewish prejudices toward the Christian population.

Radicalization of the Polish right wing movement, which went hand in hand with radicalization of its anti-Semitism, acquired a new dynamics after Józef Piłsudski’s coup d’etat in May 1926. In the end of that year Roman Dmowski had established Obóz Wielkiej Polski (Camp of Greater Poland – OWP) that had acted next to National Democratic (“Endecja”) political party and gathered mainly the youngest and the most radical elements of the national movement. In the years of 1932-1933 OWP was disbanded by the authorities after the series of anti-Jewish and anti-government violence conducted by its members. Most of them joined “Endecja” [now branded "Stronnictwo Narodowe" – National Party (SN)] and its special youth sections established to accommodate young radical activists coming from OWP. In the year 1934 the National Party faced a split when part of its most radical members had established a splinter political party “Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny” – ONR. The latter was delegalized by the authorities a few months after its establishment. Its activists continued their activities illegally.⁶ Nevertheless, in many regions of Poland, as in Kielce voivodeship, 1934 SN-ONR party split was a marginal affair and the decisive majority of so called “Young”, whose most radical proponents of the national movement stayed

in the mother party and tried to implement their radical political ideas, enjoyed the privilege of acting in the framework of legal political organization.

In Kielce voivodeship there were the Young who promoted most radical version of redemptive anti-Semitism. In their political propaganda Jews appeared as hidden rulers of Poland, “human trash”, “thieves” and “criminals”.⁷ In the propaganda of Young, more and more dominating the local National Party, they were presented in the manner of chimeric anti-Semitism; from one side as capitalist who brought the Great World Economical Crisis in 1929; from the other as “parasites” exploiting Poles in all the areas of social, economic and cultural life, killers of Polish nationalists; and lastly, as communists scheming to destroy Poland and Christianity.⁸ To understand how far went the anti-Semitism of “Endecja” in the middle of the 1930s, during gradual radicalization of the party (which was not weakened by 1934 dissociation of ONR) and whole national movement we may also take a look beyond the Kielce province. In January 1935, the National Party Warsaw headquarters issued “Program for the candidate course” for the new recruits of the “Endecja”. They were taught all the elements of the most radical, redemptive anti-Semitism:

“characteristic of Jews/ their national-religious organization aimed to rule the world/ impossibility of [their – K.K.] assimilation (...) Jews as state within a state. Mischievousness of Jews in social and political life of the nations/ demoralization of societies, decay of family, national and religious life, spreading of the class conflict, cluttering of the culture, crippling development of the host nations / Jews in economical life / [Their – K.K.] unproductivity, chain of economic intermediation, unfair competition, usury, black marketeering, tax avoidance, white trade, cocaine etc./ Jewish slogans: “progress”, “international brotherhood”, humanitarianism, capital. Secret associations/ enslaving and bribing of people, secret goals/ Fight with Jewry as national self-defense.”⁹

From the very beginning of the 1930s the National Party’s anti-Jewish campaign was something much larger than just propagating boycott of the Jewish

economy and the “Polonization” of the Polish middle class. As it was phrased by Jan Zdzitowiecki, one of the all-Polish leaders of the Young, whose proclamation entitled “Young Movement” was reprinted in the newspapers of the national movement also in Kielce voivodeship, it was a fight with “Jewish disease”.¹⁰

In order to understand the evolution of the Polish radical right wing politics of the 1930s, its growing influence in Polish province, including Kielce voivodeship, we need to turn to studies of fascism and radical political modernism that swept through Europe in the 1930s. The same as with the case of anti-Semitic ideology, this requires stepping down from the level of the history of ideas – the way in which most of the studies on right anti-Semitism in the Second Republic have been done so far – to the level of political culture and praxis. The functioning and the development of the fascist political culture in Poland cannot be attributed only to the nationalist radicals splinter party ONR that was established after its splintering from the National Party in 1934. Many, if not most, of no less radical Young stayed in the mother party and decided that they can more successfully ran their activities under the guise of legal political party. Especially in Kielce voivodeship, and what can have direct connection to the severity of anti-Jewish violence in this area, ONR was very weak since most of the Young decided simply to stay in SN. As it was reported to the state administration security authorities by the head of Częstochowa district in July 1934, Stefan Niebudek, local leader of SN party, “heeds to the slogans of ONR. Program of his activities, despite that formally he does not belong to this camp, stems largely from its ideological and tactical guidelines”.¹¹ A month before, he openly admitted to his followers that indeed his views are closer to ONR, but the national radical program has simply better chances for successful realization if the radicals are going to conduct its implementation as members of the legal political party.¹² Here of the outmost importance is the fact that a few months later Niebudek became member of the national board of “Endecja”, becoming one of the country leaders of the party. In 1935 one could have witnessed a dynamic raise of anti-Jewish violence in Kielce voivodeship, and local police authorities had no doubt that attacks on the Jews were committed by the members of

National Party at the same time sympathizing or even being in political contact with the Warsaw headquarters of the National Radical Camp.¹³

Radical, redemptive anti-Semitism was not the only thing that linked many activists of National Party with that of ONR and attested to the deep fascist elements of their political culture.¹⁴ Another was their unbridled militarism and elevation of violence as the crucial form of political activity bringing national redemption. In local bulletin of National Party edited in Opatów, one of the district centers of Kielce voivodeship, physical confrontation of nationalists with communists or sympathizers of the Sanacja regime were means for “building strong characters, courage and physical strength”.¹⁵ In 1933 the Young of Kielce region, while establishing their autonomy in the framework of National Party, organized their “youth sections” according to the rules of “militarized discipline”.¹⁶ In September 1935 as it was reported by Kielce voivodeship authorities:

National Party – taking advantage of dire economical situation and raising anti-Semitism of urban populations had organized anti-Jewish boycott. This action will be developed in October. National Party does its best to popularize the national idea. One of its propaganda tricks that is supposed to attract the masses is to introduce uniforms for the members of the party, associating uniform with the notion of strength.¹⁷

According to this line, the party organized its massive gatherings, like for example dedication of its new banner in Radom on 6th of October 1935 or marches organized on 1st of September 1935 in Częstochowa, which were first of all manifestations of paramilitary and physical strength. In the former 200 people strong “military unit” (oddział) marched in three groups, each under its own banner. After the mass in local church, marcher were adressed by one of Częstochowa nationalist leaders talking about their banners as “stained with the blood of our comrades killed by Jews in their fight for national cause”.¹⁸ In January 1936 local leaders of National Party received orders to organize military

drills for the party members.¹⁹ According to the report of voivodeship office on security situation in the region in February 1936:

Agitation creates state of permanent and growing excitement of the society, which National Party tries to transform into readiness to fight that would give party authorities possibility of instant mobilization of mob against Jews or security forces in case of any disturbances. National Party leaders recommend organizing party cells according to military patterns, during “briefings” party leaders are greeted with the “attention!” command, they receive reports in military manner.²⁰

Further steps in militarization of the party were taken also in the spring of the same year.²¹ How elements of fascism, radical anti-Semitism, close connections between some of the National Party and the National Radical Camp members were interconnected, was proved also by an event taking place during June 1936 trial in Radom of Christians and Jews engaged in Przytyk pogrom and Christian-Jewish riots. The main defender of the accused Christians was Kazimierz Kowalski, so called maximalist that was representative of the most radical elements in National Party, who in 1939 became its last interwar president. During the trial, the activists of former ONR organized illegal march in front of the Radom court. Kowalski marched hand in hand with national radicals in their paramilitary uniforms, organized in the rows of 4 people each. Marchers carried their illegal party banners, shouting “down with the Jews!”, they clashed with the police and beaten the Jewish inhabitants of the town.²²

In order to understand the impact of the European fascism on ideological development in Polish national movement we need to study the impact that Hitler’s rise to power in Germany had on the political imagination of the Polish right-wing opposition, especially on the Young generation of the national movement. It is important to note that the dominant Polish historiography of *Endecja* in interwar Poland concentrates on showing a clear distinction between the non-Christian, racial nationalism of the Nazis and the “Catholic nationalism” of the National Democrat establishment, or at least its older variety.²³ This

distinction may hold true on the level of the official, central party press. But the situation looks different if we compare what was said during party rallies and conferences with what was published in the party press. Kielce voivodeship example demonstrates that at least in the realm of program of policy towards Jews, the impact of the German national socialist example on the Polish right wing was much greater than most of the recent historiographies tend to admit.

For example, on 2nd of April 1933, during the county gathering of the National party in the town of Jędrzejów, catholic priest Adam Błaszczyk – a deputy of the Sejm and an important National Party leader in the Kielce region – discussed Hitler’s anti-Jewish measures “as worth of praise and following”.²⁴ This was not an isolated incident. The German model was called upon in various local meetings and in the local press by “Young” as well as “Old” members of the National Party. The very same positive things about Nazi prosecution of the Jews, supplemented with satisfaction with observation of similar surge of radical anti-Semitism also in Poland, were said by Stefan Sołtyk, a leader of the nationalist in the Radom area (where Przytyk pogrom took place), on the gathering of the National Party activists on 9th of April 1933.²⁵ An interesting source of information is in this case “Gazeta Narodowa”, the main organ of the national movement in Kielce voivodeship published in the years 1932-1939, edited by the leaders of the Young, Stefan Kowalski (who in 1939 became a leader of National Party) and later on by Stefan Niebudek.²⁶ Throughout all of the late spring and summer 1933, to its usual reports on daily Jewish misdeeds in cities, towns and villages of the area it had added very favorable reports on that how “the Jewish problem” was firmly dealt in Hitler's Germany. For example, on 4th of June 1933 after the title page editorial about “4 million (sic!) of Jews taking bread from 4 million Poles” it informed about the Alfred Rosenberg’s “anti-Semitic university” bringing eager students from all over Europe.²⁷ On 25th of June reported on the meeting of the National Board of “Endecja” that took place two weeks before, from which it quoted speech of one of the National Party main economic experts, Roman Rybarski. According to his opinions, Hitler’s drastic measures in the internal politics were strengthening Germany and thus, German threat in the future. In order to curb this threat, Poland should follow this example in its own

internal politics, among many other steps, by developing Polish commerce in expense of the Jewish one, by ideological “national consolidation”, by reducing numbers of Jews in schools, important professions and administrative positions.²⁸ On 9th of July “Gazeta Narodowa” continued with its favorable reports on next anti-Jewish legal measures introduced by the Nazis.²⁹ Finally, on 1st of October, after series of acts of anti-Jewish violence in Częstochowa in summer of 1933, among them an attempt of murder of local Jewish journalist by the National Party activist, followed by the arrest of 42 young nationalists, newspaper proudly reported that no one else as the head of Nazi Germany propaganda machine Joseph Goebbels praised the nationalists “fight against the Jews” in Częstochowa and condemned their arrests.³⁰ This kind of enthusiasm towards prosecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany was not only limited to the year 1933. On 18th of February 1935, during the discussions on the reorganization of the local branches of “Endecja” that was held in Radom, one of the discussants had said: “National camp, observing how today Jews are fraternizing with the Sanacja regime, should take fight against the Jews into its own hands and bring the same results as they were achieved by Hitler”.³¹ In a few other localities of the voivodeship, its leaders were talking about “solving the Jewish issue in a radical way, following example of Hitler’s Germany, which will bring rapid decrease in unemployment”.³² On 28th of January 1936 in the village Kuźnicze during the meeting of the local members of the “Endecja” Władysław Majer, one of the party leaders from Częstochowa, foretold Polish nationalists gaining power in Poland as Hitler had done in Germany and then follow his example.³³ As it was pronounced day later on another SN party meeting: “The best way to de Judaize Poland is to do what Hitler did in Germany”.³⁴ It is also important to note that these positive views on Hitler’s Germany policies against the Jews were not a local phenomenon. They were explicitly expressed in the official party communiqués issued by the Warsaw Central Board of the National Party from very beginning of National Socialist revolution.³⁵

