

East Asian Regional Security Governance: Bilateral Balancing and ASEAN' s Informal Cooperative Security

メタデータ	言語: eng 出版者: 公開日: 2017-10-03 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2297/37481

4 East Asian regional security governance

Bilateral hard balancing and ASEAN's informal cooperative security

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In East Asia, inter-state security challenges are serious. In this region, power relations between states are complex and potential sources of conflict are widespread. Perhaps most notably, the rise of China has had profound impacts on this country's relations with its neighbouring countries, such as Japan and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Sino-Japanese rivalry has been aggravated by the development of nationalism in each country. China and Japan are in dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the maritime boundary in the East China Sea. ASEAN-China relations are marked by a significant level of disparity between the material capabilities of the two parties. In the South China Sea, China is in territorial disputes with many of the ASEAN members over the Spratly Islands. In addition, the question of sovereignty over Taiwan has remained unresolved for half a century, as Beijing has shown no sign of compromise on this issue. Moreover, for the same half century, the Korean Peninsula has been divided into two countries, and the development of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang in recent years is complicating the country's relations not only with its neighbours but also with external powers such as the US.

Nonetheless, it is fair to say that security order – defined as rule-governed interaction among states in their pursuit of private and public security goals – does exist in East Asia today (Alagappa, 2003a: x; Alagappa, 2003b: 24), contrary to the pessimistic assessment of regional security made in the early 1990s by several authors (Friedberg, 1993; Betts, 1993; Buzan and Segal, 1994; Segal, 1996). Inter-state relations have not been disrupted by direct military confrontations, although there have been a few crises, such as the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 and the Mischief incident in February 1995 between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

On this basis, the present chapter seeks to enhance our understanding of regional security governance in East Asia today, by exploring three sets of questions. Thus the first section of this chapter addresses the questions of what

kinds of measures have been taken for East Asian regional security governance, and what the characteristics of such measures are. Two types of measures have been taken in this region, both of which have unique characteristics: power balancing and cooperative security. Power balancing in East Asia is characterized by the prevalence of bilateralism and of 'hard balancing' strategies. Cooperative security in this region is characterized by the leading role of minor powers and by an informal approach to cooperation.

The second section explores questions that involve an intra-regional comparison: in what ways have the East Asian countries combined these two measures, and in what terms have they defined the relations between the two? The Northeast and Southeast Asian countries have combined power balancing and cooperative security in different ways, thereby defining their relations differently. Japan has prioritized power-balancing measures, and used cooperative security as a complement to these measures. In contrast, ASEAN has prioritized cooperative security, thereby pursuing it as a substitute for power-balancing measures.

The third section addresses a moral issue, by seeking to assess which of these two measures is more appropriate. In East Asia, it is too simplistic to assume that cooperative security is morally superior to power balancing, although the former is free from a security dilemma in the traditional sense. For the sake of 'human security' in East Asia, cooperative security can hardly be considered an appropriate measure for regional governance. The concluding section discusses the implications of the arguments in this chapter for the overall themes of the present edited volume, i.e., the density and normativity of regional security governance.

Before proceeding any further, a few points should be made. To begin with, the term 'East Asia' in this chapter refers to the area encompassing Northeast and Southeast Asia. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in the post-Cold War era, Northeast and Southeast Asia have formed a single regional security complex – a group of states that possess a degree of security interdependence, or a set of units that are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be resolved apart from one another. The East Asian regional security complex includes the US, which has a significant stake in Asian affairs, and also Taiwan and North Korea, although their sovereignty is not recognized by all the Asian countries (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 44, 47, 144).

The main focus in this chapter is on the security governance measures taken by the 'Western' countries in East Asia – i.e. the countries that belonged to the Western bloc during the Cold War, such as Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN members at the time, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.¹ The policies of countries such as China and North Korea form another important theme, which should be explored in future research.

The notion of security adopted in this chapter is broad. The starting point of analysis is the observation that there is order in the East Asian region, despite the pervasiveness of inter-state security challenges. Yet the focus of analysis

will not be limited to inter-state security relations. In the concluding section, human security or human rights issues will also be covered. However, it should be noted that the present chapter does not cover every important security issue. Along with the two sets of issues mentioned so far – inter-state security and human security issues – at least two other sets of issues are serious in East Asia. First, transnational criminal practices such as the drug trade and human trafficking are rampant, in Southeast Asia in particular. Second, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) has been a major threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula and beyond. The development of measures to address these issues should be examined in future research.

Two measures

What kinds of measures have been taken for East Asian regional security governance, and what are the characteristics of such measures? The measures taken by the countries of East Asia can be largely divided into two categories: power balancing and cooperative security (Table 4.1). Neither of these two concepts is peculiar to Asia. In other words, both power balancing and cooperative security have been practised in various parts of the world. However, the measures pursued in East Asia have some unique characteristics that make the overall structure of security governance in this region distinctive.

