@article{oai:kanazawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00000438,
 author = {Fujisawa, Mieko and 藤澤, 美恵子},
 journal = {行動経済学 = Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance},
 month = {Jan},
 note = {本研究の目的は，既存住宅市場が拡充するために必要な情報開示について提言することである．そのために，本研究は，情報の非対称性のある既存住宅市場における住宅の質の情報の開示と均衡価格に関する理論モデルを構築した．理論モデルと実験経済学の手法によるデータを比較し，売出価格や成約価格および成約率について分析する． 理論上は，情報が開示されると完全ベイジアン均衡は分離均衡となるが，一部でも情報が開示されないと一括均衡が存在する．実験においても同様な結果が得られた．一方，実験の成約価格は，理論価格よりも低い価格で成約しており，売主は必ずしも利益を最大化していない．情報開示量は，成約数と正の相関があり，成約価格や売主の売出価格の決定に影響を与えている．以上より，売主と買主の両者に公正な利益をもたらす規範的な情報開示は，理論ばかりでなく実験においても完全情報であるとの知見を得た． This study aims to provide a proposal for the disclosure of information necessary for expanding the existing housing market. The study uses a theoretical model of information disclosure for housing quality and equilibrium prices in the existing housing market in which there is information asymmetry. The theoretical model is compared to the data from an experimental economics method and this study analyzes the offering price, contract price, and contract rate. In theory, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium becomes a separating equilibrium when there is information disclosure. However, if any part of the information remains undisclosed, a pooling equilibrium forms. A similar outcome was observed in this experiment. On the other hand, the contract price in the experiment was lower than the theoretical price, which means that the seller does not necessarily maximize profits. The amount of information disclosure positively correlates with the number of contracts, and influences the contract price and the seller's offering price. This study finds that normative information disclosure that provides fair profits to both the seller and buyer is perfect information not only in theory, but also in an experiment.},
 pages = {1--11},
 title = {既存住宅市場における質の情報開示量と価格に関する実験},
 volume = {9},
 year = {2016}
}