Beyond “economic boycott” – social engineering of violence

Fascist right wing modernism, ideas of militarization of society, its violent reconstruction through struggle with external and internal enemy, with radical, millennial anti-Semitism in its very center have decisively urban provenance, as they were firstly developed and endorsed by the urban intelligentsia. In the Polish case, it is therefore no surprise that in the 1930s the first sites of outburst of the organized anti-Jewish violence driven by millennial anti-Semitism were Polish universities.³⁶ How then could this urban, modernist ideology be promoted in the very different social context of the Polish province? How was the Catholic peasant able to view his traditional Jewish neighbor as both a Bolshevik threat and a Wall-Street capitalist, as the one who spread sexual degeneration and destroyed Polish intelligentsia? In Kielce voivodeship, the promotion of this kind of millennial anti-Semitism was achieved by the means of a complex political program.

First, the issue of the economic boycott of the Jews had been implemented by Endecja as its systematic policy from 1931. By relying on the official declarations of the National Democrats, some historians are able to corroborate the picture of the boycott as separate issue than the physical attacks upon Jews.³⁷ Indeed, this was the picture created by a part of the official National Democratic press, as advocating the violence was illegal. Cases of dissolution of the Camp of Great Poland (OWP) in the years of 1932-1933, followed by the dissolution of the National Radical Camp (ONR) in 1934 and a similar threat faced by the National Party (SN) in 1936 – in all cases largely because of an engagement of their member in physical violence against Jewish population of the country – excluded the possibility of placing open calls to violence in official right wing press. The story was different in the case of leaflets and posters. Violence, including the anti-Jewish variety, radical anti-Semitism, together with militarism, modernist catastrophism, longing for an ultimate sacrifice, belief in a thorough degeneration of the modern world, and the “sense of a new beginning” – all of these features of right-wing European fascist modernism – filled out unofficial publications of national movement and various public speeches of its activists. Calls for economic boycott of the Jews were only one of many anti-Jewish elements

present in the rhetoric and the activities of the national movement in Kielce voivodeship. The Endecja press and other official publications promoted a radical, millennial anti-Semitism. Undoubtedly, the daily promotion of this kind of *Weltanschauung* was an important factor strengthening the potential for the emergence of physical violence. But it was not the only factor and not a sufficient one. In the Kielce region, what triggered the violence that led not only to the events in Przytyk, but also earlier ones in Odrzywół, Krzepice, Truskolasy, Przysucha, Radom, Opoczno, Opatów, Częstochowa and the surrounding countryside, was a deliberate political program and organized activity, which can be branded as *a social politics* or *a political communication through violence*.

Violence was an inseparable part of the anti-Jewish boycott campaign. It had an unofficial, but an important character. Already in 1932 nationalist youth had attacked Jews on the streets of Kielce and Dąbrowa Górnicza. In their internal meetings, the local activists of the National Party were admitted that their organization stood behind these occurrences.³⁸ Anti-Jewish violence had acquired much greater dynamics in the next year. Częstochowa, Radom and Włoszczowa districts in late spring and summer of 1933 were visited by the special student delegations from Poznań that recruited young people for fight with Jews and the ruling Sanacja regime.³⁹ In July 1933 leaders of the Young in Częstochowa discussed possibility of buying guns in the wake of upcoming “national revolution”. “Fighting squads” of the National Party were trained in military and street fighting tactics. In the same month, a few of the Częstochowa members the party were arrested for attacking Jewish passerby on the streets of the city.⁴⁰ At this time their leader Stefan Niebudek was trained in Poznań in “organization of the anti-Jewish disturbances”. Anti-Jewish action was planned as a first stage of anti-government coup.⁴¹ In the other places of the Kielce region, the National Party was distributing anti-Jewish leaflets, its members were collecting arms, organizing into fighting groups and beating the Jews.⁴² Slogans used by the party propaganda used arsenal of radical, redemptive form of anti-Semitism. They informed about “Jewish blood-suckers”, threatened of “Judeo-communism”, and called for end of the “Jewish exploitation” and “Jewish slavery”, finally they included opened calls to beat Jews.⁴³ At this time, the Young in Częstochowa and

Kielce were organizing anti-Jewish attacks in order to test military readiness and efficiency of their fighting squads for their future confrontation with the authorities.⁴⁴ In August of 1933 a general intensification of a violent anti-Jewish campaign in Częstochowa came together with murder attempt on a local journalist David Altman whom nationalist considered as their arch local enemy.⁴⁵

The wave of the anti-Jewish violence continued in Kielce voivodeship in 1934, although with lower dynamics, and then rose again in 1935. In the early spring of that year the most discussed topic during the gatherings of National Party, was concerning “fight with Jews”.⁴⁶ In April 1935 leaflets and posters were distributed that called for economic boycott, for beating and even “finishing with the Jews”.⁴⁷ In September 1935, during parliamentary elections young nationalists tried to organized anti-Jewish disturbances in Częstochowa. During the arrests police was confiscating knuckle-busters, knives and clubs.⁴⁸ Lesser indicants of that kind took place also in Radom, Kielce and Truskolasy in the same and again in Radom in the next month.⁴⁹ The most drastic events took place in Opoczno district, in the market town of Odrzywół and its surrounding villages, where things gotten out of control of the leader of the National Party. In Odrzywół, Young radicals, as it seems overstepping directives coming from above, unleashed a wave of anti-Jewish violence that was supposed to lead to instant “national revolution”. New peasant members of nationalist organization were convinced by the Young that this kind of revolution would take place all over the country, would be joined by military and would overthrow the Sanacja government. The apogee came between 20th and 29th of November 1935, when the attacks on the Jewish stall keepers during the market day were organized. The clashes with the police and the arrests brought death of 12 peasants and 25 wounded. It is important to note that almost all of the villagers killed in these events and tens prosecuted in the trial that followed the events were not simply “peasants” but members of the National Party.⁵⁰ A very similar anti-Jewish riots as this one were organized in Odrzywół on 20th of November 1935, which were close to materialize in few other towns of the region. Agitation and individual beatings of the Jews took place in towns and villages of the Kielce voivodeship

on a daily basis during this and next month, again, attributed mostly to the National Party and ONR.⁵¹

In January 1936 local authorities were reporting that militancy of the National Party propaganda, its call for physical confrontations with the Jews and authorities, was the main factor raising its popularity in the Kielce voivodeship villages.⁵² One of the most spectacular events of this kind was a fully blown pogrom organized by SN “Young” activists in Truskolasy, Kłobuck and Krzepice in Częstochowa District on 27th of January 1936. It was preceded by bomb detonation under the synagogue in Truskolasy on 18th of January and an attempt of setting up fire under the prayer house in nearby Miedźno two days later. On 27th of January activists of the National Party faked the desecration of the Truskolasy church by local Jews, called for revenge and attack the Jewish participants of local fair, leaving tens of them wounded and their property destroyed.⁵³ Again, in this case as in other cases of anti-Jewish attacks, authorities had no doubts who stood behind them, and that they were elements of a general political action undertaken in the whole region that in the end looked for toppling of the Sanacja regime.⁵⁴ In the district of Radom, where two month later Przytyk incidents took place, according to the security department of the voivodeship office:

Action had taken massive character to the extent that there is no place which would be free from any kind of anti-Jewish excess and Jewish population is so heavily boycotted that in some localities it had lost all basis of its economical existence. Majority of National Party cells in the district had created fighting squads whose goal is to surround Jewish shops and not to let in Polish buyers. In addition, special action will be undertaken against these who decide to buy merchandise from the Jews. Merchandise and clothes of buyers will be destroyed, they will be ridiculed.⁵⁵

Just in March 1936, only in Radom district, police had registered 76 incidents between Jews and Christians.⁵⁶

Nation or nationalist?

At the same time, in its official documents, the National Party tried to speak Aesopian language, on the one side suggesting that it stands in vanguard of the opened struggle and physical fight with the Jews, on the other stating that anti-Jewish attacks were spontaneous, and unprovoked activity of the masses. This image has also dominated contemporary historical literature on the topic. An illustrative example of this case is a manuscript explaining the 16th of February 1936 elections to the General Council of National Party that was passed hand in hand between its activists in Kielce. Let us note that this situation took place just after an eruption of massive anti-Jewish violence in the region, culminating in Odrzywół riots, pogroms in Truskolasy, Przysucha, Krzepice, tens of individual violent attacks on the Jews across the whole region and just before the Przytyk pogrom. The document underlined political priorities that were “fight with internal enemy allied with the communist movement” and militarization of the Polish nation. In its final part document included following statement:

Most vivid phenomenon of our current political life is powerful, lively but until now not yet sufficiently politically organized anti-Jewish sentiment of wide masses, with villagers playing increasingly important role (...) Of thousands of [anti-Jewish – K.K.] incidents only few reach the news (...) Today this Jewish wall separating Polish society is crumbling under more and more frequent hammer strikes. These strikes are not isolated things, they can be heard all over the country and nothing can stop them, because they do not come from one party but are inflicted by nation, by all its classes. These strikes are symptom of awakening and understanding that this wall needs to be destroyed in order to regain full national strength.⁵⁷

The document continued with enthusiastic noticing of “fight with the Jews” undertaken by artisans, workers, peasants and intelligentsia, nevertheless noting that dynamics of this fight was still too low and should be raised. At its end, national leaders of the party set its goals, observing that especially youngest

generation of the Poles was the one that could have been convinced that overriding political goal of the era was confronting the Jewish menace.⁵⁸