Power balancing

Power is probably one of the most enduring classical concepts used in the field of international relations (IR), and most students of IR must be familiar with the logic of power balancing. In East Asia today, a set of security arrangements between the US and its partners is operating on the basis of this logic. These arrangements include: the formal defence treaties of the US with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, all of which were concluded during the Cold War; a series of memoranda of understanding that countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia concluded in the 1990s with Washington, allowing US warships to visit their ports and use their facilities; and various frameworks for joint military exercises. These arrangements are exclusive in

Table 4.1 Characteristics of regional security governance measures in East Asia

	<i>Power balancing</i>	<i>Cooperative security</i>
Nature	Exclusive	Inclusive
Form	Bilateral	Multilateral
Leading player	Superpower	Minor powers
Constraint mechanism	Military	Normative
Institutionalization	Legal	Informal

nature, and are premised on the existence of potential adversaries – in this case, China and North Korea. Yet, ironically, the US–Japan security alliance, which is one of the core elements of the US-centred power arrangements, is acknowledged – if not entirely supported – by an important potential adversary, namely, China. According to the ‘cork in the bottle’ theory, the alliance prevents Japanese militarism from re-emerging. To the extent that the alliance serves as the cork in the bottle that contains Japanese militarism, the US presence in Asia is acceptable to Beijing.

Two characteristics stand out with regard to the power-balancing measures in East Asia: the prevalence of bilateralism and the prevalence of ‘hard balancing’ strategies founded on military capabilities.

Bilateralism

The power-balancing measures in East Asia are founded on a network of bilateral arrangements centred on the US. This network is commonly referred to as the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system, in which Washington constitutes the hub of a wheel. The form of the security arrangements involving the US in East Asia is in sharp contrast to that in Europe – namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is a multilateral military organization. To be sure, there are also some multilateral arrangements in this region. The Cobra Gold, a series of joint military exercises involving the US and many of its Asian partners, is a case in point. However, these arrangements are founded on the hub-and-spoke system, and it is unlikely that they will develop into a multilateral collective defence organization comparable to those in other parts of the world, such as NATO, at least in the foreseeable future. In short, bilateralism is predominant in East Asia, as far as power balancing is concerned.

The question of why bilateralism is so predominant has been a subject of debate. In other words, students of Asian security have been exploring the question of why, in Asia, there is no multilateral defence organization comparable to NATO. According to Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, this issue cannot be approached without taking into consideration the issue of identity. The Americans and Asians do not share a common identity. They are ethnically different, have different religions, and do not share common political values (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). John Duffield shed light on another important factor in East Asia, namely, the historical memories of the Second World War. These memories have made many countries of Asia reluctant to cooperate with Japan in the military sphere (Duffield, 2001). Kent Calder and Min Ye focus on the role of the ‘critical juncture’ of the Korean War. The crisis in the Korean Peninsula mandated the creation of a credible Pacific security framework as rapidly as possible. In other words, the time pressure created the bias toward bilateralism (Calder and Ye, 2004; Calder, 2008).

A more standard approach is to focus on the capability gap between Washington and its Asian partners. Multilateral security institutions constrain the policy autonomy of a dominant power (Weber, 1993: 235–37; Ikenberry,

2002). The US possesses greater material capabilities than do Asian countries, and multilateral arrangements would give these countries a greater say, thereby undermining Washington's dominant position against them. This was probably one of the reasons why the US preferred bilateralism in Asia during the Cold War era, although it strengthened NATO in Europe. The capability gap between Washington and its partners was more significant in Asia than in Europe. As John Ikenberry maintains, the US was both more dominant in Asia and needed less from Asia. Hence, bilateralism was the preferred strategy. In Asia, the US was an unchallenged hegemonic power, and thus had few incentives to seek multilateralism, which would reduce its policy autonomy (Ikenberry, 2002: 130; also see Katzenstein, 1997: 23).

Hard balancing

Today, what can be regarded as 'hard balancing' strategies are predominant in East Asia. In other words, power-balancing measures in this region are based on the notion of collective defence in a traditional sense, which is associated with measures to counterbalance the military power of potential adversaries through military means. The US-centred hub-and-spoke system is constituted by various forms of military arrangements. Many of these arrangements are founded on formal defence treaties, although some of them are based on memoranda of understanding. The prevalence of hard-balancing strategies in East Asia is notable because 'soft balancing' diplomacy is widely practised in various parts of the world today. According to T. V. Paul and his colleagues, soft balancing diplomacy is non-offensive and non-threatening. It commonly involves building tacit non-offensive coalitions, intended to neutralize the power of potentially threatening states. Examples of soft balancing include the partnership between China and Russia in the 1990s, aimed at countering the influence of the US at the global level (Paul *et al.*, 2004).