It is striking that against all what was written above and against vast archival evidence the author of the only book monograph of Przytyk events, in fashion similar to some other historians quoted in footnotes above, tried to prove that boycott action of the National Party had nothing to do with anti-Jewish violence. Piotr Gontarczyk, using materials of the same archives that were researched for the need of this text, had ignored all of the above mentioned evidence. The way in which he dealt with the National Party action aimed to stop selling of the wood from Radom district to the mills owned by the Jews is characteristic. The party activists had many times physically attacked cart drivers and peasants working for the Jewish business. According to Gontarczyk this had nothing to do with anti-Jewish action of the National Party (!) and the authorities were to be totally mistaken in their opinions concerning obvious meaning of the affair: “peasants were Poles, members of the National Party, and mill belonged to the Jew. I wonder how finesse would be the officials if, owner of the mill, lets say, was a Belgian. Would we have anti-Flamand or anty-Walonian incidents?”.⁵⁹ With this absurd sentence, a Polish historian tried to cover obvious meaning of what had happened. Grabowy Las was a state wood that sold its resources to a few local mills owned by Jews. The National Party, in the framework of its general Jewish boycott action, tried to stop this economic relation. Here, exactly as it was in almost all cases before, violence was inseparable part of the boycott. SN action started in the end of January 1936. From the very beginning it was performed not by uncharacterized “peasants” but by local peasant members of the party. Its main elements were attacks, beating card drivers and throwing out wood that they were carrying to the Jewish mills. There were more than 10 cases of such actions between the end of January and the end of February 1936.⁶⁰ In the report sent to Ministry of Internal Affairs on 13th of March 1936 voivodeship office branded this as: “terrorist action performed by members of National party”.⁶¹

The effects of violence were to serve as kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Jews were to be attacked. They would defend themselves by appealing to the state

authorities or by direct physical self-defense. Interventions by the authorities were to be presented as proof of the Sanacja regime “serving the Jews.” Any anti-Jewish attacker wounded or killed in the attacks was to be cast as a martyr. This, in turn, would serve as another form of direct “proof” of Jewish aggression. Such a course of events was supposed to take place in crowded areas, fairs where the large numbers of peasants convened were to be ideal. Physical confrontation conducted in such places would inevitably create confusion, chaos, and involvement of the bystanders. It would also make use of the prevailing traditional ethno-religious divide. A fight between “Jews” and “Polish Catholics” would inevitably bring more and more peasants on the side of the latter. To strengthen this phenomenon, the National Democrat Young would look for the support of the provincial Catholic clergy. Finally, the ongoing situation would be explained to peasants in the categories of millennial anti-Semitism and the general Endecja ideology. In this way, it would finally get a stronger hold on the Polish countryside and gain the status of a self-fulfilling prophecy. As it was discussed in Radom in 1934, members of SN fighting squads, together with SN sympathizers proficient in violence:

“were to provoke fights with Jews, which the peasant population should especially be dragged into. That is to be done through agitation during the fairs (...) because those arrested [after fights – K.K.] will mainly be Christians, bitterness will spread among Polish society, and hostile attitudes toward the government that is defending the Jews will arise.”⁶²

Another element of this plan was, as it was pronounced in Częstochowa during board election of the local branch of the National Party on 30th of May 1935: “dragging priests to our actions, and even unmasking them in front of the police”. The authorities would then start to suppress Catholic priests and this would surely bring support for the nationalist cause.⁶³

In this way, Endecja’s ideology started to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, finding its confirmation in “facts,” and as such, it was now easier to promote among the peasants.⁶⁴ We should bear these two examples of

sophisticated National Party social policy and agitation in mind not only when we look at the case of Przytyk, but also when we look at other more and lesser known cases of collective anti-Jewish violence. Anti-Jewish violence rose from 1931, reached its peak first in 1933 and remained high in 1934, dropped slightly in the first half of 1935, rose again after parliamentary elections in the second part of this year, and reached its second peak just prior to the events of March 1936 in Przytyk.⁶⁵

It is important to note that the violence continued and the National Party faced a growing threat of repression from the state, its leadership increasingly stressed the need for presenting the violence as having a spontaneous appearance, somehow “naturally” manifested by peasants and city dwellers. Instigating the violence, at the very same time, nationalist activists tried to conceal any proofs that could point them as its organizers.⁶⁶ Official publications were constantly “winking” their eyes to their readers over the heads of the censorship and legal authorities. Such “reading between the lines” should be kept in mind when we read the official SN publications. And they always need to be juxtaposed with the reports of the district chief (*starosta*), the provincial governor (*wojewoda*), and the police; with leaflets, posters, memoirs, and so on. In the words of the circular of the National Party executive of August 1933, anti-Jewish excesses should always appear as if they were “coming out not from national, but from Catholic youth.”⁶⁷

Exactly the same strategy of Aesopian language was used by the Christian perpetrators defense lawyers during Odrzywół and Przytyk trials, both held in June 1936. All of them, more than dozen altogether were leading activists of the National Party. They tried to protect their organization from possibility of legal prosecution for organizing and instigating illegal violence, claiming that it was spontaneously performed by “the people”. At the same time they were eye blinking to their followers, suggesting that they were the true leaders of “anti-Jewish struggle”.

During Odrzywół trial one of the National Party lawyers stated that destruction of Jewish stalls 20th of November 1935 was the effect of “raising patriotism” and that police made mistake arresting those who had made it. This

was followed by the statement of his colleague who used his position of defense lawyer to present passionate outline of “Endecja” anti-Semitic ideology. He had defined anti-Jewish riots as “national illness”, instantly adding that “Jewish cancer is destroying us for centuries already.” Jews, as “unrelenting enemies” were themselves provoking anti-Jewish disturbances in order to force authorities to arrests Polish patriots, or killing patriots themselves. What had happened in Odrzywół was according to advocate Jezierski “reaction of ill organism who tries to heal himself, because it is not healed by the doctors.” While defending the accused in the characteristic, veiled manner, he actually admitted a crucial role of the National Party in Odrzywół events: “members of National Party did not stain themselves with robbery, they were conducting anti-Jewish activity, acting in the state of higher emergency. That is why I ask to acquit all of accused”. He was then followed by most known National Party lawyer, Kazimierz Kowalski, who at very beginning of his talk stated that “Jewish question needs to be resolved in our times. We need to free Poland from its fourth partitioner [reference to free partitions of Poland in the end of XVII century – K.K.]”. Another lawyer of the National Party, Stanisław Zdzitowiecki, was quoting notoriously an anti-Semitic weekly and organ of National Radicals – “Prosto z Mostu”, claiming that “incidents happen because society has a reflex reaction to Jewish flood, that had drowned our life, even our literature and culture.” At the same time he did not hesitate to bring forth example of Nazi anti-Jewish laws who had successfully defended Germany from the same threat.⁶⁸

Exactly the same kind of rhetorics was performed by National Party lawyers during the Przytyk trial. The trial itself, as well as tragic events of 9th of March 1936, deserves full academic study and critical reevaluation of what has been written on this topic so far. Here, I will just quote a few examples that present how worldwide notoriety of the trial was used by “Endecja” to promote its radical anti-Jewish ideas, claiming at the same time that they came from the Polish nation in general. “Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy” (Warsaw National Daily), a leading newspaper of the nationalist movement, in its issue from 10th of June 1936, next to its correspondence from Przytyk trial had placed the following sentence: “Fight to de Judaize [walka o odzyskanie – K.K.] Radom district

villages and towns is a fruit of National Party struggles, it is creation of last few months, it is a context of tragic events in Odrzywół and Przytyk”. In the same article newspaper informed with opened satisfaction that in Przytyk number of Jewish stalls dropped from 50 to 10, and 40 Christian stalls were established instead.⁶⁹ An advocate Niedźwiedzki added that Jews in conscious and planned manner had provoked Przytyk incidents in order to curb successful boycott of their commerce. He had finished his speech with following words:

“whole country is waiting for polonization of its commerce. We had lived to see independent Poland, but we still lack economical independence. What is happening now in Poland has an epochal meaning (...) I don’t know if we will live to see our full economical liberation. But our task is to start the process. Let the future generations finish what we have started”⁷⁰.

On 20th of June during one of the last days of Przytyk trial, Kazimierz Kowalski had diagnosed current situation in Poland as a state of open “Polish-Jewish war”, quoted anti-Semitic publications proving centuries long Jewish scheming aimed in destroying Christian civilization, Jewish inspirations of both French and Russian October Revolution terrors, finally he had openly suggested who really stood behind tragic events anti-Jewish violence stating: “there, where the action is performed by camp of friends of the accused, there is no need of police protection.”⁷¹

Instead of conclusion – ideas for further research

The case of Kielce voivodship in the years 1931-1936 proves how much research is still to be done on the political motivation and organization of anti-Jewish violence in last decade of Interwar Poland. We still do not have its full map and description.⁷² Only after this initial stage of research, it should turn towards deeper “objective” reasons that stood behind violence. Surely, these were also important. The poverty of the countryside, a prolonged economic crisis and a lack of opportunities for village youth were all crucial factors. The village generation that came to adulthood in the 1930s was the first generation in Polish

history, the majority of whose members knew how to read (if not always to write), and was socialized in Polish state schools. They were the first generation to grasp the idea of an ethnically defined Polish nation, and could relate to the then-dominant idea of Poland as a state of the Polish nation, which should act in its interest. Research into this case of rapid cultural modernization of an economically backward social space, into the conditions of 1930s Polish and European political authoritarianism could bring very interesting results.

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² Piotr Gontarczyk, “Pogrom? Zajścia polsko-żydowskie w Przytyku 9 marca 1936 r.: mity, fakty, dokumenty”, Biała Podlaska 2000; Jolanta Żyndul, “If not a pogrom, then what?”, “Polin”, vol. 17 (2004), p. 385-391; Piotr Gontarczyk, “Pogrom? The Polish-Jewish Incidents in Przytyk, 9 March 1936”, “Polin”, vol. 17 (2004), p. 392-396; Adam Penkalla, “The ‘Przytyk Incidents’ of March 9 1936 in Archival Documents”, “Polin”, vol. 5 (1990), p. 327-359; Joshua Rothenberg, “The Przytyk pogrom [9 March 1936]”, “Soviet Jewish Affairs” vol. 16. 2 (1986), p. 29-46.

³ Jerzy Gapys and Mieczysław B. Markowski, “Konflikty polsko-żydowskie w województwie kieleckim w latach 1935-1936”, “Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego”, nr. 192 (1999), p. 41-93; Jerzy Gapys, “Zajścia antyżydowskie w Odrzywole w 1935 r. wyrazem wpływów Endecji w województwie kieleckim”, “Biuletyn Kwartalny Radomskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego” nr. 34.1 (1999), p. 43-58; Michał Trębacz, “‘Pod murami Jasnej Góry’. Pogrom w Częstochowie 19–21 czerwca 1937 r.”, eds. Artur Markowski, Konrad Zieliński and Kamil Kijek, “Pogromy Żydów na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX w. Studia przypadków (do 1939 r.)”, Warszawa 2018 (forthcoming).

⁴ David Engel, “Away from a definition of antisemitism: An essay in the semantics of historical description”, eds. Jeremy Cohen and Moshe Rosman, “Rethinking European Jewish History”, Oxford 2009, p. 30-53.

⁵ For the definition of this kind of anti-Semitism see especially: Saul Friedländer, “Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939”, New York 1997; for its application to the Polish case and studies of anti-Semitism in interwar Poland, see: Grzegorz Krzywiec, “Between ‘Realpolitik’ and redemption: Roman Dmowski’s solution to the ‘Jewish question’”, eds. Francois Guesnet and Gwen Jones, “Antisemitism in an Era of Transition: Continuities and Impact in Post-communist Poland and Hungary”, New York 2014, p. 69-90; Yisrael Gutman, “Polish Antisemitism Between the Wars: An Overview”, ed. et al. Yisrael Gutman, “The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars”, Hanover and London 1989, p. 97-108; Joanna B. Michlic, “Poland’s Threatening Other: The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the Present”, Lincoln 2006.