In what terms can the dominance of hard-balancing strategies in East Asia be comprehended? A standard approach would be to argue that it reflects the difficulty of the security dilemma operating in this region in the post-Cold War era. Many of the Asian countries have been concerned about the increasing military power of China. In addition, Japan has also been apprehensive about the unclear and missile programmes of North Korea. South Korea has also been attentive to the military development across its northern border.

Yet for a fuller understanding of the issue, it is also useful to take a temporal view, and focus on the path-dependent development of security governance measures. The military alliances of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand with the US were concluded during the Cold War, to deal with the threat of the Eastern bloc. When the Cold War ended, for these Asian countries a military alliance was the default option. The existence of alliances was the starting point of the vicious circle, leading to the security dilemma in post-Cold War Asia.²

Cooperative security

Cooperative security is one of the most popular terms used in the post-Cold War era. It can be defined as efforts to achieve security among all participants through non-military and non-coercive means, without attributing either friend or enemy status to the participants involved.³ This notion has been used to capture various kinds of activity in different contexts. It is frequently used in the context of security cooperation in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2000: 2–3). It is often used to discuss the partnership of NATO with the former Eastern bloc countries (Adler, 2008). It is also used to cover efforts to regulate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and advanced military technologies (Nolan, 1994: 10). In East Asia today, several cooperative security frameworks exist, all of which are inclusive and multilateral. They include: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which held its first meeting in 1994, involving almost all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region; the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), which met first at a summit meeting in 1997, involving China, South Korea and Japan; and the East Asia Summit (EAS), launched in 2005 and involving the ASEAN members, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India.⁴

Two characteristics stand out with regard to the cooperative security arrangements in East Asia: the leading role of the minor powers and an informal approach to cooperation.

Leadership of the minor powers

Cooperative security in East Asia has been led by an association of minor powers in Southeast Asia. The frameworks mentioned above – the ARF, the APT, the EAS – constitute ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise. ASEAN is at the centre of security regionalism, which involves various major powers. This association has been in a position to set agendas for regional security cooperation, determining which security issues should be addressed, and in what ways. This is remarkable, bearing in mind that students of IR tend to focus on the role of great powers in shaping regional order (see, for example, Waltz, 1979: 72–73; Mearsheimer, 2001: 5; Katzenstein, 2005). It is worth mentioning that the leadership of the minor powers is by no means a prerequisite for the promotion of cooperative security. To illustrate, the cooperative aspect of NATO activities in the post-Cold War era should not be seen as being dominated by the minor powers in the alliance.

ASEAN's centrality to East Asian cooperative security has been determined by two factors. The first is the background condition of rivalry between the great powers. Any cooperative security institution led by Tokyo or Washington would probably be rejected by Beijing, and vice versa. Against the background of rivalries between these powers, ASEAN has been in a unique position. In this view, it has been able to assume the leading role by default. Yet this is only half the story, and there is something more to tell. The great power

rivalries do make it difficult for Washington, Tokyo or Beijing to play a leading role, but do not automatically constitute an environment that defines ASEAN as the centre of security regionalism. The second factor is the agency of the Southeast Asian countries, concerning the construction of the social environment defining ASEAN's centrality. In the wake of the Cold War, the Southeast Asian countries began to make conscious efforts to promote cooperative security, although other policy options were also available, as will be argued later. By developing their cooperative security enterprise and promoting their cooperative security norm, these countries have constructed an environment that defines ASEAN's centrality to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

Informal style

The cooperative security arrangements in East Asia are distinctively informal, in terms of constraint mechanisms and of the degree of institutionalization. In ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise, the central constraint on the behaviour of its participant countries is neither material nor legal, but normative. This enterprise is characterized by a low degree of institutionalization, or the absence of concrete institutional mechanisms to monitor the behaviour of its participant countries and to impose sanctions on countries that violate the rules. ASEAN's informal approach is in strong contrast to that of the OSCE participant countries. In the post-Cold War era, these participant countries accelerated the process of institutionalizing their organization, and began to take on new responsibilities and challenges, including the prevention and resolution of conflicts, democratization processes, and the protection of ethnic minorities (see OSCE, 2000: 42–43; OCSE, 2008). They also adopted the so-called consensus-minus-one rule, which provided that decisions could be taken without the consent of the state concerned, in cases of gross violation of humanitarian commitments (CSCE, 1992; OSCE, 2008: 14). In East Asia, in contrast, no similar institutional developments can be observed. Cooperation is promoted on the basis of dialogue, decisions are made by consensus, and few concrete measures for the prevention and resolution of conflicts have been institutionalized.

The key to understanding the operation of cooperative security in Asia is the norm of security cooperation promoted by ASEAN (Katsumata, 2009a). This norm concerns the notion that security should be pursued cooperatively and non-militarily, by enhancing a sense of mutual understanding and trust through dialogue and consultation. ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise embodies a norm-building exercise, in which the Southeast Asia countries practise their norm in order to promote it across the Asia-Pacific region. The concrete aims of ASEAN's forums such as the ARF are two in number. The first is to constrain the behaviour of non-ASEAN participant countries. The mechanism of constraint here is social sanctions in terms of a loss of reputation that will be suffered by those who reject the widely accepted norm

(see Keohane, 1984: 94, 104–06). The second is to socialize non-ASEAN countries into ASEAN's cooperative security norm. ASEAN's ultimate goal in the ARF is to share its norm with all the participant countries through socialization (see Johnston, 2001; Johnston, 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 895, 902–04; Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

The core elements of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise can be encapsulated by making an analogy: the ARF can be described as a 'brewery' of norms, or a 'norm brewery' (Katsumata, 2009a: 8–9). In a brewery, a new beverage is brewed from a blend of different ingredients, through collaborative work between the brewmaster and his/her assistants. What determines the taste of the beverage is the preference of the former. In ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise, the role of this Southeast Asian association is analogous to that of a brewmaster in a brewery. ASEAN's speciality is Asian medicinal liquor, whose effect is different from that of modern pharmaceuticals. Such liquor can improve and sustain our health over the long term, while modern pharmaceuticals are effective for acute care but have side effects. In concrete terms, what ASEAN is promoting in the ARF is cooperative security, the utility of which can be distinguished from that of power-balancing measures such as collective defence. The former is meant to improve the regional security environment in the long run by reducing tensions, thereby eliminating the root causes of conflict. The latter can have an immediate effect, but inevitably causes a security dilemma.

Why is cooperative security in Asia informal? Why has ASEAN not done anything beyond the promotion of its norm? This question can be approached in at least three ways, which are all mutually compatible. One way is to focus on the China factor. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, when they established the ARF in the early 1990s, the ASEAN countries were aware of Beijing's wariness of highly institutionalized frameworks, and thus decided to start from a weakly institutionalized forum (Johnston, 1999; Johnston, 2008: Chapter 4).

Another possible way is to adopt a rationalist perspective and to focus on strategic calculations. Miles Kahler argues that the Southeast Asian countries' aversion to a highly institutionalized framework is both instrumental and strategic. It is instrumental in that it results from their consideration for the cost to sovereignty. It is strategic in that they reject binding and precise obligations in a setting that might require bargaining with governments with greater powers (Kahler, 2000: 562, 568–69).

Finally, this issue can be approached from a constructivist perspective, by focusing on ASEAN's traditional diplomatic norm: all that is required by such a norm is an informal approach to cooperation. Amitav Acharya (2004) argues that the ASEAN countries have 'localized' the norm of common security that had been developed in Europe during the Cold War to ensure that it fits with the local diplomatic norm in Southeast Asia. ASEAN's norm is associated with the notion of the ASEAN way of diplomacy, which underlines the member countries' commitment to the habit of dialogue and consultation, aimed at enhancing a sense of mutual understanding and trust. The ASEAN way calls

for an informal and gradual approach to cooperation based on consultation and dialogue, while rejecting rigid rules and a rapid institutionalization of a framework for cooperation. Its particular elements include decision-making through consensus, mutual respect for state sovereignty, the non-use of force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states (see Katsumata, 2003).

Intra-regional comparison

In what ways have the East Asian countries combined the two measures – power balancing and cooperative security – discussed above? In what terms have they defined the relations between these two measures? These measures can be combined in different ways, and their relations can be defined differently. To be specific, there are two ways of defining their relations: as a complement or as a substitution.

On the one hand, countries may prioritize power-balancing measures, and use cooperative security as a complement to these measures. Cooperative security may complement power balancing by mitigating the security dilemma that it creates. Although power-balancing measures can serve as an emergency means for dealing with direct military confrontations, they inevitably bring about mutual suspicion and a security dilemma. In such a case, cooperative security activities may play a role by serving as a mechanism for defusing the conflictual by-products of power-balancing practices (Khong, 1997: 298). In this view, the relevance of cooperative security is a function of that of power balancing. The greater tension in the power relations between the countries involved, the greater the need for them to develop cooperative mechanisms. In Figure 4.1, when the value on the *x*-axis increases, that on the *y*-axis also increases.




Figure 4.1 Cooperative security as a complement




Figure 4.2 Cooperative security as a substitution

On the other hand, countries may prioritize cooperative security, thereby pursuing it as a substitute for power-balancing measures. The former may substitute for the latter, by serving as an alternative way of approaching regional security, which relies on non-confrontational and non-military means. Cooperative security is aimed at improving the security environment in the long run without bringing about a security dilemma. In this view, the relevance of power balancing is a function of that of cooperative security. When cooperative security relations between countries develop, the necessity for them to rely on power-politics arrangements is reduced. In Figure 4.2, when the value on the *x*-axis increases, that on the *y*-axis decreases.