⁶ Zygmunt Kaczmarek, “Obóz Wielkiej Polski. Geneza i działalność społeczno-polityczna w latach 1926-1933”, Poznań 1980; Szymon Rudnicki, “Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny. Geneza i działalność”, Warszawa 1985; Jan Muszyński, “Duch młodych. Organizacja Polska i Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny w latach 1934-1944”, Warszawa 2011, p. 30-40; Roman Wapiński “Pokolenia Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej”, Wrocław 1991, p. 283-286, 298-300; Idem, “Narodowa Demokracja 1893-1939. Ze studiów nad dziejami myśli nacjonalistycznej”, Wrocław 1980, p. 268-288; Jerzy J. Terej, “Rzeczywistość i polityka: Ze studiów nad dziejami najnowszymi Narodowej Demokracji”, Warszawa 1979, p. 9-112.

⁷ Archiwum Państwowe w Kielcach (APK), Urząd Wojewódzki Kielecki (UWK) I, 1918-1939 (100), 20494, k. 89; APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 300, 302, 325.

⁸ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 132-133, 295, 303.

- ⁹ Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (MSW) 9, 866, k. 8.
- ¹⁰ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 40.
- ¹¹ APK, Komenda Wojewódzka Policji Państwowej w Kielcach 1388, 62, k. 5.
- ¹² APK, UWK, 20496, k. 227, 260.
- ¹³ APK, KWP 1388, 90, k. 126.
- ¹⁴ For a voices of Polish historians questioning these elements of political culture of Polish national movement in 1930s, see for example: Jan Muszyński, "Duch młodych...", p. 31, 35, 43-45; Krzysztof Kawalec, "Narodowa Demokracja wobec faszyzmu. Ze studiów nad dziejami myśli politycznej obozu narodowego", Warszawa 1989, p. 168-189.
- ¹⁵ APK, UWK I (100), 20494, k. 638.
- ¹⁶ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 121.
- ¹⁷ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 1115.
- ¹⁸ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 1130-1131.
- ¹⁹ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 14, k. 5.
- ²⁰ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 14, k. 24.
- ²¹ AAN, 1378 UWK, AM ZHP 1537/14 t. 14 - 267/II, k. 66.
- ²² "Haynt", nr. 141 A, 21st of June 1936, p. 2.
- ²³ See for example: ed. Bogumił Grott, "Nacjonalizm czy nacjonalizmy? Funkcja wartości chrześcijańskich, świeckich, neopogańskich w kształtowaniu idei nacjonalistycznych", Kraków 2006; ed. Idem, "Różne oblicza nacjonalizmów. Polityka-Religia-Etos, Kraków 2010; Idem, "Dylematy polskiego nacjonalizmu. Powrót do tradycji czy przebudowa narodowego ducha", Warszawa 2014.
- ²⁴ APK, UWK, 20495, k. 121.
- ²⁵ APK, UWK, 20495, k. 126.
- ²⁶ Andrzej Notkowski, "Prasa prowincjonalna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (1918-1939)", Warszawa 1992, p. 287.
- ²⁷ "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 32, 4th of June 1933, p. 1-2.
- ²⁸ "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 36, 25th of June 1933, p. 1.
- ²⁹ "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 39, 9th of July 1933, p. 1.
- ³⁰ "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 39, 1st of October 1933, p. 4.
- ³¹ AAN, 1378 UWK, AM ZHP 1537/14 t. 13 - 267/II- t. 13, k. 403.
- ³² AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 390, 395.
- ³³ Archiwum Państwowe w Częstochowie (APCz), 60 Starostwo Powiatowe w Częstochowie (SP) 1918-1939, 27, k. 5.
- ³⁴ APCz, 60 SP, 27, k. 18.
- ³⁵ See for example statements of the National Party in its monthly party members bulletins for April and May 1933, AAN, 9 MSW, 866, k. 4-5.
- ³⁶ Monika Natkowska, "Numerus clausus, getto ławkowe, numerus nullus, 'paragraf aryjski': antysemityzm na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim 1931-1939", Warszawa 1999; Szymon Rudnicki "From 'Numerus Clausus' to 'Numerus Nullus'", "Polin", vol. 2 (1987), p. 247-252; Emanuel Melzer, "No Way Out: the Politics of Polish Jewry 1935-1939", Cincinnati 1997, p. 71-80; Natalia Aleksion, "Jewish Students and Christian Corpses in Interwar Poland: Playing with the Language of Blood Libel", "Jewish History", vol. 26 (2012), p. 327-342; Idem. "Christian Corpses for Christians! Dissecting the Anti-Semitism behind the Cadaver Affair of the Second Polish Republic", "East European Politics and Societies", vol. 25, nr. 3 (August 2011), p. 393-409.
- ³⁷ See for example Roman Wapiński, "Narodowa Demokracja...", p. 308; Piotr Gontarczyk, "Pogrom? Zajścia...", p. 9-58.
- ³⁸ APK, UWK I (100), 20494, k. 638.
- ³⁹ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 108, 331.
- ⁴⁰ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 332-333.
- ⁴¹ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 334-335.
- ⁴² APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 348, 354-360, 363.
- ⁴³ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 364, 369-371, 408.

- ⁴⁴ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 372-373, 376-379, 464-465.
- ⁴⁵ APK, UWK I (100), 20495, k. 409, 411, 415-421, 429; "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 50, 28th of August 1933, p. 3; "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 51, 3rd of September 1933, p. 3; "Gazeta Narodowa" (Częstochowa), nr. 58, 1st of October 1933, p. 3.
- ⁴⁶ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 815.
- ⁴⁷ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 221, 702.
- ⁴⁸ APK, UWK I, 20497, k. 140-141, 159, 174-175.
- ⁴⁹ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 13, k. 1021, 1115, 1130.
- ⁵⁰ Kamil Kijek "Pogrom który się nie udał. Zajścia w Odrzywole, 20-29 listopada 1936 roku" in eds. Artur Markowski, Konrad Zieliński and Kamil Kijek, "Pogromy Żydów na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX w. Studia przypadków (do 1939 r.)", Warszawa 2018 (forthcoming).
- ⁵¹ APK, 1388 KWP, 90, k. 3-13, 16.
- ⁵² APCz, 60 SP, 27, k. 2.
- ⁵³ For more detailed description and sources on this event see: Kamil Kijek, "Świętokradztwo, bojkot, tradycyjny i nowoczesny antysemityzm. Przemoc antyżydowska w Truskolasach, Kłobucku i Krzepicach 27 stycznia 1936 roku- wybór źródeł", "Kwartalnik Historii Żydów", nr. 2 (258), 2016, p. 497-533.
- ⁵⁴ See for example: AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 14, k. 5.
- ⁵⁵ AAN, 1378 UWK, 267/II- t. 14, k. 8.
- ⁵⁶ Joseph Erben-Holan, "Far vos zenen in yor 1936 forgekumen di pshitiker geshenishen?", ed. David Shtokfisz, "Sefer Przytyk", Tel-Aviv 1973, p. 205.
- ⁵⁷ APK, 1388 KWP, 62, k. 16-17.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., k. 17.
- ⁵⁹ See Piotr Gontarczyk, "Pogrom?...?", p. 39-40.
- ⁶⁰ APK, UWK I, 3533b/20706, k. 12-17, 23-26, 31-33, 44-45, 46-47, 97-99; APK, UWK I, 3534, k. 100-102.
- ⁶¹ APK, UWK I, 3533b/20706, k. 44, APK, UWK I, 3534, k. 100-102.
- ⁶² AP Kielce, UWK I, 20496, k. 187.
- ⁶³ AAN, 1378 UWK, AM ZHP 1537/14 t. 13 - 267/II- t. 13, k. 663.
- ⁶⁴ APK, UWK I, 20496, k. 74-76.
- ⁶⁵ APK, UWK I, 20495, k. 37-38, 53, 89, 331-332; 334-336, 342, 348, 369-373, 376-377, 517-524.
- ⁶⁶ See for example discussion on this issue held in the headquarters of the National Party in Kielce 10th of July 1933, precisely at the time when its activists have attacked Jews on the city streets, APK, UWK I, 20495, k. 464.
- ⁶⁷ APK, UWK I, 20495, k. 399.
- ⁶⁸ APK, UWK I, 20706 (3533b), k. 6-7.
- ⁶⁹ "Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy", nr. 158, 10th of June 1936, p. 1.
- ⁷⁰ "Haynt", nr. 141 A, 21st of June 1936, p. 7.
- ⁷¹ APK, UWK I, 20706 (3533b), k. 170; "Haynt", nr. 141 A, 21st of June 1936, p. 8; "Nasz Przegląd", nr. 182, 21st of June 1936, p. 4; "Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy", nr. 169 B, 21st of June 1936, p. 1-2.
- ⁷² For an introductory overview of anti-Jewish incidents in the years 1935-1937 see: Emanuel Melzer, "No Way Out...", p. 53-70; Jolanta Żyndul, "Zajścia antyżydowskie w Polsce w latach 1935-1937", Warszawa 1994.

History as a Resource of the Populist Radical Right: The Long-Term Aftermath of Anti-Semitic Campaigns

Haruka Miyazaki

Since 2005, I have observed the course of discussion and changing evaluation of Roman Dmowski's political thoughts and deeds. In the 2000s, when I began my research, Dmowski was generally recognized as a "black hero" in Polish history, or he was ignored as an infamous anti-Semite, though some political activists admired him as a "founding father of the Polish nation state." Indeed, since the second half of the 1990s, Dmowski has been re-evaluated in more and more public ways. For example, in 1995, the Warsaw City Council decided to name the rondo in the center of capital after him (Rondo Romana Dmowskiego). In 2011, Narodowcy fixed the starting point of their independence day march (Marsz Niepodległości) in this rondo, cementing Dmowski as a patron of national movements.¹ Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, a monument to Dmowski was built in the Plac Na Rozdrożu in Warsaw. This statue became a subject of criticism and was doused with paint several times. While protests said "Dmowski must tumble," Narodowcy placed tribute flowers under the monument.

Dmowski's existence is also prevalent in publications, including Grzegorz Krzywiec's *Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 1886-1905)*, which focused on his early thought and National Democrats from the viewpoint of the intelligentsia's radical right nationalism at the turn of the century.² On the other hand, in 2014, Dmowski's works were edited again and introduced as an anti-Islamic nuance in the context of "the conflicts between European and Islamic civilizations."³ At the same time, Dmowski's thoughts began to influence political activities of populist radical right groups in Poland. These groups, such as Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR) and Młodzież Wszechpolska (MW), exploit historical resources from the heritage of National Democrats and Dmowski's nationalism. What made the rise of populist radical right groups possible was, first of all, the re-evaluation of this historic figure who was ignored during the communist era. Second, after the accession to the

European Union in 2004, it seemed that the Polish society recovered the European-multicultural aspect of its identity. At the same time, however, it aroused the ethno-national aspect of its identity. On these bases, finally, refugee crises and nationalistic xenophobia, as a kind of expressions of anxiety, rose to the surface during the second half of the 2010s.⁴ Is it an externalization of deep-frozen anti-Semitism without Jews? Or has xenophobia changed its subject simply from Jews to other “strangers”? If we keep these questions in mind, we realize that Krzywiec’s paper is not only research on the history of political thought but also includes issues concerning recent controversy about Polish nationalism and Polish-Jewish relationships. Here I would like to pose a few questions, keeping in mind these historical issues’ relevance to the political debate in present-day Poland.