These two distinct approaches have been taken by the Northeast and Southeast Asian countries respectively – the point that this section seeks to demonstrate. On the one hand, the Northeast Asian countries have adopted the complementarity approach: they have prioritized power-balancing measures, and used cooperative security as a complement to these measures. On the other hand, the Southeast Asian countries have adopted the substitution approach: they have prioritized cooperative security, thereby pursuing it as a substitute for power-balancing measures.

To illustrate the difference between the Northeast and Southeast Asian countries, the rest of this section makes an intra-regional comparison in East Asia. To be specific, it compares the policies of Japan and ASEAN, given that both these parties have been concerned about the security posture of China. It is worth noting that Japan and many of the ASEAN countries have territorial disputes with China. On the one hand, Japan is in dispute with Beijing over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, and over the boundary in the East China Sea, which is rich in natural resources. On the other hand, many of the ASEAN

members – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – are in dispute with Beijing over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. It should be noted that when they deal with external powers, the ASEAN countries act as one body and speak with one voice to advance their common interests.

To put it briefly, the next sub-section argues that the core element of Japanese security policy in the post-Cold War era has always been based on the logic of power balancing. In an attempt to deal with various external challenges in Northeast Asia, including its rivalries with China, Tokyo has strengthened its alliance with Washington. A side effect of this policy has been the aggravation of a security dilemma in Northeast Asia. Thus, as a complement to power balancing, Tokyo has pursued multilateral cooperative security by involving itself in ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise.

The sub-section after this demonstrates that since the early 1990s the ASEAN countries have actively pursued multilateral cooperation, and sought to promote their cooperative security norm. To be sure, these countries have not been able to dispense with their bilateral security partnership with the US, since their norm-building enterprise is still in the process of development. Nevertheless, their enterprise has had a certain impact on the regional security environment. In particular, ASEAN–China relations have improved dramatically since the early 1990s.

Northeast Asia: Japan

The logic of power balancing constitutes the core of Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War era. Since the 1990s, Japan has sought to strengthen, rather than weaken, the security measures that had been established to counter-balance the threat of the communist camp during the Cold War. Against the background of various security challenges in post-Cold War Asia, such as the rise of China, it has constantly modernized its Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Moreover, it has introduced a number of new measures to strengthen its military ties with the US.

Several key events have underscored Tokyo's intention to strengthen its alliance with Washington. In April 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton issued a Joint Declaration on Security, and 'celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history'. They stated that the security relationship between the two countries would remain the 'cornerstone for . . . maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia–Pacific region' (Japan and the US, 1996). On the basis of this declaration, in the following year, the two countries issued new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, replacing the original Guidelines issued in 1978. In December 2003, Tokyo officially decided to introduce the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, thereby further strengthening its technological cooperation with Washington (Cabinet Secretariat, 2003). In 2004, when Washington brought up the idea of relocating its air force headquarters from Japan to Guam, as part of its worldwide realignment of US forces in the post-

9/11 era, Japan objected to such an idea, due to its concern for deterrence (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2004). In 2006, during the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) – the so-called 2+2 meeting – the foreign and defence ministers of the two countries stressed the importance of improving the interoperability of Japan's SDF and US Forces (US–Japan Security Consultative Committee, 2006). In the 2007 SCC, the four ministers underlined several new measures to strengthen the two countries' cooperation, in particular, in the area of BMD (US–Japan Security Consultative Committee, 2007).

Japan's power-balancing policy has been successful, to the extent that it has been able to prevent military clashes: however, at the same time, such a policy has failed to prevent the aggravation of a security dilemma in Northeast Asia. It is hard to find evidence that the Sino–Japanese security tensions have eased over the last decade. On the one hand, Beijing attacks Tokyo's defence policies:

[C]omplicated security factors in the Asia–Pacific region are on the increase . . . Japan is . . . adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile defense system for future deployment. It has also markedly increased military activities abroad.

(Information Office of the State Council of China, 2004).

On the other hand, Japan's National Defense Program Guideline, approved by the Cabinet on December 2004, explicitly mentions Beijing as its security concern by using the strongest language it has ever used:

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

(Japan Defense Agency, 2004)

It is known that sometime in 2003–04 the Japanese SDF drew up a confidential security plan that maps out the country's military responses to possible Chinese military attacks against Japan (*Asahi Shimbun*, 2005).

Tokyo seems to be aware of the operation of a security dilemma, as it has actively taken part in ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise. It was in the early 1990s that Japan began to pursue cooperative security. At the time, Japan needed to reassure its Asian neighbours that its active foreign policies in the post-Cold War era were not ill-motivated. Thus, in 1991, it called for a multilateral security dialogue to be carried out within the framework of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC).⁵ Since the first meeting of the ARF in 1994, Japan has been one of the most active supporters of ASEAN's initiative. While stating that 'Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security,' and the 'US military presence is critically important', its 2004 National Defense Program Guideline notes the development of

multilateral frameworks such as the ARF: 'By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role . . . to promote a stable security environment in the region' (Japan Defense Agency, 2004). In the ARF, Japan expresses its 'hope that China will continue its economic development . . . in harmony with the international community . . . and will carry out its role as a responsible major power' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2009).