The effects of the anti-Semitic campaign

My first question is about the effects of the anti-Semitic campaign against non-Jewish people. Krzywiec pointed out that, since 1905, the political anti-Semitism of the Narodowa Demokracja, in opposition to leftists and progressivists, came to play a role in mobilizing a portion of the social strata in Congress Poland.

The Endeks’ anti-Semitic slogans were not only applied to the whole of the Jewish community but also aimed at leftists, centrists, and conservative groups who engaged in compromise. In his election campaign during the 4th Russian Duma election of 1912, Dmowski attacked his Polish opposition even more than the Jewish population. However, at that time, Dmowski called his Polish opponents “Jewish puppets” and condemned them. In other words, the anti-Semitic campaigns did not only target Jewish communities but also sought to deprive Polish people and Jews of the opportunities to contact one another for the purpose of social exchange and collaboration. This included the denouncement of Polish people who were regarded as Jews, Polish people with Jewish parents, and Polish people who were deemed to be sympathetic to the Jews. Krzywiec pointed out that, in this sense, Dmowski’s anti-Semitic campaign was successful.

Similar situations can be seen in subsequent Polish history. For example, it

could be said that the situation in 1968 reflected the anti-Semitic campaigning of the 1910s. Of course, politicians in the 1960s did not engage in anti-Semitic pursuits to reproduce the circumstances from the 1910s. However, as a kind of resource of the 1968 campaign, could we not say that historical events were referenced by select similar cases? Will this sort of partial regression therefore occur in Poland in the future? An example of this can be found in 2006-2007, when circumstances involved the resurgent growth of the populist radical right. At that time, political parties and politicians in the political mainstream themselves maintained a conservative position but then accepted or promoted the activities of radical and extremist groups.⁵

Was the sharing and advocacy of a monoculture possible?

My second question regards the attitudes of the acculturated or integrated Jewish inhabitants in Polish society toward changes within the Jewish community after the 1905 revolution.⁶ According to Krzywiec's paper, several important social changes occurred during the 1905 Revolution. First, there was the Jewish immigration from the Russian Empire to Congress Poland. Second, there was a sort of social and cultural revolution within the Jewish community in Russian-ruled Poland. In Warsaw and other cities of Russian-controlled Poland, Yiddish culture became popularized; Yiddish theater grew rapidly, and many Yiddish newspapers were established.

Even faster than other Polish groups, the acculturated Jewish people reacted with surprise and disgust to these changes. Krzywiec pointed out that there was prompt antipathy toward the "Litvaks" of the Polish Jewish population. (The term Litvak was used as an epithet to refer to Jewish outsiders with Russian roots; this was essentially the only form of public discontent that could be publicly expressed toward Russia under the tsar.)

Under these circumstances, what did the "acculturated Jewish people" assume of their own position? They must have thought about their social status in Russian-ruled Poland, as well as in the future independent Poland. If Poland would turn into a nation state according to Dmowski's plan, then ethnic minorities, including the Jewish people, might lose their place to live. How did they see their

own predicament?

How feasible was Piłsudski's federalism?

My third question is about Józef Piłsudski's federalism and its feasibility.

Today, we know that the federalist plan of Józef Piłsudski ended in failure. In the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, various nationalisms were emerging at the turn of the century. Piłsudski's federalist plan is considered to have been unrealistic from today's point of view. (Indeed, his vision was not realized.) It can be said that the reasons we evaluate it this way is a result of historical hindsight from our experiences in the 20th century. After World War I (and since 1989), the construction of nation states based on nationalism with ethnicity at the core became mainstream.

If we do not think of it as an inevitable consequence of the incidents of the second half of the 20th century, how could one diagnose the circumstances in which Piłsudski lived? In other words, to what extent was his federalist plan feasible? Indeed, Piłsudski was “a man of contradictions” and “represented different things to different people.”⁷ However, it is clear that his attitude was distinctly different from those leading to political anti-Semitism in any cases. Piłsudski was born into a traditional Polish-Lithuanian aristocratic family, and in a sense maintained the character of a pre-modern politician. His fondness for the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was well known. For that reason, for Piłsudski, “Poland” meant citizenship and civilization more than it did ethnicity and language. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappeared in the 18th century, but its memory continued to live on in Polish romantic literature. It was also remembered in the armed uprisings of 1830 and 1863. Piłsudski's “civic nationalism” came from this background and was premised on the sharing of a broad political framework of Poland as well as a non-ethnic Polish consciousness.⁸ Therefore, the concept involved the formation of a federation of several smaller nations that was comparable to those in Germany and Russia.

The Catholic Church

My last question is about the role of the Catholic Church in Poland.⁹ What was the role of the Roman Catholic Church in popularizing the ideology of the Obóz Wielkiej Polski (OWP)?

Krzywiec pointed out that Dmowski defended the Catholic Church because he found the church as an ally in a battle against Jewish power. According to Dmowski, Catholicism was the only power capable of undoing the influence of the Jewish spirit. Dmowski and the young members of OWP, who appeared as the new generation of nationalists in the 1920s, wanted to make their own nationalistic creeds that would demonstrate affection for Catholicism. It was in contrast to their predecessors, who were indifferent to religion. In this point, Piłsudski differed from them. He was against the idea of unifying church and nation (though he formally became a Lutheran in his younger years).¹⁰

Eventually, OWP could not obtain definitive support from the Catholic Church's hierarchy, though many lower-level clergy supported the group. The church's hierarchy kept a certain distance from the assertions of OWP. Even so, OWP's ideas could penetrate the local congregations through the many lower-level priests to a certain degree. These priests had opportunities for daily contact with the congregations in the church and were thought of as familiar clergy. Could these members of the clergy have utilized the church as a medium for the ideology of OWP?

This populist radical right ideology permeated into the Catholic culture to a certain degree. Can we find traces of this that remain in Poland today? These traces could be referred to as a historical "resource." Since the start of the 2010s, it had seemed that Catholicism will probably take on a different political invocation from its position during the latter half of the 20th century.

For example, on April 16, 2016, in the Białystok Cathedral, an infamous Catholic priest Jacek Międlar celebrated the mass on the occasion of the anniversary of the foundation of ONR. During the mass, he addressed the members of ONR, saying: "No toleration for Jewish cowardice... for Poland and Poles embracing malignant tumors, no toleration for such tumors. And this tumor need chemotherapy... The chemotherapy is uncompromising national-catholic

radicalism.” After the mass, ONR members went to the street to demonstrate with slogans such as “We don’t want violence in Poland, we don’t want aggression in the name of Allah, we don’t want rapes, we don’t want lynching, and we don’t want terror...,” which Międlar uses frequently in his agitations.¹¹

If we compare this situation with the demonstration of “Generation of John Paul II,” we find a turbulent Polish-Catholic Church. The second half of the 20th century was an era in which we strongly set forth with inter-religious dialogues and strove to find reconciliation with those of the Jewish faith. However, it seems that some “imagined crisis” triggered a change in the sense of outsiders in Polish society. The presence of the above-mentioned priest is considered to have come with this shift. Then, what attitude will Catholicism take in the future regarding the overall situation?

¹ Jacek Różalski, “Rondo Dmowskiego. Narodowcy chcą dla patrona godnej alei lub placu,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 November 2015.

² Grzegorz Krzywiac, *Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 1886-1905)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2016), Jarosław Garliński trans.

³ Łukasz Radecki and Marta Stołowska, “Od wydawcy” in Roman Dmowski, *Wybór pism*, vol. 1 (Poznań, 2014), pp. 783-786.

⁴ On the refugee crisis and reactions against them, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Strangers at Our Doors* (Cambridge, 2016).

⁵ Rafał Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots* (London, 2010), pp. 1-14.

⁶ Cf. Heiko Haumann, *A History of East European Jews* (Budapest, 2003), put the start of the emigration waves of Litvaks in the 1880s. Dmowski mentioned about the “mass of russified Jews inflowing into Warsaw” in his pamphlet. Roman Dmowski, *Nasz patryotyzm: podstawy programu współczesnej polityki narodowej* (1893).

⁷ Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland*, p. 20.

⁸ Andrzej Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski 1867-1935* (Kraków, 2017), pp. 24-25.

⁹ For a critical account of the connection between the church and the nation in Poland, see Brian Porter, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 3-10. See also Ewa Nalewajko, *Między populistycznym a liberalnym: Style polityczne w Polsce po roku 1989* (Warszawa, 2013), pp. 298-300.

¹⁰ Garlicki, *Józef Piłsudski 1867-1935*, pp. 102-103.

¹¹ Marcin Kornak, “Katalog Wypadków,” in *Nigdy Więcej*, vol. 22, 2016, p. 234. See also, Bianka Mikołajewska, “Uczestnicy mszy narodowców wywlekli z kościoła Obywatelkę RP. Trzymała transparent z cytatem z Jana Pawła II: “Rasizm to grzech”” in *OKO.press*, 11 November 2017.

**Factors and Preconditions of Violence:
Application of the Concept of ‘Radical Habitus’**

Hisashi Shigematsu

In interwar Lithuania, large segments of commerce and industry were occupied by the Jews; therefore, Lithuanians – who desired to move from rural areas to cities – were not satisfied with the economic situation. Many Lithuanian scholars, who mention the background of the pogroms by Lithuanians and participation of Lithuanians in the Holocaust during the period 1941–1944, claim that such economic asymmetry was one of the major factors in the rise of anti-Semitism in the 1930s. There was a boycott campaign in Lithuania as well. However, I have always wondered why such anti-Semitic attitudes in the 1930s led to acts of violence at the beginning of the 1940s because I have believed that prejudicial assertions or propaganda and actual violence against the Jews belong on different levels. Therefore, I agree with Kijek’s claim that “millennial, radical anti-Semitism cannot – on its own – explain the emergence of actual acts of violence.”

Kijek emphasizes that we need to focus on the multiple and compound factors of anti-Jewish violence, and he mentions the effect of ethno-nationalism as a meta ideology in interwar Poland. Ethno-nationalism is, of course, not peculiar to interwar Poland. In the era of nation-states, ethno-nationalism was dominant in many countries; moreover, it can be seen widely even today. As the political philosopher Will Kymlicka insists, even liberal democratic countries – where all citizens, including national minorities, are treated equally – cannot be ethno-culturally neutral.¹ National minorities as groups are not on equal footing with the majorities in nation-states.