Southeast Asia: ASEAN

The ASEAN countries in the post-Cold War era have actively pursued multilateral cooperative security, and sought to promote the norm of security cooperation across the Asia-Pacific region. In the early 1990s, these countries took the lead in initiating cooperative security and invited China to take part in the ARF, although it was Beijing that constituted their primary external security concern. Since then, they have constantly pursued a policy of engagement toward Beijing, and always placed emphasis on multilateral cooperation. To be sure, many of the ASEAN countries have also maintained security ties with the US on a bilateral basis. Their norm-building enterprise is still in the process of development, and thus they have not been able to dispense with their security partnerships with Washington. However, their ties with Washington are less significant than those of Japan. The arrangements of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to allow US warships to visit their ports do not guarantee Washington's significant military commitment. It is true that some countries such as the Philippines have sought additional measures to strengthen their relations with the US in the last decade, but these measures have been concentrated in the area of counter-terrorism. It is fair to state that in the area of inter-state security relations with external powers, the main focus of the ASEAN countries has been on multilateral cooperative security.

Remarkably, the security environment in Southeast Asia seems to be improving. In particular, the ASEAN countries have managed to improve their relations with China. In the early 1990s, they regarded China as a non-like-minded country; today, however, the key term in ASEAN-China relations is 'partnership'. In October 2003, the two parties issued a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership (ASEAN and China, 2003), and in November 2004, they adopted a Plan of Action to implement this declaration. By so doing, they sought to strengthen their partnership in a wide range of issue areas, including politics, the economy, social affairs, security and international and regional affairs (ASEAN and China, 2004).

The change in China's attitude toward multilateral cooperative security demonstrates the fruitfulness of ASEAN's enterprise. Few would disagree with the claim that, although its attitude was cautious in the early 1990s, Beijing today is actively involved in forums such as the ARF. Yet sceptics argue that China's active involvement in multilateralism should be seen as part of its effort to constrain US diplomacy in Asia, so as to expand its sphere of influence at

the expense of Washington's. Multilateralism by definition challenges bilateralism and unilateralism, both of which are Washington's *modus operandi*, as Beijing sees it (See Emmers, 2003: 124–25, 163; Wang, 2000: 483, 485; Roy, 2003: 70–71; Li, 2004: 65). However, the sceptics' case is weak because China has pursued multilateral cooperation even in areas where the US is not involved. In 2002, this country demonstrated its commitment to multilateralism by signing a declaration on a code of conduct in the South China Sea (ASEAN and China, 2002; see also China and the Philippines, 2007). Moreover, in 2003 it acceded to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is regarded as a non-aggression pact. It is worth noting that China acceded to this legal document when the US had not indicated any intention of doing the same. These developments are significant because they may constrain the power-politics behaviours of Beijing but not those of Washington. China's cooperative policies in these cases suggest that its motives are not limited to its strategic considerations *vis-à-vis* Washington (see Katsumata *et al.*, 2008; Katsumata, 2009a: Chapter 6).

Last but not least, the successful initiation on the part of ASEAN of East Asian regionalism also demonstrates the fruitfulness of ASEAN's cooperative security enterprise, in terms of the improvement of ASEAN–China relations. The establishment of the APT and the EAS deserves special attention. From the realist point of view, these channels can be seen as a framework within which ASEAN promotes a security dialogue with a potential adversary – i.e. China – while excluding an important security partner – i.e. the US. These East Asian frameworks involve a major power with which the ASEAN countries should seek a balance but not their crucial security partner. If ASEAN had relied solely on power-politics arrangements with Washington in the 1990s, it would probably not have been able to establish this kind of framework. ASEAN's multilateral engagement strategy, adopted in the early 1990s, has enabled the association to pursue further cooperative policies toward the Northeast Asian countries.

What factors have shaped the difference between the policies of Japan and ASEAN? Why has the Southeast Asian association placed more emphasis on cooperative security than has Japan? ASEAN's preference for cooperative security should be understood in terms of a set of ideas associated with security cooperation, which the Japanese have not internalized. The Southeast Asians have shared an understanding about an appropriate approach to regional security, in the spirit of which they sought to promote their cooperative security norm across the Asia–Pacific region (Katsumata, 2006; Katsumata, 2009a).