Nevertheless, violence against national minorities or ethnic conflicts occurs only under specific circumstances. Although ethno-nationalism is still present, pogroms against the Jews are not so common as they were at the beginning of the 20th century. Therefore, we need to focus on the kinds of factors that escalated ethno-nationalism into actual acts of violence, though they were, as Kijek points

out, compound. In the case study regarding anti-Jewish violence in interwar Poland, ethno-nationalism should be understood as a precondition or necessary condition rather than a factor causing violence.

It is probably necessary to compare anti-Jewish violence with other cases, such as prejudice against Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in interwar Poland, who were considered “potentially dangerous” (as were the Jews). Was there any violence against Belarusians and Ukrainians at that time? If so, what were the major differences between these and the anti-Jewish cases? Grasping the differences between cases against the Jews and those against other minorities is probably helpful for understanding how modern, millennial anti-Semitism and pre-modern, traditional ethno-religious prejudice functioned in acts of anti-Jewish violence. If there was no violence against Belarusians or Ukrainians, or if violence against them was not as harsh as violence against Jews, we need to consider why ethno-nationalism led to radical violence only against Jewish people. Kijek claims that “a deliberate political program and organized activity” triggered the violence. Was there an intent to carry out campaigns against Belarusians and Ukrainians as well?

It is also important to consider the aim of Endecja and the reason for the group’s promotion of anti-Jewish violence, even though it ostensibly denied any physical attacks on the Jews. My second question addresses Endecja’s purposes and means. Was the group’s anti-Semitic promotion just a means to increase its political power against the Sanacja government (suggesting that anti-Jewish violence was not its purpose)? Or, did Endecja sincerely believe that Poland should have been a state without Jews? These questions may be important for understanding the characteristics of anti-Jewish violence.

I suppose that, in Lithuania, anti-Semitic promotion was a means rather than a purpose for radical political movements, which had other purposes; later, however, persecution of the Jews gradually became the purpose. Is it possible that anti-Jewish promotion by Endecja also changed from a means to its purpose over time?

Endecja was probably not a monolithic political group. There might have been differences in political views among its members. Kijek points to the

generation gap between “young” and “old” members of the National Party. He indicates that the former were more radical, but he also points out that both glorified the Nazi-German model and called for people to follow Hitler’s anti-Jewish measures. To what extent were the “young” members more radical than the “old”? What was the significant difference in their political views? Did the “old” members also become agitated and support violence against the Jews? Or, were they reluctant to do so?

As more than a decade had passed since World War I and the independence of East-Central European countries, including Poland, generation gaps were often found in many countries in the region. In the 1930s, youth not only in Poland but also in other neighboring countries such as Germany required radical reforms. Generally, experienced or “old” political leaders in Lithuania in the 1930s still believed in a liberal democracy, though the youth were dissatisfied with the existing political system. This generation gap was one of the major factors in the radicalization of political movements in the late 1930s. I have noticed similarities in terms of radicalization among both Lithuanian and Polish youth, but I have not paid much attention to the generation gap between the Jews at that time. Therefore, I was very inspired by Kijek’s concept of “radical political habitus,” which can also be applied to Jewish youth. I suppose that there was a similar tendency toward radicalization among Jewish youth in Lithuania as well.

Kijek points out that about 80% of the Jewish youth in Poland were educated in Polish state schools in the 1930s. In contrast, most Jewish youth in Lithuania were, as far as I know, educated in Hebrew or Yiddish private schools, which received subsidies from the Lithuanian government. The proportion of Jewish youth attending Lithuanian state schools was relatively small. Although many Jewish young people educated in interwar Lithuania learned the Lithuanian language and spoke it with Lithuanians, there were some Jews who believed that the Lithuanian language was not sophisticated or useful because it was the language of peasants. These Jews preferred to speak Russian or Polish with non-Jewish people. Therefore, the degree to which Jewish youth in Lithuania were acculturated and “Lithuanianized” might be different from the degree to which Jewish youth in Poland were. A comparison between the two groups is expected.

Kijek explains the “radical political habitus” of Jewish youth as follows:

The more acculturated and Polonized Jewish youth had become, the more young Jews expected from the Polish state and the stronger they felt their exclusion and the rise of anti-Semitism. And thus, young Jewish people – more than the older generation – were interested in the defense of “Jewish honor” and with answering violence with violence.

This explanation reminds me of the current situation of young Muslim minorities in Europe. As is generally well known, some second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants, who have acculturated to European culture to a greater extent than their parents and grandparents, feel alienated. Some young women show their “Islamic identity” by wearing veils, and young men do so by growing mustaches, joining radical Jihadist organizations, or conducting acts of terrorism, even though they have not been particularly religious and have had drinks. Thus, they are “more European” than their parents and grandparents. They are not traditionalists; rather, they are modernists.

The political sociologist Christian Joppke compares policies on Muslim minorities that have been adopted in three European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.² According to Joppke, the policy in the United Kingdom has been based on multiculturalism, so communities of ethnic minorities have been able to preserve their cultures (so, in this sense, the United Kingdom is a “federation of cultures”³). In contrast, the policy in France has been based on republicanism and secularism (i.e., *laïcité*), so ethnic minorities have demanded to be integrated even in the private sphere. Joppke maintains that Muslim integration has been more successful in France than in the United Kingdom, but I feel that the modern phenomenon of the radicalization of Muslim youth is especially noticeable in France. Homegrown terrorism is still a grave problem in France and other countries. I suppose that such integrated or “Europeanized” Muslims may feel a sense of alienation and the rise of Islamophobia, as the Jewish youth in Poland “felt their exclusion and the rise of anti-Semitism” in the 1930s.

It is likely that the paradox of integration coinciding with exclusion is widely observed. Therefore, Kijek's concept of "radical habitus" can be applied more generally to many other cases not only in East-Central Europe in the 1930s but also in other parts of the world or in other periods, including the present day. I firmly believe that this concept is useful not only in historical studies but also in other fields.

¹ Will Kymlicka, "The New Debate Over Minority Rights," in *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 17–38.

² Christian Joppke, *Veil: Mirror of Identity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).

³ Amartya Sen, "The Uses and Abuses of Multiculturalism," *The New Republic*, February 9, 2006.

討論 2 日目

グジェゴシュ・クシヴィエツ（以下 GK）報告

◆ 討論者（宮崎悠）への応答

ーリトヴァクに対する反感、ポーランドの世論とポーランド・ユダヤ人の世論について。

GK: リトヴァク問題は、ポーランドの知識人やエスタブリッシュメントにとって現実の問題ではなく、想像上の問題であった。リトヴァクの移民は 19 世紀に始まり、反ユダヤ差別の引き金となったが、移民現象そのものうちには、なぜ 1909 年、1912 年という特定の時期にこの問題が議論され始めたのかを説明するものはない。なぜなら、この時期にポーランドの地に向けた大きな移民の波があったわけではないからだ。この時期のリトヴァク問題は想像上の問題だった。したがって正しい問いの立て方は、なぜポーランド人がリトヴァク問題を見出したのか、なぜ彼らが自分たちが社会的、文化的危機にあると認識し、スケープゴートを求めたのかということだ。リトヴァク問題は、ある種の精神的な問題であり、その要因はユダヤ人ではなく、ユダヤ人を内包するポーランド社会のうちにあった。そしてポーランドのユダヤ人は、その社会の構成員でもあった。

自由主義者や左派の世論のかなりの部分は、これらのグループにユダヤ出自のポーランド人が多くいたという意味で「ユダヤ化」されていた。他国の例で知られるように、法的解放を遂げたユダヤ人がこの社会層に流れ込んだのは自然な過程であった。ユダヤ系ポーランド人が設立した劇場や定期刊行物は多くあった。たとえば *Nowa Gazeta* 紙は今ではユダヤ新聞と言われているが、ポーランド語で書かれており、多くのポーランド人執筆者が寄稿した。その一部にはユダヤ系もいた。オーナーは、自分自身をユダヤ出自のポーランド人とみなしていた。ポーランド史において、彼はユダヤ人として登場する。このような人物をどのように扱うかは、ポーランドの歴史叙述の問題だ。

文化的適応を遂げたか、同化したユダヤ人は、文化的な、あるいはアイデンティティに関わる深い危機に直面していた。彼らはポーランド人の世論に自らを適応させるため、反リトヴァク思考を自ら採用したのである。

ーピウスツキの連邦案に実現可能性はあったか。

GK : ピウスツキその人をどのように説明するかは、現在に至るまで、ポーランド史における大きな問題の一つであり続けている。歴史家アンジェイ・ガルリツキによるピウスツキの自伝は、資料的なレベルにおいて記念碑的著作であるが、分析的なレベルでは、ガルリツキのみならず他の歴史家たちもピウスツキをうまく扱えていない。ここではピウスツキその人を語ることは避けつつ、彼の陣営のプロジェクトについて述べるが、その実現可能性については、私は非常に悲観的である。ピウスツキ以前の連邦主義的思考、すなわち、連邦案を用いたある種の市民的アイデンティティの発展可能性についていえば、さらに悲観的だ。そして彼の死後に連邦案がどうなったかといえば、ポーランドの公論において連邦案の地位がいかに低くなったかを劇的に示すことができるだろう。他方で、ピウスツキが偉大な政治家であったことは事実で、彼は自分自身の行為によって、何らかのイベントやプロジェクトを現実のものとすることができた。彼が連邦案について考え出したとき、この構想をさらに練り上げていこうとした人々がいた。この構想と結びついた機関もあった。だがピウスツキが死んだとき、全ての構想もまた消えてしまった。

ー現代の反ユダヤ現象において、過去の歴史が「資源」として参照されることがあるか。

GK : 歴史書に書かれたことをある者が読み、新しい文脈において採用するという考えについては、私は否定的だ。実際、人々はそのようなことをしてはいない。1968年の反ユダヤ煽動者の誰一人として、反リトヴァク・キ

キャンペーンについて知らなかった。このことは確かである。彼らの胸中に、何らかの象徴やポーランド史における反リトヴァクの偏見についての知識があったかもしれないが、第一次世界大戦前に何が起こったのかについては、彼らは知らなかった。

ーカトリック教会と反ユダヤ主義について。

GK: これについて手短かに説明するのは容易ではないが、一つ指摘しておきたいのは、カトリック教会の急進化という現象は、社会に存在する文化コードとして捉えるのがよいということだ。カトリック教会はポーランドの文化コードを作り出す一つの要素であり、このコードの中で反ユダヤ主義は、その特徴や性質の一部が変わったとしても、不可欠の役割を果たしている。反ユダヤ主義は、社会的な教えの中で完全になくなったわけではない。

◆ フロアからの質疑と応答

ー昨日の報告ではポーランド独立以前の反ユダヤ主義が主題であり、1905年革命が一つの転換点であったことが述べられた。1905年革命がポーランドの近代的政治文化の始まりであったということは、多くの研究者が認めるところであるが、今日の報告の主題であったポーランドにおけるファシズム運動の起源もこの時期にあるといえるだろうか。