ASEAN's preference cannot be altogether understood from the viewpoint of power calculations. Given the significance of the power gap between ASEAN and China, the Southeast Asian countries could have sought stronger security ties with the US. Indeed, in the early 1990s, along with the inclusive framework of the ARF, they had at least two other policy options, both of which might have been more reasonable from the standpoint of power politics. First,

they could have chosen not to promote multilateralism at all, but rather to have concentrated on their bilateral military relations with certain external powers such as the US. Second, they could have pursued limited multilateralism. In other words, they could have limited the inclusiveness of a new multilateral framework, by not inviting non-like-minded countries at the time such as China, Russia and Vietnam, to take part. A non-inclusive arrangement would have been easier than an inclusive one, because Washington was reluctant to engage in Asia-Pacific region-wide frameworks in the early 1990s (see Solomon, 1990; Zoellick, 1991). The pursuit of this option might have served as a means to 'soft balance' the power of China and to hold its policy in check. However, the Southeast Asian countries pursued neither of these two options. Instead, they chose a policy of engagement toward Beijing, and initiated an accommodative forum, the ARF. It is worth adding that ASEAN's engagement policy toward Beijing cannot be seen as a strategy of 'bandwagoning'. It is hard to argue that ASEAN chose one side over the other. The ARF is an inclusive framework, whose participants include not only China but also other countries, such as the US and Japan.

Moral appropriateness

One crucial issue remains unaddressed: which measures are more appropriate? Bearing in mind that the relationship between power balancing and cooperative security can be defined differently, which of these two measures is the moral superior? A majority of students of IR would probably argue that cooperative security is more desirable, although it is by no means easy to promote 'cooperation under anarchy' (Oye, 1985; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985) because a 'struggle for power' is common in 'politics among nations' (Morgenthau, 1960). However, East Asian security is a complex subject, and what seems to be a simple question may involve a number of complicated issues. It is too simplistic to assume that cooperative security is morally superior to power balancing.

In exploring appropriate ways of regional security governance, it is important to broaden our perspective and bring into view 'human security' issues. Although the analysis thus far has been premised implicitly on the notion of 'national security,' the concept of human security should not be neglected in any discussion of regional security governance in East Asia. Many of the governments of the East Asian countries are undemocratic, and many of the people in this region have been under political oppression. Undeniably, in recent years the ASEAN members have begun to implement the liberal reform of their association, thereby pursuing liberal norms concerning human rights and democracy. They have been under pressure from the North American and European countries, and also recognized the legitimacy of these liberal norms in today's global society (Katsumata, 2009b). Nevertheless, if we are to focus on the broader East Asian region, a more complex picture emerges.

For the sake of human security in East Asia, cooperative security can hardly be considered an appropriate measure for regional governance. This is because

it would create two types of walls that would keep East Asia secluded from the advancement of human security in the global society, namely, material and ideational walls. The material wall is constituted by strong ties between ASEAN and China. This wall would insulate ASEAN from Western pressure, thereby making it difficult for the North American and European powers to exercise influence over the Southeast Asian countries in the area of human rights. It would do so by reducing the need for these countries to succumb to Western pressure. If concordant relations between ASEAN and China developed as a result of cooperative security, whenever the Western powers attempted to put pressure on the former, it would always be able to turn to the latter as an alternative partner. Unlike the North American and European powers, China would not criticize ASEAN's human rights record.

The ideational wall is constituted by an East Asian identity, the elements of which do not include liberalism. This would keep East Asia secluded from the development in the global society of liberal norms concerning human rights and democracy. The promotion of cooperative security would facilitate the construction of an East Asian identity. This is because cooperative interstate relations must facilitate international exchanges, which are the basis for forming collective identities (Adler and Barnett, 1998: especially page 41; Barnett and Adler, 1998: 416–18; Wendt, 1994: 388–91; Wendt, 1999: 343–63). Yet the political orientation of an East Asian identity would not be liberal. This is evident from the list of agenda items in the strategic partnership between two important parties to East Asian cooperation, namely, China and ASEAN. Excluded from this list are issues such as human rights and democracy (ASEAN and China, 2003; ASEAN and China, 2004).

The problem here can be described as a 'human security dilemma' in East Asia: the promotion of cooperative security relations between East Asian countries would jeopardize the security of the people in this region. Cooperative security may seem morally appropriate because it is free from a security dilemma in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, its promotion ironically puts human security at risk. This is probably the most problematic aspect of East Asian regional security governance.

There is no simple solution to this dilemma. Yet it can be said, at least, that the involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in regional security governance is crucial. One characteristic common to power balancing and cooperative security in East Asia is the absence of civil society actors. Regional security governance in this region is dominated by the governments. To be fair, some non-governmental actors are involved in cooperative security activities; however, their political status is unique. They are commonly referred to as 'track-two' actors, whose role is to support intergovernmental cooperation at the 'track-one' level. Those actors within track-two frameworks such as the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) would hardly take a critical attitude toward their own governments. Absent from East Asian regional security governance are the so-called 'track-three' actors, represented

by CSOs. This inevitably limits the range of agenda items for regional cooperation. A sensible starting point for those who work toward human security governance in East Asia must be to provide support to SCO activities in this region.