GK: 実際には 1919 年ないし 1922 年に作られた「ファシズム」という語を、それ以前の時代の事象について用いるのは避けたい。むしろ用いたいのは、エルンスト・ノルテ (Ernst Nolte) やスタンリー・ペイン (Stanly Payne, *European Civil War, 1905–1939*, Wisconsin, 2010) が用いる「市民戦争」ないし「ヨーロッパ市民戦争」という概念だ。これらの論者は、ヨーロッパの市民戦争はロシアやポーランドに始まり、西欧ではずっと後に、第一次世

界大戦後に起こったと考えている。ノルテやペインの考える「市民戦争」が東欧において1905年に始まったという意味では、ご指摘の通りだ。

ー昨日話題に上ったエスノ・ナショナリズムとシヴィック・ナショナリズムについてはハンス・コーン(Hans Kohn)の議論がよく知られているが、ポーランド人歴史家のアンジェイ・ヴァリツキ(Andrzej Walicki)もこれについて論じていた。彼は、冷戦後の多宗教的・多文化的国家ポーランドにおいてシヴィック・ナショナリズムを実現する機会があったと論じている。今から見ると、楽観的に過ぎるように思われるが、これについてはどう思われるか。

GK: ヴァリツキは最も傑出したポーランド思想史家の一人である。彼はポーランドの歴史に市民的な政治的共同体の発展の余地を探し出そうとし、この文脈でコシチュエシコなど19世紀前半より以前のポーランド人ナショナリストについて多く書いている。ポーランドの歴史に、シヴィック・ナショナリズムや、これに依拠した市民概念へと発展しうる理念や連邦主義の歴史があった、という彼の見方は正しい。しかし、これらは全て実際には失敗してしまった。ヴァリツキの著書は洗練されており、皆さんに薦めたいが、思想史として優れていたとしても、現実の歴史はそれほど楽観的には進まなかった。

ーどちらかといえば昨日の報告についてのコメントであるが、19世紀末から1930年代までの間にポーランド人共同体とユダヤ人共同体が互いを疎外していく過程を、イディッシュ語の公的空間の登場に着目したり、「ラディカルなハビトゥス」という概念を用いることによって明らかにするというアプローチに感銘を受けた。これらのアプローチは、国民社会の形成と疎外化の過程という問題一般により広く用いることができ、中東欧における国民社会形成の比較研究の可能性を開くものである。

国民社会形成という一般的な歴史的発展において、ユダヤ人の問題は避

けることのできないものであったが、最近出版された大著、*A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe (Vol. 1: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century')*, eds. Balázs Trencsényi, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baar, Maria Falina, and Michal Kopecek, Oxford, 2016) では、国民的言説の一要素としての反ユダヤ主義には多くの言及があるものの、ユダヤ人のナショナリズムについては言及が全くない。これに対し、お二人の研究は、ユダヤ・ナショナリズムおよびポーランド社会におけるユダヤ人とポーランド人の反目を、中東欧の歴史全般と比較可能な事例として扱うことで、歴史学におけるその位置をいわば正常化する可能性を開くものであると思われた。

GK: 方法論としての「ラディカルなハビトゥス」概念の導入については、基本的にはキエック氏へのコメントであるが、これについて一言述べておきたい。私は自著 (*Chauvinism, Polish Style: The Case of Roman Dmowski (Beginnings: 1886–1905)*, Frankfurt am Mein, 2016. ポーランド語原著は2009年刊行) において、「ラディカリズム」をポーランド史における一つの概念として、つまり、左派や共産主義者やその他周辺の政治集団がもつ傾向の意味ではなく、社会的・政治的な現象を指すものとして用いた。だがこれは失敗だった。本の元となった博士論文は“Roman Dmowski and Polish radicals in the turn of the century”というタイトルで、単著にまとめなおしたとき、私はドモフスキをある種のラディカルな右派と表現した。だがその意図は受け入れられず、誰もが彼の反ユダヤ主義や人種主義、人類学的思考にばかり着目した。これは私にとって失敗であり、それゆえ、「ラディカルなハビトゥス」というより有効な概念を用いたキエック氏のアプローチには大いに満足した。この概念を用いた研究が、ラディカリズムとはそもそも何であったのかを首尾よく説明することを期待している。

比較研究については、私はユダヤ歴史研究所 (*Żydowski Instytut Historyczny*) で3年間行われた反ユダヤ主義問題の学際セミナーにおいて、ポーランド・ユダヤ研究を他の研究と比較することを推奨したのであるが、

残念ながらあまり上手くはいかなかった。しかし、ポーランドの事例というのは確かに例外ではなく、少なくともヨーロッパの文脈というより大きな絵の一つのパーツなのである。ポーランド性なるものは単体ではなく、比較的文脈で分析せねばならない。ラディカリズムや政治的コミュニケーションといった事柄の比較研究は実り多いものとなるであろうし、これは歴史学のみならず、社会学、文化研究等についてもいえるだろう。

一報告で用いられているクレスィ (Kresy) の概念に疑問を持った。クレスィの原義はベラルーシなどの東部国境地域であるはずで、報告で言及された地名のうち、グロドノはよいとしても、ルブリンやケルツェ (いずれもポーランド第二共和国の中央部～西部に位置する) は、クレスィには当たらないのではないか。むしろ、ただの田舎ということにはならないか。

GK: クレスィという語の私の用い方は挑発的ではあるが、意識的、意図的なものである。ポーランド第二共和国の語彙において、クレスィとは、ヴィルノ県、ポレシエ県、ヴォウイン県、スタニスワヴフ県などの東部諸県を指す。ご指摘の通り、私が挙げた地名はクレスィには当たらない。ではなぜクレスィという語を用いたか。ポーランド人共同体をエスニシティ共同体と捉えるならば、ルブリン県は実際にはクレスィなのである。つまり、ルブリン県は、社会的・民族的構成においてクレスィに非常に似ていた。

ヨーロッパのこの地域が「ブラッドランド」だったとするティモシー・スナイダーの主張 (『ブラッドランド——ヒトラーとスターリン 大虐殺の真実』(上)(下) 布施由紀子訳、筑摩書房、2015年) が正しいとすれば、ここルブリン県はブラッドランドの中心地の一つだった。ここで、1937/8年に、政府によってマイノリティへの差別的な政策、すなわち、ウクライナ人に対する民族浄化とユダヤ人の根絶が行われた。ヴィスワ作戦 (1947年) と呼ばれる残留ウクライナ人の平定 (強制移住) が行われたのもここだ。この場所をクレスィと位置付けるのに足る多くの出来事が起こっており、現在研究が行われている。

カミル・キエク（以下 KK）報告

◆ 討論者（重松尚）への応答

一反ユダヤ暴力と反ベラルーシ人、反ウクライナ人暴力との違いについて。

KK:最も重要な相違は、ポーランド人ナショナリストやサナツィア政府にとって、ベラルーシ人やウクライナ人は同化が可能であると考えられていたということだ。これに対し、ユダヤ人の同化は、ポーランド人ナショナリストにとって脅威であった。それはポーランド性を内部から侵食すると考えられていた。この考えは 1930 年代に存在したのみならず、ドモフスキによってすでに 19 世紀末に示されており、もちろん、1905 年革命後にも唱えられていた。

もう一つの相違は、ベラルーシ人、ウクライナ人への暴力は確かに右派によるものでもあったが、主に政府によるものであったということだ。政府は、彼らにときには暴力を振るい、ときには同化の圧力をかけたが、このことは過激なウクライナ人組織——ユダヤ人やポーランド人と同じ急進化はウクライナ人の間でも起こっていた——によるテロルを引き起こした。反ウクライナ人暴力が主に政府によるものであったため、ウクライナ人の対抗暴力は強力な反体制的性格を帯びていた。

さらなる相違は、それぞれの民族集団についての捉え方にある。ナショナリストは、ユダヤ人をポーランドの近代化の妨げと考えていた。なぜなら、生まれ変わった真に近代的なポーランド国民 (nation) は、純粋にポーランド人からなるインテリゲンチアを持つ都市的国民であらねばならず、また、地方における商業も一手に引き受けるべきだと考えられていたからだ。これらの職業をユダヤ人が担っている以上、ユダヤ人はポーランド国民の真の近代化の妨げであった。このことは、ベラルーシ人やウクライナ人には当てはまらない。彼らは地方においてポーランド人の人口的優勢を妨げてはいたが、同化が可能であると考えられていたし、大学生や医師や

小村の商人としてポーランド国民の近代化の障壁となることもなかった。

ー反ユダヤ暴力や社会からのユダヤ人の除去は、それ自体が目的であったのか、それともサナツィア政府と戦うための手段であったのか。

KK: その両方である。ポーランドからユダヤ人を除去することは一つの目的であり、同時に、民主主義のための戦い、ユダヤ的システムとしての自由主義、文化的ポルノグラフィ等々からの解放のための戦いの手段であると考えられていた。若者たちは、自分たちが戦争を戦っていると理解しており、その戦争ではユダヤ人が重要な役割を担っていると考えていた。

ーエンデツィア内部の青年世代と老年世代の差異について。

KK: もちろん重要な差異があった。エンデクの中でも、スタニスワフ・グラプスキ (Stanisław Grabski) のような人物は、ユダヤ人を嫌っていたには違いないが、自由民主主義を信じていて、暴力には確実に反対していた。彼は民主主義者だった。だが彼は、エンデツィアの党の中で次第に周辺的な地位に追いやられていき、彼と同様の立場も 1930 年代にはエンデツィアの中で弱まっていった。代わって台頭してきたのが、反ユダヤ暴力に反対せず、しかし、エンデツィアにはそれを実行する準備がまだ整っていないと考える者たちであった。というのも、もし反ユダヤと反サナツィアを組み合わせた暴力行為に及べば、サナツィア政府によって党が潰されてしまうと考えられたからだ。

こうした態度に対し、青年たちによる下からの革命が起こった。青年活動家たちは、サナツィア政府とユダヤ人を攻撃しようとした。暴動が起こり、警察が人々を殺害すれば、サナツィア当局は恐怖するであろうと。なぜなら当局もまた多くの農民を殺すことを恐れていたからである。村民を射殺した警察に対し、農民たちは大騒動を起こすであろう。そうすれば万事良好だ、と。だが、老年層の党指導部は時期尚早と考え、恐れた。これ

が、自分たちはサナツィア政府と対決できるほど強くないと考えた民主主義者と、戦う用意のできていた最もラディカルな青年たちとの主な差異であった。

－「ラディカルなハビトゥス」概念の比較研究における汎用性について。

KK: 比較研究の提起はとても魅力的だ。実際、私とクシヴィエツ氏は数年後に、1930年代の中東欧における政治的ラディカリズムについての比較研究のプロジェクトを立ち上げようと計画している。リトアニア、ルーマニア、ハンガリー等の事例も取り入れたいし、もちろん、ユダヤ人の事例も取り入れる。ユダヤ人はラディカルなモダニズムの犠牲者であったばかりでなく、アクターでもあった。ユダヤ人もまた、1930年代の時代精神としての急進化の影響を受けていた。キェルツェ県での暴力にはユダヤ人も参加していた。