Conclusions

What do the arguments in this chapter imply for the overall themes of this edited volume, i.e. the density and normativity of regional security governance? The arguments suggest at least three things. First, the governance of inter-state security relations can be dense in several different ways – on the basis of several different elements – and thus its density cannot be assessed along a single continuum. This chapter has identified the difference between the policies of the Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. Yet their difference by no means suggests that the density of regional security governance in the one area is greater than that in the other. In both Northeast and Southeast Asia, the density of governance is significant. In other words, in both areas there is a strong consensus in the discourse of regional security, and countries have been making substantial joint efforts – either bilaterally or multilaterally – on the basis of the shared recognition that security problems can be managed only through collaboration beyond national borders (see Breslin and Croft in this volume). The only difference between the two areas concerns the elements of density. On the one hand, the main element of density in Northeast Asia is the material power of countries, embodied in their hard-balancing strategies. Here, density is achieved on the basis of a patchwork of bilateral arrangements, centred on a global superpower. On the other hand, the main element of density in Southeast Asia is the norm of security cooperation. There, density is maintained by an association of minor powers, through an informal approach to cooperation. In this regard, it can be said that material power is not a prerequisite for making the governance of inter-state security relations dense. A norm-building exercise initiated by a group of minor powers is sufficient for dense governance.

Second, the density of governance in one issue area can sometimes have a negative impact on that in another. Regional security governance involves collaboration beyond national borders, and thus the implications of its density should usually be positive. It is not hard to imagine that collective defence arrangements can facilitate cooperation in many other fields, for example. Today, on the basis of their existing bilateral security treaties, the US and its partners, such as the Philippines and Japan, are developing measures to crack down on terrorist activities or to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. However, what the argument in this chapter suggests is that dense collaboration in one area can sometimes work against that in another. With regard to the governance of inter-state security relations in the form of cooperative security, the greater its density becomes, the less likely would be the development of collaborative efforts to address human security threats. This is because cooperative security

would create material and ideational walls, which would keep the region secluded from the advancement of human security in the global society. After all, security governance is all about changing the material and ideational structure of the region, and the implications of change are not always positive. This relates to the next point.

Finally, the density of regional security governance and its moral/normative appropriateness are two separate issues, and the former does not necessarily guarantee the latter. In other words, greater density does not necessarily mean superior morality. Indeed, on many occasions, greater density even means inferior morality, and the danger is often less than obvious. It can be said that, although the density of governance is significant in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, moral problems exist in both areas. The power-balancing measures taken by the Northeast Asian countries are morally questionable because these measures inevitably create a security dilemma. The cooperative security policies implemented by the Southeast Asian countries are equally – or perhaps more – problematic, although these policies are usually seen as more desirable. This is because they bring about what can be regarded as a human security dilemma, thereby jeopardizing the security of the people in the East Asian region. In this respect, an important task in regional security governance is to make a connection between its density and its moral/normative appropriateness, in order to avoid cultivating the former at the expense of the latter.

Notes

- 1 The membership of ASEAN expanded in the latter half of the 1990s – Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Myanmar did so in 1997 and, finally, in 1999, Cambodia became the tenth member.
- 2 With regard to the path-dependent development of security governance measures, the study of J. J. Suh on South Korea is worth mentioning. Suh explores the question of why Seoul continues to ally itself with Washington, although it has strong and modern military forces, and underlines the relevance of the ‘alliance assets’, such as the interoperability of military technologies between Washington and Seoul (Suh, 2004).
- 3 In this definition two elements are critical: inclusiveness/indivisibility and the non-use of military force for coercive purposes. First, the cooperative approach to security is inclusive, in that no particular parties are excluded or regarded as opponents. Security is treated as something ‘indivisible’ and is sought through cooperative undertakings. According to John Ruggie, the notion of indivisibility is one of the important elements of multilateralism (1993: 11). Second, the non-use of military force for coercive purposes is one of the characteristics that distinguish cooperative security from conventional security mechanisms, such as collective defence and collective security.
- 4 The APT and the EAS are by definition not fully inclusive in terms of their participant countries. However, the fruit of the activities within these frameworks is by no means exclusive. What is sought is a peaceful and stable regional security environment; its nature is different from the kind of security pursued through power-politics arrangements, which can be achieved only at the expense of the opponents.

- 5 At the ASEAN-PMC in July 1991, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama, noted the need for Japan to reassure its Asian neighbours and called for a security dialogue to be carried out within the framework of the ASEAN-PMC (Nakayama, 1991). More remarkably, as early as 1991, officials of the Japanese foreign ministry had explored the idea of inviting China to take part in a security dialogue (see Satoh, 1994: 15–16).

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Comparative Regional Security Governance

Edited by
Shaun Breslin and
Stuart Croft

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

2012