◆ フロアからの質疑と応答

－ポーランドの反ユダヤ的な社会・政治状況は、パレスチナへのユダヤ移民に影響を与えたか。

KK: ポーランドからパレスチナへの移民の波は1931～36年に最大となったが、1936～39年のパレスチナ・アラブ反乱は、パレスチナへのユダヤ移民を制限するいわゆる「白書」が出される契機となった。1936～37年にポーランドで発行されたユダヤ新聞を見ると、ポーランドのポグロムとパレスチナのアラブ人反乱の記事が交互に掲載されている。昨日も述べたように、パレスチナで起こっていたことはポーランドのユダヤ人の自衛活動に影響したし、ユダヤ人内部の暴力にも影響を与えた。また、ポグロムや反ユダヤ暴力の経験は左右両派のシオニストを急進化、軍事化させた。ホロコーストを生き延びた少数の者たち、またはホロコースト以前に移民して

いた者たち、たとえばメナヘム・ベギンやイツハク・シャミルなどにとって、これらの経験は、彼らが現実やパレスチナ／イスラエルにおける政治をどう捉えるかにおいて決定的な意味を持った。最近私は、ホロコーストを生き延びイスラエルに移民した、プシティク・ポグロムの目撃者の1人にインタビューをした。彼は当時10歳で、兄がプシティクのベタル支部の指導者で自衛組織に関わっていたという。彼の語りは、ポグロムの経験が彼らのラディカルズムを形成する要素であったことを如実に示していた。

一若者の暴力のラディカル化の要因について、歴史的背景というより心理面に着目した場合、これを大人社会へ参入するためのイニシエーション（通過儀礼）と解釈することは可能か。

KK: 完全にその通りだと思う。彼らは、親たちは弱く、暴力に及ぶ勇気がないと考えており、これに対し、自分たちが親たちよりも強く、より良い新しい世代であることを誇示していた。彼らは、自分たちが暴力というラディカルな行為を行うことができる最初の世代であり、一歩前に踏み出し、現実を変えることができると考えていた。

エンデツィアの青年運動の公式な歌であった「青年讃歌 (Hymn młodych)」の歌詞にそれがよく表れているので引用したい。モダニスト的な表現が散りばめられ、ファシズムや暴力の肯定といった世代的アイデンティティの全てが表明されている。

Złoty słońca blask dookoła,

金色の太陽が輝きわたる

Orzeł Biały wzlata wzwyż.

白鷲 [※ポーランドの国章] が高く舞い上がる

Dumne wzniesmy w górę czola.

私たちは誇り高い額を上げよう

Patrząc na Polski Znak i Krzyż.

ポーランドの^{しるし}国章と十字架を見つめながら

Polsce niesiem odrodzenie.

私たちはポーランドをよみがえらせる

Depcząc podłość, fałsz i brud.

卑劣、欺瞞、穢れをたたきのめして

W nas mocarne wiosny tchnienie.

私たちの中には力強い春の息吹がある

W nas jest przyszłość, z nami lud!

未来は私たちの中に、大衆は私たちと共にある！

Naprzód idziem w skier powodzi,

大洪水に逆らって私たちは進む

Niechaj wroga przemoc drży.

敵は震え上がるがよい

Już zwycięstwa dzień nadchodzi.

勝利の日はまだ近い

Wielkiej Polski moc to my! (bis)

私たちは偉大なるポーランドの力だ！（繰返し）

ラディカリズムや政治的モダニズムに関し、ミレニアル（millennial）という語を用いる意図とは。

KK：ミレニアルという語もまた、昨日言及したロジャー・グリフィンから援用している。その意味は、我々または彼らの日々の終わり、ということだ。先述の通り、ラディカルなポーランド人は、ユダヤ人を確固たる具体的な敵とする戦争を戦っていると考えていた。それは大災厄や破滅に行き着くはずであり、最終的には我々か彼らのどちらかがこれを贖うのだ、と

考えられていた。この認識は、ルーマニア、ナチス・ドイツ、イタリアなど、当時のヨーロッパの右派の運動のそれと非常によく似ている。

一反ユダヤ主義にも関わらず、なぜ大半のユダヤ人はポーランドから移住しなかったのか。また、ナチスの侵攻後にリトアニアに逃れたユダヤ人が多かった理由を伺いたい。リトアニアでは、反ユダヤ主義がポグロムに至るほど激化していなかったことがその理由だろうか。

KK：1930年代にはポーランド・ユダヤ人の一部は移住の必要を強く感じていたが、どこにも行き場がなかった。米国は移民の受け入れをやめていたし、西欧諸国も全く乗り気でなかった。一部はフランスや南米に移住した。もっとも、全員が移住を望んでいたわけではない。ユダヤ人にとってポーランドは、彼らの祖先が1000年にわたって住んできた土地であった。この地で自分たちを、そしてポーランド人を救うために戦うべきであると考えたユダヤ人もおり、その最も精巧な運動がブンドの運動であった。彼らが運営した中央イディッシュ学校機関（TSYSHO）の学校を見ると、この理念がユダヤ人の子供たちにも根付かされていたことが分かる。もちろんこのことは、物理的・象徴的な暴力を背景に、多くのユダヤ人が移住を望んでいたという事実を変えるものではない。1930年代に、ポーランドの全ユダヤ人人口の30%にあたる900,000人が関連機関に移住の可能性を問い合わせていたというデータもある。

ナチスの侵攻後は、ポーランドのユダヤ人はどこであれ東に逃げようとした。短期間ソ連の支配下に置かれたヴィルノ（ヴィリニユス）へは多くのユダヤ人が逃れたが、彼らは単純に東へと向かったのだと言える。1930年代のリトアニアは決して親ユダヤ的ではなかったが、第一次世界大戦直後にはユダヤ人に自治が約束されるなど、比較的住みやすい場所という印象はあったであろう。重松氏がコメントの中で述べたリトアニア国家によるユダヤ人学校への助成も、ポーランドでは実施されなかったことだ。第一次世界大戦後のヴィルノ（ヴィリニユス）の帰属問題についても——結

局ポーランドに併合されたが——リトアニアへの帰属を是とするユダヤ人が多かった。ポーランドよりもリトアニアの方が、ユダヤ人の民族的発展をよりよく保証するだろうと思われたからだ。

◆ 全体討論

ー反ユダヤ暴力に対するサナツィア政府の態度とは。

GK: ユダヤ人への暴力は、主に一般庶民が下から起こしたものであった。しかし、1937~38年には、サナツィア政府の一部にこの暴力に加担した者があった。この時期、サナツィア政府の中でも右派はファシスト化しつつあったのである。報告の中で触れた、サナツィア体制側が作ったポーランド青年同盟（ZMP）の会員数は、極右の国民急進派陣営ファランガ（ONR-Falanga）の会員数の6倍にあたる60,000人で、彼らはルブリンやワルシャワで暴力行為に参加した。これについてはズィグムント・クルコフスキの日記を薦めたい（Zygmunt Klukowski, *Zamojszczyzna, 1918–1959*, Warszawa, 2017）。主に書かれているのはホロコーストと戦後のことであるが、30頁ほどがルブリン県西部におけるこれらの青年に割かれている。彼らは政府が支持した反ユダヤ・ボイコットを実施するのみならず、国民急進派陣営によるポグロムやテロルに参加した。なお、ポグロムとは通例、自然発生的なもの、無意識的な大衆によって引き起こされる劇的・動的な暴動を言うが、ポーランドで起こったことは意識的なテロルであった。

KK: 1937/8年以降のサナツィア政府が反ユダヤ暴力にどう関わったかというクシヴィエツ氏が述べた問題については、まだほとんど研究がないというのが現状である。事実に関して首尾一貫した歴史書は未だ書かれておらず、出版前の研究段階だ。歴史学はサナツィア政府がポグロムを抑制しようとしたという前提に立っているが、クシヴィエツ氏が指摘するように、ナショナリストの一部とサナツィア政府との間に協力関係があったこと

は確かで、それによって、政府が反ユダヤ・テロルをコントロールすることがより容易になったとも考えられる。もちろん、サナツィアとは巨大な陣営であり、ファシズム傾向が強まる中で周縁化されてはいたものの、多くの元自由主義者や自由主義者を含むなど、一枚岩ではなかった。したがって状況は極めて複雑であった。

一戦間期ポーランドにおけるポーランド化について伺いたい。

KK: 非常に魅力的で、まだ研究が必要な分野だ。ユダヤ性とポーランド性を結びつけること、ユダヤ・ナショナリストでありながらポーランドの市民でもあることは、シオニストのみならず、フォルキスト、ブンディストなど全てのユダヤ人政治運動が試み、解決できなかった問題だ。

YIVO の重要な活動家であるザルマン・レイゼン (Zalman Reyzen) は、アメリカ化、ドイツ化、ポーランド化、といった現象はより力のある民族によるマイノリティへの抑圧だ、と述べたが、これは文化に関する 1930 年代のユダヤ人の言説をよく表している。西欧では法的解放の代償として、ユダヤ人はユダヤ人であることをやめねばならなかった。ドイツにはもはや民族的ユダヤ人はいない。アメリカでもイディッシュ語に基づくユダヤ意識は失われつつある。ソ連でも言語面での文化的適応は進んでいる。——このように考えられていた。ユダヤ・ナショナリストの考えた民族文化の定義と、進行中の文化的変化との間には矛盾があった。ユダヤ人青年たちは、ポーランド語とイディッシュ語で同時に考え、感じていた。生活のいくつかの領域には、例えば、学校や政治や新聞のように、ポーランド語で考える領域があり、一方で、家庭や政党活動においては、イディッシュ語や、より少ない程度であるがヘブライ語が話された。つまり実際の状況は多文化的であったが、文化についての定義や言説は、これとは反対のものであった。ユダヤ人もポーランド人も、また他のヨーロッパ諸民族も、文化をきわめて有機論的、一元論的に捉えていた。一つの民族は一つの言語をもち、一つの民族的魂を持つと考えられていた。

イディッシュ文学研究者のカロリナ・シマニャク (Karolina Szymaniak) によれば、1930年代末に、ユダヤ新聞では、政治家ではなく作家たちの間で、大半のユダヤ人青年がポーランド語を話しているという状況を何とかせねばならない、との議論がなされていた。数世代後には、ポーランドのユダヤ人のほとんどがポーランド語を話すようになり、イディッシュ語は正統派の間でしか残らないであろう、と。その後、戦争とホロコーストが始まり、状況は一変してしまった。

GK: ポーランド化は、マイノリティにとっての問題であっただけでなく、マジョリティにとっての問題でもあった。つまり、大衆の国民化という問題であるが、この分野の社会史的研究は極めて重要でありながら手薄であるのが現状だ。当時多くのポーランド人エリートは、ポーランド人の大半をなす農民を、彼らが理想とする意味での「ポーランド人」とは考えていなかった。農民は教育され、「ポーランド人」にならねばならなかった。そしてもう一つの問題として、人口のかなりの部分を占めるウクライナ人や、ベラルーシ人、ポレシエ県に見られた民族的アイデンティティについて明白な観念のない自称「ここの人 (tutajszы)」をいかにポーランド化するかという問題があった。

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